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ABSTRACT 
 
Theology is a rational endeavour to understand everything about God, from within a 
faith tradition and its scriptures, and in response to problems posed by the conditions 
of a particular time and place. Islamic theology, in particular, has been a reactive 
discipline. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1876-1960), as a prominent scholar in the 
modern era, lived through a tumultuous period witnessing the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, the emergence of secular nation states for the first time in Muslim 
history, two world wars, and the challenges imposed by European modernity on 
traditional Muslim societies and Islam. Unlike other revivalist leaders, in dealing 
with the complexity of circumstances and the social and political restrictions around 
him, Nursi chose to respond following a theological revival method, where he 
attempted to revive Islam by renewing faith in people through his theological 
writings. By loading so much significance and revivalist objectives to theology, 
Nursi produced an original and fresh expression of Islamic theology based on the 
Qur’an. In this thesis, my original contribution to knowledge is the critical evaluation 
of Nursi’s writings about God and identification of his contributions to Islamic 
understanding of God and tawḥīd as the central doctrine of Islam. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Dr Colin Turner from Durham University narrates a dramatic turning point in his life 
when he was questioned about the meaning of lā ilāha illa’llah at a rally in 1980s 
Britain where he and a large crowd of Muslim students were protesting the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. Slogans shouted included “Russians out,” “Death to 
Brezhnev,” “allahu akbar” and “lā ilāha illa’llah.” When a passer-by asked him 
what lā ilāha illa’llah meant, without hesitation he answered “There is no god but 
Allah.” Dr Turner was confounded when the questioner retorted, “I’m not asking you 
to translate it, I’m asking you to tell me what it really means.” Dr Turner realised he 
did not know the real meaning of tawḥīd, the central tenet of Islamic faith 
encapsulated in the phrase lā ilāha illa’llah. Determined to find the answer, he read 
all the books on Islam he could get his hands on. These books talked about practices, 
laws, ethics, economy and government, but seemed to miss what mattered the most – 
an explanation of the meaning of lā ilāha illa’llah. The mosque imam at his 
university equally could offer no help. One fellow student, overhearing Dr Turner’s 
questioning of the imam, said he had the tafsīr (exegesis) of lā ilāha illa’llah and 
offered to read it together. Thinking it would be no more than twenty pages he 
agreed. The answer turned out to be over 6,000 pages of theological writings in a 
large collection of books.1 These books were none other than Bediuzzaman Said 
Nursi’s magnum opus known as Risale-i Nur Kulliyat (Epistles of Light Collection). 
                                                 
1 Colin Turner, “The Risale-i Nur: A Revolution of Belief” (paper presented at the First International 
Symposium on Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, Istanbul, March 16, 1991), accessed September 14, 2012, 
http://bit.ly/1PEOodJ. 
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Nursi (1876-1960) is one of the most significant Muslim theologians and revivalist 
leaders of the twentieth century, yet one of the least known and researched. 
Theology is important not only to understand the core of a given faith tradition, but 
also to appreciate its worldview and social manifestations. In the case of Islam, 
significant knowledge gaps exist in the way Islamic theology is studied and related to 
the Islamic worldview and contemporary Islamic revivalist movements. 
Astonishingly, as Montgomery Watt notes no substantially fresh theological work 
had been produced within the normative Sunni tradition for more than 500 years.2 In 
the Muslim world, Islamic scholarship mainly focuses on Islamic law and its related 
disciplines of legal theory, ethics and social applications. In Western scholarship, 
study of Islamic theology followed an Orientalist approach covering mainly the 
classical period with a body of literature destined to gather dust on library shelves. 
New research generally gravitates towards radicalism, terrorism and the social and 
political implications of Islamic movements in the post-9/11 world, significantly 
lacking relationships to Islamic theology. 
In our time, research on Islamic theology and its study is largely overshadowed by 
three main imperatives. First, there is growing recognition that old frames of 
reference about Islam and Muslims constructed in Western discourse have to be re-
examined. After the initial shock of 9/11, it was realised that old narratives no longer 
accurately describe the real world of Islam. There have also been numerous books 
published, countless documentaries produced and frequent TV debates conducted 
with probing questions such as, ‘Why do they hate us?’ ‘Is violence in the nature of 
Islam?’ ‘What gave rise to Al-Qaida and ISIS?’ The fact we are asking so many 
                                                 
2 Montgomery W. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1985), 33-36. 
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questions is an admission that our old paradigms no longer match reality. Jonathan 
Lyons convincingly argues that a negative image of Islam and Muslims is 
perpetuated by certain social groups and institutions who stand to benefit from the 
survival of that image.3 While this has somewhat improved in recent years, Western 
paradigms of Islam and Muslims still need to be critically reassessed and 
reconstructed. 
Second, when paradigms of Islam and Muslims are reassessed, a fundamental shift in 
the nature of the relationship between the Muslim and Western worlds is observed. 
At the outset of Islam’s birth in the Arabian Peninsula, the relationship was marked 
by the emergence and dominance of the Islamic civilisation. For more than a 
millennium, from the seventh century to the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
Islamic civilisation dominated global politics, science, culture and commerce over an 
area spanning from the shores of the Atlantic Ocean to the Asia-Pacific regions.4 
Although the Crusades made a lasting negative imprint on the psyche of Muslims, 
large populations of Christians, Jews and people of other faiths lived under Muslim 
rule in relative peace and tolerance in a time when there were few Muslim minority 
populations living in countries governed by non-Muslims. Since the late eighteenth 
century, the baton of world domination passed to European powers. The intellectual, 
economic and military ascendency of Europe enabled the Western world to almost 
completely colonise the entire Muslim world. In the post-colonial era of World  
War II, Western domination continued in the political, economic and cultural space. 
This relationship of dominance was fundamentally altered since 9/11 and the 
invasion of Iraq with the key message that military domination and hegemony do not 
                                                 
3 Jonathan Lyons, Islam through Western Eyes: From the Crusades to the War on Terrorism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 5. 
4 See Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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work. Although the Western hegemony did not completely end, recent historical 
developments strongly suggest there is a need to rethink and reshape Islam-West 
relations. 
Third, there is a further element beyond the relationship problem – a clearly 
observable revival and resurgence of Islam throughout the Muslim world and among 
expanding Muslim minorities living in Western societies. The fact that millions of 
Muslims travel for annual pilgrimage (Hajj); Muslim women choose to dress in 
conservative Islamic clothing in increasing numbers; the abundance of Islamic online 
and printed publications and resources; the emergence of pro-Islamic political 
governments in some Muslim countries; and Islamic overtones in the Arab Spring 
revolution would suffice to demonstrate that a global and diverse Islamic revival is 
taking place. It is important to understand the root causes of this revival and examine 
where it may lead and how it will affect the rest of the world. 
Counterintuitively, a deeper study of Islamic theology would provide a significant 
contribution to all three imperatives. Going back to Islamic theology with a fresh 
outlook and methodology would provide a solid basis for the re-examination of old 
Orientalist paradigms about Islam. Study of Islamic theology would provide a firm 
foundation in the growing interest in interfaith dialogue as a way Muslims and 
Christians (and people of other faiths) relate to one another in a world where military 
domination and solutions have proven ineffective. As Christian scholarship is largely 
theological, Islamic theological juxtaposition provides a better ground for interfaith 
dialogue. Since Islamic theology and how it is invoked and expressed in the life of 
contemporary Muslims is the bedrock of all Islamic revivalist movements, its study 
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is imperative in understanding the similarities and differences between contemporary 
Islamic movements. 
Significantly, when one brings theology into the backdrop of contemporary 
imperatives in scholarship three knowledge gaps emerge. First is the insufficient 
exploration of the relationship between the theological expositions of the large 
transnational Islamic revivalist movements to their final social and political vision. 
The question of ‘how do revivalist founders express principle beliefs of Islam such 
that their followers are influenced to create a social vision for change?’ is seldom 
asked. Such a relationship shapes their ultimate form and determines their influence 
on the immediate social environment. How this influence transforms the host society 
and then spreads across the Muslim world gains great importance. 
The second gap follows on from the first. It is the gap in knowledge on how the 
theological outlook of the founding Muslim spiritual leader shapes their followers’ 
worldview – the people who read and are influenced by their writings. Such links in 
transnational Islamic movements are insufficiently explored. This point has 
paramount importance as the usual assumption is that Muslim masses are politically 
seduced into following a charismatic leader because of their social and political 
narrative. This assumption creates a blind spot over the real nature of how a follower 
attaches to a revivalist leader. Followers develop attachment and spiritual esteem for 
the leader usually as a result of reading or listening to the leader’s Islamic theological 
and Qur’anic interpretations. The social and political activism comes later with a 
desire to spread what benefitted them to other people. Even if the attraction is social 
and political narrative, the follower is inevitably moulded theologically over time. 
Thereafter, theology motivates their actions. Therefore, closing the gap in knowing 
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how followers are influenced by a revivalist leader’s theological and spiritual 
writings is a significant area of research. 
The third knowledge gap exists with the relative lack of coverage of Islamic 
revivalist movements and theological works from Turkey. In his otherwise excellent 
coverage of Islamic theology, Montgomery Watt fails to include Nursi and his works 
in his coverage of the modern era of Islamic theology even though he mentions far 
less significant works and scholars.5 John Esposito in Islam the Straight Path covers 
revivalist movements in just about every major Muslim country, but misses Turkey 
completely.6 Other similar studies do no better. Although there is a growing body of 
literature about the transnational Hizmet Movement7 as one of the largest socio-
religious movement in Turkey associated with M. Fethullah Gülen (b. 1938), 
theological considerations are deficient. Such research also ignores Nursi, his works 
and the Nur (Light) Movement, which is ultimately one of the key inspirations and 
theological foundations for not only the Hizmet Movement,8 but also to some degree 
just about all religious movements in Turkey. Turkey’s growing influence in the 
Middle East and world geopolitics should arouse interest in the Islamic revivalist 
movements emerging from Turkey.  
Thus, this dissertation aims to describe, contextualise and critically examine the 
theological writings of Nursi. Since the knowledge gap is broad and potentially far-
reaching, the focus of this thesis is a critical analysis of the Islamic theology of God 
                                                 
5 Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 162. 
6 John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 115-141. 
7 One of the most comprehensive research works into the Hizmet Movement is Hakan M. Yavuz, 
Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). See also Martin E. 
Marty, ed., Hizmet Means Service: Perspectives on an Alternative Path within Islam (Oakland, 
California: University of California Press, 2015). 
8 Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, 180. 
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as articulated by Nursi in his magnum opus, Risale-i Nur Kulliyat. This analysis is 
presented within the context of classical Islamic theology.  
Literature on Nursi and Epistles of Light 
There are limited but increasing numbers of works published in English on Nursi and 
his works. They range from biographies to edited publications focusing on Nursi’s 
cosmology, political and ethical themes. Some of these works cover theological 
topics from Nursi’s perspective, yet at the time of writing this thesis, there are no 
publications with a specific focus on the theology of God as explicated by Nursi. 
Attention to Nursi and his works generally started after a series of international 
symposiums organised in Turkey by the Istanbul Science and Culture Foundation 
(İstanbul İlim ve Kültür Vakfı). Papers from these symposiums were published as 
conference proceedings and made available online.9 A total of 195 papers were 
presented in nine international symposiums conducted between 1991 and 2010, but 
an analysis of their content show only twelve are strictly theological in scope. 
Şükran Vahide is one of the earliest translators of Nursi’s works to English. Her 
translations are known to strictly follow the original text, but are especially difficult 
to read and understand. She also co-wrote a biography of Nursi, Islam in Modern 
Turkey: An Intellectual Biography of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi.10 A less scholarly 
work by Fred Reed, Anatolia Junction: A Journey into Hidden Turkey,11 is a lighter 
read in a narrative style covering a broad outline of Nursi’s life and his contributions 
                                                 
9 See http://www.iikv.org/academy/index.php/sympeng/issue/archive. 
10 Şükran Vahide and Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʻ, Islam in Modern Turkey: An Intellectual Biography of 
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005). 
11 Fred A. Reed, Anatolia Junction: A Journey into Hidden Turkey (Burnaby, Canada: Talonbooks, 
1999). 
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to Islamic revival. Such biographical works are limited in their coverage of Nursi’s 
writings, especially on theology. 
One of the earliest scholarly treatments of Nursi and his significance as a revivalist 
leader is sociologist Şerif Mardin. His book12 and journal articles set the scene in 
academic studies on Nursi. His work not only defines a framework for the analysis of 
twentieth century Islamic revivalist movements, but also Nursi’s Nur Movement. 
The genre of social treatment of Nursi and his influence in modern Turkey is 
continued after a fifteen year gap with Hakan Yavuz’s study13. Although this work is 
not specific to Nursi, Yavuz gives Nursi a key role in his survey of the religious and 
socio-political landscape in Turkey for much of the twentieth century. These works 
are quite useful in their analysis of Nursi’s impact on religious thought and revival, 
yet they do not cover his theological writings in any detail. 
There are some publications combining the life and thought of Nursi. These works 
generally cover Nursi’s life followed by a focus on certain themes of his works and 
thought. A relatively short book authored by Colin Turner and Hasan Horkuc14 is an 
example. Apart from a brief coverage of his life, the book examines Nursi’s thought 
and ideas on culture, society and politics. One of Ian Markham’s books15 specifically 
focuses on Nursi’s ideas and contribution to interfaith dialogue with a particular 
focus on Christian-Muslim relations. Another work with interfaith focus is Thomas 
Mitchell’s Said Nursi’s Views on Muslim-Christian Understanding16. Two-thirds of a 
                                                 
12 Şerif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey the Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). 
13 Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey.  
14 Colin Turner and Hasan Horkuc, Said Nursi (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009). 
15 Ian S. Markham, Engaging with Bediuzzaman Said Nursi a Model of Interfaith Dialogue (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2009). 
16 Thomas F. Michel, Reflections on Said Nursî’s Views on Muslim-Christian Understanding 
(Istanbul, Turkey: Söz Basim Yayin), 2003. 
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more recent work by Ian Markham, co-authored with Suendam Pirim,17 consists of 
direct extracts from Nursi’s writings compiled under belief, prophethood, 
eschatology and worship as the four main themes of the Qur’an. The book has 
critical analysis of Nursi’s explanations on the concept of God, but only on eight 
pages. 
In addition, four edited books have been published with particular themes on Nursi’s 
works: (1) Globalization, Ethics and Islam;18 (2) Islam at the Crossroads: On the 
Life and Thought of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi;19 (3) Spiritual Dimensions of 
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi’s Risale-i Nur;20 and (4) Theodicy and Justice in Modern 
Islamic Thought: The Case of Said Nursi.21 These publications are significant 
contributions as they bring together academics and experts on Nursi and his thought. 
Nevertheless, they lack topical cohesion and consistency in theoretical framework. 
While only the fourth book has a theological focus, its scope is narrowed to the 
theme of theodicy. Although theodicy is an important philosophical and theological 
problem, it is a relatively small part of the complete concept of God that Nursi 
portrays in his works. 
Two recent publications are significant. Colin Turner’s The Qur’an Revealed: A 
Critical Analysis of Said Nursi’s Epistles of Light22 covers the breadth and depth of 
Nursi’s works with excellent critical analysis. Turner’s work is consulted and cited 
                                                 
17 Ian S. Markham and Suendam Birinci Pirim, An Introduction to Said Nursi: Life, Thought and 
Writings (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011). 
18 Ian S. Markham and İbrahim Özdemir, eds., Globalization, Ethics, and Islam: The Case of 
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005). 
19 Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʻ, ed., Islam at the Crossroads: On the Life and Thought of Bediuzzaman Said 
Nursi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003). 
20 Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʻ, ed., Spiritual Dimensions of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi’s Risale-i Nur 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008). 
21 Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʻ, ed., Theodicy and Justice in Modern Islamic Thought: The Case of Said 
Nursi (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010). 
22 Colin Turner, The Qur’an Revealed: A Critical Analysis of Said Nursi’s Epistles of Light (Berlin: 
Gerlach, 2013). 
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extensively in this dissertation; however, the first three chapters are particularly 
relevant to this study. Ali Unal’s General Principles in the Risale-i Nur Collection 
for a True Understanding of Islam23 is ambitious in its breadth and depth of covering 
just about all main ideas and interpretations of Nursi throughout his works. It 
nevertheless lacks critical analysis as its main aim appears to be a summation and 
arrangement of Nursi’s arguments in a coherent volume. 
Although research and publications on Nursi and his works is increasing, just about 
all of them cover him as a social or political phenomenon.24 While the social and 
political impacts of Nursi’s activism during his life and beyond are significant, a 
theological examination of his works remains largely unexplored. 
The situation is no better for books published in Turkish. Despite the fact that more 
than 300 books25 are published on Nursi and his works in the Turkish language, very 
few of them deal with theology directly. A survey of these books reveal they focus 
on his life (about 42 books), social aspects of the movement he inspired, short 
commentaries on selected books, and various compilations of passages from Nursi’s 
writings. One reason for this could be because Nursi’s writings are in Turkish and 
widely available, and there is not much point repeating the same content in new 
books. In the introduction to his book 100 Soruda Bediüzzaman Said Nursı̂ 
(Bediuzzaman Said Nursi in 100 Questions), Hekimoglu Ismail says he intended to 
write a book covering the names of God as explained by Nursi, but he abandoned the 
                                                 
23 Ali Unal, General Principles in the Risale-i Nur Collection for a True Understanding of Islam 
(Clifton, New Jersey: Tughra Books, 2015). 
24 Some research topics are listed on the Nursi Studies website, http://bit.ly/1UjP21G. 
25 Book titles published in Turkish are listed on the Nursi Studies website, http://bit.ly/1hn9Kku. 
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idea when he realised that Nursi’s works were replete with such explanations and he 
would have had to repeat the same passages.26 
Nevertheless, a few Turkish titles related to Nursi’s writings on the theology of God 
are available. Ali Mermer’s Bediüzzaman’da Mârifet ve Tefekkür (Knowledge of 
God and Reflection in Bediuzzaman)27 deals with various topics related to Nursi’s 
contribution to Islamic thought and how he shows a way to reflect on God to attain 
knowledge of God. Gülşen Gazel’s book, Risale-i Nur Işığında Esma-i Hüsna 
(Beautiful Names of God in the Light of Risale-i Nur),28 provides how Nursi explains 
certain names of God throughout his works. The book compiles and elaborates on 
various names of God as explained by Nursi, but it does not present the content in a 
theological framework. Neither does it explain the significance of the names of God 
in the way Muslim believers relate to God. 
Two publications look at Nursi and his work from the perspectives of theology and 
philosophy as disciplines. Abdülkadir Harmancı’s study Said Nursi’nin Risalelerinde 
Kelâm-Felsefe Problemleri (Theology and Philosophy Problems in Said Nursi’s 
Treatises)29 pulls together Nursi’s main theological arguments within the classical 
Islamic theology (kalām) framework. Although this work is quite useful for this 
research and a good summary of Nursi’s main arguments, it lacks critical analysis 
and depth in its treatment of the theology of God. Niyazi Beki’s analytic study 
Kur’an İlimleri ve Tefsir Açısından Said Nursi’nin Eserleri (Works of Said Nursi 
                                                 
26 Hekimoğlu İsmail, 100 Soruda Bediüzzaman Said Nursı̂: Risale-i Nur Küliyati ve Risale-i Nur 
Talebeleri [Bediuzzaman Said Nursi in 100 Questions] (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 1994), 5. 
27 Ali Mermer, Bediüzzaman’da Mârifet ve Tefekkür [Knowledge of God and Reflection in 
Bediuzzaman] (Istanbul: Gelenek, 2004). 
28 Gülşen Gazel, Risale-i Nur Işığında Esma-i Hüsna [Beautiful Names of God in the Light of Risale-i 
Nur] (Istanbul: Gündönümü Yayınları, 2006). 
29 Abdülkadir Harmancı, Said Nursi’nin Risalelerinde Kelâm-Felsefe Problemleri [Theology and 
Philosophy Problems in Said Nursi’s Treatises] (Istanbul: Ayışığı Kitapları, 1994). 
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from the Perspective of Qur’anic Sciences and Exegesis)30 gives a good investigation 
of Nursi’s contribution to Qur’anic exegesis and its methods. Although it does not 
explore Nursi’s theological contribution, Beki positions Nursi’s works as a 
theological exegesis of the Qur’an.  
For the most part, studies on Nursi and his thought in English and Turkish31 have 
increased over the last decade, yet none of these works brings together Nursi’s 
theological arguments about God, which constitute the majority of his writings. 
Research Question and the Main Argument 
The main argument of this dissertation is: Said Nursi, in response to the spiritual, 
intellectual, social and political challenges facing Turkey and the Muslim world, 
followed a theological revival method and produced a fresh expression of Islamic 
theology based on the Qur’an. In doing so, he made original contributions to 
normative Islamic theology. 
The logic of this argument rests on the following premises: Theology is a rational 
endeavour to understand everything about God, from within a faith tradition and its 
scriptures, in response to problems posed by the conditions of a particular time and 
place. Nursi lived through a tumultuous period, witnessing the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire; emergence of secular nation states for the first time in Muslim 
history; two world wars; and the challenges imposed by European modernity on 
traditional Muslim societies and Islam. The conditions and restrictions Nursi faced 
meant he could only have access to the Qur’an and nothing else. To deal with the 
                                                 
30 Niyazi Beki, Kur’an Ilimleri ve Tefsir Açısından Bediüzzaman Said Nursı̂’nin Eserleri [Works of 
Said Nursi from the Perspective of Qur’anic Sciences and Exegesis] (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 
1999). 
31 There are also significant publications on Nursi and his works in Arabic. Risale-i Nur is translated 
to 27 languages. See http://saidnur.com/. 
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complexity of circumstances and the social and political restrictions around him, 
Nursi chose a theological revival method, where he attempted to revive Islam by 
renewing faith in people through his theological writings. Since Nursi loaded so 
much significance and revivalist objectives to theology, he focused on areas of 
theology he felt needed most focus and as a result produced an original and fresh 
expression of Islamic theology based on the Qur’an. 
Certain questions essentially emerge out of this argument. In light of the primary 
texts of Islam and resorting to rational arguments, does Nursi simply restate core 
Islamic theology about God as expressed by Sunni theologians in proceeding 
centuries or does he establish an original Islamic theological discourse about God? 
Unpacking this question further, as a Sunni Muslim scholar, does Nursi follow the 
Māturīdī or Ash’arī theological schools in his expositions about God, does he seek to 
reconcile between the two main Sunni theological schools or, intentionally or not, 
does he embark on an original Sunni theological discourse based on the theological 
underpinnings of the Qur’an? Furthermore, what are the similarities and differences 
in content, methodology and expression between Nursi’s writings and the two main 
Sunni theological schools’ (Māturīdī and Ash’arī) expressions of mainstream Islamic 
discourse on God? 
Exploring these related questions will deliver a detailed explanation of Nursi’s main 
theological discourse about God and his solutions to theological problems arising 
from the dialectic arguments of Western Enlightenment philosophy and as they were 
echoed within the Muslim world in the first half of the twentieth century. This will, 
in turn, contextualise where Nursi’s theological discourse sits within the rubric of 
classical Islamic theology and critically appreciate his effectiveness in expressing the 
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normative Sunni Islamic theological concepts on God to the contemporary Muslim 
and non-Muslim audience. 
This dissertation shows, while Nursi strictly followed the normative classical Sunni 
Islamic theology and stayed within the tenets of Islamic faith as his fundamental 
theological orientation, he made original contributions to Islamic theological 
discourse in three ways. First, he responded to and addressed new philosophical 
arguments against belief in God emerging from the Enlightenment era. Second, he 
redefined the scope of Islamic theological discourse by circumventing topics no 
longer relevant for the contemporary era and going deeper in areas of theology 
skimmed briefly in the classical period, even bringing rational scope to areas 
previously deemed unprovable with reason. Third, he contributed to the methodology 
and expression of Islamic theological tenets to make them more relevant and 
accessible to ordinary believers. 
Methodology and Approach 
To realise the research objectives, textual analysis was carried out in three layers. 
The first layer was a rhetorical analysis that set the context for Nursi’s writings. 
Nursi’s identity and influence as a Muslim scholar living through a pivotal transition 
from the classical to the modern period of the Muslim world gives a historic context 
to his writings. This transition also had a dramatic effect on Nursi as he spiritually 
transforms, focusing on theology rather than more direct social and political 
activism. Analysis of Nursi’s main aims and audience in producing his works was 
significant in deciphering the language and style of his texts. 
The second layer involved a discourse and thematic analysis to examine the features 
of Nursi’s writings. Nursi’s theological writings are spread throughout his works 
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without a thematic structure, despite each passage having clearly articulated and 
structured themes. Some arguments are repeated to support related theological 
interpretations and proofs. Discourse analysis was used to deconstruct his main 
theological arguments, while thematic analysis was used to reconstruct his arguments 
within the theological framework. For example, to compile his main arguments on 
the proofs of God, I have deconstructed his arguments for God’s existence 
throughout his works and thematically reconstructed them in a single chapter. 
Although the 10th Word deals with proofs of afterlife, it contains arguments for the 
existence of God and explanations of relevant names and attributes of God. Proofs of 
God are also discussed in the 22nd Word and 33rd Word. Integrity of his arguments is 
preserved as the deconstruction focused on the main discourse and themes, and then 
logically linked them together. While this method helped clarify Nursi’s arguments, 
it removed important theological links Nursi threads in his writings that add to the 
strength of his style and persuasive power of his arguments. 
Third is the contextualisation, critical analysis and evaluation of Nursi’s arguments 
and theological elucidations with the Māturīdī and Ash’arī theologies in a 
comparative framework. Such juxtaposition has given Nursi’s theology a context 
through which both common elements and distinctive features are revealed. This 
highlighted the links with classical Islamic theology and expedited finding answers 
to the main research question. 
I have used primary texts and worked with Nursi’s original works written in the 
classical Turkish language. Nursi’s writings are collected in thirteen volumes. Hutbe-
i Shamiye (1911) is the print version of a notable sermon delivered to more than 
10,000 people in 1909 at the Umayyad mosque in Damascus. Muhākamāt (1911) is a 
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work of exegetical methodology written as an introduction to his intended exegesis 
of the Qur’an. Ishārāt al-ījāz (1918) is a Qur’anic exegetical work that Nursi started 
just before World War I (WWI), but could not finish due to war. It only covers the 
first chapter of the Qur’an and up to the 33rd verse of the second chapter. Mathnawī 
Nūriye (1923) forms the seedbed of Nursi’s theological works expressed concisely in 
short passages. The main core of Nursi’s theological writings are Sözler (1926-1930), 
Mektubat (1929-1934), Lem’alar (1932-1936) and Şualar (1936-1949), written in 
sections across a twenty-four year period. Nursi’s correspondence with his students 
has been compiled in four volumes (Barla Lahikası (1926-1935), Kastamonu 
Lahikası (1936-1943), Emirdağ Lahikası I (1944-1947) and Emirdağ Lahikası II 
(1949-1960). These works are valuable in understanding Nursi’s methodology of 
religious revival, principles of religious activism and consoling spiritual advice to his 
students disheartened under political pressure. The last piece of the collection is 
Nursi’s biography, Tarihçe-i Hayat (1953),32 published during his later life by his 
students. These works form the primary sources of this study. 
In spite of the fact that Nursi used a colloquial version of Ottoman Turkish to render 
his writings more accessible to ordinary readers, the language is hard to understand 
for the modern Turkish speaker as it is replete with Arabic and Persian words and 
phrases. Working with original texts not only helped preserve the integrity of Nursi’s 
thought and discourse, it also uncovered important aspects of his style. I have used 
prints published by Söz Basım Yayın, which have additional features quite useful for 
researchers: a mini dictionary of more difficult words for each page, a 
comprehensive index, a separate index of concepts, detailed table of contents, added 
                                                 
32 Şükran Vahide, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi: The Author of the Risale-i Nur (Cağaloğlu, Istanbul: 
Sözler Publications, 2000). 
 17 
footnotes to Qur’anic and hadith references cited but not usually referenced in the 
original texts, and further information on places and names. 
For English, I have used Şükran Vahide’s translation as a base. Translations were 
checked with the original and rendered to make them more accurate and readable if 
there were rare mistakes or ambiguities. However, I have not translated words 
indicating key theological concepts. For example, I have used rubūbiyyah instead of 
using the translation ‘dominicality’. Although this is literally a correct translation, it 
does not convey the Islamic theological concept of rubūbiyyah, which means God’s 
ownership, governance and related divine actions particularly guiding all beings 
towards their potential and purpose throughout the universe. The same approach is 
followed for the names and attributes of God. 
Where words and expressions have generic theological significance, I have used the 
Arabic transliteration rather than the Turkified version used by Nursi. Instead of 
rububiyet as written in the Turkish original text, I have used rubūbiyyah so the word 
is understood by a wider readership and linked to other Islamic theological literature. 
If the expression was not theologically significant, I have retained the Turkish 
original and given the English translation in brackets. 
Lastly, although the Chicago 16th edition referencing style is used, the style is 
modified in referencing Nursi’s works. It is very difficult to find the right location in 
Nursi’s works because there are many prints of his works and as a result typesetting 
and pagination are often different. Working with the primary texts may also be 
difficult for researchers unless they can understand classical Turkish and happen to 
have the same prints used in this research. Therefore, I have included the additional 
layers of numbering Nursi uses in his writings to make referencing easier. For 
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example, instead of ‘Nursi, Words, 65’, the reference is ‘Nursi, Words, 10th Word, 3rd 
Truth, 65’.  
Chapter Outline 
This dissertation is organised in seven chapters. Since the foundation of the 
dissertation is the normative Islamic scholarly responses to changed conditions of 
time and place, Chapter 1 examines the development of Islamic theology from the 
time of Prophet Muhammad to the modern era. It gives a fresh definition of theology 
and introduces the concept of theologian’s tension – an irresistible sense of 
responsibility to address theological challenges coupled with a distinct aversion in 
involvement in theology driven by a fear of deviation or accusation of deviation. 
While this makes Islamic theology essentially a reactive discipline, just about all 
Islamic theological developments are the product of scholars who overcame the 
theologian’s tension and responded to the conditions and challenges of their time. 
Chapter 1 underscores a long period of theological drought lasting from late 
medieval times to the modern era. The modern era introduced dramatic challenges to 
Islamic theology and the faith of Muslim masses, soliciting a theological response. 
While there were notable responses, the most significant one came from Nursi. 
Chapter 2 explores this response and Nursi’s theological revival methodology. 
Nursi’s 84 years of life spans a turbulent time. His struggle parallels the painful 
transition from a multi-faith and multicultural Ottoman Empire to a nationalist 
secular republic of Turkey. During the latter part of the Ottoman Empire (1900-1922) 
he tried to initiate an educational revolution, while in the early republic era (1922-
1950) Nursi followed a distinctive and original theological revival approach. The 
chapter introduces the concept of revivalist dilemma – the impulse to revive Islam 
 19 
countered by the knowledge that one’s scholarly work and activism would inevitably 
attract charges of treason. The awareness of major theological questions, the negative 
impact of modernity and materialistic philosophy on the faith of Muslim masses, and 
the need to avoid political persecution drove Nursi to devise a theological revivalist 
approach unlike other revivalist leaders of the twentieth century. 
The analysis of Nursi’s works begins with Chapter 3, which centres on his 
contribution to Islamic epistemology. Nursi shifts the classical Islamic theological 
approach to epistemology to revelation and the universe, rather than the classic 
debate between reason (‘aql) and revelation (naql). In addition to the primary sources 
of the Qur’an and Sunnah (sayings and actions attributed to Prophet Muhammad), 
Nursi highlights the universe as the third primary and, crucially, equal source of 
knowledge. For Nursi, the Qur’an is the book of revelation and the universe is the 
book of creation, and both originate from God. The role of reason is to examine the 
correlation between the two. This chapter also constructs a theoretical framework for 
the study of theism. The framework rests on four fundamental questions about God – 
does God exist, is God one, how do humans relate to God and what does it mean to 
believe in God? 
Chapters 4 to 6 investigate Nursi’s answers to these fundamental theological 
questions in the backdrop of classical Islamic theology. Chapter 4 deals with the 
proofs for the existence of God. In approaching these proofs, Nursi intentionally 
avoids the contingency and temporality arguments within the cosmological argument 
as he finds them burdensome and abstract for most ordinary people. In his attempt to 
engage ordinary readers, Nursi overlays his reasoning with literary devices and 
develops a unique style of analogies, story-telling and personifications. With his 
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default argument and the overarching governance argument, Nursi makes original 
contributions to the proofs of God’s existence in Islamic theology. 
Chapter 5 examines how tawḥīd, unity of God, is demonstrated and explained with 
various proofs within the classical Islamic theology and how Muslim theologians 
address the immediate theological implications arising from absolute monotheism. 
The chapter explores and analyses Nursi’s contributions to the proofs of God’s unity 
and his answers to key theological and philosophical implications of the absolute 
monotheism of God. The chapter shows that Nursi made three main contributions to 
the understanding of tawḥīd in Islamic theology. First, he articulated an advanced 
definition of tawḥīd to include not only a broad understanding of the unity of the 
creator but to witness a stamp of unity in every created object. Second, he expanded 
on the traditional proofs of tawḥīd. He contributed to the discourse on cause and 
effect, and provided new proofs to argue that causes do not have real effects. Third, 
he thoroughly explained how the creation of universals and particulars would have 
no difference to God’s power and there is no more difficulty for God to govern a 
small object than the entire universe. With these contributions Nursi strengthens 
tawḥīd, the most significant doctrine of Islam. 
Chapter 6 delves into Nursi’s account on how Muslims should relate to God in Islam. 
This area is one of the most distinctive aspect in Nursi’s thought where he combines 
elements of mysticism with theology. Building on the discourse of classical Islamic 
scholarship on attributes of God, Nursi primarily focuses on the Qur’anic concept of 
the Beautiful Names (asmā al-ḥusnā) of God. This approach allows Nursi to argue 
that such a focus instils a profound appreciation of God stemming from knowledge 
of the world and the universe. The mystical aims of knowing and getting close to 
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God are realised not only through the traditional spiritual methods of worship 
(‘ibāda) and remembrance of God (dhikr), but also by reflecting on how God’s 
names manifest over the universe and created artefacts therein. Essentially, Nursi 
makes a highly original contribution that scientific knowledge can potentially 
increase one’s understanding of God and inculcate spiritual closeness to God.  
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1 X 
CHAPTER 1: ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND THE 
THEOLOGIAN’S TENSION 
1.1 Introduction 
In any faith tradition,1 new theological interpretations have emerged either in 
response to certain historical and socio-political circumstances or challenging 
questions posed in encounters with differing intellectual and religious ideas of the 
era. This impetus is one of the key drivers of theological development. The process 
of theological development when it involves human reason and alteration is often 
coupled with a risk of altering the very tradition itself. How can one be sure that a 
given theological expression is authentic and not an adulteration of the original 
version expressed at the foundation of the faith tradition? Such a concern is most 
acutely felt by Muslim scholars to this day, generating a persistent aversion from 
involvement in theological interpretation and attracting criticism to those with the 
courage to engage in theology. 
This chapter proposes the concept of the theologian’s tension created by two 
opposing forces. On one hand, there is imperative to preserve the simplicity and 
purity of faith by remaining silent on debatable matters of theology and on the other 
the irresistible need to respond to the emerging theological challenges posed by new 
historic circumstances and assertions considered deviant. This tension makes Islamic 
theology essentially a reactive discipline. The drive for Muslim theologians to write 
on theology was primarily motivated by the desire to preserve the correct beliefs of 
Islam. Yet, the act of preservation of faith essentials was also instrumental in its 
                                                 
1 Since Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s seminal work World Religions (1961), the word ‘religion’ has been 
viewed as problematic and ‘faith tradition’ became the normal use. The expression ‘faith tradition’ is 
equally problematic in that the word ‘faith’ connotes accepting religions without rational convictions. 
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development. In early centuries of Islam, theological disputations were viewed as 
dangerous and heavily criticised. It was accepted and considered the foundations of 
religion during the medieval era.2 In the last 600 years, Islamic theology remained 
relatively constant or even underdeveloped. 
Further, this chapter postulates a definition of theology and theologian’s tension. 
They are illustrated through a historic analysis and with the contention that each 
theologian responded with a plethora of scholarly output to the theological 
challenges and historical circumstances of their time in order to express what they 
considered correct Islamic theological positions on matters of debate. This chapter 
explores the rich history of Islamic theology, its key protagonists, and their works 
and influence to reveal the interplay of the theologian’s tension in the development 
of Islamic theology. 
1.2 Islamic Theology and the Theologian’s Tension 
Islamic theology traditionally has been expressed in two related disciplines – ‘aqāid 
and kalām. ‘Aqāid is the plural form of ‘aqīdah, which originates from the Arabic 
root a-q-d philologically meaning ‘to tie a knot.’3 A related word is ‘ītiqād,4 literally 
meaning to attach to something wholeheartedly as tightly as a knot would hold two 
pieces together.5 In this respect ‘aqāid becomes something that is wholeheartedly 
attached to and accepted. In Islamic theological lexicon, ‘aqāid refers to a set of 
creeds a believer has to accept as true.6 
                                                 
2 W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1985), 133. 
3 Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, Islâm Ansiklopedisi [Islam Encyclopaedia] (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 
1993), vol. 2, 212. 
4 The word ‘‘ītiqād’ is interchangeably used with the word iman (faith). 
5 Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, Islâm Ansiklopedisi, vol. 2, 212. 
6 Ibid, 213. 
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The second key word kalām is the plural form of kalima meaning ‘word’. In Arabic 
philology, the word kalima comes from the root word k-l-m meaning ‘to influence, to 
injure.’7 In Islamic theological lexicon, kalām refers to rational Islamic theological 
discourse or simply systematic theology.8 The most often cited reason for calling 
theology kalām is the way Muslim theologians began their discussion saying ‘al-
kalām fi …’ (the word on … is).9 Principally, kalām was about discussing ideas, 
beliefs and doctrines in spoken and written word while others preferred to keep quiet.  
Both kalām and ‘aqāid cover the fundamental tenets of Islam and are collectively 
referred to as uṣūl al-dīn – foundational principles of religion. Both disciplines are 
based on the textual sources of Islam and include interpretations of those sources. 
Nonetheless, there are nuances of difference between ‘aqāid and kalām. While 
‘aqāid lays out beliefs of Islam in creedal codes, kalām explains them in detail.10 
‘Aqāid is expressed in short statements of creed reflecting theological positions, 
while kalām gives textual and reasoned arguments justifying those creeds.11 It can 
also be said that ‘aqāid corrects what is considered as wrong beliefs, whereas kalām 
refutes objections and doubts posed around what is considered as right beliefs.12 
Kalām’s scope is also broader and includes epistemological foundations of theology.  
While shahādah – the statement ‘there is no deity but God and Muhammad is His 
servant and messenger’ – is the basic creedal proclamation in Islam, various ‘aqāid 
formulations were drafted over time and served as creedal statements to underscore 
                                                 
7 Ibid, vol. 25, 196. 
8 Hamza Yusuf, introduction to The Creed of Imam al-Ṭaḥāwī (al-Aqīdah al-Ṭaḥāwiyyah), by Aḥmad 
ibn Muḥammad Ṭaḥāwī, trans. Hamza Yusuf (Berkeley: Zaytuna Institute, 2007), 16. 
9 Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, Islâm Ansiklopedisi, vol. 25, 196. 
10 Ibid, 197. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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the mainstream positions on debatable matters of theology.13 As Josef Van Ess 
highlights, they were not used to pressuring “secular authorities to persecute 
heretics” as happened in other faith traditions.14 Their function was to clarify, 
elucidate and educate. 
Ilāhiyyāt is the main branch of theology that covers the concept of God in Islamic 
theology. Strictly speaking, ‘ilāhiyyāt’ would be translated as ‘divinity’ or more 
specifically the ‘study of the divine’. The word ‘theology’ is closely related as it is 
derived from the Greek words logos (reasoning, discourse) and theos (God, divinity); 
hence, the word ‘theology’ literally means a rational discourse about God.15 
Although it is safe to use the word ilāhiyyāt interchangeably with theology – since 
theology has been used to include a broader scope than the word ilāhiyyāt – this 
thesis will use ‘theology of God’ to specifically refer to ‘ilāhiyyāt’. 
A lexical definition of theology or kalām is in order following this linguistic analysis 
of key terms. William Chittick gives the broadest and simplest definition of theology 
as “God-talk in all its forms.”16 For him, theology is concerned with a rational 
clarification of the reality of God as the “Object of Worship” so people can relate to 
God in correct ways.17 Contemporary Muslim scholar Hamza Yusuf makes a further 
distinction between experiential faith and its intellectual understanding. For him, 
theology is an intellectual response in the mind of a believer who responds to 
challenges posed by confronting propositions that contest their understanding of their 
experiential faith. Therefore, the “true theologian” is one who also experiences the 
                                                 
13 Josef van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2006), 13. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Sherman A Jackson, On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Abū Ḥāmid al-
Ghāzalīʼs Fayṣal al-Tafriqa (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3. 
16 William C. Chittick, “Worship,” in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, ed. 
Tim J. Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 221. 
17 Ibid. 
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faith.18 Jeffrey Halverson gives a similar definition and further adds the scope for 
theology: “Theology, in proper usage, is the systematic, rational, defensible 
articulation of one’s belief about God, revelation, the cosmos, and humanity’s 
relationship to the divine.”19 
For John Frame, theology is about expressing the language of revelation conveyed in 
scriptural texts to another language to facilitate its understanding.20 Although 
Frame’s definition reflects the Christian theological paradigm, his explanation of the 
nature of theology highlights the inescapable link of theology to revealed texts. It 
could be said this is the main distinction between theology and philosophy. Both 
philosophy and theology are rational in their nature, but theology is always linked to 
a faith tradition and its scriptural texts in a way that philosophy is not. 
Classical Muslim theologians gave a more protective definition and role to theology 
(kalām). Al-Farābī21 (872-950) consigned theology a protective function for the set of 
beliefs and extended its scope to providing an intellectual foundation to matters of 
conduct.22 Al-Ghazālī23 (1035-1111) also pointed to the defensive nature of Islamic 
theology and added that Islamic theology has successfully reconciled the tension 
between ‘aql (reason) and naql (tradition, revelation).24 ‘Adud al-Din al-’Iji (1300-
1355) reiterated the classical view and defined theology as a discipline “that gives 
the ability to prove creeds of religion by providing definitive evidence and 
                                                 
18 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ṭaḥāwī, The Creed of Imam al-Ṭaḥāwī (al-Aqīdah al-Ṭaḥāwiyyah), trans. 
Hamza Yusuf (Berkeley: Zaytuna Institute, 2007), 13. 
19 Jeffry R. Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam: The Muslim Brotherhood, Ash’arism, and 
Political Sunnism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 2. 
20 John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 2002), 3. 
21 Full name is Abū Naṣr Muḥammad bin Muḥammad Farābī. 
22 Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, Islâm Ansiklopedisi, vol. 25, 196.  
23 Full name is Abū Hamid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī. 
24 Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, Islâm Ansiklopedisi, vol. 25, 196. 
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refutations for counter arguments.”25 Ibn Khaldūn26 (1345-1405) echoed the 
defensive nature of Islamic theology in his delineation of the purpose of theology: 
In general, to the theologian, the object of theology is to find out how the 
articles of faith, which the religious law has laid down as correct, can be proven 
with the help of rational arguments, so that innovations may be repulsed and 
doubts and misgivings concerning the articles of faith can be removed.27 
Importantly, in all these distinctions of theology, the defence is the faith propositions 
of Islam as articulated by its primary textual sources, the Qur’an and Sunnah.28 These 
definitions also presuppose a substantive need to defend those faith propositions. The 
need, in turn, follows the presence of competing theological assertions and doctrines 
deemed heretical or unqur’anic, therefore, unislamic. These competing theological 
assertions will not exist in a historical vacuum and necessarily entail social, political, 
intellectual, and religious causes and conditions.  
With all things considered, I postulate the following definition of theology: Theology 
is a rational endeavour to understand, explain and preserve everything about God and 
related to God from within the tenets of a faith tradition and its scriptures, in 
response to theological challenges posed by the religious, intellectual and 
experiential conditions of particular time and place.  
This definition has four main points of emphasis. First, propositions of faith are 
either directly about God (such as existence of God, unity and attributes of God) or 
somehow related to God (such as God’s revelation to human beings, God’s judgment 
of human life in the afterlife, God’s relation to Creation and humans relating to God). 
Second, theology is an intellectual endeavour to understand the propositions of faith, 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Full name is Abū Zayd ‘Abdu r-Raḥmān bin Muḥammad bin Khaldūn. 
27 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1967), 53. 
28 Fethullah Gülen, Essentials of the Islamic Faith (Lanham: Tughra Books, 2009), 6. 
 28 
explain them from a rational perspective and if possible check if they pass through 
the test of reason. Third, theology is invariably linked to the scriptures and canonical 
texts from which the propositions of faith are deduced. The consequence of this 
aspect is that theology of Islam has to be consistent and cogent within its core 
revealed texts of the Qur’an and hadith for it to be identified as Islamic theology. 
Without reference to and consistency with revealed texts, theology becomes a mere 
philosophical discourse. Fourth, theology invariably responds to challenges and 
problems emerging from the intellectual, social and experiential state of society in a 
given time and place. A specific historical context provides the conditions that pose 
significant challenges for theologians in their attempt to provide a coherent 
theological response. Such response inevitably compels theology to haul out a fresh 
expression from its sources to preserve its tenets, relevance, universality and 
timelessness.  
In the case of Islam, these four aspects of theology combine to pose great risk and 
stimulus at the same time, arousing the theologian’s tension in the inner world of a 
Muslim scholar. The risk is that theology could become the instrument of 
transforming the religion into a form the founder may have never intended. The 
discourse of the theologian may in fact be wrong and as a result cause them and 
people they influence to deviate from the original faith. The Qur’an is replete with 
criticism of earlier generations altering the divine message over time.29 No God-
fearing theologian would want to face the charge of deviation in this life or the next. 
As a result, there is a distinctive aversion within Muslim scholars to be involved in 
theology. This chapter illustrates this aversion in a survey of the history of Islamic 
theology. Paradoxically, there is also a sense of duty felt by a Muslim scholar to 
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protect and preserve the original teachings of Islam.30 Faced with a streak of what 
they consider wrong interpretations of Islam and its sources, a Muslim scholar may 
feel compelled to speak and write on matters of theology. The theologian’s tension 
arises as a combined result of the impulse of responsibility and aversion of risk. 
While this tension alarmed many scholars and caused them to stay clear of theology, 
the sense of duty outweighed in others. The development of Islamic theology is a 
consequence of the latter’s courage to embark on theological discourse. Fourteen 
hundred years of development in Islamic theology demonstrates the interplay of the 
theologian’s tension sparking periods of immense originality as well as extended 
periods of lapses into conservatism. At will be illustrated in the following sections, 
the theologian’s tension is also responsible for the struggle between traditionalism 
and rationalism seen in Islamic thought. 
1.3 Theology in the Qur’an and Sunnah 
Montgomery Watt, similar to just about all historians of Islamic theology, begins the 
journey of Islamic theology with key historic events following the death of Prophet 
Muhammad (632).31 Yet, as Tim Winter notes, a closer examination would have to 
put the beginning of the Islamic theological formation right back to the start of 
Prophet Muhammad’s mission and the emergence of the Qur’an as a book of 
revelation.32 It is possible to argue that the Qur’an is largely a theological book 
responding to the myriad beliefs existent at the time of revelation. 
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The fundamental theological teachings of Islam are inescapably based on the Qur’an 
and to some extent elaborated by Prophet Muhammad in the hadith literature. While 
the style of the Qur’an intertwines many themes and topics within its chapters (often 
even in a single verse),33 it is possible to identify broad themes of the Qur’an. Said 
Nursi identifies four main themes and aims of the Qur’an – Oneness of God (tawhid), 
prophethood (risālah), resurrection and the afterlife (ḥḥashir), and justice (‘adālah) 
and worship (‘ibādah)34 – the fourth referring to spiritual and worldly guidelines for 
human beings as individuals and society.35 He also contends these four themes 
permeate through the entire Qur’an and can be found in all of its parts, chapters, 
verses and even single words.36 Farid Esack concurs with a similar categorisation 
with the distinction that he calls the fourth theme “righteous conduct in the Qur’an” 
and further sub-divides it into three sub-themes of personal conduct, social and 
economic conduct, and religious practices.37 While right conduct is the Qur’an’s 
focus for Esack, Nursi qualifies this aspect as justice. Watt and Richard Bell identify 
five main Qur’anic themes – the doctrine of God, other spiritual beings, prophethood 
and other religions, the doctrine of the last judgment, and regulations for the life of 
the community.38 Faruq Sharif has undertaken a detailed content analysis to identify 
the major themes in the Qur’an. He identified eight distinct themes – the Creator and 
His creatures (16.0%), the Prophet and the Qur’an (11.6%), the previous bearers of 
the divine message (22.5%), some historical events (3.3%), faith and religion 
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(12.9%), afterlife (21.5%) and commandments (12.2%).39 Sharif adds that nearly 
28% of the Qur’an describes God and God’s attributes and the divine origin of the 
prophetic mission as a way for God relating to humanity.40  
So, irrespective of how major themes of the Qur’an are identified and listed, all 
categorisations show an overwhelming majority of the Qur’an’s content deals with 
matters of theology. While the Qur’an does not establish a systematic theology, as 
Van Ess contends,41 it is essentially a theological book in its content and 
propositions. The Qur’an puts forward arguments for its propositions and responds 
critically to other theologies that existed at the time. In doing so, the Qur’an did not 
necessarily raise new theological problems, as Van Ess puts it, “it treated the same 
problems differently” in original ways.42 
Interestingly, while the Qur’an is replete with theological verses and passages, hadith 
literature does not give a systematic and detailed discussion on theology. Yusuf 
argues the main reason is because Prophet Muhammad was not a theologian in a 
philosophical sense.43 Although most would agree with this contention, there is 
evidence to suggest the Prophet often reasoned with people at a theological level, but 
he generally relied on the rhetorical and rational persuasiveness of the Qur’an.44 Most 
likely, the Prophet felt the Qur’an was sufficient for the people of his time and its 
revelation was fresh enough to drive home important theological justifications of 
tenets of faith.  
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As Muhammad Zubair Siddiqi contends, another reason could be that hadith 
collections after the Prophet mainly focused on legal, practical, ethical and to some 
extent spiritual matters.45 Furthermore, hadith scholars were highly sceptical of 
anything theological attributed to the Prophet for concern that fabrications would 
enter the fold due to sectarian biases.46 At the same time, there are numerous hadith 
narrated in relation to definition and attributes of belief (īmān). In the Ṣaḥiḥ Muslim47 
collection, 380 hadith are reported on the subject matter of belief across 200 pages.48 
This could be due to the early debate over the definition and consequence of belief 
and disbelief. The Companions may have narrated hadith in relation to these matters 
and they would have rapidly spread due to the significance and scale of the debate at 
the time.49 This also shows theologically significant exhortations of the Prophet in 
other tenets of faith may not have been transmitted as these were not debated within 
the generation of the Companions.50 Another important factor is that in theology only 
hadith transmitted by multiple sources (mutawātir) were accepted as evidence, 
instead of the hadith transmitted through single channels (khabar al-wāhid).51 The 
number of prophetic traditions on theological issues is not small, but the usable 
amount is limited because this technical issue dramatically reduces hadith sources 
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prophetic traditions) is to identify forgeries and authenticate reports from Prophet Muhammad. The 
fact that hadith related to belief are reported in the early period while the Companions of the Prophet 
were still alive and they appear in the most authentic collections of al-Bukhari and Muslim show that 
these traditions (ahadith) could be considered authentic.  
50 This point will be discussed in more detail in this chapter. 
51 Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Abu Mansur al-Māturīdī, Kitâb al-Tawhid, trans. Bekir Topaloğlu. 
(Ankara: İSAM, 2003), 9. 
 33 
applicable to theology. As a result, hadith literature as a secondary source to the 
Qur’an contains relatively few theologically significant reports and they generally 
reflect the earliest theological debates.  
For the generation of the Companions, the Qur’an and Sunnah were sufficient as 
commutual sources of Islam. The Qur’an set the theological framework and critiqued 
disbelief, polytheism, Judaism and Christianity. Prophet Muhammad built a strong 
community of believers on the Qur’anic theological foundation of pure monotheism 
as well as other fundamental values and principles of Islam. For the generation of the 
Companions, the Qur’an and memory of the Prophet were still fresh and alive. The 
general theological outlook of Muslims in their era was more or less uniform – at 
least until the murder of the third caliph, ‘Uthman (577-656).  
1.4 Political Polarisation and Emergence of Creedal Works 
After the Prophet, the Rightly-Guided Caliphs expanded the borders of Islam at an 
astonishing speed. Muslims conquered Syria, Egypt, North Africa, Iraq and Persia, 
mustering a new Islamic empire and civilisation spanning from Spain to India within 
a generation after the Prophet’s death.52 Significant political events; encounters with 
other cultures and faith traditions; and a new generation of Arab and non-Arab 
converts inevitably posed new theological questions, giving rise to early 
manifestations of the theologian’s tension. 
The second caliph, ‘Umar (579-644), introduced the distinct social policy of 
establishing new settlements for Muslim armies and populations in conquered 
territories rather than settling them in existing cities.53 Garrison towns like Cairo 
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along with Kufa and Basra quickly became cosmopolitan urban centres attracting 
migrants, new converts and citizens from a diversity of ethnic and religious 
backgrounds.54 Muslims came in contact with seasoned Christian and Jewish 
theologians.55 Islam received to the fold fresh converts from Persian, Byzantine and 
Jewish backgrounds inevitably bringing with them their prior heritage to the way 
they absorbed Islam.56 Such conditions produced intense theological debates 
especially in Basra between 690 and 730. These theological debates are notably 
important as the foundations of almost all major Islamic theological schools were 
laid on the bedrock of these debates and the outcomes they produced.57 
Twenty years of stability and expansion post-Prophet Muhammad was vitiated by the 
murder of the third caliph, ‘Uthman, in 656 and the resultant civil war between ‘Ali 
(601-661), the fourth rightly-guided caliph, and Mu’āwiya (602-680), the governor 
of Syria. Kharijites (Seceders), after splintering from the camp of ‘Ali and later 
peeling themselves from the main body of Muslims, became the first significant sect 
to develop a theological response to early political events. They developed a distinct 
doctrine linking actions with faith and drawing the conclusion that committing grave 
sin leads to disbelief and, astonishingly, those sinners could be killed unless they 
repented.58 The implication was that grave sinners (kabāir) were destined eternally 
for hell.59 Armed with the harsh doctrine of takfīr (declaring someone as an 
unbeliever),60 Kharijites assassinated the fourth caliph ‘Ali (and failed in their 
attempt to assassinate Mu’āwiya), claiming that both ‘Ali and Mu’āwiya committed 
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grave sins and became disbelievers by agreeing to arbitrate their disagreement over 
the caliphate.61  
Kharijites were generally uneducated, devout and nomadic Arab tribesmen.62 They 
often rebelled and deemed those who did not join them in their rebellion as grave 
sinners.63 Their puritanical doctrine and sheer violence posed a political threat as well 
as theological challenge to the early Muslim community. Watt draws the conclusion 
that Kharijites’ lasting influence on Islamic thought was their insistence on the view 
that all government decisions and laws must be based on the Qur’an.64 The Qur’an 
was important for all Muslims, and the Kharijites simply could not be ignored. 
Interestingly, as Yusuf notes, a group among the Kharijites who opposed the radical 
factions within their ranks founded kalām as a new discipline.65 The great majority of 
believers, though, considered Kharijites as religious extremists, thugs and terrorists 
(bughāt).66 Living Companions of the Prophet and leading scholars vehemently 
disagreed with Kharijites and forcefully insisted committal of grave sin does not take 
the sinner out of Islam.67 
One such leading figure was Hasan al-Basri (642-728),68 a prominent scholar and 
spiritual authority in the cosmopolitan city of Basra, located in southern Iraq.69 Al-
Basri’s popular teaching circle was often a vibrant stage for theological debate. 
Fatefully, al-Basri’s circle also splintered the most significant theological antagonists 
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in Islamic history, the Mu’tazilites. Al-Basri’s young student, Wasil b. Ata (700-
748), broke ranks from his teacher’s class over a debate on the eschatological destiny 
of committing grave sins (kabāir).70 Ibn Ata insisted the grave sinner would be in a 
state between two states (al-manzilatu bayn al-manzilatayn), neither believer nor a 
disbeliever.71 He formed his own study circle growing in time to become the 
influential Mu’tazilite theological school.72 They were called mu’tazila, those who 
have ‘withdrawn’ themselves.73 Emergence of the Mu’tazilites74 would set the stage 
for a theological struggle for the next 300 years, concurrently intensifying the 
theologian’s tension and giving scholars the courage to overcome it. 
While some scholars gravitated towards responding to theological challenges, the 
theologian’s tension caused many others to precipitate towards quietism. Those who 
remained quiet (or non-judgmental), first on the political dispute between ‘Ali and 
Mu’āwiya and then on the early theological debates, were called the Murji’ites 
(postponers),75 who, for example, held that it was pointless to discuss the fate of a 
grave sinner and left the matter to God’s judgment in the afterlife.76 Murji’ites were 
concerned about the propensity of sharp theological positions causing sectarian 
polarisation and hoped to keep Muslims united by suspending judgment on debatable 
matters of theology.77 Even though Murji’ites did not put forward a definitive view 
on the theological debates at hand, their quietism was in itself a significant 
theological position. As Watt observed, Murji’ites were part of the early “general 
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religious movement,” and the general religious movement eventually coalesced as 
the mainstream Sunni Islam78 or, as Khaled Blankinship points out, most Murji’ite 
doctrines were adopted as part of the Sunni theology.79 
The debate over the legitimacy of Umayyad caliphs following the ‘Ali–Mu’āwiya 
dispute brought out political polarisations that inevitably had theological overtones.80 
The party (shi’a) of ‘Ali claimed descendants of the Prophet had a right to the 
caliphate.81 Coupled with the Shi’ite assertion of the Umayyad illegitimacy, 
significant portions of the Muslim masses complained about discriminatory and 
unjust policies of the Umayyad rulers.82 Umayyads countered and claimed their rule 
was sanctioned by God in a similar fashion as Adam was first made caliph on earth83 
and God’s decree (qadar) came to pass on this matter.84 The debate over these claims 
led to the emergence of those who denied human free will (Jabrites) and those who 
gave humans freedom of choice and creative power over their actions and destiny 
(Qadarites).85 
In an attempt to settle the matter, Umayyad caliph ‘Abd al-Mālik (r. 685-705) 
requested al-Basri to write on the correct Islamic position on human will and God’s 
will.86 Al-Basri reluctantly produced the Epistle on Free Will, one of the first 
theological works recorded in Islamic history.87 Jabrites relied on the Qur’anic verse 
13:27, “God leads astray whomever He wills,” to support their predestinarian 
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theology. Al-Basri contested this claim and argued the verse 13:27 should be 
considered together with 14:27, “God leads the wrongdoers astray.” Al-Basri’s 
methodology was to examine the entire Qur’an to arrive at the conclusion that God’s 
determination of human actions takes into account human choices. Yusuf highlights 
that al-Basri’s views on human free will and action represented the mainstream and 
was later codified into Sunni creedal formulations.88 Michael Cook contends, if al-
Basri’s epistle together with other early epistles are authentic, Islamic doctrine must 
have already been well-established by the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik.89 This in turn 
shows early scholars had clear theological positions, although only few had the 
resolution to write on the matter. 
One of the earliest extant creedal works, al-Fiqh al-Akbar90 (The Great 
Understanding), belongs to Abū Hanīfa (699-767) the founder of the Hanafite legal 
school. The work is more of an elucidation of Islamic creed rather than lengthy 
theological discourse and was mainly aimed at refuting the theology of the Qadarites, 
Shi’ites, Jahmites91 and Kharijites.92 Although the work is brief, it is, nevertheless, an 
important text reflecting the mainstream conclusions on matters of theology debated 
in eight century.93 An examination of the work reveals the main body of Islamic 
theology and its branches were already established in skeleton by the first half of the 
eight century. 
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In his early career, Abū Hanīfa was heavily involved in theology, so much so that he 
is recognised as the first significant scholar of the early period to vigorously debate 
with heretics on matters of theology.94 Abū Hanīfa had his critics and interestingly 
not for his theological elucidations but for engaging in theology. Abū Hanīfa’s 
response to a critic sums up his motivation for involvement in theology: “To do what 
the Companions did would be sufficient if we were in their position, but we are 
confronted by enemies who attack us and declare shedding our blood lawful.”95 Abu 
Hanifa’s response dramatically illustrates the theologian’s tension at play and how he 
overcame the tension by justifying engagement in theology as a necessary endeavour 
not only to defend Islam, but also to defend Muslims from sectarian (mainly 
Kharijite) violence. Although Abū Hanīfa later shifted and excelled in Islamic law 
when he could not answer a woman’s question on divorce,96 his influence on 
theology continued with his most famous work al-Fiqh al-Akbar.97 
Scathing critiques of theology (kalām) continued after Abū Hanīfa. His prominent 
student Abū Yūsuf (729-798) famously said “knowledge of kalām is ignorance, 
ignorance of kalām is knowledge.”98 Imam Shāfi’i (767-820), leading jurist of his 
time and founder of the second most significant Islamic legal school, has reportedly 
said “A servant meeting God with any sin other than shirk is better than his meeting 
God with kalām.”99 These scholars were strong but not absolute in their 
condemnation for Imam Shāfi’i wrote two theological books, the Validation of 
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Prophecy and the Refutation of Brahmanism.100 Rather, they were targeting 
theological dialectics and views promoted under the guise of kalām considered 
harmful to Islam and Muslims. Famous hadith scholar and jurist Ahmad ibn Hanbal 
(781-856) condemned ascetic al-Muhāsibi for writing a rebuttal of theological 
innovators, “Do you not first narrate their views and then rebut them,”101 implying 
along with other critics that even with the best intentions, involvement in kalām 
could spell out and then spread wrong beliefs. As Van Ess highlights, these scholars 
were not intolerant of differing views, rather, they thought the toleration of 
difference in law was expected and to a degree useful, but difference in theology 
could be tolerated far less, since theology comprised eternal truths and mistakes 
within it could lead to eternal damnation.102 Nevertheless, these scholars’ criticisms 
of kalām theology endure to this day. 
A dramatic illustration of the theologian’s tension is the response of early Muslim 
scholars’ positions on certain Qur’anic descriptions of God that would appear 
anthropomorphic if taken literally. Non-Arab converts to Islam had trouble reading 
and understanding the early Kufic scripts, which had no reading aids of diacritical 
marks leading to disagreements over various ways of reading and, therefore, giving 
variant meanings to the same Qur’anic text. During the reign of the third caliph 
‘Uthman, Hudhayfa ibn al-Yaman (d. 656) warned the caliph to do something before 
the community “turns against itself over scripture,” triggering the work on fixing the 
Qur’anic dialect.103 While this helped preserve the integrity of the Qur’anic text, the 
Qur’an still had expressions such as “God sees,” “The hand of God” and “God has 
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sat on the throne,” potentially leading to anthropomorphic interpretations and 
understanding of God. The Qur’an also had expressions of transcendence such as 
“and comparable to Him there is none”104 and “there is nothing whatever like 
Him.”105 While the anthropomorphist Hashawiyya106 sect believed God had limbs and 
organs, Muta’zilites argued these expressions should be interpreted to mean God’s 
power, knowledge and grace. 
The mainstream Sunni scholars thought it was dangerous to give literal 
(anthropomorphic) meanings or limit the meanings of these expressions through 
interpretive fixation. The main position was that of tafwīd (consignment): accept 
these expressions as they are without interpretation and consign their true meaning to 
God.107 Even courageous Abū Hanifa went only as far as defining these expressions 
as “attributes of God” without explaining what those attributes connoted. Discussing 
the nature of God was the most dangerous field, where the theologian’s tension was 
most acutely felt. Theologians, other than Muta’zilites, in early centuries refrained 
from saying anything in this regard other than what the Qur’an already expressed. 
Discussions on this point illustrate that theological engrossment until the dawn of the 
ninth century CE was primarily dominated by Mu’tazilites and other groups 
considered heretical. Within mainstream Islam, involvement in and support of 
theology was heavily criticised and viewed as tantamount to support of Mu’tazilism 
and sectarianism. Theological involvement of Sunni scholars was rare and their 
works of theology were generally limited to short creedal elucidations. Although 
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theology as a discipline was still in its formative stage and not among the list of 
universally accepted Islamic disciplines as yet,108 main branches and positions on 
theology were established and they strictly adhered to the scriptural text. Regardless 
of what scholars thought about theology (kalām), their views for and against it 
demonstrated the theologian’s tension at play. There were benefits and dangers of 
involvement in theological debates. Only those who felt a strong sense of 
responsibility, such as Abū Hanīfa, dared to sail in the stormy waters of theological 
disputations. 
1.5 The Acceptance of Kalām as a Fundamental Islamic Discipline 
A defining moment in the history of Islamic theology is the encounter of Muslims 
with the Hellenistic philosophy. It is not certain when the first philosophical works to 
Arabic were translated, but it was sometime towards the second half of the eighth 
century CE with the ascendance of the Abbasid Empire. In the cosmopolitan city of 
Baghdad, as Jim Khalili suggests, Muslim theologians felt the need to improve their 
reasoning and debating skills before Jewish and Christian theologians who seemed to 
be familiar with Aristotle and Plato.109 Influenced by the supremacy of reason in the 
Hellenistic thought and armed with rational tools of philosophy, Mu’tazilism became 
an intellectually and politically formidable theological school in the early ninth 
century.110 The need to refute Mu’tazilites and associated Neoplatonic philosophers 
on matters of theology become the chief motive and catalyst in the development of 
mainstream Islamic theology.111 From the late ninth to mid-tenth centuries, the 
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theologian’s tension resulted in the emergence of systematic Islamic theology as the 
reconciliation between the revealed scriptures (naql) and human reason (‘aql). 
A tipping point was reached towards the end of Abbasid caliph al-Maʾmūn’s reign  
(r. 813-833) reign when Mu’tazilites were instrumental in the imposition of the 
doctrine of the ‘createdness’ of the Qur’an on Muslim scholars through the political 
clout of the caliph’s office.112 Al-Ma’mun’s great political and scientific 
achievements with the House of Wisdom113 were forever tarnished in the Muslim 
psyche through the initiation of a mihna (tribulation or inquisition) lasting sixteen 
years (827-843).114  
Although the issue seemed to coalesce over the nature of the Qur’an, the very notion 
of God was at stake. Mu’tazilites insisted the attributes of God had “no existence 
distinguishable to His essence, but rather emanated from the essence of God;”115 God 
speaks through His essence (dhāt) and God’s speech only exist at the time of 
speaking.116 Their main concern was that recognising attributes separate to God’s 
essence would lead to anthropomorphism and affirming multiplicity in God’s 
essence.117 Whereas Sunni theologians insisted this position contradicted clear verses 
of the Qur’an and held a suprarational view that God’s attributes are eternal and 
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neither completely separate to God’s essence nor are they the same as God’s 
essence.118 
The controversy around the nature of the Qur’an was symptomatic of a deeper 
epistemological difference between Mu’tazilites and the Sunni majority. Sunni 
hadith scholars championed the primacy of naql (tradition), while Mu’tazilites 
advocated the supremacy of ‘aql (reason).119 There were extremists on both sides of 
the theological spectrum. Rationalists such as Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (854-925) and Ibn 
al-Rāwandī120 asserted that reason and revelation were incompatible, especially in 
ethical matters. In sharp contrast, the anthropomorphist Hashawiyyah sect insisted 
reason had no place in religion and Muslims have to rely totally on the literal reading 
of the Qur’an and Sunnah in all matters.121 Such polarisation strained further the 
already acute sense of the theologian’s tension to breaking point. If Islam was to 
remain relevant as a world religion and source of a world civilisation, theology had 
to reconcile the two fundamental sources of ‘aql and naql. 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal, a strict follower of the tafwīd position, emerged as the hero of 
mainstream Islamic theology in his public defiance of Mu’tazilite doctrine when 
other major scholars and judges either prevaricated or remained silent in the face of 
the mihna.122 Ibn Hanbal did not leave any theological writings,123 but his defiant 
stand symbolised the triumph of mainstream Qur’an and Sunnah based textual 
theology over the theological rationalism of Mu’tazilites. In their heyday, 
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Mu’tazilites made significant contributions to the defence of Islamic monotheism 
before other faith traditions, but their influence started to decline after the mihna.124 
Revoking of the Abbasid government policy on the ‘createdness of the Qur’an’ 
meant a victory for the people of hadith (ahl al-ḥadith) over the rational theology of 
Mu’tazilism.125 From that moment on, no other government could dare meddle with 
theology through policy.126  
It was not the repeal that brought the end for Muta’zilism, but the final intellectual 
nail on their coffin came primarily through the assimilation of the systematic 
theology (kalām) within mainstream Sunni theology. Chief theologians responsible 
for this feat were Abū al-Hasan ‘Alī ibn Ismā’īl al-Ash’arī (873-933) and 
Muhammad Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī (853-944), who solidified and systemised 
Sunni mainstream theology as established theological schools.127  
Among the two, usually al-Ash’arī is cited as the main proponent of Sunni 
theology.128 Al-Ash’arī was the star pupil of al-Jubba’ī (849-915), the leading 
Mu’tazilite master in Basra.129 His transformation is dramatically narrated in the 
annals of Islamic scholarship in a number of renditions. In one version, al-Ash’arī 
saw Prophet Muhammad three times in his dreams. In the third dream, the Prophet 
exhorted him, “By no means should you abandon kalām, but you shall support that 
which was revealed. God will assist you.”130 This is significant as Muslims believe 
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seeing Muhammad in dreams is true.131 Prophet Muhammad’s endorsement of kalām 
in defence of textual revealed sources gives kalām legitimacy. As long as the 
theologian is using reason in defence of the text, there should be no charge of sin or 
innovation. This approach decidedly removes the religious and psychological barrier 
created by the theologian’s tension. 
As a result of these dreams, or the decline and irrelevance of Mu’tazilism by the turn 
of tenth century as Watt argues,132 al-Ash’arī started to question the doctrines of 
Mu’tazilism. Famously, he entered in a critical discussion with his master, al-Jubba’ī. 
Taftazanī (1322-1390) relates a pivotal episode where al-Ash’arī asks al-Jubba’ī: 
“What is your opinion regarding three brothers, one of whom dies obedient, 
another disobedient and the third as a child?” He replied, “The first will be 
rewarded. The second punished in Hellfire, and the third will neither be 
punished nor rewarded.” Ash’arī asked, “If the third one says, ‘O Lord, why did 
you give me death at a young age and not leave me to grow up so I could be 
obedient to you and thus enter in Paradise?’” Jubba’ī replied that Allah would 
say, “I knew that if you had grown up you would have disobeyed and thus 
entered the Hellfire, so it was better for you to have died young.” So, Ash’arī 
said, “If the second one says ‘My Lord, why did you not let me [too] die young 
so I would not have disobeyed and entered Hellfire?’ What will the Lord say 
then?” Jubba’ī was confounded.133 
This story is significant in three ways. First, to Sunni theologians it demonstrated the 
intellectual invalidity and logical incoherence of Mu’tazilite doctrines. Mu’tazilites 
were defeated in their own game. Second, it is a demonstration of how kalām’s 
rational tools could be used to defend the validity of the scripture-based Sunni 
theology and the invalidity of other sects – a key driver for theologians in having the 
courage to overcome the theologian’s tension. Third, the story illustrates to Muslim 
theologians limitation of human reason in acquiring certain knowledge. As Hans 
                                                 
131 According to some hadith narrations, dreams are of three types – true dreams with divine 
inspiration; dreams that are generated by the brain activity of the person; and dreams influenced by 
Satan. In a hadith narrated by Bukhari and Muslim, Prophet Muhammad said, “The one who sees me 
in their dream is like they have seen me in life for Satan cannot impersonate me.” 
132 Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 65. 
133 Ibn Yusuf, Imam Abu Hanifa’s al-Fiqh al-Akbar Explained, 16-17. 
 47 
Küng puts it, through al-Ash’arī, “rational argument was utterly at the service of 
orthodox teaching and kalām utterly at the service of Sunnah.”134 Al-Ash’arī’s 
transformation story coupled with his dreams aids in legitimising the use of reason 
on one hand and setting limits to it on the other.  
As Richard Martin and others assert, al-Ash’arī’s transformation reflects his ultimate 
conviction that Mu’tazilite doctrine was not congruent with Islam’s textual 
sources.135 Watt similarly suggests al-Ash’arī most likely felt revelation explained 
human existence and guided people in life better than reason.136 In 912, after a two 
week retreat, al-Ash’arī produced writings outlining a systematic theology based on 
the pious predecessors (salaf) and prophetic traditions.137 He distributed these 
writings in the mosque and declared he had stripped himself from Mu’tazilite 
theology as he literally took off his outer garment.138 Significantly, al-Ash’arī named 
his theology ahl al-haq wa al-sunnah (the people of truth and the prophetic 
tradition).139 Al-Ash’arī’s main theological works al-ibana ‘an usūl al-diyānah 
(Elucidations of the Foundations of Religion) and al-Luma’ (The Flashes) are 
extant.140 Over time, the expression usūl al-dīn derived from the book title also 
became the title of Islamic theology as one of the four core Islamic disciplines.141 
Where al-Ash’arī sits with respect to reason and revelation and to what degree he 
used kalām is debatable. George Makdisi asserts, “The question of whether al-
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Ash’arī adopted kalām as a method remains to be seen.”142 Richard Frank contends 
al-Ash’arī followed kalām methods and positioned his theology in the middle of two 
extremes of Mu’tazilite rationalism and the Hashawiyya literalism.143 Küng 
challenges this view maintaining that al-’Ash’arī’s attempt was not a reconciliation 
between reason and revelation, but rather reason was subsumed within revelation.144 
Certainly, al-Ash’arī’s theology is heavily scripture-based and he distinctively holds 
the “without specifying how” (bi-la kayf) position of the traditionalists in the way 
Qur’anic descriptions of God are understood.145 Nevertheless, as Küng 
acknowledges, al-Ash’arī justified the use of reason with numerous hadiths and 
Qur’anic citations.146 Al-Ash’arī also argued rational theology was essential under 
circumstances where the faith of people was weak and polluted with doubts.147 As 
Watt highlights, while there was rational theological involvement within the Sunni 
tradition prior to al-Ash’arī, he was nevertheless pivotal for the majority to accept 
reason to such a degree that the main body of Sunni Muslims in the Islamic 
heartlands thought themselves as Ash’arite by the eleventh century.148 So, regardless 
of where Ash’arite theology sits on the reason–revelation spectrum, al-Ash’arī made 
a major contribution in the acceptance of kalām within Islamic theology among the 
majority of Muslims, especially within ahl al-hadith (traditionalists). He, therefore, 
removed a major obstacle standing before scholars who elected quietism in the face 
of the theologian’s tension. 
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The Ash’arī theology was further developed by al-Baqillānī (950-1013) and al-
Juwaynī (1028-1085)149. Al-Baqillānī wrote a systematic outlay of Ash’arī theology 
in his Kitāb al-Tamhīd (Prolomegana).150 Al-Juwaynī’s work, Kitāb al-Irshād ilā 
Qawāṭi’ al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-I’tiqād (A Guide to the Conclusive Proofs for the 
Principles of Belief),151 has been a definitive text in Ash’arī thought. According to 
Ash’arite historian Ibn Khaldun (1332-1405), al-Juwaynī’s work is the best statement 
of Ash’arī theology in accordance with early Muslim authorities and has been 
therefore studied in madrasas for centuries.152 Al-Juwaynī played a crucial role in 
injecting philosophical methods within theology.153 The contribution of these 
scholars helped solidify Ash’arī thought as a primary school of theology in Islamic 
scholarship. 
In comparison to al-Ash’arī, little is known of the life of the second major founder of 
mainstream Islamic theological school, al-Māturīdī. He is often ignored even though 
he is the founder of a major theological school within the Sunni tradition.154 Al-
Māturīdī was born in Central Asia two decades earlier than al-Ash’arī and by the 
time al-Ash’arī reverted from Mu’tazilite theology at age forty (912), al-Māturīdī had 
already produced his seminal work Kitab al-Tawhid (the Book of Unification), which 
is extant in Arabic original and is available in Arabic155 and Turkish.156 Mustafa 
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Cerić157 argues these two facts alone – two-decade seniority of al-Māturīdī and al-
Māturīdī completing his seminal work before al-Ash’arī started his Sunni venture – 
would  position al-Māturīdī as the founder of synthetic theology.158  
Al-Māturīdī based his theology on Abū Hanīfa159 largely through his education by a 
pedigree of scholars with a line of teaching going back to Abū Hanīfa.160 Cerić 
contends al-Māturīdī was not a mere follower of Hanafi School, but a master in using 
the methods of the school in addressing theological problems of his day.161 Oliver 
Leaman remarks al-Māturīdī provided a “solid intellectual foundation” to Abū 
Hanīfa’s theology,162 to such an extent that Māturīdī theological school has become 
the main theology of the Hanafi legal school.163  
In the political climate of the tenth century, central governance of the Abbasid 
caliphs in Bagdad was declining, with local dynasties gaining prominence.164 
Khorosan, Transoxiana and its rich economic and intellectual centres of Samarkand, 
Bukhara and Tashkent were ruled by Samanids.165 Transoxiana was the eastern 
centre of the Muslim world and under stable political climate.166 As the traveller al-
Maqdīsī (946-1000) observed, Central Asia was largely dominated by the Hanafi 
legal school with the presence of some Kharijites, Mu’tazilites and Karramites.167 
There were also presences of Judaism, Christianity and local dualist faith traditions 
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such as Persian Manichaism, Daysanism and Marcionism.168 To gain popular support 
and stamp their legitimacy, local rulers supported Sunni scholarship. Thus, the 
religious and political landscape set a fertile substratum for the development, 
preservation and spread of Sunni mainstream theology in the east.169 Representing 
the Sunni tradition, al-Māturīdī had to deal with the dual need to respond to the 
doctrines of non-Islamic faith traditions170 on one hand and the dogmatic 
anthropomorphism of the traditionalism and cut-dry rationalism of Mu’tazilites on 
the other.171 
As Yusuf highlights, al-Māturīdī set out to respond to intellectual challenges 
confronting Muslims by following a middle path between the rationalism of 
Mu’tazilites and the dogmatism of Hashawiyya literalists172 – a synthesis between 
‘aql and naql. Cerić identified that such a synthesis rested on the premise that human 
reason should be subservient to the boundaries of revelation, but at the same time 
reason should be allowed to perform its role in interpreting, understanding and 
explaining revelation.173 Halverson adds, in doing so, al-Māturīdī gravitated toward 
reason, as he acknowledged that reason unaided by revelation can also be a source of 
knowledge.174 It appears al-Māturīdī was not hindered by the theologian’s tension or 
a history of involvement in Mu’tazilism, as in the case of al-Ash’arī. While Watt 
underplays al-Māturīdī’s influence on Islamic theology,175 Cerić compellingly 
disagrees in Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam and asserts that al-Māturīdī is the 
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greatest of all theologians of his era and beyond, mainly because of his originality 
and effectiveness in dealing with theological problems and challenges of his time.176 
Despite the importance of al-Māturīdī in the development of Islamic theology, al-
Ash’arī enjoys a greater celebrity status. The famous bibliographer and indexer Ibn 
al-Nadim (d. 990) did not include al-Māturīdī in his listing.177 Even Abū Hafs ‘Umar 
al-Nasafi (1067-1142), al-Māturīdī‘s own follower, did not mention al-Māturīdī and 
his work Kitab al-Tawhid in his seminal work al-’Aqaid al-Nasafiyyah.178 Bekir 
Topaloglu, as well as Cerić, cites the main reason as the difficulty of Kitab al-
Tawhid’s grammar and structure, rendering his work hard to read and understand.179 
Hence, the book’s main arguments were simplified and elucidated by later Maturidite 
scholars.180 Furthermore, al-Ash’arī’s story was more powerful and dramatic, making 
him more popular with theologians181 who needed such a story to silence their critics 
to justify involvement in theology. Muhammad Abu Zahra (1898-1974) stressed, 
since al-Ash’arī lived in the central heartlands of the Muslim world and he 
intellectually defeated the Mu’tazilite leader al-Jubba’ī, al-Ash’arī received a more 
prominent mention in the annals of Islamic theology; however, al-Māturīdī 
undertook a similar struggle in Asia.182 
Another prominent text, based on Abū Hanīfa’s earlier work is The Creed of Imam 
al-Ṭaḥāwī. This work was produced by Abū Ja’far Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-
Ṭaḥāwī (853-935). Al-Ṭaḥāwī attributed his work to “Jurists of the faith, Abū Hanīfa, 
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Abū Yusuf and Muhammad.”183 The creed elucidated by al-Ṭaḥāwī gained widest 
acceptance because of its simplicity and its aim to provide ordinary Muslims with a 
basic text where they can quickly learn creedal conclusions of mainstream Islam 
without the complex theological discourse.184 Even though the creed of al-Ṭaḥāwī is 
brief, the creedal statements reflect the conclusions of systematic theology. This 
work is considered one of the earliest creedal works over which many commentaries 
were produced.185 It has even been embraced by the more conservative Hanbalī 
School.186 A fresh translation by Yusuf was published in 2010.187 
It is largely held in Sunni Muslim scholarship that al-Māturīdī in the east, Ash’arī in 
the centre and al-Ṭaḥāwī in the west of the Muslim world have defended the 
mainstream Islam and preserved the integrity of its theology.188 By the end of the 
tenth century, in the face of a weakening Abbasid caliphate189 and the proliferation of 
sectarianism, the theological output of these three scholars became the foundation of 
mainstream majority. As scholars and Muslims followed the creeds elucidated by al-
Māturīdī, al-Ash’arī and al-Ṭaḥāwī, a neologism emerged to describe their 
theological position – ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama’ah (the people of prophetic tradition 
and majority consensus)190 from which the compressed ‘Sunni’ title is acquired. Even 
though there were differences within their theologies, the differences were 
recognised as within the interpretive boundaries of the Qur’an191 and a reflection of 
the prophetic statement “In my community disagreement is an opportunity for divine 
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mercy.”192 Rejection of extremism of any kind and following an inclusive broad 
middle path became the guiding principle for the mainstream Sunni majority.193  
Al-Ash’arī and al-Māturīdī’s main motive was to defend mainstream Sunni theology 
against doctrines considered unislamic and unqur’anic.194 Their work resulted in 
three significant outcomes with respect to the theologian’s tension. First, they 
founded their theology firmly in the textual sources, thwarting any criticism of 
religious innovation (bid’a) from within the ranks. Second, they used varying 
degrees of rational argumentation to prove their theology and showed that, in order 
to deal effectively with rival sects and other faiths, theologians must include reason 
in their theological arsenal. Third, their work essentially redefined kalām as a 
scripture-based rational systematic theology and succeeded in the acceptance of 
kalām within the list of core Islamic disciplines.195 In a way, the theologian’s tension 
was captured within the framework, epistemology and methodology of the new 
kalām. For as long as scholars stayed within the boundaries of the new kalām, they 
did not have to worry about the theologian’s tension. Conquest of the theologian’s 
tension in favour of elucidation of theology opened the floodgate of theological 
output. Yet, there still remained a major antagonist challenging Sunni mainstream 
Islamic theology – the philosophers.  
1.6 Maturation of Islamic Theology as a Discipline 
Without doubt, one of the most significant of all representatives of mainstream Sunni 
theology is the great theologian Abū Hamid al-Ghazālī. Most historians of theology 
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place al-Ghazālī under the rubric of Ash’arī theology.196 He was a star pupil of the 
influential Ash’arite theologian Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwaynī.197 For Oliver 
Leaman, al-Ghazālī is too distinctly original to be confined to one theological 
school.198 As Yusuf contends, al-Ghazālī in his magnum opus Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn 
(Revivification of Sciences of Religion) made a unique expression of theology as an 
awareness of the Divine through inner and outer dimensions of religious practices.199 
A distinct contribution of al-Ghazālī is his synthesis of spiritual insight (kashf) within 
the rubric of theology.200 As Frank Griffel demonstrated in in his work, Al-Ghazālī’s 
Philosophical Theology,201 al-Ghazālī followed a strictly Ash’arite theology in his 
early career and his original contributions coalesced later in life. 
What is certain is al-Ghazālī represents a genre of Muslim theologians (to which 
Nursi also belongs) who synthesised multiple Islamic disciplines to develop an 
original yet islamically self-evident body of thought. In scholars like al-Ghazālī, the 
theologian’s tension manifests as a concern to stay within the boundaries of the 
Qur’an and Sunnah, and revive Islamic beliefs in the everyday practices and lives of 
ordinary Muslims through a combination of primary scriptures, reasoned theological 
expositions and spiritual insight. The need to reach out and meet the needs of 
ordinary Muslims is the catalyst in their thought. 
The eleventh century ushered in pivotal change for the Muslim world. For about a 
century Shi’ite empires, Fatimids in the west and Buwayhids in the east, dominated 
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much of the Muslim world.202 Overthrowing the Buwayhids in 1055, the Seljuk 
Turks took reign over the central Muslim heartlands, including Baghdad.203 Ash’arī 
theology was largely banned in the early eleventh century until the Seljuk rulers, 
under the administration of great vizier Nizam al-Mulk, instituted Ash’arī theology 
as the official creed of the land.204 To unify the Muslim world and preserve 
mainstream Sunni theology,205 particularly against Isma’ili propaganda and violence 
mounted from the forts of Alamut,206 Seljuks established madrasas as an innovative 
educational institution,207 with a set curriculum comprising Arabic, theology, Islamic 
law, Qur’anic exegesis, hadith traditions, logic, philosophy as well as astronomy and 
mathematics.208 It was within the Nizamiyah madrasas that al-Ghazālī rose as a 
celebrity professor. In his extensive immersion in learning and teaching, al-Ghazālī 
observed two main problems – the over-influence of philosophy in theology and the 
lack of spiritual integrity in people’s religious practices – that would eventually lead 
to inner turmoil and distress. 
In his early career, al-Ghazālī acknowledged that, while systematic theology (kalām) 
was useful in clarifying and defining creedal positions, as well as revealing a greater 
understanding of God, with all things considered, it did not enable one to get closer 
to God and in most cases led to doubts and loss of certainty in one’s beliefs.209 
Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī did not take a hostile stance. In his legal work al-Mustaṣfā, 
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he placed theology (kalām) as the foundation of other Islamic disciplines.210 It was 
also al-Ghazālī who demonstrated the Qur’anic basis for logic (mantiq) in his work 
Qisṭas al-Mustakīm (The Just Balance).211 Al-Ghazālī’s critique of theology reflects 
his main concern that the ultimate aim of the truth seeker and all Islamic disciplines 
should be to inculcate a closer relationship with God. 
Such concern inevitably led to a defining moment in the history of Islamic thought – 
al-Ghazālī’s critique of philosophy. Prior to al-Ghazālī, Islamic philosophy claimed 
to have a voice in theological discourse, especially since the work of influential 
polymath al-Kindi (801-870). While he was praiseworthy of philosophy, al-Kindi 
stayed within the theological underpinnings of the Qur’anic revelation seen clearly in 
his objection to the philosophical litmus test, the eternity of the world.212 Al-Fārābī 
was not as careful. While not denying revelation’s claim for truth, he wedged a line 
of departure from theology with his acceptance of the eternity of the world and 
adoption of the Neoplatonic notion of emanation213 – ideas further developed by the 
great polymath and philosopher Ibn Sina (980-1037, aka Avicenna). 
Armed with a thorough knowledge of philosophy, al-Ghazālī made a damning 
critique of philosophy in Tahāfut al-Falāsifah (Incoherence of the Philosophers),214 
where he outlined twenty deviations of philosophers with three (eternity of the 
universe, God knowing universals but not particulars, and rejection of physical 
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resurrection) being tantamount to heresy.215 Half a century later, Ibn Rushd (1126-
1298) published a rejoinder satirically titled Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (The Incoherence of 
the Incoherence).216 Ibn Rushd conceded extreme rationalists were wrong in some 
areas, but he argued al-Ghazālī’s charge of deviation and heresy (kufr) on all 
philosophers was based on misreading their arguments, and he was throwing the 
baby (moderate philosophy) out with the bathwater.217 Trying to find a reconciliatory 
middle ground, Ibn Rushd argued “every religion is based on revelation (naql), but 
reason (‘aql) is blended with it,”218 a position similarly found in the newly accepted 
kalām.  
Soon after the completion of Incoherence of the Philosophers, al-Ghazālī 
experienced a profound personal and spiritual crisis to the point of physical 
breakdown.219 The main trigger was his scepticism as to whether theoretical 
knowledge of the jurists and theologians or “realised knowledge” of the Sufis was 
the surest way of attaining knowledge of God and salvation in afterlife.220 Ultimately, 
was it possible to arrive at certain knowledge at all?221 The answer was critical not 
only for him, but for all believers. If the ultimate goal was to attain a sound 
knowledge of and spiritual closeness to God, legal empiricism and theological 
abstraction were limited in their ability to achieve the main goal. Spiritual insight 
(kashf) at first sight also seemed subjective and lacked certain knowledge. The 
theologian’s tension was most acutely felt by al-Ghazālī at the epistemological level 
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and the cognitive dissidence it caused finally manifested in his loss of speech and 
appetite.  
Al-Ghazālī left his esteemed teaching position in Baghdad and embarked on a ten 
year retreat to experience spiritual life as a Sufi.222 He came out of the retreat 
attesting the idea that sacred law, rational theology and philosophy are only good if 
they help one attain inward sincerity and closeness to God.223 He found certainty only 
through “a light God cast into his heart,” a light that enabled him to intuitively know 
basic truths without proofs.224 It was the Sufi spiritual insight (kashf) and its practices 
that was the safest and surest way in achieving the ultimate purpose for human 
existence.225 For him, Sufism enabled the realisation of Islamic goals in a complete 
way that no other disciplines could ever achieve. Sufism is an essential part of Islam 
without which the religious rituals and creedal formulations would be devoid of 
spiritual substance and inner dimensions of meanings.226 He crystallised these 
insights in his monumental work, the Revival of Religious Sciences (Iḥhyā al-ulūm 
al-dīn). What makes these insights and IḥyāIḥyā significant and authoritative is that 
al-Ghazālī excelled in all disciplines concerned.227 His work combined the beneficial 
features of all Islamic disciplines in a unique blend and a self-evident expression of 
Islam that earned him the title hujja al-Islam (proof of Islam) and mujaddid (renewer 
of Islam). 
The impact of al-Ghazālī on philosophy is still debated. John Walbridge maintains 
al-Ghazālī’s critique was projected more towards the “Farabian theory of religion” 
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rather than philosophy itself.228 Umer Chapra contends al-Ghazālī was not against 
taking truth from philosophers as long as “what they say is sensible in itself, 
supported by evidence and not in conflict with the Qur’an and Sunnah.”229 This 
quotation from al-Ghazālī reflects the theologian’s tension and function of theology 
within the great theologian’s thought – any idea incorporated must be within the 
truths inculcated by scriptures and the theologian was the gate keeper. Chapra also 
quotes al-Ghazālī acknowledging the key role of reason in gaining knowledge and 
his deeming rejection of natural sciences in protection of Islam as a grave crime 
against religion, and Chapra concludes that al-Ghazālī advocated the complementary 
role of reason (‘aql) and revelation (naql) in theology and life.230 Not everyone 
agrees. Watt contends the critique of Thahāfut irreversibly weakened the 
philosophical movement in the Muslim world,231 even though Ibn Rushd made a 
powerful attempt to salvage philosophy. Watt goes further and acknowledges al-
Ghazālī as “the leader in Islam’s supreme encounter with Greek philosophy,” and 
from this encounter Islamic theology triumphed at the expense of philosophy, 
particularly Neoplatonism.232 For Leeman, al-Ghazālī in effect peeled off theology 
from pure philosophy (falsafa) while at the same time absorbed logical tools of 
philosophy within the intellectual arsenal of theology.233  
Al-Ghazālī’s critique led to two important outcomes for theology and its relationship 
with philosophy. First, the charge of philosophy’s propensity to lead people to heresy 
stuck with it to this day. Stripped from its theological grounding, philosophy in effect 
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protruded out of the list of core Islamic disciplines. Brightest minds distanced 
themselves from philosophy especially when demand for scholars excelling in other 
disciplines was at their peak. Philosophy did not altogether disappear, but rather, as 
Watt argues, it was transformed lending its useful parts and critical instruments to 
Islamic theology.234 Incidentally, as Neo-platonic philosophy and Mu’tazilite 
theology declined in Sunni majority circles, they were incorporated and further 
developed through the Shi’ite theological orientation.235 
Second, largely through the influence of al-Ghazālī, logic and kalām (uṣūl al-dīn) 
have become a central component of Islamic madrasa education in later centuries.236 
Even though the smaller Hanbalī strain continued to oppose it and maintained simple 
literal position to tenets of faith, the majority consensus have seen systematic 
theology and logic as essential.237 They considered their study as fard al-kifāya 
(sufficiently obligatory), and contended it was impossible to talk about Islam without 
establishing the existence and unity of God, the truth of revelation, prophethood and 
the afterlife.238 They disagreed with the charge of theology being an innovation 
(bid’a), since theology explained and proved matters of faith. As the Qur’an shows, 
prophets have also explained matters of faith to people through rational arguments. 
Furthermore, if theology is an innovation so would all other Islamic disciplines, as 
none of these existed at the time of the Prophet and Companions.239 For the time 
being, arguments for theology won the debate, and systematic theology and study of 
logic were accepted in the madrasa curriculum.  
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These outcomes nurtured an environment where theology could further flourish, 
albeit within the Ash’arī and Māturīdī boundaries. Works produced in the later 
period (khalaf) during and beyond the twelfth century, although prolific, lacked 
originality240 and were marked by three distinct theological contributions. First, 
theological works were mainly characterised by systematic organisation of al-
Māturīdī and al-Ash’arī theologies through the extensive use of logical methods.241 
The great theologian and polymath Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzi (1149-1209) could only 
continue the Ash’arite tradition.242 A succinct Maturidite creed written by Najm al-
Din al-Nasafi (d. 1142) was taught in madrasas for centuries.243 Second, Ash’arite–
Maturidite comparative studies as the mainstream theology of ahl al-sunnah wa al-
jama’ah (the people of prophetic tradition and consensus) gained prominence.244 Al-
Māturīdī and al-Ash’arī were aligned on many theological positions with four 
differences,245 because as Blankenship points out, al-Māturīdī took a more balanced 
approach between reason (‘aql) and revelation (naql).246 Theologians particularly 
noted these differences were sometimes no more than semantic and within the 
interpretative ambit of the scriptures. Third, theological developments took a vertical 
line of development within the two broad theological schools. Theological output 
was notably dominated by extensive commentaries, super-commentaries, glosses and 
even super-glosses.247 On the creed of al-Nasafi, for example, a dozen different 
commentaries were written; and on the commentary written by Ash’arite theologian 
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al-Taftazāni248 about 30 glosses were produced; and on one of these glosses an 
additional 20 super-glosses were written.249 Al-Taftazāni’s commentary on al-Nasafi 
was studied in madrasas for centuries as the combined theology of the mainstream 
Sunni Islam.250  
It is safe to conclude the theologian’s tension was eliminated when theology was 
kept within the confines of the madrasa curriculum. The chief figure responsible was 
al-Ghazālī. His critique of philosophy and spiritual transformation resulted in the 
exclusion of philosophy as a standalone discipline from core Islamic sciences while 
logical methods of philosophy were incorporated in theology. Scholars reached a 
consensus on Maturidite and Ash’arite theologies, and developed them further 
through a process of prolific commentaries. For as long as the theologian remained 
within the boundaries of revelation and authorised texts, they were free to use 
reasoning and interpretation to address key theological questions and respond to 
counter theologies found in heretical sects and other faith traditions. In a way, 
overcoming the theologian’s tension effectively negated it. Without the presence of 
rival theologies and philosophy though, Islamic theology was in danger of decline 
and lapse into conservatism.  
1.7 Mystical Contribution to Theology and Conservative Reaction 
The Muslim world endured a turbulent era from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. 
In 1099, the crusaders stormed Jerusalem, sacked the city and slaughtered the entire 
civilian population.251 For the next 150 years, regional Muslim leaders and crusader 
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kings interlocked in political and military struggle with civilians usually suffering the 
consequences. This was not all – the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad was under a 
looming danger of Mongol invasion. Wreaking havoc in Central Asia, Mongol 
hordes turned south to Muslim heartlands. Genghis Khan’s grandson Hulagu 
captured and completely destroyed the capital Baghdad in 1258 ending the 500 year 
Abbasid tenure to caliphate.252 A third calamity followed in the fourteenth century in 
the form of a global pandemic decimating millions in North Africa, Middle East and 
Europe. The great Muslim historian Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) recorded:  
Civilisation decreased with the decrease of mankind. Cities and buildings were 
laid to waste, roads and way signs were obliterated, settlements and mansions 
became empty, dynasties and tribes grew weak. The entire inhabited world 
changed.253 
Islam is a resilient religion and Muslims are tenacious people who seem to bounce 
back from the greatest of catastrophes. Much of the social and religious infrastructure 
remained intact and Islam had spread deep into Asia when the Mongols converted to 
Islam.254  
Theological abstraction and painstaking legalism do not bring solace to masses 
suffering under military invasions and pandemics. People need deep spiritual wisdom 
to give meaning to their suffering. This need coupled with al-Ghazālī’s influential 
transformation story255 and his euphemism that purification of the heart is an 
individual obligation (fard ‘ayn)256 provided fertile ground for Sufism to spread 
throughout the Muslim world. Sufism was institutionalised under Sufi orders 
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(tariqa)257 and Sufi centres mushroomed alongside already proliferated madrasas. 
‘Abd-al-Qadir Jilānī (1077-1167), Ibn ‘Arabī (1165-1240), Jalāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī 
(1207-1273), Bahā al-Dīn Naqshband al-Bukhārī (1318-1389) and many more 
towering spiritual figures surfaced across the vast Muslim world. Unlike their 
theological counterparts, Sufi masters were not restrained by the theologian’s 
tension, leading to a time of rigorous theological originality bolstered by their 
spiritual appeal and popular following. 
The Spanish-born Sufi mystic Ibn ‘Arabī is particularly notable as one of the most 
prolific writers and for his unique blend of theology, cosmology, metaphysics and 
spirituality. His vast magnum opus, Futuhat al-Makkiyya (The Meccan Openings), 
has not been fully understood let alone properly translated and edited.258 While Ibn 
‘Arabī claimed to base his thought on the Qur’an and Sunnah, he provided audacious 
linguistic and theological interpretations informed by his spiritual insights.259 Watt 
labels Ibn ‘Arabī’s work as theosophy and his interpretations having pantheistic 
tendencies,260 a charge that was to importune Ibn ‘Arabī for centuries. 
Ibn ‘Arabī introduced new interpretations or, to be more correct, dramatically 
expanded and nurtured the seeds of existing theological ideas to have a lasting 
influence. For Ibn ‘Arabī, the universe with its ever-renewed creation (tajdid al-
khalq) is an instantaneous reflection of God’s names,261 the human self has no 
boundaries in its becoming,262 the human being has the potential to become the 
perfect man (insān al-kāmil), and the controversial concept of unity of being (waḥdat 
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al-wujūd).263 ‘Unity of being’ became immensely popular not only within Sufi 
literature, but with the Sufi masses as well.264 Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought is profound and 
language highly cryptic, the expression, for example, “It is part of the perfection of 
‘being’ that there is imperfection in it,”265 is clearly beyond the comprehension of 
many. As William Chittick, an expert on Ibn ‘Arabī, suggests Ibn ‘Arabī is 
remarkably original and without precedent.266 Chittick adds further that no significant 
scholar could ignore Ibn ‘Arabī as his fundamental ideas and terminology have 
percolated in the capillaries of the Islamic culture through the proliferation of 
Sufism, popular poetry, power of his proofs and acceptance by scholars from a range 
of disciplines.267 Walbridge further notes that Ibn ‘Arabī’s system of the primacy of 
existence could not be ignored by subsequent philosophers, even though he did not 
use the conventional philosophical argumentation.268 Somewhat similar to al-Ghazālī 
but certainly more audacious, Ibn ‘Arabī represents an interdisciplinary approach to 
theology resulting in multiple theological overtones. 
In stark contrast, Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) emerged in the fourteenth 
century as a Hanbalī theologian and contested the spread and practices of Sufism, 
kalām and philosophy. For Ibn Taymiyya, the main problem was that scholars 
worried about their well-paid positions and were not prepared to stand up for what 
was right and simply conform to blind scholarly tradition.269 In a way, al-Ghazālī was 
also critical of the scholarly cadre for having rather worldly inclinations.270 This 
observation adds another dimension to the theologian’s tension – the concern for 
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one’s career yanking a great deal of scholars into conformism. Freed by this concern, 
Ibn Taymiyya wrote daringly in levelling scathing criticisms against philosophy and 
particularly Ash’arī theology.  
Ibn Taymiyya’s thought is characterised by a rejection of foreign elements and 
adherence to Islam as understood by the pious predecessors (salaf al-sālihīn).271 For 
him, the creed of pious predecessors is the surest and will be so until the Day of 
Judgment272 – a sentiment signalling an intention to bypass the centuries of Islamic 
scholarship instead of the enormous task of refuting the entire Islamic tradition to 
preserve the purity of Islamic creed. Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyya takes on the 
challenge.  
In his Radd ‘ala l-Mantiqiyyīn (Refutation of Logicians), Ibn Taymiyya’s goal was to 
pull down “the logical foundations of philosophical metaphysics and speculative 
mysticism.”273 He attempted this by refuting two fundamental notions of logic – no 
concept can be formed without definitions and categorical syllogism leads to certain 
knowledge.274 Ibn Taymiyya argued against the first stating that a definition reflects 
the statement of the definer who would know the quiddity of the thing defined either 
through a definition or through other means. But definition here would require 
another definition leading to infinite regress. Then knowing the quiddity of 
something through other means becomes the only option, making the definition 
redundant.275 He argued against the syllogistic method, stating there were other 
means to acquiring the same knowledge syllogism tried to obtain through tiresome, 
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tedious processes without any guarantee – why would anyone try to travel to Mecca 
by testing all possible paths whether they led to Mecca or go around in increasingly 
larger circles until one crosses Mecca when it is possible to travel to Mecca through a 
known straightforward path at a moderate pace.276 Ironically, these are also reasons 
to argue why reasoning did not lead to certain knowledge, yet it seems reasoning is 
an inescapable reality of human thought. 
Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of logic touched the very foundation of theology and 
madrasa education. He echoed the common criticism put to theology (kalām) in that 
theology gave greater emphasis to reason over revelation; theologians strayed away 
from the Qur’anic method and overly trusted in reason and syllogism; the majority of 
times they just repeated philosophers’ views rather than develop original Islamic 
thought; and they neglected the emotional and spiritual needs of humans, hence 
could not nourish their faith.277  
Ibn Taymiyya’s opponents charged him with the heresy of anthropomorphism.278 
Famous traveller Ibn Battuta narrated listening to one of his sermons where Ibn 
Taymiyya said “Verily God descends to the sky over our world in the same bodily 
fashion that I make this descent” and Ibn Taymiyya took one step down from the 
pulpit. A Mālikī scholar objected to this saying it was blasphemous to say so and was 
beaten by the congregation as a result.279 Interestingly, Ibn Taymiyya did not openly 
deny that God is not a body (jism), a notion vehemently opposed by Ahmad Ibn 
Hanbal.280 
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Ibn Taymiyya also heavily criticised Sufism and accused Sufis of holding pantheistic 
beliefs.281 He attacked people’s veneration of Sufi masters and labelled visiting their 
tombs as saint-worship.282 Interestingly, he wrote on Sufism to give new meaning to 
the key concepts of love of God, fear of God and humility, and even spoke of 
annihilation (fanā’) as the perfect fulfilment of Shari’ah.283 With this attempt, Ibn 
Taymiyya implicitly acknowledged the role of spirituality and placed Sufism in the 
Islamic tradition, albeit in reformed form.  
In contemporary times, there is a tendency to view Ibn Taymiyya as an arch-
conservative and arch-radical.284 Ignaz Goldziher asserts that Ibn Taymiyya’s 
writings lay largely dormant for six centuries until ‘Abd al-Wahhab revived them in 
the eighteenth century.285 Paula Skreslet contends Ibn Taymiyya and his works 
revived the withering Hanbalī line of theology and served to push the Hanbalī Sunni 
theology in a new direction of conservatism.286 Watt goes further to assert that Ibn 
Taymiyya “profoundly altered the course of theological thought in Islam.”287 James 
Piscatori contrasts these evaluations as anachronistic readings of Ibn Taymiyya, and 
insists that he simply responded to the context of his time.288 It is safe to say that, if 
Ibn ‘Arabī stretched the boundaries of theology, Ibn Taymiyya reminded the limits 
and provided checks and balances for theology especially with his message of 
adherence to the original Islam of the pious predecessors (salaf al-sālihīn). It is this 
strain that made Ibn Taymiyya a reference for the notorious Wahhabi movement of 
Arabia to emerge in the eighteenth century and present day puritanical and 
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conservative Salafi movements.289 Further, Ibn Taymiyya unwittingly stretched the 
theologian’s tension and reminded scholars of its constant presence. 
After the Mongol onslaught, the political fortune of the Muslim world improved in 
the fifteenth century and beyond with the emergence of three great Turkish dynasties 
– the Ottoman Empire in the Muslim heartlands and the west, the Safavids in greater 
Iran and the Mughals in India. The Ottomans spread Islam to the Balkans and to 
some extent Eastern Europe.290 The Hanafite legal school and Maturidite theological 
school were more suitable to the ethnically and religiously diverse Ottoman 
Empire.291 As the Ottoman Empire spread, Maturidite theology also proliferated 
through a large portion of the Muslim world.292 Sufism was also prolific not only 
within Ottoman society, but throughout the Muslim world. The Mughals, similar to 
Ottomans, adopted the Hanafite legal and Maturidite theological schools in its multi-
faith society.293 Contrariwise, the Safavids, territorially wedged between the 
Ottomans and Mughals, adopted the messianic Shi’ite tradition.294 
Although kalām was still included as a core discipline within the madrasa 
curriculum, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw a transformation of moderate 
conservatism gravitated by the theologian’s tension into extreme conservatism that 
suffocated even moderate rationalists.295 Two figures are notable in this later period – 
Ahmad al-Sirhindī (1564-1624) and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). 
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‘Abd al-Wahhab was attracted to Ibn Taymiyya’s teachings and responded to the 
deterioration of popular religion in Arabia with a program of radical reform.296 He 
gained prominence when he aligned his puritanical theology with the Su’ud tribe to 
undertake a bloody appropriation of the whole of Arabia, including the religiously 
significant cities of Mecca and Medina.297 Henri Laoust maintains ‘Abd al-Wahhab 
initiated a new edition of Hanbalite doctrines rather than extending Ibn Taymiyya’s 
ideas.298 Watt agrees to insist that ‘Abd al-Wahhab did not follow Ibn Taymiyya’s 
methodology, a methodology that was carefully conceived to escape scholastic 
stringency and adopt Islam to changing conditions.299 ‘Abd al-Wahhab selectively 
borrowed from Ibn Taymiyya and used his criticism of Sufism, philosophy and 
theology as well as his idea of returning to the pure and simple Islam of the early 
generations.300  
Needless to say, the sectarian violence and puritanical theology of Wahhabism 
alarmed the Sunni scholarship and rulers.301 ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s own brother 
Sulayman has written a refutation of his brother’s ideas and claimed ‘Abd al-
Wahhab’s doctrines were unprecedented in the history of Islam.302 Despite ‘Abd al-
Wahhab rejecting these charges during his lifetime,303 Ottoman Sultan instructed the 
Egyptian army to put an end to the short lived Wahhabite Saudi rule in 1813 only to 
have it resurface again as an independent state in 1926.304  
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India took a different course. On one hand, Ibn ‘Arabī’s major influence exerted 
itself in a geography where speculative Sufi theologies such as waḥdat al-wujūd 
(unity of being) ran the risk of degenerating into pantheism in the backdrop of the 
Indian religious landscape.305 On the other, Mughal emperor Akbar’s (1542-1605) 
religiously tolerant policies went a step too far in his attempt to unify all people of 
India under one din-e ilāhi (divine religion).306 The venture risked an irreversible 
adulteration of Islam in the subcontinent. The Naqshibandi Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi 
(1564-1624) rose as a major figure and was given the honorific title “the renewer 
(mujaddid) of the second millennium.”307 Sirhindi was critical of Ibn ‘Arabī’s waḥdat 
al-wujūd concept (not to the extent of Ibn Taymiyya) saying it removed the creator–
creature distinction.308 Instead, he argued the notion of waḥdat al-shuhud (unity of 
witnessing) to hone the point that what is perceived as unity of being is actually a 
spiritual experience and testimony to God’s unity.309 In effect this modification 
recognised the spiritual experiences of the mystics while at the same time averted the 
risk of falling into pantheism.  
In his struggle against Akbar, Sirhindi tried to “set things right” and promote an 
understanding of Islam that conforms to inward and outward adherence to the 
example (Sunnah) of the Prophet and Islamic law (Shari’ah).310 This traditional 
emphasis could be read as leaning towards conservatism, but it was others who 
followed Sirhindi who became increasingly conservative. An outstanding figure to 
continue the Sirhindi influence was Shah Waliullah Dehlawī (1703-1762).311 As Watt 
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observed, Shah Waliullah maintained strict adherence to the Qur’an and Sunnah, but 
at the same time adopted his thought to meet the intellectual and social needs of his 
time and place,312 especially in the face of growing threat of colonialism in India. 
Watt attributes the beginning of the conservative strain to Shah Waliullah’s son’s 
student Sayyid Ahmad who adopted and preached rigid Wahhabi conservatism in 
India.313  
Thus, the long period extending from the thirteenth to nineteenth centuries witnessed 
a number of developments from a theological perspective. First, as Sufism became 
more prevalent in Muslim societies, it wielded notable influence on theology 
especially with the works of Ibn ‘Arabī and later by Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi with his 
more mainstream Shari’ah-conformant Sufi religious thought and Islamic revivalism. 
Second, as a reaction to encroachments of Sufism and adoption of theology in 
madrasa curriculum, Hanbalī strain of critics and reformists emerged with their main 
protagonists being Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. The culmination of these 
outcomes slowly stagnated theology and ushered a long period of conservatism and 
theological stagnation even though systematic theology (kalām) continued to be 
taught in madrasas and Maturidite theological school received vitality within the 
Ottoman Empire. Classical Islamic theology was not prepared for the next major 
challenge to come, this time from an unexpected place: Europe. 
1.8 Challenge of Materialistic Philosophy and the Modern Era 
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw waves of major catastrophes befall 
the Muslim world. Coinciding with the European political and economic at the onset 
of the Industrial Revolution, the power and prosperity of the Muslim world took a 
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sharp downturn. Unlike the previous tribulations and challenges, European 
colonisation and modernity affected the entire political, cultural, economic and 
religious landscape, resulting in the complete collapse of Islamic civilisation.314  
Three factors conjoined to accelerate the decline of the Muslim world – social and 
political fragmentation, economic slowdown and educational regress.315 The 
politically fragmented Muslim world fell before the powerful colonial armies of 
European powers financed with their lucrative monopoly over the Indian Ocean 
trade. Following the collapse of the Safavid Empire in 1736,316 the Mughal Empire 
was abolished in 1857 when Britain declared India as a new addition to its global 
colonial empire.317 Africa was devoured by France, Italy and the British, and finally 
the Ottoman Empire was reduced to an internal portion of Anatolia in 1918, after 
heavy losses in WWI.318  
On the economic front, with the discovery of the American continent and European 
access to Indian Ocean, millennium-old trade routes took a dramatic shift.319 The 
Muslim world was no longer on the direct trade route and Muslims could not change 
fast enough to contend with the rising European competition.320 With the advent of 
new manufacturing technology and associated consumerism, European powers 
surpassed the GDP of the Ottoman Empire through the seventeenth and nineteenth 
centuries.321  
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Perhaps the most serious setback was the split of knowledge between essential and 
highly specialised religious sciences, and the optional and declining material 
sciences.322 As Bernard Lewis observed, scientific education was reduced to a few 
slim outdated texts, while religious education comprised more than a decade long 
study in madrasas.323 Once the champions of knowledge and science, Muslims lost 
their original scientific advantage to European developments in science and 
associated applied technology.324 As will be explored further in the next chapter, 
advances in science and philosophy made its way to Muslim territories and posed 
significant challenges to the core tenets of Islam in a way theologians had not 
encountered before. 
Such dramatic changes importuned a theological response. In a climate of far-
reaching consequences, Muslim scholarship and activity gravitated towards social 
and political reform, and in most cases campaigns for independence and ensuing 
political struggle. While the basic Islamic creed was strongly reaffirmed, the 
intellectual debates of the previous centuries were no longer relevant for the 
challenges brought to fore by European modernity and Enlightenment philosophy.325 
There were only three notable attempts made to address such challenges through 
theological discourse. 
The first notable venture came from Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) with his 
Risālat al-Tawhid (The Treatise of Unity).326 This work is elucidations of correct 
beliefs concerning God and an outline of mainstream Islamic theology. John 
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Esposito states ‘Abduh saw no contradiction between reason and revelation or 
science and religion.327 However, Watt contends, on many important contemporary 
theological problems, ‘Abduh cited the limitation of reason and need for acceptance 
of revelation. This approach could be interpreted as the effect of the theologian’s 
tension on ‘Abduh leaning him back to a conservative stance. It is also probable he 
was either incapable of addressing these new questions or did not see them worthy of 
spending significant time on them. 
The second attempt is Muhammad Iqbal’s (1877-1937) The Reconstruction of 
Religious Thought in Islam.328 While Kenneth Cragg praises this work, claiming it is 
“the most ambitious and inventive adaptation of dogma attempted by a Muslim,”329 
Watt underscores the heavy influences of Western philosophers such as Bergson, 
Nietzsche and even Freud on Iqbal’s work.330 An examination of the book supports 
Watt’s view as the work is highly philosophical and often quotes the philosophers 
mentioned as well as being beyond the comprehension of most ordinary Muslims. 
Although Iqbal has become an inspiration for Indian Muslims mainly through his 
poetry, this work did not generate significant interest or influence among twentieth 
century Muslim scholarship. 
The third undertaking is Said Nursi’s Risale-i Nur Kulliyat (The Treatise of Light 
Collection), totalling more than 5,000 pages it stands out from the rest in volume and 
content. It is safe to state at this early stage that, unlike ‘Abduh, Nursi addressed just 
about all classical and contemporary theological problems with textual and rational 
arguments; and unlike Iqbal, Nursi does not overly philosophise on matters of 
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theology beyond the reach of ordinary Muslims. From a theological perspective, as 
Ibrahim M. Abū-Rabiʻ underscores, Nursi is “one of the most brilliant Islamic 
thinkers of the modern era.”331 Turner and Horkuc agree and further add that Nursi is 
the most significant and influential Muslim theologian to emerge in the modern era 
and break more than 500 years of theological drought.332 These major contentions 
and their truths will be tested in the forthcoming chapters. 
1.9 Conclusion 
This chapter defined theology as a rational endeavour to understand everything about 
God, from within a faith tradition and its scriptures, and in response to problems 
posed by the conditions of a particular time and place. While the rational aspect of 
theology makes it understandable and acceptable to humans, its response to the 
conditions of time and place is an attempt to make it relevant and applicable for each 
era. At the same time, its faithfulness to revealed texts keeps the integrity of theology 
within the faith tradition across centuries. These three aspects of theology combine to 
pose great risk and stimulus at the same time, creating the theologian’s tension in the 
mind of a pious Muslim scholar. The development of Islamic theology is the 
interplay of how the theologian’s tension manifested in each era and how each 
scholar responded to the forces and challenges at play.  
Islamic theology, hence, is largely a reactive discipline. In the beginning, simple 
theological propositions of the Qur’an and the personality of Prophet Muhammad 
were sufficient to persuade the first generation of Muslims. As Islam spread to the 
greater Middle East, the crucible of ancient religions and philosophies, Muslims 
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encountered numerous theological problems originating from these religions and 
philosophies. Scholars of the early era not only refrained from delving deep into 
these problems, they also discouraged their students and ordinary believers from 
engaging in them. However, the spirit of curiosity, competitive human nature, and 
natural resistance to blind faith and people’s demand for rationally satisfying answers 
combined to produce the need to preserve the fundamental tenets of Islam and 
respond to numerous theological questions through the framework of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah. Scholars who have overcome the theologian’s tension and responded to 
these challenges gave birth to the discipline of Islamic theology. 
Three centuries of intellectual struggle chiefly with Mu’tazilites, philosophers and 
other sects considered heretical, culminated in the Ash’arite and Maturidite Sunni 
schools of theology, designating the broad mainstream ahl al sunna wa al-jama’a. 
Through the work of subsequent theologians, especially al-Ghazālī, philosophical 
methods and its logical tools were domesticated within the ambit of Islamic theology. 
As a consequence, Islamic theology acquired a synthesis between reason (‘aql) and 
tradition (naql). It has evolved to attain a distinct scope, intellectual rigour and depth, 
and fresh expositions largely through the work of major Muslim scholars. 
From the eleventh century onwards, theology with its core texts became a central 
part of the madrasa education system. Although this ensured theology’s place as a 
core Islamic discipline, it also stifled its further development, coinciding with the 
troubled historical period of the Crusades, the Mongol invasion and the Sufi mass 
movement. Muslim scholars in each century continued to respond to circumstances 
of their era to preserve mainstream Islamic theology and to a limited degree made 
original theological contributions. 
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An important detail is that in pivotal times in Muslim history a different type of 
theologian, the mujaddidī line, emerged and was mainly represented by major figures 
such as al-Ghazālī and Sirhindi who approached Islamic theology from an 
interdisciplinary perspective coupled with the need to revive Islam within the 
Muslim masses. 
In comparison to previous centuries, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought 
with them unprecedented change in all facets of life and human thought. The modern 
period ushered European colonisation and witnessed the collapse of Muslim empires 
and classic Islamic civilisation. Enlightenment philosophy, scientific developments 
and Western modernity spawned new theological challenges for theologians from all 
faith traditions including Islam. Furthermore, secular modernist governments in 
Muslim societies persecuted religious activism along with influential Muslim 
scholars. Since the history of the development of Islamic theology demonstrates that 
Muslim scholars invariably responded to the circumstances and challenges of their 
time, the unique circumstances of the modern era also solicited a theological 
response. While there were notable responses, as will be explored in the next chapter, 
the most significant theological response came from Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. 
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2 X 
CHAPTER 2: THEOLOGICAL REVIVALISM OF NURSI 
2.1 Introduction 
Before delving into a critical examination of how Said Nursi expounds Islamic 
theology of God, it is important to give a historical context and rhetorical analysis of 
Nursi, his writings and nature of his activism. Who is Said Nursi as an Islamic 
scholar, theologian and modern intellectual? What is his role and position in Islamic 
scholarship having lived at a pivotal time in Muslim and world history? What were 
the exigencies that prompted him to write primarily on Islamic theology rather than 
other disciplines of Islamic scholarship?1 How were his books written and for which 
audience? What has been the results and impact of his writings and religious 
activism? These are the questions that will be explored in this chapter. 
Nursi’s 84 years of life span one of the most turbulent times in modern history and 
parallel the painful transition of the Ottoman Empire from a multi-faith and 
multicultural commonwealth to the nationalist secular Republic of Turkey.2 During 
the latter part of the Ottoman Empire (1900-1922), Nursi tried to revive Ottoman 
institutions, in particular pushing for educational reform.3 In the era of the early 
Turkish republic (1922-1950), the new government engaged in an ambitious and 
Jacobin secularisation program that essentially sidelined Islam from all aspects of life 
and oppressed religious leaders, including Nursi, in order to perpetuate its reforms 
and regime.4 As argued in this chapter, in the face of this new reality Nursi 
developed a distinctive and original approach to Islamic revivalism and chose a 
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theological revival method rather than legal reinterpretation (ijtihad), modern 
exegesis of the complete Qur’an or political struggle methods expounded by other 
Islamic revivalist leaders of the same era. Nursi chose this approach to deal with 
what I call the Islamic revivalist dilemma.  
Compelled by the intellectual and political circumstances of his time, Nursi’s choice 
of theological revival method in dealing with the revivalist dilemma has yielded two 
main outcomes. First, it has allowed him to maintain a non-political and non-violent 
line of religious activism under the nervous scrutiny of a hostile secular 
establishment and their charges of treason. Second, focusing his activism solely on 
revival of faith, Nursi has authored a large body of original Islamic theological works 
titled the Risale-i Nur (Treatises of Light) collection. 
2.2 Islamic Revivalism and the Revivalist Dilemma 
In the twentieth century, a complex web of interrelated factors mushroomed an 
unprecedented number of Islamic revivalist movements in the Muslim world. While 
most of these movements were highly localised with interests restricted to a 
particular country, a number have become transnational through the persuasive 
power of their appeal and the forces of globalisation.5 In this section, a theoretical 
framework for revivalist movements is provided to set an explanatory context to 
Islamic revivalism and the particular approach taken by Nursi to revive Islam in 
Muslim societies.  
There is a tendency to define Islamic revivalist movements as religious groups with 
political objectives who are active in the social and political space to inject Islamic 
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values and laws into society.6 In defining Islamic movements, Hakan Yavuz 
similarly highlights their role in the reconstitution of social and political space 
“through participating, influencing and controlling cultural, educational and 
economic spheres.”7 This is rather limiting as it either leaves out movements that are 
not political in nature or incorrectly classifies them within the political paradigm. A 
more generic definition would be: an Islamic revivalist movement (jama’ah) is a 
collective amalgam of hearts and minds of large numbers of Muslims with a sense of 
common purpose and focused on clearly articulated religious change in people and 
their lives.8 A transnational Islamic revivalist movement is the one that has spread 
from the country of origin across to other Muslim or non-Muslim societies other than 
just diaspora of the original country. 
Islam has a strong emphasis on community activism and social change. If Muslim 
believers, as good people, do not “enjoin good and prohibit evil”9 the society will 
eventually be corrupted. When corruption spreads unchecked, another equally 
important duty, islah, is placed on the shoulders of conscientious individuals.10 Islah 
means putting things right, rectifying and amending.11 Islah includes rebuilding a 
dysfunctional world, society and individuals.12 Notably, I have not used the word 
‘reform’ as a simile or definition for islah. Reform means to form something again, 
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sometimes completely deformed, whereas islah sets something right from its 
corrupted form to its original state and on a path toward goodness and perfection.13 
There is another equally important and related concept in Islam, tajdid (renewal or 
regeneration in religion). In a hadith report, Prophet Muhammad said, ‘Certainly, 
God will send for the community of believers (ummah) every hundred years 
someone who will renew (yujaddidu) their religion.’14 The mujaddid (renewer) 
effectively clears away interpretations that hinder Islam’s contemporary relevance 
and application. They look at the core sources of Islam (the Qur’an and Sunnah) for 
inspiration when addressing the major challenges affecting the entire Muslim world 
in their own time.15 In the process, the mujaddid imparts to Islam a fresh expression, 
yet self-evidently authentic and in a form that can be understood by scholars and 
non-scholars alike. Most significantly, while islah calls for change in societies, tajdid 
renews Islam for contemporary times and modern people. Revival (iḥyā) is an 
attempt to achieve both these functions at the same time. In effect, revival seeks a 
change in society through a renewal of Islam.16 
Over the last century, there has been more than sufficient reason for Muslim 
revivalist leaders to have acquired a strong desire for change. Major trigger factors 
include the invasion of Muslim lands by colonial forces;17 the abolition of the 
caliphate in 1924;18 the widespread erosion of Islam’s profile and prevalence in 
everyday life because of modern ideas and irreligious culture;19 the oppression of 
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religious Muslims by secular governments in most Muslim countries;20 the failure of 
secular and authoritarian regimes to bring progress and prosperity in twentieth 
century;21 the creation of Israel in 1948 and the resultant suffering of Palestinian 
Muslims;22 the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980; and the first Gulf War of 
1991.23 When compared with a sense of a glorious past and awareness of their 
current predicament, conscientious Muslim scholars or activist leaders feel a sense of 
responsibility to do something about their standing in the world. In short, Muslim 
revivalist leaders want to change the conditions in which individuals live and the 
circumstances in which societies develop.24 
The big question a revivalist leader must answer is: something has to change, but 
what is the most accurate diagnosis of the social plight and spiritual condition of 
Muslims and the resultant prognosis?25 This is where what I call the revivalist 
dilemma starts. The dilemma sits between state and religion; between religious 
activism and religious quietism; and between theology and treason. The dilemma is 
this: where does one start to revive Islam in the presence of an occupying force or an 
oppressive secular modernist regime? How does one respond to the inevitable 
persecution and charges of treason while preserving the moral high ground? At the 
same time, how does one achieve tangible results in restrictive circumstances in 
order to develop religious activism into a mass movement? The way revivalist 
founders dealt with this dilemma shaped not only the nature of respective Islamic 
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revivalist movements, but also the way Islam–West relations came to pass in the 
twentieth century.  
The movements that originated in Muslim countries during the twentieth century 
were generally of two types: secular modernist or Islamic religious. The former were 
established in response to the political struggle against colonisation and ensuing 
demand for independence.26 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938) in Turkey, Mustafa 
Kamil (1874-1908), Sa’d Zaghul (1860-1928), and Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872-1965) in 
Egypt, and Reza Khan (1877-1944) in Iran, usually the Western educated elite, all 
had secular solutions for their respective societies. While they all thought religion 
made people resist change and progress, it was Mustafa Kemal as the first leader to 
introduce radically secular paradigm for a Muslim country.27 Just as Europe 
progressed when it diminished Christianity’s grip on society and politics, the same 
hope existed for Muslim societies; therefore, Islam needs to be made consistent with 
European norms of philosophy, state and economy.28 Hence, secularists chose a 
political struggle and implemented aggressive secular policies and Westernisation 
programs when they gained power.29 Westernisation attempts linked with secular 
models have generally failed in their promise to bring freedom, progress and 
prosperity to their respective societies.30 In some respects, they caused the formation 
of Islamic movements and their political manifestations when Muslim scholars and 
activists felt Islam was in danger from the persecution of authoritarian secular 
governments.31 
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The Islamic response was led by Muslim scholars or Sufi masters and was generally 
supported by merchants, farmers, tribal leaders and masses of religious people.32 
Islamic revivalist movements, in turn, are usually one of two types. The first are the 
movements that essentially have a top-down approach; the second are the movements 
that have a bottom-up approach. The top-down approach is essentially the political 
approach to Islamicise society through political power.33 For these movements, the 
root problem is corrupt secular governments who persecute their people, waste the 
resources of the country and collaborate with imperialistic foreign powers to 
perpetuate their rule while colluding in the suffering of their people.34 These 
movements want to bring about change in society through the exercise of political 
power. The centrepiece of their vision is the creation of an Islamic state.35 In just 
about every Muslim country, political parties or movements professing an Islamic 
vision were established. Some came very close to power, like the Islamic Salvation 
Front party in Algeria in 1991,36 while others came to power only to lose it very 
quickly, such as Erbakan’s Refah Party in Turkey, under strong opposition from the 
incumbent military and bureaucratic elite.37 There is also the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
(Party of Liberation), established in 1953, which has become trans-national although 
it has a relatively small number of active members. Hizb ut-Tahrir argues that, in 
order to achieve justice and true freedom from colonial powers and Western 
interference in Muslim countries, there has to be an Islamic balance of power. This 
could only be achieved if the whole Muslim world was led by a single caliph. For 
this to be realised, an Islamic state must be created and Shari’ah must be 
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implemented in every Muslim country.38 This openly declared agenda invariably 
makes these groups a prime target for suppression by governments in Muslim 
countries, while they make the West nervous about the security consequences of such 
a prospect.39 
The revivalist movements that have a bottom-up approach for change have been far 
more influential. As Fazlur Rahman points out, their views have the centrality of the 
human being and the transformation of individuals.40 Only if individuals are 
transformed spiritually and socially can the society at large make progress. As people 
transform society, the changes sought are far more long-lasting than changes brought 
through political means.41 
The revivalist movements with a bottom-up approach exist in two main forms. The 
first are those that, after becoming mass movements, have a tendency to become 
politicised with the confidence of public success or, alternatively, they flirt with 
violence under increased political pressure and persecution.42 Examples are the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of Egypt established in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna (1906-
1949) and its Palestinian offshoot Hamas established in 1988 by Ahmad Yassin 
(1937-2004). The MB initially started as a spiritual and social movement, but was 
heavily persecuted by the military and secular governments from the 1940s onwards 
when it became large and influential.43 In the twenty-first century, MB held seats in 
the Egyptian parliament and produced the first elected president, Muhammad Morsi, 
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after the Arab Spring revolution of 2011.44 Similarly, Hamas led a successful charity, 
social services and educational campaign for Palestinian refugees in Gaza and the 
West Bank.45 It famously inspired the intifada of stone-throwing youths against 
Israeli tanks.46 Under pressure, a powerful armed wing called the ‘Izz al-Din al-
Qassam Forces47 engaged in suicide bombings.48 Hamas later established a political 
party and won elections in Gaza and the West Bank.49  
Across the other end of the world, Indonesia’s Nahdatul ‘Ulama (Union of Scholars, 
established in 1926) movement entered the first democratic elections in 1998 and its 
leader Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009) became Indonesia’s first democratically 
elected president, even though Sufi practices of spiritual transformation lie at the 
core of the teachings of the movement.50 Similarly, the powerful Muhammadiya 
movement (established in 1912 by Hajji Ahmad Dahlan) in Indonesia promoted 
education by establishing schools and espoused a personal transformation of an 
individual by practising Islam. Yet, the movement also entered into the political 
process by establishing a political party.51 So, the usual tendency is for large bottom-
up revivalist movements to become political at some point in their evolution.  
In contrast, there are exceptions and these form the second type of bottom-up 
movements that remain resolutely spiritual and social despite becoming a mass 
movement with widespread potential political appeal. The notable transnational 
examples are the Tabligh Jamaat established in 1927 by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas 
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in the Indian Subcontinent region52 and the Nur Movement established by Said Nursi 
in 1925, with its offshoot the Hizmet Movement of Turkey.53 At least in their 
literature and rhetoric, these movements have a politically neutral stance and 
staunchly stay away from violence, even if their movements are persecuted. They 
focus on reawakening the spiritual conscience of their followers and direct their 
energy to the service of Islam and humanity. They view politics as a hindrance in 
achieving this fundamental objective.54 Although rare, these examples illustrate that 
it is possible for Islamic movements to stay out of politics, and therefore violence, 
and remain a mass movement. 
With the definition of the revivalist dilemma and analysis of the types of Islamic 
revivalist movements in mind, Nursi’s theological revival method can now be 
examined in detail. Such critical exploration will produce two outcomes. First, it will 
show how difficult it is to deal with the revivalist dilemma while remaining on a high 
moral ground and resisting temptation for armed struggle even in self-defence. 
Second, it will enable an understanding of Nursi’s original theological approach to 
Islamic revivalism and how this has produced an original and fresh expression of 
Islamic theology. 
2.3 Old Said: Egressing as a Saintly Scholar 
Said Nursi divided his life into two distinct phases55 – Old Said (1876-1920) and 
New Said (1920-1960).56 According to him, Old Said was young, courageous and 
famous, involved in society and was politically active. Whereas New Said was older 
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and wiser, more spiritual and reserved, and preferred seclusion instead of public life 
and acclaim.57 Biographer Şükran Vahide adds a third period (1950-1960) during 
which Nursi had limited involvement in politics.58 Zeki Saritoprak notes this was “at 
least at the level of voting,”59 while Mustafa Akyol argues that Nursi’s limited 
involvement in politics did not go beyond his support for democracy introduced to 
Turkey in 1950.60 It is safe to assume that Old Said’s success as a scholar and 
disappointment as a social and political activist were preparation for his later life as 
New Said when his theological approach to Islamic revivalism crystallised. The 
reputation he earned as an exceptional Muslim scholar, a national hero and a saintly 
master has been the foundation on which he began his launch of Islamic revival not 
only in Turkey but for the entire Muslim world.  
The pedigree of a Muslim scholar is immensely important. Khaled Abou El Fadl 
notes that Muslims generally look for proof of knowledge and better than average, 
almost saintly, piety in their religious scholars and leaders before they put their trust 
in them and follow their teachings.61 Sound knowledge and saintly piety sit 
concomitant to ensure that trusting Muslim masses are not intentionally deceived. 
Although El Fadl critiques them as insufficient to constitute the dynamics of 
scholarly inquiry,62 they were not only important criteria people looked for in Nursi’s 
era, but also they remain as standards Muslims expect from their scholars. Added to 
knowledge and piety, any family ties to previous great Muslim scholars or Prophet 
Muhammad would be a major plus. Hence, there is a need to examine the early life 
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of Nursi and look for such a pedigree as these considerations would make him a 
prime candidate as a revival leader. A second focus at this point is the intellectual, 
social and political circumstances in which Nursi began his activism in his early life. 
The period from 1900 to 1922 was turbulent in all considerations. As will be 
discussed, tumultuous events of the era coupled with his personal sense of calling, 
inspired in three key dreams, combined to inspire fervent religious activism in Nursi. 
Nursi was born in 187663 to a peasant family in the village of Nurs, hence his 
surname Nursi. He was later known by various titles including Said-i Kurdi,64 which 
led scholars to put his ethnicity as Kurdish. Nursi’s ethnicity has been a source of 
debate in modern Turkey. Recent research conducted by historian Ahmet Akgunduz 
in Ottoman archives puts Nursi as a direct descendent of the Prophet Muhammad.65 
Akgunduz has produced archival records66 putting Said Nursi, on his father Mirza’s 
side, as a direct descendent of Prophet’s first grandson Hasan through Abd al-Qadir 
Jilani (1077-1166)67 and, on his mother Nuriye’s side, as a direct descendent of 
Husain, the second grandson of the Prophet.68 This makes Said Nursi ethnically Arab 
although he may have other ethnicities mixed in his family line over time. This is a 
significant finding and puts Nursi on a direct prophetic family lineage. This was 
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known by the people of eastern Anatolia who have called Nursi Seyda,69 a title used 
in the region referring to people from the family of the Prophet.  
Nursi began his education at the age of nine and from a very early age detested being 
dominated and displayed independence.70 His early childhood education is 
characterised by arguments with fellow students and teachers over unfair institutional 
practices. Moving between various madrasas due to his independent nature, he did 
not study more than Arabic grammar and syntax for several years, retreating back to 
his village in Nurs after every setback.71  
This pattern of withdrawal continued until one night, at the age of twelve, he saw 
Prophet Muhammad in a dream: It was the Day of Judgment and as the dead were 
being resurrected Nursi felt a desire to meet Prophet Muhammad. While wondering 
how he could do this, it occurred to him to go and sit by the bridge of sirat72, for 
everyone had to pass over it. So he went and waited by the bridge and there he met 
and kissed the hands of all the prophets. Finally, Prophet Muhammad arrived. Nursi 
kissed his hands and pleaded for knowledge. The Prophet said: “Knowledge of the 
Qur’an will be granted to you on the condition you ask no questions to any of my 
community (ummah).”73 This was a stipulation he would never violate later in life. 
This was the first of the three significant dreams geared to shape his life direction 
and his work on Islamic revival.  
Excited and inspired by this dream, the first task for Nursi was to acquire knowledge 
despite his unsettled personality. The method to follow was to seek answers but 
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never to question people. It was in the small village of Dogubayazit where he met 
Sheikh Mehmed Jalili and dedicated himself to learning foundational religious 
sciences and texts studied in madrasas at the time.74 Owing to his photographic 
memory and exceptional cognitive skills, Nursi quickly gained his diploma, 
memorising and learning classic texts in just three months what would normally take 
average students fifteen years to study.75 Nursi was fourteen years old when he 
graduated as a child prodigy.76 Serif Mardin questioned what this graduation equates 
to in terms of educational standard, buts adds that “in time he became extremely 
knowledgeable on religious matters, especially in hadith.”77 While the madrasa 
education system was the only one available to Nursi, he was frustrated by its slow 
pace and narrow curriculum. 
After graduation, Nursi travelled and spent time with local scholars. Biographers 
note young Nursi’s gifted abilities attracted other scholars’ attention and jealousy 
alike as his growing popularity among ordinary people became noticeable.78 Nursi 
answered all questions presented to him by the scholars, defeated his opponents in 
religious debates (munāzarāt), and established himself as a scholar of a high standing 
at a very young age. It was due to his remarkable intelligence and knowledge that he 
was given the title ‘Bediuzzaman’ meaning ‘wonder of the age’ by the famous 
scholar of the region Molla Fethullah Efendi as he found him resembling 
Bediuzzaman Hamadānī (968-1008) in intellect.79 Although there is some tendency 
to hyperbole in Islamic biographical writings, when many exceptional episodes in 
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relation to Nursi are considered together, it is quite plausible to think that he started 
influencing people around him at a very early age. 
Nursi’s scholarly debates continued in various towns and subsequently in the city of 
Mardin.80 In Mardin, Nursi gained a glimpse of broader issues confronting the 
Muslim world when he encountered two passing travellers, one of whom was 
influenced with the ideas of influential nineteenth century reformer Jamāl al-Dīn al-
Afghānī (1838-1898)81 and the other was a member of the Sanūsī Sufi order82 – 
which provided a religious framework for the formation of a modern nation state in 
North Africa.83 Al-Afghānī was promoting unity under the flag of Islam to energise 
the masses and Muslim rulers in order to counter colonial forces.84 Nursi, in his 
defence speech85 of 1909, mentions al-Afghānī and Muhammad ‘Abduh as his 
predecessors on the idea of Islamic Unity.86 Vahide contends that encounter with al-
Afghānī’s follower was an important trigger for Nursi to be aware of issues related to 
European imperialism and colonisation, and ideas of Islamic unity or pan-Islamism.87 
Vahide adds that the Islamic Unity concept Nursi proposed was not a political unity 
but a building of unified consciousness for progress.88 Serif Mardin notes a point of 
departure between al-Afghānī and Nursi, Nursi has abandoned the “instrumental 
stance he had assumed at the beginning.” In any case, the encounter in the city of 
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Mardin was a significant step for Nursi to be aware of a world outside of his native 
eastern Anatolia. 
Nursi’s mention of al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh shows he was at the very least aware of 
their activism, but there is no premise to suggest he was significantly influenced by 
their ideas. This is despite the fact that al-Afghāni had a wide influence in Muslim 
heartlands.89 ‘Abduh, the prime pupil of al-Afghāni, and ‘Abduh’s student Rashīd 
Ridā (1865-1935) were to follow a different trajectory for pre-WWI Islamic 
revivalism compared to Nursi. Esposito suggests the central theme in their reform 
proposal was opening the gate of ijtihād.90 Hashim Kamali agrees and says, for 
‘Abduh and Ridā, the solution to the problem of the Muslim world lay in new 
ijtihād.91 For them, society changed rapidly introducing new problems and issues to 
deal with which were not in the older legal books. Further, the cultural and social 
setting also changed, requiring revisiting the legal solutions of older times.92 In polar 
contrast, Nursi argued this was not the time for opening the gate of ijtihad, putting 
aside any hope of achieving positive reform, and an attempt at new ijtihad would 
bring a flood of destruction under harsh circumstances.93 As the subsequent 
discussion will show, Nursi proposed an educational solution to the deeper problems 
of ignorance plaguing Muslim societies in the late stages of the Ottoman Empire.  
In 1892, Nursi was expelled under armed guard from the city of Mardin on account 
of his spreading disruptive ideas relating to constitutionalism and freedom.94 On his 
journey he asked the guards to unlock his handcuffs in order to have ablution and 
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pray. When they refused, as the news spread, the locks opened miraculously and 
Nursi performed his obligatory prayers. The guards became his students.95 This 
incident was seen as wonder-working (karāma),96 quickly spread among people and 
earned Nursi a reputation as a Muslim saint.97 Şerif Mardin affirms it was the saintly 
reputation that became a key part in Nursi’s popularity later in life.98 Oral culture and 
quick transmission of news among tribes helped spread his reputation. Karāma 
narrative played a significant role at this juncture. 
It was on account of his reputation for extraordinary knowledge and now saintly 
piety that, in Bitlis and subsequently in Van, Nursi received patronage with various 
governors in return for providing religious education to their children.99 During his 
stay in Van, he continued to study Islamic disciplines and memorised additional 
classical texts to complete the total to 90 key Islamic texts committed to memory, all 
of which, as he claimed, ascended him to the “truths of the Qur’an.”100 
In Van, through discussions and debates with state officials, Nursi also became 
aware of the negative influences of Westernisation and secularisation on the educated 
upper classes and their blaming of the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire on 
Islam.101 He also discovered that classical arguments put to refute the doubts of 
unbelievers were not sufficient for this new breed of modern intellectuals as they 
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seemed to argue through science rather than ignorance.102 He realised he had to study 
science and philosophy, similar to al-Ghazālī in the twelfth century, to refute their 
arguments against faith and religion.103 During his stay in the residence of Tahir 
Pasha, he took advantage of the extensive library available to him and broadened his 
knowledge of disciplines including history, geography, mathematics, geology, 
physics, chemistry, astronomy and philosophy.104 Nursi’s experience in Van and 
exposure to science crystallised his thinking that students should be enlightened “by 
demonstrating the truths of religion in the manner most appropriate to the 
understanding of that century”105 – a pivotal approach he would subsequently follow 
in his theological revival activism. 
Dazzled by the scientific, industrial, and military success of Europe, a significant and 
influential segment in the Ottoman intellectual echelon was increasingly sidelining 
Islam and blaming it for the decline of the Muslim world.106 Influential figures such 
as Baha Tevfik (1881-1916), Tevfik Fikret (1867-1915), Süleyman Sırrı (1874-
1925), Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1931) and many other Young Turks107 were 
influenced by social Darwinism and positivism108 and considered Islam as an 
impediment for social, intellectual and political progress.109 Baha Tevfik imported 
the scientific materialism of Ludwig Büchner (1824-1899) to the intellectual circles 
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of Istanbul.110 Tevfik Fikret would go further and blasphemously declare the Qur’an 
as an “antiquated book” with its pages akin to “cemeteries of ideas.”111 In their view, 
the solution was to abandon Islam and embrace Europe and its progressive 
civilisation. The intellectual and civilisational gravity of Europe was so strong that 
journalist Hüseyin Cahit (1875-1957) noted the inescapable civilisational event-
horizon when he wrote in 1898, “We are bound, whether we like it or not, to 
Europeanise.”112 In a similar tone, the Western view that science and religion are 
inherently in conflict was imported to the intellectual coffee table discussions of late 
Ottoman Istanbul.113 
Nursi argued the opposite: the decline of the Muslim world was because principles of 
Islam were already abandoned in the lives of individuals and society, and they had to 
be brought back. Further, there was no inherent incompatibility between science and 
religion.114 The problem was that scientific knowledge and religious sciences were 
independently studied in separate institutions. So, unless people were educated in 
both religious and modern sciences, they were destined to oscillate between religious 
bigotry and arrogant atheism, and never attain the required wisdom.115 Nursi 
proposed an educational reform that would combine modern and religious sciences 
with the view that both would reinforce one another and provide Muslims with the 
conditioning to reverse the decline of the Ottoman Empire.116 Nursi wrote: 
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The religious sciences are the light of the conscience and the modern sciences 
are the light of the reason; the truth becomes manifest through the combining of 
the two. The students’ endeavour will take flight on these two wings. When 
they are separated it gives rise to bigotry in the one, and wiles and scepticism in 
the other.117 
The first institution that would implement these reforms was Nursi’s proposed 
Islamic university, Medresetü’z-Zehra, to be situated strategically in eastern Anatolia 
(near the city of Van) where Turkish, Arab, Kurdish and Persian populations 
intersected.118 In his vision, this university would rival al-Azhar University in 
reputation and influence, and serve the world of Islam.119 
Just about this time, Nursi saw the second key dream120 that was to shape his 
direction. He saw in the dream Mount Ararat exploding and rocks scattering to every 
corner of the world. An “important person” commanded him to proclaim the 
miraculousness of the Qur’an to the world.121 He interpreted the dream to mean a 
cataclysmic event would occur and the protective walls around the Qur’an would 
collapse to expose the truths of the Qur’an to assault and he would be given the duty 
and responsibility to protect these truths, even though he was not worthy of it.122 
Shortly after the dream, Tahir Pasha showed Nursi a newspaper article that reported 
a speech delivered by William Gladstone, the British Secretary for Colonies, at the 
House of Commons. Gladstone reportedly said, “so long as the Muslims have the 
Qur’an we shall be unable to dominate them. We must either take it from them or 
make them lose their love of it.”123 Vahide notes that Nursi vowed resolutely, “I will 
prove and demonstrate to the world that the Qur’an is an undying, inextinguishable 
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sun!”124 Nursi later remarked that this event caused a major shift in his thought, 
making him realise that all his learning and experience prepared him to “understand 
the Qur’an and prove its truths.”125  
One way to do this was to embark on a journey to Istanbul to see the Ottoman Sultan 
in order to gain official support and funding for his proposed university, 
Medresetü’z-Zehra, and a series of reform proposals.126 His observations in Istanbul 
confirmed his earlier thoughts. Istanbul had two types of educational institutions: 
missionary schools and secular state schools under government mandated reforms 
focusing on European languages and modern sciences on one hand; and madrasas 
delivering religious education with a narrow curriculum designed to fulfil traditional 
religious and legal roles on the other.127 This solidified his resolve to eliminate the 
duality in education as this was producing a population with diametrically opposing 
worldviews, socially fragmenting an already politically and ethnically polarised 
society.  
Following the military coup organised by the Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP) against Caliph Abdulhamid in 1908, 31-year-old Nursi delivered his ‘Address 
of Freedom’ in Istanbul and Salonika, calling for constitutionalism and freedom.128 
Subsequently, Nursi became very active in political and social life, addressing 
gatherings, publishing numerous articles and delivering speeches. He also became an 
active member of various religious societies, including the Society of Muhammad 
whose members, including Nursi, were accused of inciting a counter CUP revolt 
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known as the ‘March 31st Incident’.129 Surprisingly, Nursi was acquitted after his 
defiant defence speech and on account of his attempts at quelling the revolt.130 
Unable to find support for his project in Istanbul, Said travelled throughout the 
eastern provinces explaining that the principles underlying constitutionalism and 
freedom were not contrary to the teachings of Islam.131 The questions that were put to 
him were collated and published in two volumes: Muḥākamāt (The Analyses/ 
Reasoning) and Munāẓarāt (The Dialogues/Discussions), published in 1911 and 
1913 respectively.132 The Muḥākamat is an important original work outlining the 
principles of Qur’anic exegesis.133 Just like Muhammad ‘Abduh before him, Nursi 
saw a need to reinterpret the entire Qur’an; however, unlike ‘Abduh, he wanted to 
prove the “truths of belief” by a blended method of science and religion that would 
address the needs and thinking of modern humans.134 His plan was to write 60 
volumes of Qur’anic exegesis.135  
In 1911, Said visited Damascus where he was asked to deliver a Friday sermon at the 
famous Umayyad Mosque to a congregation of more than 10,000 people and close to 
100 scholars.136 In this sermon, Said diagnosed despair as the greatest ailment of 
Muslims and discussed in detail the imminent rise of Islam.137 He identified 
ignorance, poverty, and political and social fragmentation as the enemies of Islam 
and three root causes for the decline of the Islamic civilisation.138 In addition, he had 
identified six dire sicknesses in the Muslim community. First, the rise of despair and 
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hopelessness in social life; second, the death of truthfulness in social and political 
life; third, love of enmity; fourth, not knowing the luminous bonds that bind the 
believers to one another; fifth, despotism, which spreads like contagious diseases; 
and sixth, restricting work and endeavour to only what is personally beneficial.139 
The cures for these diseases were “taken from the pharmacy of the Qur’an.”140 
Explaining each in detail he offered hope, solidarity, honesty, mutual love, 
brotherhood and Islamic unity achieved through the principle of consultation. He 
believed Muslims have hope because Islam has the capacity to progress in material 
and non-material areas at the same time. He reminded the audience that Muslims are 
students of proof, and therefore belief should be approached through reason and 
conviction over blind faith.141 Nursi’s diagnosis and prognosis at this sermon was 
published immediately as the Damascus Sermon.142 This sermon showed Said’s fame 
and reputation in the Arab world in addition to Ottoman heartlands. 
Following the Damascus trip, an opportunity came up to achieve his dream of 
establishing a model institution of higher learning. When Sultan and Caliph Mehmed 
Rashad (1844-1918) set out on his journey to Balkans, Said was invited along with 
representatives of the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire.143 During this 
journey, he persuaded the caliph to approve his university project and was granted 
large sum of money.144  
Unfortunately for Nursi, WWI broke out as the foundations of the university were 
being laid.145 He became an adjunct lieutenant colonel of a volunteer force146 on the 
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eastern front composed of four to five thousand men, mostly volunteers and his 
students.147 As the war with the Russians continued, Nursi started to write his 
Qur’anic exegesis (tafsīr) work. He could only, however, manage to write exegesis 
of the first short chapter and up to the sixteenth verse of the second chapter.148 This 
work was to be printed after the war as a volume, ishārāt al-ījāz (The Signs of 
Miraculousness). During the defence of the city Bitlis, Said Nursi was wounded, 
captured by the Russian army, and taken to a war camp in Kostroma about 300km 
north-east of Moscow.149  
Up until this point in his life, Nursi had been involved in religious, social and 
political activism to effect change in the late Ottoman society building on his 
reputation as a saintly scholar linked to the lineage of Prophet Muhammad with 
exceptional knowledge and personal piety. His analysis of the circumstances of the 
Muslim world and the problems it faced resulted in an educational reform solution 
where science and religion would be taught in tandem. This was rather a unique 
solution to ones advocated by reformers like ‘Abduh and Ridā. Events rapidly 
unfolded as the Ottoman Empire collapsed to give birth to a European nation in the 
form of a new secular Turkish Republic, just as Nursi famously predicted in 1908,150 
and it marked a new turning point for him. 
2.4 Transition from Old Said to New Said 
Said’s reflections as a prisoner of war and the Ottoman Empire’s loss in WWI were 
pivotal for him to examine everything about his life, the state of the Muslim world, 
and what has to be done to change its seemingly irreversible decline. This was a 
                                                                                                                                          
146 Saritoprak, “Bediuzzaman Said Nursi,” 397. 
147 Vahide and Abu-Rabiʻ, Intellectual Biography, 109. 
148 Saritoprak, “Bediuzzaman Said Nursi,” 399. 
149 Vahide and Abu-Rabiʻ, Intellectual Biography, 125. 
150 Ibid, 42. 
 104 
defining moment for him and many other Muslim revivalist leaders of the era. 
Almost all modern Islamic revivalist movements influential in Muslim world today 
emerged at this time, especially after the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924. 
Between 1917 and 1925, Said underwent a spiritual transformation and crystallised 
his method of theological revival of Islam instead of a political vision and solution.  
Nursi began his spiritual transformation while in the war camp in Kostroma. He 
received permission to attend a small mosque on the banks of River Volga.151 As he 
narrated in Flashes later,152 one night at the mosque he experienced the inevitability 
of his mortality and intense feelings of powerlessness and weakness. He said the 
experiences and sense of loss of WWI made him feel as old as 80 even though he 
was only 40 years old.153 He makes a resolution that for the rest of his life he will 
stay out of social and political life, and prefer a life of spiritual solitude in a cave. 
Sometime after this resolution, taking advantage of the 1917 Communist Revolution 
in Russia, Nursi escaped and travelled alone through Eastern Europe to Germany and 
from there to Istanbul.154  
He was received in Istanbul as a war hero. Enver Pasha (1881-1922), the Minister of 
War and one of the leaders of the Young Turks movement, appointed Nursi to work 
as an Islamic expert at the highest religious institution in the Ottoman Empire, Dār 
al-Hikma al-Islāmiyya (Islamic House of Wisdom),155 which was charged with the 
provision of solutions to legal, ethical and theological problems of the Muslim 
world.156 Nursi reluctantly took up the position.157 Enver Pasha also published the 
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first volume of Said’s Qur’anic commentary, ishārāt al-ījāz, written during WWI.158 
Said’s scholarly contributions continued with the books Sunuhāt (Thoughts, 1920), 
Hakikat Çekirdekleri (Flowers of Truths, 1920), Nokta (Point, 1921), Rumuz 
(Indication, 1922), and Ishārāt (Signs, 1923). These works critically analysed 
reasons for the Ottoman loss and the failure of Young Turks to integrate Islam in 
their policies.159  
This was a time of soul searching for the entire Muslim world and people demanded 
answers. At this pivotal time, Nursi saw the third key dream that gave him a sense of 
responsibility in facing the current challenge. In the dream, he was summoned to a 
great council made up of representatives of leading figures of Islam from each 
century. He is asked to take a seat as the “representative of the century of 
destruction.”160 He is questioned on the reasons why the Ottoman Empire lost WWI 
and what was to happen now. Interestingly, Nursi gives positive explanations for the 
defeat and does a critique of capitalism and imperialism, and exhorts the superiority 
of Qur’anic values and principles under the nods of approval from the council 
members.161 An expert on Nursi’s work Abdullah Aymaz in his commentary to 
Sunuhāt asserts the expression “representative of the century of destruction” is an 
indication that Nursi is the Mujaddid (Renewer) for the twentieth century.162 This 
contention is important as Nursi’s followers have accepted him as the Renewer of 
Islam and the Muslim world in the twentieth century.163 Vahide maintains there were 
independent scholars – she gives three prominent examples – who conceded that 
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Nursi was the Mujaddid of the twentieth century after they marvelled his works and 
acknowledged the sacrificial struggle he led in the name of Islam in the post-1925 
period.164  
With the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire and occupation of Istanbul, the very 
seat of the caliphate, almost the entire Muslim world was either colonised or under 
occupation of seven European powers – Britain, Russia, France, Germany, Belgium, 
the Netherlands or Italy.165 Only some parts of Anatolia, Turkey, and mountainous 
areas of Afghanistan were spared from colonial forces. Iran was not colonised but 
caught between the competing interests of Russia and Britain, and eventually was 
carved into their northern and southern mandate respectively.166 The impact of 
European colonisation on the Muslim world cannot be overstated. The entire Islamic 
civilisation, with its geography, social and political relations, educational, economic 
and cultural institutions, were permanently altered under colonial forces.167  
However, there was a greater calamity that attacked the very core of religion. 
Materialistic and positivistic philosophy and its challenging assertions about faith 
were now threatening Islam after they delivered a devastating blow to Christianity in 
Europe.168 Charles Lyell’s (1797-1875) discovery of the geological age of the earth 
as billions of years old exposed the falsity of the traditional 7000-year-old 
explanation pervasive in the churches.169 Charles Darwin’s (1809-1882) theory of 
evolution explained the origins and forms of biological life on earth.170 Émile 
Durkheim (1858-1917) extended the evolutionary concepts of natural selection to 
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social life and society,171 while Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) maintained that religion 
was an “illusion” in a sense that it was a product of human wishes.172 Freud also tied 
human behaviour to sexual impulses.173 The rather ironic proclamation of the 
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) that “God is dead” was taken 
literally and accepted as fact by intellectuals.174 In the West, everything was now 
explained by science and nothing was deemed to be beyond its explanatory power.175 
As discussed earlier, materialistic thought and positivistic philosophy, and the 
resultant religious indifference, spread to the upper echelon of Muslim intellectuals 
and bureaucracy. The cream of the Muslim intellectual class and its elite were in a 
state of cognitive dissidence of being infatuated with European success and the 
humiliation of military defeats delivered under the crushing military might of the 
same Europe. 
In this historic backdrop and dramatic intellectual conditions, the inner 
transformation of Nursi, already commenced in Kostroma, continued during his stay 
in Istanbul under British occupation. Nursi’s inner struggles would take him to places 
of solitude in the high hills of Bosphorous in search of a spiritual remedy for himself 
and the Muslim world.176 Vahide suggests that Nursi’s transformation occurred in 
three stages: first, he realised the deficiency of philosophy and reason alone in 
attaining enlightenment; second, he overcame the limiting forces of the ego; and 
third, he understood that he should take the Qur’an as his sole master.177 My analysis 
shows he first undergoes self-transformation through a process of self-criticism. 
                                                 
171 Özalp, Islam between Tradition and Modernity, xx. 
172 Kenny, Western Philosophy, 993. 
173 Ibid, 812. 
174 Armstrong, The Case for God, 246. 
175 Özalp, Islam between Tradition and Modernity, xx. 
176 Turner and Horkuc, Said Nursi, 23. 
177 Vahide and Abu-Rabiʻ, Intellectual Biography, 166. 
 108 
Second, he looks for a way to address the spiritual and intellectual challenge facing 
Muslims at the time; and third, he resolves to follow a Qur’anic theological method. 
The first phase was triggered when he was in a state of reflection in solitude on a 
hilltop and working intermittently as a member of the Dār al-Hikma al-Islāmiyya 
where he was expected to find solutions to the debilitating problems facing the 
Muslim world. Nursi fortuitously came across ‘Abd al-Qadir Jilānī’s Futuh al-Ghayb 
(Opening the Unseen) and started to read it.178 He was struck by the introductory line 
anta fī dār al-hikma fa utlub tabība yudāwī qalbak (You are in dār al-hikma,179 so 
search for a doctor to cure your heart).180 Nursi later wrote in Lemālar (Flashes) that 
he took these words as more than coincidence and assumed they addressed him 
directly. He felt he was more diseased spiritually inside than the world outside he 
desperately tried to fix.181 He added that reading the book was extremely painful for 
his pride and he had to stop half-way through it.182 When the initial wounds healed, 
he fully read the book. Nursi remarked that Jilani performed a spiritual operation on 
him, curing him of his inner spiritual diseases.183  
In the second phase, having somewhat cured his spiritual crisis, Nursi turned his 
attention to the pertinent way to reach haqīqa (reality) not just for himself but for all 
Muslims in the modern era.184 Put differently, he was looking for the shortest way to 
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facilitate conviction in faith and a thorough understanding of Islam that could stand 
firm against intellectual currents and ideologies.185 
He first turned to philosophy. While previously he thought philosophy and sciences 
could be an instrument of spiritual enlightenment and spiritual progress, and 
therefore strengthen Islam, he now discovered that “their spiritually conducive 
benefits were few and harms were many.”186 In his view, philosophy darkened his 
mind and muddied his soul, and only a flash of light emerging from the sun of lā 
ilāha illallah (there is no god but Allah) illuminated his inner world and cleared 
away the obstacles to spiritual enlightenment.187 Importantly, Nursi contended that 
philosophy was for the elite, not for the ordinary people. Even the geniuses could 
only go half-way in the discovery of truth by reason alone.188 Nursi was not 
necessarily against reason, as will be discussed in the next chapter, rather he thought 
philosophy could not help ordinary Muslim masses. 
He next turned to Sufism and reviewed it in detail. Although it was a “luminous 
way,” in Nursi’s assessment, it required great caution and only very few and the elite 
could go all the way.189 He reasoned that a person cannot enter paradise without 
belief, but many have achieved salvation without Sufism, after all “man cannot live 
without bread but he can live without fruit. Sufism is the fruit, truths of Islam the 
basic sustenance.”190 To further drive home his point, Nursi claimed that cultivating a 
revival of belief was the most important duty. Even if the great Sufi masters of the 
past, ‘Abd al-Qadir Jilānī, Baha al-Dīn Naqshband or Ahmad Sirhindīi, were alive 
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today they would exert all their effort to “strengthening the truths of belief.”191 The 
implication of this contention is that, in Nursi’s view, these great Sufi masters would 
not practice and promote Sufism but rather work to revive faith (theological revival) 
as a necessity of the era. Vahide notes that Nursi never joined a Sufi order or 
formally followed a specific Sufi master.192 Mardin argues that rather than Sufism 
“unicity of God” formed the centrality in Nursi’s thought at this time and later 
became a guiding principle in his Islamic revivalism.193 
So, if philosophy (reason alone) and Sufism (heart alone) cannot help most people, 
what will? While pondering this question, Nursi came across a letter in the Mektūbāt 
(The Letters) of Ahmad Sirhindī.194 The letter begins with the address, “Letter to 
Mirza Bediuzzaman.” Nursi is astonished for his father’s name is Mirza and his 
epithet is Bediuzzaman. The letter insisted to “take only one qiblah (direction),” that 
is, only one teacher.195 Once again Nursi took the advice as if directed to himself and 
sought someone to follow.196 He said, after long search and inability to find a perfect 
guide, he realised all great reformers and scholars received inspiration directly from 
the Qur’an, so if he followed only the Qur’an he would find the “source of all 
rivers.”197 Nursi concluded, “So I sought help from the Qur’an, and praise be to God, 
the Risale-i Nur was bestowed on me, which is a safe, short way inspired by the 
Qur’an for the believers of the present time.”198 This is a strong indication that Nursi 
thought none of the scholars or major figures of the past provided a complete 
solution to the challenge facing his era. Since, in his view, the Risale-i Nur as an 
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inspiration from the Qur’an has met the spiritual need and challenge of the time, and 
since the Risale-i Nur is largely a theological work, the solution Nursi proposed and 
implemented was a theological revival approach. 
This completed the third and final stage of Nursi’s enlightenment and transformation 
in becoming the New Said. He was spiritually cured; he discovered the futility of 
philosophy and shortcomings of Sufism in helping the greatest numbers of people 
attaining salvation; and the Qur’an and its theological haqīqāt (truths) were the only 
way to follow to bring people out of the spiritual and intellectual furrow they were 
in.  
Vahide maintains the new way discovered by the New Said constituted access to the 
“essence of reality” by the adjuvant use of the mind and heart, and illuminated by the 
Qur’an. Mardin argues that the hallmark of the New Said was that he appealed 
directly to the faith of the people rather than working through political structures like 
the Old Said had done.199 So, perhaps unintentionally, Nursi applied the utilitarian 
principle of ‘happiness for the greatest number of people’ to theology as ‘access to 
conviction in faith and salvation for the greatest number of people.’ Since philosophy 
and Sufism were elitist by their nature, only an approach synthesising both reason 
and faith (for Nursi, the Qur’anic approach) could provide the greatest spiritual and 
intellectual benefit for most people. 
As Nursi endured his spiritual and intellectual transformation, the Turkish nation was 
also fighting its war of independence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (1881-
1938) that would ultimately transform the frail Ottoman Empire into the new Turkish 
Republic. In 1922, Mustafa Kemal personally invited Nursi to Ankara, the new 
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capital, to join the independence movement. On arrival, Nursi quickly realised the 
new leadership had no interest in Islam, they were lax in their religious practices, and 
there was an undercurrent of materialistic and positivistic ideologies.200 
In response, Nursi released a persuasive article addressing the members of 
parliament urging them to be firm on their daily prayers as the leaders of the nation 
and protectors of the caliphate. As a result, more members started to pray, forcing the 
enlargement of the parliament prayer room. Furious at this development, Mustafa 
Kemal confronted Nursi in the presence of other members, “Hoja Hoja! We called 
you here in order to benefit from your elevated ideas, but you come here and 
immediately started writing things about the prayers and have caused differences 
amongst us.”201 Nursi retorted “Pasha, Pasha! After belief, the most elevated truth in 
Islam is the obligatory prayers (salat). Those who do not perform the prayers are 
traitors and the opinions of the traitors are to be rejected.”202 After this confrontation, 
Nursi decided to leave Ankara even though Mustafa Kemal later apologised and 
offered him a high profile government post of the religious head of the eastern 
provinces, a high salary, a mansion and a seat in parliament.203 However, it was clear 
Mustafa Kemal and Nursi were on different wavelengths and it would be impossible 
for them to work together. Vahide contends that change in Nursi and his inner 
resolutions were the main contributors to him leaving Ankara.204 Nursi later 
explained: 
So, I was compelled to leave those most important posts. Saying that nothing 
can be gained from working with or responding to those people, I abandoned 
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the world and politics and social life and spent all my time on the way of saving 
belief (of people).205  
Significantly, this illustrates that Nursi genuinely did not want to engage in politics 
or social life; rather, he resolved to devote himself to an ascetic life and engage only 
in theology for the purpose of providing answers to the doubts and questions of 
ordinary Muslims on matters of faith. He had already begun this in Ankara by 
publishing Zaylu l-Zayl (Addendum to Addendum) and Hubab (Seeds), works in 
Arabic that provided responses to atheism.206 
Having refused Mustafa Kemal’s offer, Said went back to the eastern city of Van 
where he stayed for two years, residing in Nurşin Mosque.207 In the summer months, 
he would seclude himself on the mountain slopes of Mount Erek, where he would 
reflect and contemplate rather than write or teach.208 In his Friday sermons, he would 
focus on the fundamentals of belief, rather than social or political developments, 
according to Turner and Horkuc, signalling the clear change in his approach of 
staying out of social and political life.209  
Meanwhile in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal was implementing his secular agenda. He 
started with the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. He abolished the 
Ottoman monarchy and became the first president of Turkey.210 A more religiously 
significant move was the termination of the caliphate in 1924,211 an unprecedented 
move in the long history of the Muslim world. A suite of sweeping reforms covering 
all aspects of life followed the change in political regime. The alphabet was changed 
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from Arabic to Roman characters.212 The comprehensive adoption of Swiss law 
replaced Islamic law and swept aside Islamic jurisprudence.213 Covering the hair for 
women and traditional clothing for men were outlawed in state departments and 
government schools.214 Religious education in madrasas was banned; Sufi orders and 
lodges were closed.215 The degree of change and extent of the transformation were so 
far-reaching that even the wearing of a European hat was made compulsory by law in 
1927 and, in 1932,216 the Arabic call to prayer in mosques was replaced by a Turkish 
rendition.217 Cinemas, theatres, and Western-style music and dance parties were 
organised and encouraged by the state with the aim of modernising the lifestyle of 
the people.218 Interestingly, Mustafa Kemal’s secular program or reforms included 
the establishment of the Department of Religious Affairs (Diyānet), most likely to 
control mosques and regulate their affairs.219 This department still exists today and 
reports to the government.  
Mustafa Kemal, now with the surname Ataturk (Father of Turks), wanted to make 
Turkey a modern, Western, secular country so it could stand unashamed among the 
modern civilisations of Europe.220 Although Ataturk’s objective appeared to be 
sound, the implementation geared by the single party regime221 was fast and 
aggressive. Any opposition to the Kemalist regime, religious activism and public 
displays of religiosity were labelled as reactionary (irtija) – an intent to take Turkey 
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back to the Ottoman era.222 As a consequence, the treatment of religion and lack of 
respect for religious values within an intensely religious society caused deep 
resentment.223 Vahide emphasises that changing the alphabet, banning the Qur’anic 
script, closing the madrasas and prohibiting independent educational institutions 
made conditions for religious education almost impossible.224 So, Nursi had to 
negotiate his way under these circumstances and find a way to educate people about 
Islam without establishing an educational institution.  
In 1925, Nursi’s non-political activism attained a clear non-violence struggle just 
before the Shaykh Said Piran225 revolt broke out in eastern Turkey. On being invited 
to join this rebellion, Nursi declined, stating that military jihad is forbidden within 
the same society as it would cause anarchy. Civilised people should only be 
persuaded through an intellectual jihad rather than a violent use of force.226 The 
rebellion was not only put down fiercely, influential tribal and religious leaders in 
eastern Turkey, including Nursi, irrespective of their involvement were exiled to 
remote parts of the country.227 The scale of the displacement, although it appears to 
have been precautionary, illustrates the intolerance of the new secular regime to any 
form of political opposition, especially when it came with ethnic and religious 
overtones. For Nursi, unfair persecution by the secular government added another 
layer of difficulty to already harsh circumstances. 
The eight years from 1917 to 1925 marked a significant turning point in Nursi’s life. 
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and classic Islamic civilisation made him 
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question his deeply held beliefs and ideas as well as the paths to human 
enlightenment. He underwent a spiritual transformation and came to realise that 
neither philosophy nor Sufism could provide access to reality for most people. Any 
talk about a new ijtihad or legal interpretation was out of the question under the 
circumstances. The only path open to follow was a theological line. So, the ultimate 
solution for Nursi was to return to the Qur’an. It was to be a return not to a distant 
past, but to seek new inspiration from the Qur’an in order to save the faith of people. 
His encounter with the new Turkish leadership in Ankara towards the end of the war 
of independence solidified his conviction that the root problem facing the Muslim 
world was the deep penetration of atheistic assertions and materialistic ideologies. 
The solution, therefore, was a theological revival. Furthermore, the extreme secular 
policies of the new Turkish Republic made it extremely difficult to engage in any 
religious activism without the risk of arrest and persecution. So, the revivalist 
dilemma was felt the sharpest in new Turkey. Nursi’s theological revival approach 
was perhaps the safest one could follow under such circumstances. 
2.5 New Said: Facing the Revivalist Dilemma 
The circumstances of the new Turkish Republic triggered a 25-year life in exile, 
house arrest and imprisonment for Nursi. This period constituted the most productive 
years in terms of Nursi’s writings and religious influence. The challenges facing 
Nursi were enormous. On one hand, the Ottoman caliphate with all of its religious 
and educational institutions had collapsed, many religious leaders and scholars 
perished during WWI and the Turkish War of Independence, and the war-torn 
country and its largely ignorant population228 needed rebuilding and spiritual solace. 
On the other, there was a government who was applying authoritarian secular 
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policies and was determined not to go back to the Ottoman era where religion 
influenced society.229 How does one negotiate their way through this maze of 
circumstances without being charged with treason and achieve outstanding results in 
the revival of Islam? This question is at the heart of the Islamic revivalist dilemma. 
Nursi addressed the revivalist dilemma by following his blueprint for Islamic revival 
by producing and disseminating extensive theological writings and managing to keep 
his followers out of politics and violent retaliation in the face of persecution. 
Despite being deported to the south-west city of Burdur, now 48 years old, Nursi 
continued to teach and write. His early teachings were later compiled into a book 
entitled Nur’un İlk Kapısı (The First Door to Light).230 Mardin contends that Nursi 
was embraced by the people of western Turkey for the saintly reputation he acquired 
in his early life.231 He was transferred to Isparta in 1926 where he continued to attract 
students and large numbers of participants in his classes. Mardin adds that Isparta 
was a region where Islamic education concentrated during the Ottoman era, so the 
authorities inadvertently sent Nursi to a fertile ground for religious instruction.232 
Frustrated, the authorities decided to move him to a remote village of Barla with no 
road access and a handful of houses, where they were certain he would have no 
opportunity to recruit students and fade away over time.233  
In the eight and a half years spent in Barla, Nursi began writing his Risale-i Nur 
treatises, answering hundreds of questions and providing arguments for the existence 
of God, miraculousness of the Qur’an, resurrection of the dead and the existence of 
afterlife among other theological subjects. The core of his theological writings, 
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Sözler (The Words) and Mektūbāt (The Letters), was completed in this early exile 
period.234 With these writings Nursi’s audience was ordinary Muslims who had 
doubts about faith or those who had already lost their faith succumbing to the new 
positivistic education and secular way of life. These writings were written with a 
style that was easy for people to understand.235 This marks a clear shift from his 
earlier works, such as Muḥākamāt and Munāẓarāt, where his language is far more 
detailed and sophisticated addressing the learned of the madrasa rather than the 
masses of ordinary Muslims. Nursi often used parables and analogies to bring 
abstract concepts closer to ordinary people’s comprehension.  
Reading of his texts reveals that his writings also combined rational proofs and 
arguments explaining the theological verses of the Qur’an interpreting empirical 
facts and observations from the natural world and cosmos, and relating them to the 
propositions of faith. In his method, he did not outline in detail the opposing views, 
nor did he preach, preferring to speak directly to his own soul.236 In one instance, 
when a group of students complained to Nursi about the lack of their teachers’ 
teaching them about God, he retorted, “don’t listen to your teachers, listen to the 
sciences they teach, they tell you all about God” and then proceeded to show how 
this could be done.237 This advice to students is significant as it shows the natural 
theology of Nursi and how he sees no difference between science and religion, 
reason or faith. In doing so, as Mardin explains, Nursi wanted to provide “the widest 
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access to the correct methodology of right religion” to the greatest number of 
people.238 
In contrast to Nursi and his Nur movement, the MB in Egypt followed a different 
trajectory. The social and political circumstances, although not entirely the same, 
were nevertheless similar in Egypt as it underwent an ambitious modernising phase 
in the nineteenth century only to be colonised by the British in 1882.239 In 1926, a 
semi-independent secular monarchy led Egypt through a fast reform program in 
parallel with Turkey.240 Hasan al-Banna (1906-1948) founded the MB in 1928 as a 
social and religious movement about the same time as Nursi started his revival 
initiative in Turkey.241 As Esposito argues, al-Banna’s diagnosis was that Islam was 
not just personal faith and piety, it was a comprehensive system covering social and 
political life as well.242 While there is no reason to assume Nursi disagreed, he never 
articulated political ideas in his post-1925 writings. This is a distinctive difference 
between the Nur movement and the MB, and it has lead the MB to bypass the faith 
problems of masses that Nursi has identified and addressed in his writings and 
activism. 
Despite initial distancing to politics, the MB’s successful establishment of social and 
educational institutions, and their popularity, inescapably attracted political 
attention.243 Hasan al-Banna was assassinated in 1948, spiralling Egypt into turmoil 
and resulting in the military coup of Free Officer led by Jamal Abdul Nasr (1918-
1970). Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), one of the most influential leaders of the MB, 
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continued a more confronting approach to the authorities in his publications 
especially Milestones,244 a highly critical book on Egyptian society comparing it to 
Jahiliyya (era-of-ignorance-before-Islam) society, which led to his arrest and 
execution in 1966. Qutb is often cited as an ideologue of the jihadist movements in 
the contemporary era.245 Jeffrey Burke asserts that Qutb, along with Mawdūdi (1903-
1979) and al-Banna, have more of a mixed legacy, as “on the one hand they have 
fuelled the ideologies of al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, on the other hand, they 
have also inspired moderate Islamic factions.”246 It appears the MB and its leaders 
could not appreciate the subtlety of the revivalist dilemma and succumbed to the 
provocation of persecution and gave enough material for secular authorities to 
intensify persecution and charge them with treason.247 
Another key difference between Nursi and other revivalist leaders is their approach 
to the Qur’an, although just about all leaders called for a return to the Qur’an. For 
Muhammad ‘Abduh, Muslims had to immerse themselves in the study of the Qur’an 
to appreciate the supremacy of God’s unity.248 ‘Abduh started to write a detailed 
Qur’anic exegesis and publish these writings in the al-Manar journal. After his death 
in 1905, his disciple Rashid Ridā continued the project until his death in 1935.249 The 
idea of a full Qur’anic exegesis was also followed by Sayyid Qutb with his 
completed exegesis, Fi Zilāl al-Qur’an (Under the Shadow of the Qur’an). This 
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commentary brought forward a Qur’anic social and political vision for society.250 
Abul ‘Ala Mawdūdi (1903-1979), the founder of the transnational movement 
Jamaat-e Islami in the Indian subcontinent, also took to the same task of writing a 
complete Qur’anic exegesis. Influenced by the debate over the separation of India 
and Pakistan, Mawdūdi’s exegetical work, as argued by Esposito, attempted to give a 
Qur’anic blueprint for a comprehensive Islamic system covering all aspects of life, 
including government, society and economics.251 While Nursi echoed the idea of 
immersion in the Qur’an,252 he focused mostly on theological verses and a thematic 
and theological commentary of the Qur’an rather than a full exegetical work.253 This 
is even more telling considering Nursi had also started to write a complete 
commentary of the Qur’an (Ishārāt al-ījāz The Signs of Miraculousness)254 during 
WWI. The fact he abandoned this project in favour of the theological writings of 
Risale-i Nur shows the theological orientation of Nursi and his distinctive reading of 
the circumstances of his time and his prognosis to the challenge they posed. Judging 
by his target audience of ordinary Muslims, it is also possible Nursi would have 
thought people would not read a conventional multi-volume exegetical work; hence, 
he chose the unusual theological approach to the Qur’an and wrote relatively short 
epistles.255 
With this approach Nursi attracted numerous eager students. Nursi advised his 
students to establish study circles in homes, and read and discuss the books.256 
Students would get together and rent a house, called dershane, with the aim of 
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holding regular informal study circles.257 Those students who could write well would 
volunteer to manually reproduce the books at a time when writing and teaching the 
Qur’an and religious books were prohibited by law.258 In some villages, like Sav, the 
whole village population took part in secret manual reproduction at nights, while 
they worked in the fields during the day.259 As a result of these activities, it is 
claimed that more than 600,000 copies of Nursi’s books were reproduced by hand 
and distributed throughout Turkey.260 
This intense activity had not gone unnoticed by the government. In 1935, Nursi was 
taken back to Isparta where he was sentenced to a year in prison for writing his 
treatise on Islamic dress, interestingly written before the adoption of the Civil Code 
banning Islamic dress.261 During his time in prison, Said wrote Lemālar (The 
Flashes)262 and began writing Şuālar (The Rays),263 the third and fourth main 
volumes of the Risale-i Nur collection.264 
In 1936, Nursi was released from prison and deported again, this time to the city of 
Kastamonu, located in the central region of Anatolia.265 He stayed there for the next 
seven years and wrote more key chapters, including the ayat al-kubra (The Supreme 
Sign).266 He continued to attract new students and corresponded though post with his 
student base throughout the country. All correspondence with his students in 
Kastamonu and other places of exile was compiled into books as Lahikalar 
(Appendices) and included in the Risale-i Nur collection. These letters are good 
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sources revealing how Nursi managed to keep his students out of politics and 
violence – a key distinction of Nursi in contrast to other revivalist leaders of his era. 
In August 1943, Nursi and his students were arrested and put on trial yet again for 
writing and distributing the treatise on the signs of the end of times.267 The accusation 
levelled against him was the same as before and tantamount to treason – creating a 
secret society to overthrow the secular government by establishing a new Sufi order 
and exploiting the religious sentiments of the public to this end.268 A committee made 
up of professors of law thoroughly examined Risale-i Nur to see if it contained any 
evidence to charges laid.269 The committee reported that Nursi’s works comprised 
primarily theological writings and no Sufi or political exhortations; he and his 
students were released in 1944 after nine months in custody.270 
The court cases attracted significant media interest. Although the stories were always 
negative, they counter-intuitively drew more popular attention, increasing the 
readership of the Risale-i Nur.271 With access to a crude printing machine, Nursi’s 
students were able to duplicate the Risale-i Nur faster and in larger quantities in the 
new Latin alphabet, disseminating Nursi’s theological messages and ideas to the 
younger generation.272 At this time, Nursi’s writings began to spread to other Muslim 
countries through pilgrimage and visiting scholars to Turkey.273  
Being cleared of accusations was not the end of Said’s struggles against authorities. 
His fame and growing influence posed an enormous threat to the secular government 
who placed Nursi once again under house arrest with severe restrictions for a man in 
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his seventies.274 Worried about future generations, Said Nursi published A Guide for 
the Youth in 1947, this time in the Latin alphabet.275 This book resulted in Nursi’s 
third arrest and trial along with his students. They were sent to Afyon prison where 
Nursi reportedly survived a poisoning attempt.276 Although the expert report cleared 
Nursi’s writings,277 the court sentenced Nursi to twenty months’ imprisonment.278 
Despite an acquittal by the Supreme Court on appeal,279 delays in the legal system 
meant Nursi ended up serving twenty months in custody.280  
At his defence of the 1947 court hearings, and consistently in others, Nursi made two 
main arguments. First, on the allegation he was against the secularist regime, he 
argued that in every system there are dissidents and, on the condition they do not 
corrupt the law and order through violence, they should be tolerated under the 
principle of freedom of religion and speech.281 Second, on the allegation that Nursi 
and his students were a security threat, Nursi responded to say not a single example 
could be shown that he or any one of his 500,000282 students was involved in any 
crime or violence.283 Mardin asserts Nursi was making two main points with these 
arguments.284 First, his teachings were a good influence for law and order inside 
Turkey; and second, they educed sympathy from other Asian nations285 because in 
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the east religion was a force that has glued people together. Vahide notes that Nursi 
in his defence speeches was unapologetic about his work in promoting faith and the 
study of the Qur’an through his writings, but he argued this was not against the law 
nor was it concerned with politics.286 Nursi retorts in one of his defence speeches that 
he would keep silent if the imprisonment concerned him only:  
but since it concerns the eternal life of many others, and the Risale-i Nur, which 
reveals and explains the mighty talisman of creation, if I had hundred heads and 
each day one were to be cut off, I would not give up this mighty mystery. Even 
if I am delivered from your hands, I cannot be saved from the clutches of the 
appointed hour. I am old and I am at the gateway to grave.287 
This argument shows Nursi believed he was contributing to the spiritual salvation of 
people rather than engaging in politics. 
The arrival of democracy in the post-WWII Cold War era and the victory of the 
Democratic Party (DP) in the 1950 elections288 resulted in relatively favourable 
democratic rights and freedom of religion in Turkey. The Kemalist regime was still 
strong and the number of charges levelled against Nursi’s followers increased with 
37 cases launched in 1950s.289 All cases were acquitted in court.290 Upon printing of 
A Guide for the Youth in Latin alphabet, Istanbul court filed charges against Nursi.291 
For the fourth time, Nursi appeared in court, only this time acquittal came rather 
promptly.292 Despite continuation of the legal onslaught, conditions improved for 
Nursi and his followers in the 1950s, growing the movement noticeably.293 By 1956, 
the courts had lifted all legal restrictions on the Risale-i Nur and it could be freely 
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printed in large quantities and sold in bookstores.294 Risale-i Nur study centres 
(dershane) were established throughout the country.295 Nursi’s fame and popularity 
had grown so much that he found himself surrounded by large crowds each time he 
appeared in public.296 After a long struggle under persecution, Nursi and his 
revivalist approach was vindicated.297 
The 1950s are also marked by Nursi’s increased prominence in public life and 
relationship with the DP. A member of parliament from the DP ranks, Tahsin Tola, 
was a follower of Nursi and was instrumental in lifting the ban on the Risale-i Nur.298 
Umut Azak highlights that Nursi’s political involvement was nothing more than 
sending letters to the government acknowledging the DP’s policies on religious 
freedom and supporting the government in taking steps to increase relations with 
Muslim countries, signalled by the signing of the Baghdad Pact in 1955.299 In the 
1957 elections, Nursi found himself in the middle of the campaign firing line of 
opposing political parties. While the opposition accused the DP government of 
collaborating with Nursi and his followers, DP government officials defended 
themselves saying they were simply working for freedom of religion and speech.300 
In 1959, Nursi, now 84 years of age, travelled freely to a number of cities in western 
Turkey. His every step was covered by journalists. Nursi’s reluctance to speak to the 
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media was interpreted as an attempt to create a myth about himself.301 Azak suggests 
the intense media interest was responsible for the creation of the myth it reported.302 
The images and coverage of Nursi in the media depicted him “as an eponym for 
Islamic reactionism.”303 To quell the media frenzy and political fallout, Nursi wrote a 
public letter clarifying that he has not been involved in politics for the last 40 years 
and does not intend to do so now, and he was merely travelling upon invitations of 
his students for teaching purposes.304 
Said Nursi’s last journey was from Isparta to Urfa, a historic city in eastern Turkey, 
for the first time in 35 years of exile, house arrests and imprisonment.305 In 1960, 
Said Nursi died in Urfa at the age of 85, leaving behind nothing more than a cloak, a 
teapot, a watch, glasses and a prayer mat, total monetary value of which were only 
551 Turkish liras.306 Three months later, there was a military coup in Turkey and the 
junta ordered Nursi’s body to be exhumed and taken to an undisclosed location.307 
His burial site is unknown to this day. 
2.6 Earmarks of Nursi’s Theological Revivalism 
Vahide asserts that Nursi was a distinctive figure and an original thinker.308 For 
Turner and Horkuc, Nursi was not only “one of the most brilliant Islamic thinkers of 
the modern era”309 but also “the most important and influential Muslim scholar to 
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emerge from Turkey in the last five hundred years.”310 Turner and Horkuc also add 
that for Nursi the key emphasis was the renewal of faith, not the revival of Islam as a 
social or political system that other revivalist leaders underscored.311  
While a great majority of thinkers and scholars acclaim Said Nursi as a revivalist 
leader, noting particularly his aversion of violence, there are those in Turkey like 
Neda Armaner who polemically argue the other way. Armaner asserted that Risale-i 
Nur “let alone giving real and trustworthy religious information, worse still it carries 
a potential to completely break the national will and lead people to anarchy.”312 
Armaner claims further that the Nur Movement deviated from the Islamic norms and 
became a deviant sect within Islam.313 Mardin disagrees and says “it does not operate 
on the model of a traditional Islamic sect” and it is more like a movement to 
disseminate “truths of the Qur’an.”314 Mardin adds that Nursi’s main focus was 
ultimately theological and he enriched it in his attempt to revive it.315 Although the 
authorities tried hard to prosecute Nursi and his followers, they provided no evidence 
for the authorities to use against them in court. 
Said Nursi’s legacy can be conceptualised in two main outcomes. First, Nursi left 
behind his theological magnum opus, the Risale-i Nur. Second, Nursi demonstrated 
the efficacy of a theological, non-political and non-violent Islamic revivalist 
methodology in addressing the revivalist dilemma, with significant results that 
defined the character of the Turkish religious activism in the modern era. 
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With respect to his theological writings, the Risale-i Nur is still the most read 
religious work in Turkey316 after the Qur’an and hadith. The treatises have also been 
translated to more than twenty-seven languages.317 Nursi confessed that the 
university he wanted to establish during the Ottoman era materialised in the form of 
the Risale-i Nur, which in his view provided the blueprint for a whole new Qur’anic 
worldview.318 In a way, he reconciled his activism in the first part of his life with his 
new theological orientation that followed in the later part. According to Turner and 
Horkuc, the Risale-i Nur is “one of the most remarkable feats of Muslim scholarship 
to emerge in the last five-hundred years.”319 They add that academic research should 
not overlook Nursi and his seminal contribution to revelation based Islamic theology.  
Nursi explained that the strength of his works was due to their effectiveness in 
addressing two main issues unique to modern times.320 First, Risale-i Nur responded 
to disbelief in a way previous Islamic works had not. In the past, disbelief was 
minimal, it came from ignorance and was relatively easy to address through 
discussions about God’s attributes and admonishments by quoting verses from the 
Qur’an and hadith.321 However, in the modern era, disbelief mainly came with the 
guise of science and philosophy; therefore, based on knowledge rather than 
ignorance. The number of disbelievers has also increased considerably. Hence, the 
Risale-i Nur, as a theological exegesis of the Qur’an, was able to provide powerful 
arguments defending the “truths of the Qur’an” to address the doubts of people in the 
modern era.322 Second, Nursi argued that, rather than focusing on a future 
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punishment in afterlife, the Risale-i Nur showed a spiritual hell in sin and vice, and a 
spiritual paradise in belief during this earthly life.323 What he meant by this assertion 
is that the Risale-i Nur provided a worldview that enabled a person to experience 
spiritual delights in faith and prefer them over materialism and physical pleasure. 
Mardin supports this assessment saying Nursi’s main aim was to stop the penetration 
of materialism into Muslim culture and to large extent it has been successful for its 
readership.324  
Analysis of letters from Nursi’s students shows what they thought about his writings 
and their influence. For Hulusi Yahyagil, an army office captain and one of Nursi’s 
first student, the primary contribution of Nursi’s writings was in their theological 
values as they helped him resolve key theological questions about God, life, 
existence and the cosmos.325 For an imam in the village of Bedre, it was the message 
of hope that was present in Nursi’s writings that cured his pessimism and offered him 
knowledge about Islam that was not available anywhere else.326 For Hafiz Ali,327 the 
Risale-i Nur was a nullifier of doubts that philosophy conjured up in the mind and 
answered fundamental questions of existence.328 According to Refet, it was the 
intellectual confidence that Risale-i Nur provided to Muslims and empowered them 
from “becoming beggars of Europe for science and enlightenment.”329 Mardin adds 
the common elements in these sentiments were dissatisfaction with the existing 
literature on Islam and the ability of Nursi’s writings to give a holistic picture of 
Islam and the theological underpinnings of the Qur’an.330 So, Nursi’s choice of 
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theological revivalism was not just a tactical accommodation under political 
pressure. He genuinely believed lack of belief and doubts lay at the heart of 
contemporary Muslim challenge.  
Nursi’s Risale-i Nur is also an instrument of an important shift that took place with 
respect to the spiritual leadership and perpetuation of a movement. Nursi’s student 
Şamli Hafiz highlighted a key difference between Nursi and previous revivalist 
leaders in that, while others relied on their charisma and spiritual prowess and 
authority, Nursi dismissed any attention to himself and transferred people’s focus to 
the Risale-i Nur.331 Mardin agrees and explains that Nursi changed the traditional 
perpetuation of a movement through one charismatic leader to the next and he 
transferred the attraction of charisma to the Risale-i Nur332 and therefore to the 
theology. So, Nursi “shifted the central role of the leader to the message itself, thus 
enabling a new form of integration into Islam.”333 For Mardin, this is a much more 
universalistic way of engaging and integrating Muslims directly with Islam.334 In a 
way, Nursi democratised the revivalist movements by leaving them to their own 
resources to develop his message of theology and deep belief in God.  
In terms of the second outcome of Nursi’s legacy, religious activism and Islamic 
revival, Nursi managed to attract a mass following in spite of government 
persecution and media sensationalism. Mardin says it is difficult to determine the 
number of people in the Nur movement as it does not have any formal organisational 
structure or membership records. Nevertheless, he points out that Nursi achieved a 
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large following since the 1920s.335 He adds that the movement gained universal 
appeal from 1950 to 1975.336 However, how does Nursi’s theological revival 
methodology fare in dealing with the Islamic revivalist dilemma? 
A key premise in negotiating the revivalist dilemma is to keep the high moral ground 
under difficult circumstances and allegation of treason. When a movement attains a 
large following it becomes exceedingly difficult to contain followers’ emotions and 
impulses for retaliation under unfair treatment and oppression. This is the greatest 
weakness of Islamic revivalist movements, which their opponents exploit with great 
success even to this day. Nursi skilfully manoeuvred his way out of such quagmires 
in five key ways that defined the nature of his activism – (1) define revival of faith 
and theology as the most important duty; (2) do not get involved with politics;  
(3) follow a clear non-violent struggle; (4) give meaning to suffering; and  
(5) emphasise positive action as a fundamental aspect of prophetic activism. 
Nursi emphasised that saving people’s faith and facilitating their salvation in the 
afterlife was the most important duty. He remarked in Afyon court, “Yes, we are a 
community, and our aim and program is to save ourselves and then our nation from 
eternal damnation” in the afterlife, and the key function of Risale-i Nur is “to serve 
the Qur’an through the truths of belief and through extremely powerful and decisive 
proofs.”337 As long as this was done sincerely, a gram of work on this path would be 
far more valuable in the court of God than insincere works that mixed personal 
interest and political aims.338 During WWII, Nursi’s bewildered students asked him 
about his lack of interest in the war. Nursi explained that world powers were fighting 
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for control of the world in this transient life, whereas he and every other human 
being was faced with winning and losing an eternal abode worth at least four times339 
the earth.340 Stressing the importance of facilitating salvation, Nursi hoped to achieve 
two results: first, address the adverse impact of materialistic philosophy on the very 
foundations of religion (hence Islam) and consequently on the faith of individuals; 
second, theology had the least possibility of attracting authoritarian secular regimes’ 
allegations of treason. 
As a key element of his theological revival method, Nursi also followed a deliberate 
non-political strategy. He realised that political activism would attract severe 
persecution from the government, as shown by the 1925 deportation that the 
government was looking for any excuse to diminish centres of political influence. 
However, for Nursi, non-political strategy was more than tactical accommodation. 
He argued that Islam is concerned with belief (īmān), life and Shari’ah (law and 
society), yet belief, therefore theology, is the most important of these and the Risale-i 
Nur has chosen to strengthen belief alone.341 Further, mixing religious activism with 
a political message would create doubt in people over the motivations of religious 
activists, “so reduce to pieces of glass in the view of the heedless the diamond-like 
truths of the Qur’an.”342 Nursi added a footnote in the 1950s to the Damascus 
Sermon. He witnessed a real life scenario where a Muslim scholar vehemently 
opposed another highly righteous and pious scholar because he was on the opposite 
political persuasion, whereas the same person praised another immoral person 
because he was in his political camp. At this point, Nursi uttered his famous remark 
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“I seek refuge in God from Satan and politics.”343 So, Nursi thought that engagement 
in politics would ultimately damage Islam and political ideology invariably leads to 
biases and breaches of Islamic ethical boundaries. Importantly, Nursi was not against 
Muslims engaging in politics. The key distinction here is that those who choose to 
enter politics should not pretend to represent religion and those who choose to follow 
the Islamic revival path should not practice politics.344 Since Nursi and his followers 
chose the latter, they would not engage in politics. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Nursi’s methodology relevant for contemporary 
times is his aversion of violence in the name of religion. To ethically justify his non-
violence position, Nursi contended the Qur’anic ethical teachings345 meant a ship 
with ten criminals but one innocent person cannot be sunk on account of the single 
innocent person. Whereas, in acts of violence, ten innocents would be killed in order 
to target a single enemy. Therefore, people claiming to represent the teachings of the 
Qur’an not only cannot commit acts of violence in the name of religion, they must 
also be the guardians of law and order in the name of religion.346 Nursi also claimed 
the era of armed jihad was over – “jihad of the sword” is now replaced by the “jihad 
of the word”347 for contemporary civilised human society was to be convinced 
through persuasion rather than coercion.348 He argued that Risale-i Nur advocated 
spiritual and intellectual struggle (jihād-ı mānevī) as opposed to an armed struggle. 
For Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee, this meant an undertaking to develop a 
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reasoned argument “to reconcile science and rationalism with Islam.”349 Vahide 
interprets this position as a theological struggle “in the face of moral and spiritual 
depredations of atheism and to instil certain belief in the hearts.”350 The weapon to 
use in this jihad was imān al-tahqiqi, a firm conviction based on reason and evidence 
rather than blind faith. Vahide highlights that her study of Nursi on jihad showed his 
consistency in maintaining this interpretation of jihad throughout his life.351 The lack 
of involvement in violence formed the bedrock of Nursi’s court defences. One could 
also conclude that the courts’ inability to find him and his followers guilty of charges 
rested on a lack of evidence to link Nursi and his followers to violence (and politics). 
Nevertheless, even though Nursi and his followers were careful, they could not 
escape allegations of treason – establishing a secret organisation to overthrow the 
government and mixing religion with politics. Naturally, Nursi and his followers felt 
persecuted and treated unfairly. This is when people could be enraged and provoked 
into violent retaliation in the face of a powerful state apparatus. So, it was necessary 
to deal with persecution in a way that would control the emotions of anger and curtail 
impulses for violence. Nursi achieved this in two ways.  
First, Nursi gave positive and beneficial meaning to the persecution, enabling him 
and his students to be resilient under intense pressure and suffering. He called prison 
madrasa al-yusufiyya (school of Prophet Joseph).352 According to the Biblical 
narrative, Prophet Joseph was imprisoned unjustly, but through his patience was 
eventually freed and vindicated. Because they were also imprisoned unjustly they 
would receive the same vindication with patience. More importantly, Prophet Joseph 
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gave theological lessons to his fellow inmates while in prison.353 So, Nursi explained, 
time in prison enabled them to get together in a way they could not congregate 
outside and enabled them to study theology and strengthen their faith.354 Finally, 
Nursi argued that endurance and time in prison would bring multiple spiritual 
rewards that would be harder to achieve outside.355 In this way, Nursi and his 
students were able to transcend injustice and withstand trying circumstances of long 
incarcerations during extended trial processes. More importantly, they did not 
harbour feelings of revenge and retaliation. 
Second, Nursi insisted on the practice of what he called müsbet hareket (positive 
action), “Our duty is positive action not negative action. It is solely to serve belief 
(īmān) in accordance with divine pleasure (riḍa) and not to interfere in God’s 
concerns,” and such a stance would lead to public safety and order.356 Ian Markham 
highlights the importance of Nursi’s insistence on müsbet hareket (Turk.), which 
essentially is to act constructively and non-violently in the face of persecution.357 A 
second important dimension of positive action in Nursi’s own words is to “act with 
the love of your way not to act with the animosity or devaluation of the ways of 
others.”358 While the first dimension keeps Muslims out of violence, the second helps 
them develop good relations with people from other movements, sects and religions. 
Once again, this position is not a mere tactical accommodation. In Nursi’s theology, 
positive action is at the core of religion. According to Nursi, Islam and belief are 
ultimately a constructive endeavour whereas destruction is Satanic by its nature. This 
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is why Muslims are encouraged to repeat the phrase ‘I seek refuge in God from 
accursed Satan’ often, even though Satan has no creative powers. Since the Satanic 
path is a path of destruction and that destruction is easy and quick, with little action 
devastatingly far-reaching destruction could be inflicted. 359 Whereas Prophet 
Muhammad’s way was a constructive endeavour relying on patience, forbearance in 
the face of oppression and at the same time building a society founded on virtue and 
good deeds.360 So, in his interpretation, the prophetic way requires Muslims to act 
similarly no matter what the circumstances. Although the way Nursi expressed these 
ideas was fresh, they represent a well-established Sunni theological position on the 
support for law and order, and prohibition of violent rebellion and political 
opposition.361 For theologians and jurists in the classical period, even an unjust ruler 
and government was far better than social strife and anarchy.362 
Thus, the aforementioned five distinct aspects of Nursi’s revivalist methodology 
were critical in dealing with the revivalist dilemma in his time. They solidified 
Nursi’s theological revivalist methodology. Markham, in Engaging with 
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi: A Model of Interfaith Dialogue, contends that Nursi’s 
writings and activism hold lessons even for Christians.363 He mentions four specific 
lessons: First, “remain rooted in tradition;” second, “change in ways that are true to 
the tradition;” third, “witness to the truth of your tradition in non-violent ways;” and 
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fourth, “continue to connect faith with life.”364 This summation marks the 
cornerstone of Nursi’s methodology in religious activism and the premises for its 
success that contemporary Muslims and people from other faith traditions can 
emulate in an increasingly secular world. 
Significantly, Said Nursi explained to his close students that the Islamic revival 
would not be complete in Turkey during his lifetime, but the Risale-i Nur has 
fulfilled the most significant portion – combating atheism and irreligion spread under 
the veil of science and philosophy – and it would be used as a blueprint for a whole 
new reflection of Islam in the lives of individuals and society.365 Shahram 
Akbarzadeh agrees with Yavuz on the contention that Nursi espoused a spiritual and 
intellectual transformation of the individual “followed by the implementation of faith 
in everyday life and finally the establishment of an Islamic state based on the 
shari’a.”366 This contention, however, does not change the fact that Nursi’s activism 
during his lifetime was essentially theological and his writings do not include any 
political exhortations or a political vision for society unlike other revivalist leaders of 
his time. Rather, the fair conclusion is that, while Nursi distinctly confined the role of 
his activism to the realm of theological (and intellectual) struggle with atheism,367 he 
foresaw a natural progression and continuity of his theology and revivalist 
methodology eventually producing social and political outcomes beyond his lifetime. 
Key elements of this natural progression, according to Akyol, are the “support for 
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democracy, sympathy for the free world and interest in interfaith cooperation,” 
values kept alive by millions of his followers after his death.368 
Has Nursi’s activism produce large scale outcomes? After Nursi’s death in 1960, the 
movement branched into separate independent Nur communities (Jama’at). The 
largest of these is the Hizmet (Service) Movement founded by Fethullah Gülen (b. 
1938) in the late 1960s. Akyol contends that Gülen extended Nursi’s legacy as a 
global movement of education and dialogue.369 Saritoprak asserts that, while Nursi’s 
teachings provided Gülen with a theological paradigm and a theoretical foundation, 
Gülen advanced it further to develop a theology of social responsibility.370 Although 
other Nur communities are critical of Gülen for such a development, David 
Shankland refers to Gülen as “the most prominent of his (Said Nursi’s) followers”371 
and explains their mutual influence on Turkish people saying that “Sunnis in Turkey 
find the Nursi (and later Gülen) formula of expanding belief to embrace 
technological innovation convincing… It thus becomes possible both to be a citizen 
of the modern world and to be a pious believer.” So, Nursi and Gülen, as well as 
other similar Islamic movements, with their focus on theology and distancing 
themselves and their followers from violence and politics provided Turkey with a 
model that integrated Islam and contemporary society. 
Essentially, Nursi has been an important Islamic influence in shaping contemporary 
Turkish society. His thought and impact provided an Islamic paradigm that prevailed 
in tandem and sometimes in competition with the secular vision for society the 
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founders of Turkish republic pushed so hard. Nursi is likely to wield significant 
influence in the world largely through the transnational movements his writings and 
theological revivalist approach inspired. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Said Nursi lived during a tumultuous period of time spanning the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire; emergence of secular nation states for the first time in Muslim 
history; two world wars; and the challenges imposed by the European modernity on 
traditional Muslim societies and Islam. In addition, secular modernist governments in 
Muslim lands persecuted religious activism invariably posing before Muslim 
scholars the revivalist dilemma – how does one carry out the responsibility, as they 
felt, of reviving Islam while at the same time avoiding confrontation with a nervous 
government?  
Under these conditions and faced with the dilemma, most Muslim scholars attempted 
to base their revivalism on a complete exegesis and reinterpretation of the Qur’an 
and saw Islam as a holistic system to be implemented at all levels of society. 
Consequently, rather than focusing on theology, they concentrated on religiosity, 
social and political application of Islam. Secular authoritarian governments 
responded with persecution resulting in a spiral of social and political turmoil (even 
violence) that characterised Muslim societies in the twentieth century. 
In dealing with the revivalist dilemma, as felt more acutely in Turkey, Nursi 
followed a different trajectory and methodology. Nursi’s theological revivalism 
rested on identifying the revival of faith and theology as the most important duty for 
Muslims in modern era; not getting involved in politics; following a deliberate non-
violent struggle; attributing spiritual meaning to suffering and persecution; and 
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emphasising positive action as a fundamental aspect of the prophetic way. With this 
approach, Nursi was able to achieve his revival objectives, survive persecution and 
maintain a high moral ground for himself and his followers. Nursi left a legacy of a 
theological revival methodology where Islam and modern society can peacefully 
coexist.  
The most important instrument in Nursi’s theological revivalism was his writings. 
While Nursi also saw Islam as a holistic religion, he deliberately restricted his 
writings to theological matters and his activism to the realm of reviving people’s 
faith. His activism comprised writing and disseminating theological exegesis of the 
Qur’an compiled as the Risale-i Nur collection. These works became very popular 
with the people of Turkey and were instrumental in the revival of Islam in Turkey 
through a period of Jacobin secularisation policies implemented from 1923 to 1950. 
So, how original are these theological writings? Since the conditions under which 
Nursi operated were unique to his time and extremely challenging, and he 
concentrated his writing activities solely to theology leaving behind an enormous 
body of theological writings, the expectation is that he produced a new expression of 
Islamic theology. This is investigated next. 
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3 X 
CHAPTER 3: ISLAMIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND 
NURSI’S THOUGHT 
3.1 Introduction 
In an introductory passage to the 15th Ray, Nursi outlines two fundamental motives 
for him to write his magnum opus, Risale-i Nur – first, the spread of disbelief had 
proliferated to modern society through science and materialistic philosophy; and, 
second, Muslims indulging in the pleasures of the world to the point of being 
oblivious to God and an impending afterlife.1 While the first leads Muslims to doubt 
religion and lose faith, the second steers them towards deviation from the “straight 
path of virtue and spiritual perfection.”2 In addition to the Qur’an and Sunnah as 
primary sources, the universe and natural world play crucial roles in his attempt to 
find an empirical foundation to belief and demonstrate there is an “immediate 
spiritual hell” within a life led oblivious to the reality of God, human mortality and 
an inevitable everlasting life in an afterlife.3 
Examining Nursi’s epistemology is crucial in revealing not only how he achieves his 
stated aims, but also what his contributions are to the field. The way the universe and 
natural world are conceived and expressed in Nursi’s works has critical importance 
for laying the foundations of a contemporary exposition of Islamic theology and 
fresh expressions of its worldview. In Nursi’s theological epistemology, the universe 
as the book of creation and the Qur’an as the book of revelation have equal standing 
for they ultimately originate from the same divine source. Any claim for truth must 
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be confirmed by both the Qur’an and universe for it to hold an objective foundation. 
Human reason is an essential instrument in identifying the vital correlation between 
the two. If there is a direct correlation mutually entailed by the use of reason, then 
the truth claim can be deemed as certain truth. 
This chapter will begin with an outline of a theoretical framework for theology, 
which will assist in placing Nursi’s discourse about God within a coherent structure. 
It then proceeds to divulge classical Islamic epistemology setting the scene to 
analyse Nursi’s approach to Islamic epistemology critically and probe his evaluation 
of sources of religion with the aim of determining his contribution to the field. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework for Islamic Theology 
Islamic theology as a distinct discipline is generally framed into three broad fields – 
ilāhiyyāt (divinity), nubuwwāt (prophethood) and sam’iyyāt (transmitted beliefs 
including eschatology).4 A review of theological texts shows these three core 
elements are always present in theological works from the leading theologian Abū 
Hanīfa (699-767) in the eighth century to modern works, although not always clearly 
structured as so. Around the kernel of these three fields, introductory sections on 
epistemology, the nature of belief (īmān) and various doctrinal positions on imamate 
(leadership) are also included within the scope of Islamic theology.5  
The scope of classical theology is best explained by al-Ghazālī in the introduction to 
his work al-mustaṣfā min ‘ilm al-uṣūl (The Selection from Legal Theory). Although 
this work is an introduction to Islamic jurisprudence, al-Ghazālī makes an influential 
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categorisations of Islamic disciplines including theology.6 Influenced by his teacher 
al-Juwaynī,7 he lays out the basic framework for systematic theology and its scope. 
He argues, the theologian, using a rational methodology, proves God’s existence, 
eternity and essential attributes of knowledge, will and power (ilāhiyyāt). The 
theologian then proceeds to deal with proofs of prophethood and revelation 
(nubuwwāt). Once this is satisfactorily accomplished, the scope of theology ends and 
human reason abdicates to the truths expressed in revelation – the Qur’an and 
Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad. Al-Ghazālī concludes on these premises that what is 
authentically transmitted (sam’iyyāt) through revelation and the Prophet would be 
accepted as true.8 So, according to al-Ghazālī, the key themes with respect to God in 
classical Islamic theology are about proving God’s existence and eternity; discussing 
attributes of God leading to God’s relationship to humanity through revelation-
bearing prophets; and, hence, providing a rational foundation to the teachings of 
Islam on worship and human conduct. 
Nursi’s writings comprise all matters of classical themes of theology, although they 
are not limited to these themes nor structured within a classical framework. Two 
main reasons explain this observation. First, as was examined in Chapter 2, Nursi’s 
main audience is ordinary Muslims and non-Muslims who may have doubts or 
questions about God, the afterlife and other essentials of belief. Placing his 
discussion in a restrictive framework would have made his writings abstract and less 
interesting for the general reader. Second, analysis of Nursi’s works shows he 
deliberately avoids compartmentalising subject matters of theology and often covers 
various theological themes within the same argument for he sees them as closely 
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linked and supported by one another. Such links could not have been demonstrated if 
his arguments were placed within a rigid framework, reducing their effectiveness for 
the intended purpose and audience. Thus, Nursi’s works should not be reduced to the 
level of ordinary theological treatise. 
In spite of these reasons, it is possible to place Nursi’s writings within a theoretical 
framework. I therefore propose a new theological framework that would comprise 
not only Islamic theology, but also assist in the study of God in other faith traditions. 
The framework is constructed of responses to three interconnected questions:  
(1) Does God exist? (2) If God exists, is God one? (3) How do humans relate to 
God? In dealing with each question, a corresponding theological problem will also be 
addressed. 
The first question ‘does God exist?’ relates to the associated theological problem of 
whether one believes in God using rational arguments and concrete evidence or 
belief in God is a matter of faith only. Just about all faith traditions, including Islam, 
claim the existence of God. Although classic theologians and philosophers were 
often believers, to place religion on firm objective grounds, they produced rational 
arguments for the existence of God starting on the premise of the impossibility of 
God’s nonexistence.9 In a sense, they wanted to show that God’s existence is entailed 
as a logical necessity from the universe whose existence cannot be denied. Any 
discussion on the existence of God inevitably raises epistemological questions on the 
role of reason, the universe and revealed scriptures. 
The second question ‘if God exists, is God one?’ necessarily emerges from the first 
one. The answer to this question invariably determines the way God relates to the 
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universe and to what extent God is involved in the world. An associated theological 
problem is whether God is involved with universals only or is God involved with 
particulars as well. The answer has significant implications in the way God’s 
attributes of will, knowledge and power are understood. This, in turn, has 
consequences for human freedom of choice and the way theodicy is addressed. 
Polytheism or associating partnership with God (shirk) could also emerge in the way 
some may respond to this question. 
The third question follows naturally: ‘how do humans relate to God?’ The 
theological response to this question determines the way humans get to know and 
experience God in their spiritual and everyday lives. If God exists and since God is 
not discernible through human sense experiences, God is deemed transcendent. 
Concurrently, there is a human need to feel an immanent presence of God in their 
inner spiritual world and personal lives. This raises an associated theological 
problem, whether God is transcendent, immanent or both. If God is transcendent, 
above and beyond space and time, then relating to God becomes exceedingly 
difficult. If God is immanent, this leads to tendencies of anthropomorphism.  
Theological differences between faith traditions largely stem from their responses to 
these three fundamental theological questions. The level of difference tends to 
increase as progression is made from the first to the third question. Responses define 
their respective concept of God and shape their worldview, which has further 
extensions to other aspects of theology, including revelation, salvation, prophecy and 
eschatology. This is observed especially within the Abrahamic faith traditions – 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam. As a key feature, this theoretical framework sets a 
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platform to facilitate and develop comparative theological studies, especially 
between Abrahamic faith traditions. 
In the case of Islamic theology of God, this framework enables a thorough 
expression of the fundamental meaning of tawḥīd (unification of God) as the core 
tenet of Islam. It incorporates the classical theological discourse, while at the same 
time encapsulating just about all Nursi has written about God. The framework assists 
in sieving through Nursi’s voluminous writings to identify his key arguments, 
elucidations and interpretations in a theoretically coherent structure.  
A limitation of the theoretical framework is that it does not include prophethood or 
eschatology, where Nursi makes significant original contributions. In eschatology, 
for example, what al-Ghazālī and Ibn Sina said would be beyond the scope of 
rational proofs,10 Nursi provides rational arguments for bodily resurrection building 
on his theological conclusions about God.11 The theological originality of Nursi 
could have been more thoroughly tested if these major areas of theology were also 
critically evaluated. Their inclusion, however, would have made the scope of this 
thesis too broad. Hence, this research primarily focuses on Islamic theology. 
3.3 Epistemology in Classical Islamic Theology 
The Qur’an and Sunnah have been widely accepted by Muslim scholars across all 
disciplines as the primary sources of knowledge in Islam.12 They are the essential 
constituting texts linked to the divine revelation (wahy) offering knowledge of the 
metaphysical realm usually inaccessible to human speculation and providing 
                                                 
10 Majid Fakhry, “Philosophy and Theology: From the Eight Century to the Present,” in The Oxford 
History of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 283-284. 
11 Said Nursi, Sözler (Istanbul: Soz Basim Yayin, 2003), 10th Word, Conclusion, 138-142. 
12 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts 
Society, 2003), 1. 
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knowledge of the world humans may have disputes about.13 In the sphere of Islamic 
scholarship, any doctrine or legal opinion not firmly based on unequivocal verses of 
the Qur’an and on sound Sunnah narrations (hadith) can be summarily dismissed as 
unislamic.  
While the Qur’an and Sunnah have always been the supreme sources of Islamic 
scholarship, their usage as legitimate sources hinges on their historical authenticity. 
The Qur’an’s historical authenticity is widely accepted within Islamic scholarship 
and to a large extent within Western scholarship.14 The Sunnah transmitted through 
hadith reports is more ambivalent. A tight transmission of hadith reports from master 
to student in the early centuries of Islam could not entirely prevent eventual hadith 
forgery attempts to support political disputes and sectarian biases.15 Sifting through 
the large body of hadith narrations in circulation, Muslim scholars developed an 
elaborate methodology of hadith criticism. Forgeries were largely identified and 
relinquished, and the remaining hadith were classified in their level of soundness, 
culminating in the assembly of authentic hadith collections by the third century of 
Islam.16 So, Muslim scholarship unconditionally rested on the Qur’an and Sunnah as 
they toiled to ensure these sources were the very words and actions transmitted or 
committed by Prophet Muhammad. 
Yet, there were three imperatives compelling scholars to consider sources outside the 
Qur’an and Sunnah. The first is the fact the Qur’an and Sunnah do not explicitly 
contain everything. This is particularly sharp in the case of Islamic law. Even 
                                                 
13 Buchman, translator’s introduction, xxiii. 
14 Muḥammad Muṣṭafa Aʻẓamī, The History of the Qur’ānic Text: From Revelation to Compilation: A 
Comparative Study with the Old and New Testaments (Leicester: UK Islamic Academy, 2003), 202. 
15 Siddiqi, Ḥadīth Literature, 31-36. 
16 Jonathan A. C. Brown, Hadith: Muhammad’s Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World (Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2009), 38-41. 
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Prophet Muhammad recognised Muslims would inevitably encounter situations that 
would not be directly addressed by the Qur’an or Sunnah. In this respect, the famous 
Mu’adh hadith is often cited. When the Prophet sent Mu’adh Ibn Jabal as a judge to 
Yemen, he inquired as to how he would pass his judgment. Mu’adh responded 
‘according to the book of God (Qur’an)’. ‘And if you find nothing?’ the Prophet 
asked. ‘According to the traditions (Sunnah) of God’s Messenger,’ ‘And if you find 
nothing?’ ‘Then I shall exert (ajtahidu) to my utmost to formulate my own 
judgement,’ Mu’adh answered. The Prophet then exclaimed, ‘Praise be to God who 
guided His Messenger’s messenger to what pleases His Messenger’.17 Muslim 
intellectual Tariq Ramadan highlights the last response of Mu’adh as particularly 
significant because the Prophet acknowledged that, in Yemen, a few hundred 
kilometres from Medina, there would be new cultural and legal situations that would 
require the critical analysis and intelligence of an insightful and sensitive judge. 
Certainly, there would be new issues in geographies and epochs that are far more 
distant to Yemen at the time of the Prophet.18 Interpretation and responding to the 
nuances of evolving cultures are tasks that Muslim scholars cannot avoid even when 
the primary sources are silent. 
Although not as acutely felt, this imperative is also apperceived in the case of 
theology. As discussed in the first chapter, the Qur’an is largely a book of theology 
clearly outlining its faith propositions and providing exhaustive coverage of God and 
other related essentials of faith. The history of Islamic theology illustrates a plethora 
of interpretation of verses, giving way to endorsed theological schools and outcast 
                                                 
17 Hadith reported by Abu Dawud, cited in Ramadan, Radical Reform, 24. 
18 Ramadan, Radical Reform, 24-25. 
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divergent sects.19 In time, deeper epistemological debate arose during medieval times 
over the literal meaning (haqīqa) and figurative meaning (majāz) of the text. For al-
Ghazālī, access to the meaning of the Qur’an depends on the comprehension of 
literal truth and meaning of the divine word; hence, there is an inseparable link 
between the cognition of literal meaning and the perception of figurative meaning.20 
For Ibn Taymiyya, the main question is not of epistemic ingress to figurative 
meaning, but knowing the divine intent expressed through God’s illocutionary habit 
of speech.21 In the modern era, attention shifted from textual analysis of the Qur’an to 
emerging theological challenges (existence of God22, theodicy and evolution theory 
as important examples), requiring fresh Islamic theological responses. Despite the 
fact there is relevant content within the Qur’an and Sunnah, new theological 
questions required wading through unfamiliar philosophical and scientific 
marshlands. 
The second imperative is that revelatory texts are expressed as a compendiary and 
inevitably their exegesis and elucidation require confabulation with sources outside 
the core texts of Islam. During the early classic period (7th to 9th centuries), the main 
sources outside the core revealed texts available were rudimentary science within 
natural philosophy and Jewish and Christian theological sources. The Jewish and 
Christian sources, collectively termed as isrāīliyyāt, is evident in Qur’anic exegetical 
                                                 
19 A classic book on Islamic heresiography is Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm Shahrastānī’s (1086-
1153) kitāb al-milal wa ‘l-niḥal. An English print is available with the title Muslim Sects and 
Divisions: The Section on Muslim Sects in Kitāb al-Milal wa ‘l-Niḥal, trans. A. K. Kazi and J. G. 
Flynn (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
20 Paul A. Hardy, “Epistemology in Divine Discourse,” in The Cambridge Companion to Classical 
Islamic Theology, ed. Tim J. Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 289. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Existence of God in the classical period was also part of the theological discourse; however, the 
main motive was to base theology on proofs rather than blind faith in the inherent subjectivity of text. 
In the classical era of Islamic theology, there were no noteworthy philosophical arguments against 
God. The Enlightenment era ushered in significant counterarguments against belief in God. 
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works in the way they expanded prophetic stories covered concisely in the Qur’an.23 
Although the rich and detailed isrāīliyyāt sources24 have been the staple of Qur’anic 
exegetes from the beginning, they have also attracted staunch critics. Their 
authenticity was questionable; the reported stories often defied common sense and 
appeared more like fairy tales than carefully preserved historical reports.25 In the 
fairest and most charitable assessment of isrāīliyyāt, there was no way of knowing 
what was authentic and what was not. The use of science as a supplementary source 
of knowledge in the classical period was scarce and also seen as problematic. 
Science was still in its developmental stage and it seemed to change with time; thus, 
for exegetes, it did not fit well with the immutable truths of the revealed texts. 
Interestingly, modern times clinched a complete reversal where isrāīliyyāt has been 
completely abandoned and the use of science to explain certain Qur’anic verses has 
become prevalent.26  
The third imperative comes in the form of the need to supply objective proofs to the 
arguments posed by Muslim sceptics and non-Muslim critics. While the Qur’an’s 
and Sunnah’s epistemological roles reign supreme for faithful Muslim scholars, for 
non-Muslim scholarship they are subjective sources of knowledge and texts whose 
authority is open for critique. Muslim scholars’ rationale is that God and the Prophet 
                                                 
23 Muhsin Demirci, Tefsir Usûlü ve Tarihi [Principles and History of Exegesis] (Istanbul: Marmara 
Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakultesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2001), 132-133. 
24 There are contrasting reports from Prophet Muhammad in relation to using Christian and Jewish 
sources. In one hadith reported by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, he admonishes Muslims from consulting 
Christian and Jewish sources, “… Do not ask anything to people of the Book. Those who are deviated 
can never be able to guide you to right path…” However, there is a more affirmative narration 
reported by four canonical hadith collections, “…Narrate from the Israelites, there is no concerns in 
this.” (Al-Bukhari, Anbiya, 30; Muslim, Zuhd, 72; al-Tirmithi, Ilm, 13; Ibn Maja, Muqaddima, 5).  
25 Demirci, Tefsir Usûlü, 133-138. 
26 There are numerous works on the topic of the Qur’an and science. Two noteworthy examples are 
Maurice Bucaille, The Bible, the Qur’an and Science: The Holy Scriptures Examined in the Light of 
Modern Knowledge (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1978) and Haluk Nurbaki, Verses 
from the Glorious Koran and the Facts of Science (Ankara: Turkish Foundation for Religion, 1989). 
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are authoritative.27 Since God revealed the Qur’an, it contains nothing but the truth. 
Since Prophet Muhammad was guided by God, and at times corrected through 
revelation, everything authentically attributed to him is also nothing but the truth.28 
Humans (scholars) are merely agents who determine the meaning and application of 
the commands and truths expressed through the Qur’an and Sunnah.29 Since the 
Qur’an is a text received on the authority of the Prophet and hadith are traditions 
attributed to the Prophet, they could be seen as sources beyond the test of critical 
reason.30 Yet, as al-Ghazālī argues in al-iqtīṣād fi al-i’tiqād (Moderation in Belief), 
there are Muslims who are intellectually gifted. When they are confronted with 
difficult theological questions or their faith is shaken by sceptical opinions, they 
require assuaging answers to quell incessant doubts.31 So, rational proofs are needed 
to confirm the truth claims extruding through the scriptures.  
Unsurprisingly, the tension between reason (‘aql) and revelation (naql) has been the 
main theatre for epistemological debate in classical Islamic theology and two major 
schools of Islamic theology approached it in slightly different ways. As Binyamin 
Abrahamov concludes in Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism, “pure 
rationalism is absent from Islamic theology” in that reason independent of revelation 
is not viewed as a foolproof instrument in attaining knowledge of God.32 In contrast, 
pure traditionalism, in terms of literalist understanding and application of revealed 
sources, survives as a legitimate but marginal school.33 The majority, Ash’arī and 
Māturīdī schools, have a vacillating line of equilibrium between reason and 
                                                 
27 Abu El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, 23. 
28 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 58-64. 
29 El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, 25. 
30 Ibid, 23-29. 
31 Abu Hamid Al-Ghazālī, Al-Ghazali’s Moderation in Belief: al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʻtiqād, trans. Aladdin 
Mahmud Yaqub (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 11. 
32 Binyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1998), 52. 
33 Ibid. 
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revelation, with the Māturīdī school gravitating slightly more towards the reason end 
of the spectrum in comparison to the Ash’arī school. 
Classical Māturīdī theological works generally start with an analysis of three 
different ways of attaining knowledge – through sensory perception (idrak), rational 
syllogism (istidlāl) and transmission (khabar).34 According to al-Māturīdī, 
knowledge attained through the five senses – sight, smell, touch, taste and hearing – 
provides a sensory experience that does not necessarily require additional evidence 
for support. The knowledge of the sun’s existence and fire burning, for example, can 
be attained through sensory perception.35 Certain knowledge attained through 
narrations include mutawātir narrations – transmission of knowledge by a large 
group of people whose agreement over a forgery is impossible – and narrations from 
the Prophet whose truthfulness is proven by miracles.36 In this sense, the Qur’an’s 
content is certain and true as it is transmitted through mutawātir channels.37 A 
portion of the Sunnah is also transmitted through mutawātir; therefore, it has to be 
accepted as certain and true. The remainder of the Sunnah is largely transmitted 
through single channels (khabar al-wāhid) and if their authenticity is proven they are 
accepted, if not they are abandoned.38 Knowledge attained through rational means 
includes inductive, deductive and analogous syllogisms.39 According to al-Māturīdī, 
appeals to reason as a source of knowledge are a necessity as there are things too 
small or without volume that cannot be known through the senses alone.40 Judging 
the authenticity of narrations is also done through the application of reason.41 
                                                 
34 Al-Māturīdī, Kitāb al-Tawhid, 12. 
35 Serafetin Golcuk and Suleyman Toprak, Kelam (Konya: Tekin Kitabevi Yayinlari, 1996), 89.  
36 Golcuk and Toprak, Kelam, 95. 
37 Al-Māturīdī, Kitāb al-Tawhid, 12. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Golcuk and Toprak, Kelam, 92. 
40 Al-Māturīdī, Kitâb al-Tawhid, 13. 
41 Ibid. 
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Distinguishing between prophetic miracle and skilled magic or the difference 
between ordinary men and extraordinary attributes of true prophets can only be 
discerned through reason.42 Further, al-Māturīdī argues reasoning is a Qur’anic 
commandment sanctioned by many verses where God hinged the discovery of the 
truths of the Qur’an on the essential faculty of reason.43 Al-Māturīdī was the first 
theologian who postulated a theory of knowledge in this way such that all subsequent 
theological works had introductory chapters on epistemological discussion.44 
In the Ash’arī school, the main enterprise is finding a rational basis for the Qur’an 
and Sunnah. In his work, risāla ilā ahl al-taghr bi-bāb al-abwāb (Epistle to the 
People of Frontier), al-Ash’arī argues Prophet Muhammad took people through a 
four-staged sequential order of teachings.45 The first stage involved a demonstration 
of the contingency of the world and human beings; second, to recognise that the 
world and human beings are subject to the absolute will of the all-powerful and all-
provident God; third, to acknowledge that Prophet Muhammad is an authentic 
messenger of God; and finally, as an entailment of the third, to accept without 
question whatever the Prophet brought as revelation.46 Despite Richard M. Frank’s 
conclusion that this sequence forms al-Ash’arī’s conceptualisation of “rational order 
of the progress to faith,”47 al-Ash’arī is actually constructing the rational foundation 
to epistemological legitimacy of the revealed sources of Islam: the Qur’an and 
Sunnah.  
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid, 13-14. Al-Māturīdī quotes many verses from the Qur’an including 41:53-54, 88:17-20, 2:164, 
51:20-21. 
44 Al-Māturīdī, Kitab al-Tawhid, xx. 
45 Richard M. Frank, Early Islamic Theology: The Mu’tazilites and al-Ash’arī (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Variorum, 2007), VII, 138. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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The Ash’arite epistemological framework is further augmented by al-Ghazālī who 
argues that the theologian, using a rational methodology, starts dealing with the 
notion of existence and classifies it as eternal and contingent.48 Contingent existence 
includes all living and non-living things that have a beginning in time, while eternal 
existence only applies to God. After dealing with questions of existence and proving 
God’s eternity, the theologian examines issues related to attributes of God. In this 
respect, the theologian explains what is necessary, possible and impossible about 
God. One of the possible actions of God is sending Prophets to humanity. Hence, the 
theologian proceeds to deal with the proofs of prophethood and revelation. Once this 
is satisfactorily accomplished, human reason abdicates to knowledge expressed in the 
Qur’an and Sunnah as true revelation transmitted through Prophet Muhammad.49 In 
this epistemological framework, reason fulfils two important functions. First, it gives 
revealed texts a wholesale status of being true and being used as true premises to any 
theological (in fact any disciplinary) argument; and second, reason eventually takes a 
subservient role as an elucidative and interpretive tool for the revealed texts.  
Epistemological differences between the Ash’arī and Māturīdī schools with respect 
to the adoption of reason can be illustrated in their respective views on good and evil. 
In the Ash’arī school, good and evil and their consequences in the afterlife can only 
be known through divine revelation (wahy).50 Since God is absolutely sovereign in 
His will, if something is prohibited by revelation, it is deemed as evil and if 
something is condoned by revelation, it is deemed as good.51 Put differently, things 
and actions are not in themselves good or evil; rather, divine commandment and 
                                                 
48 Hammad, “Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s Juristic Doctrine.” 
49 Ibid. 
50 Umar F. Abd-Allah, “Theological Dimensions of Islamic Law,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Classical Islamic Theology, ed. Tim J. Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 250. 
51 Ibid.  
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prohibition deem them so. For the Māturīdī School, there is a complementary 
relationship between reason, revelation and empirical knowledge of the world; 
hence, knowledge of good and evil is discernible through all three sources.52 Divine 
wisdom dominates this universe and enlightens the human mind of the true nature of 
things and events.53 This example illustrates the greater harmony of reason and 
revelation found within the Māturīdī School. In particular, appeals to divine wisdom 
(hikma) as a dominant characteristic of the divine scheme in the universe is an 
important distinction of the Māturīdī School. As will be seen in chapters to follow, 
emphasis on wisdom (hikma) in the universe bears even greater prominence in 
Nursi’s works.  
A final epistemological consideration in classical Islamic theology is the place of 
spiritual experience and insight. Al-Ghazālī introduces spiritual insight (kashf) as an 
independent source about religious knowledge, especially in terms of knowledge of 
God (ma’rifatullah). Al-Ghazālī is original in his introduction, or more correctly the 
legitimisation of spiritual insight (kashf), as a fundamental source of knowledge. In 
mishkāt al-anwār (The Niche of Lights) he argues that deeper knowledge of God 
could be attained through spiritual insight, but not necessarily discernible through 
human reason.54 This is only possible through the light of īmān (faith) that God casts 
into the heart of a believer55 and through the gift of spiritual closeness to God 
attained as a result of purification of the heart.56 Spiritual insight of a purified heart 
intuitively knows basic truths without proofs57 and attains a true understanding of the 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Buchman, translator’s introduction, xx. 
55 Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 87. 
56 Buchman, translator’s introduction, xx. 
57 Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 87. 
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cosmos, human nature and God.58 As a gift of God, it remains latent in human nature 
(fitra) either by the influence of wrong beliefs and sins or through the veil of 
negative attributes59 or the lack of sufficient stimulation by the individual. Just like 
latent water in a well is only accessible through digging into the earth, spiritual 
insight is discernible through purification of the heart.60  
Although kashf as a source of knowledge has not gained prominence within the 
Ash’arī and Māturīdī theological schools, it has taken root as part of the Qur’anic 
concept of natural human disposition (fitra). Māturīdī theologian ‘Ali al-Qāri  
(d. 1607)61 affirms that human natural disposition is intrinsically equipped for the 
knowledge of God.62 Significantly, spiritual insight wields strong influence within 
the popular metaphysics and theology of Sufism. Given that Sufism penetrated the 
entire Muslim world from the thirteenth century onwards, kashf has to be considered 
an important aspect of Islamic epistemology. 
So, classical Islamic epistemology mainly hinges around the divine revelation 
encapsulated in the Qur’an and Sunnah. Necessity and certain imperatives have 
compelled Muslim theologians to include other complementary sources of 
knowledge. Chief among these is human reason (‘aql), but only as a subservient 
instrument to support propositions of faith. Although al-Ghazālī and al-Māturīdī 
pointed out the universe as a source of knowledge, they have not fully built this in 
their epistemology. Through his spiritual transformation, al-Ghazālī, and with him 
much of the Muslim world, turned towards spiritual insight (kashf) as a 
fundamentally superior source of knowing God. 
                                                 
58 Buchman, translator’s introduction, xxxiii. 
59 Ibid, xxxiv. 
60 Abd-Allah, “Theological Dimensions of Islamic Law,” 251. 
61 Sources do not give a date of birth. 
62 Abd-Allah, “Theological Dimensions of Islamic Law,” 251. 
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3.4 Qur’an, Sunnah and Reason in Nursi’s Epistemology 
In his introduction to the 19th Word, Nursi outlines his epistemological foundations 
for theology: 
There are three great and universal describers which make known to us our 
Lord. First is the Book of the Universe ... Second is the Seal of the Prophets, 
upon whom be peace and blessings, the supreme sign of the Book of the 
Universe. Third is the Great Noble Qur’an.63 
‘Abd al-’Aziz Barghuth highlights that, with this listing, Nursi points to the 
reciprocal dependence of the three sources in constructing a theory of knowledge – a 
construction based solely on the universe will not lead to the truth about human 
existence; conversely, a focus on revelation alone will lead to missing an essential 
dimension and prevent a correct reading of the reality of human existence.64 Hence, 
the universe and revelation as represented by the Qur’an and Sunnah are 
complementary sources. Inclusion of the universe as one of the key sources of 
knowledge about God consigns the universe equally as a primary source.  
What is equally significant in this passage is the linking of Prophet Muhammad, as 
the seal of prophets, to the universe as its supreme sign. This notion is repeated in 
many places throughout Nursi’s works where Prophet Muhammad is described as 
“the final and finest fruit of the tree of universe.”65 Since the universe has a 
beginning and it has evolved over time to produce branches of galaxies and flowers 
of stars and planets, the universe can be contemplated analogous to a tree.66 Life is 
the most important outcome and ultimately human life is the finest fruit of the tree of 
the universe. Nursi argues further to conclude that, since friend and foe recognise his 
                                                 
63 Nursi, Sözler, 319. 
64 ‘Abd al-’Aziz Barghuth, “The Place of the Theory of Knowledge in the Vicegerency and 
Civilisational Process in the Thought of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi” (paper presented at the 4th 
International Nursi Symposium on Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, Istanbul, September 20-22, 1998). 
65 Nursi, Sözler, 31st Word, 3rd Fundamental, 783. 
66 Ibid, 788.  
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high moral standards and his interactions with others testify the high moral and 
spiritual principles he brought and displayed by example, Prophet Muhammad is, 
therefore, the finest fruit of the tree of universe.67 The evidence for this is the night 
journey (isra’) and the ascension (mi’raj) of the Prophet to the heavens thoroughly 
discussed in the 31st Word as an exegesis of verses 17:1 and 53:4-18.68 
Notwithstanding the mystical tone of these arguments and even though Turner 
contends that “prophethood can never be discussed outside the context of 
revelation,”69 linking Prophet Muhammad to the cosmic purpose puts the Prophet’s 
life, words and actions (Sunnah) as an independent source of knowledge about God. 
For Nursi, Prophet Muhammad is the quintessential embodiment of what God wants 
in human beings, an essential aspect of his role as a revelation-bearing prophet. 
The Qur’an has no less significance in Nursi’s epistemology. One of the longest 
passages in Words, the 25th Word, is reserved to prove the divine origin of the 
Qur’an through an analysis of its content, eloquence and linguistic marvel. At the 
beginning of this passage, Nursi gives as many as 42 descriptions of the Qur’an.70 
Significantly, he links the Qur’an to the universe. The Qur’an is described as “the 
pre-eternal translator of the great Book of the Universe, and the post-eternal 
interpreter of the various tongues reciting the verses of creation.”71 As the uncreated 
word of God, the Qur’an explains the universe and gives an exegesis of the signs 
embedded in the universe by the Creator. So, the Qur’an is not just a source of 
knowledge for believers, but also a source to explain the universe and natural world. 
This is an interesting flipping of the epistemological ranking between science and the 
                                                 
67 Ibid, 784.  
68 These verses allude to the night journey from Mecca to Jerusalem and the ascension of Prophet 
Muhammad to the heavens in cryptic language. 
69 Turner, The Qur’an Revealed, 191. 
70 Nursi, Sözler, 25th Word, Introduction, 490-493. 
71 Ibid, 490.  
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Qur’an to Qur’an’s favour when the Qur’an is elevated to the role of interpreting the 
universe. As will be discussed further in this chapter, this relationship is reciprocal 
where Nursi cites the universe as an exegete of the Qur’an. 
The epistemological primacy of the Qur’an is seen throughout Nursi’s works as he 
almost always cites Qur’anic verses at the beginning of key passages and then 
provides explanation, interpretation and exegesis of those verses. Where appropriate, 
he supports his arguments with additional references to Qur’anic verses. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, his works are generally considered a theological exegesis of 
the Qur’an.72 Use of Sunnah references (hadith) as sources is less frequent, except in 
the 19th Letter where his gives hadith references to more than 300 reported miracles 
of Prophet Muhammad. Nursi makes original contributions to hadith interpretation in 
his introductory treatment at the beginning of the 19th Letter and 5th Ray.73 
Where does this leave reason in Nursi’s epistemology and why does he closely link 
the Qur’an and Sunnah to the universe and not to reason? Nursi admits all essentials 
of faith require conclusive proofs (burhan al-qat’ī),74 which inevitably necessitates 
reasoning. Similar to the approach of classical theologians, he goes to considerable 
lengths to provide rational proofs for the authenticity and divine origin of the 
Qur’an75 as well as outlining arguments and factual evidence in support of the 
authenticity of Prophet Muhammad’s prophethood.76 Unsurprisingly, Nursi aims to 
set a rational basis for the two fundamental sources of Islam. At the same time, he 
appears to relegate reason to a secondary status to revealed sources.  
                                                 
72 As noted in Chapter 2, Nursi outlined his exegetical methodology in his early work Muhākamāt. He 
applied this methodology in the exegetical work Ishārāt al-I’jāz.  
73 Notwithstanding the significance of these contributions, it is beyond the scope of this study to 
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74 Nursi, Sözler, 24th Word, 3rd Branch, 457. 
75 Ibid, 25th Word, 488-622. 
76 Ibid, 19th Word, 319-332. 
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Through a long analogy in the 24th Word, Nursi compares the respective capacities of 
revelation (wahy or sometimes termed naql), reason (‘aql) and religious insight 
(kashf) in attaining religious truths.77 He compares and contrasts light refracted on a 
flower (representing religious insight through the human heart) and light reflecting 
from the moon (representing philosophical reasoning) to receiving light directly from 
the sun (representing revelatory truth of the Qur’an). Just as refracted light is a 
filtered version of sunlight showing only certain colours and moonlight is a 
miniscule portion of reflected sunlight, in comparison, direct exposure to sunlight is 
consummate access to the sun. Similarly, revelation (wahy) is far more complete in 
gaining access to religious truth in stark contrast to inherent limitations of reason and 
subjectivity of spiritual experience and insight.78 While this may seem to position 
revelation to a higher locus than reason, Nursi’s aim with this analogy is to explain 
the root causes of why there seems to be three different paths to human perfection 
(kamālāt),79 why there are significant differences between faith traditions and why 
influential religious figures seem to point to different paths to God.80 Hence, in 
Nursi’s epistemology, reason and religious insight are acceptable and will lead to the 
truth, but on their own they always fall short in reaching human perfection and the 
guidance of revelation is essential and more complete. 
In the 30th Word, Nursi hones a closer scrutiny of the relationship between reason 
and revelation. He contentiously argues that, whenever the line of philosophy 
(reason) is combined with, and in a way subservient to, the line of prophethood 
(revelation), humanity finds peace and happiness. Whenever they separated, all 
virtue and goodness primarily coalesces on the flank of religion and all evil and 
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destruction predominantly coalesces on the flank of philosophy.81 Notwithstanding 
the sweeping assessment of philosophy and religion, Nursi’s argument reflects the 
Qur’anic narrative of religion and human condition. Crucially though, this claim does 
not negate reason, but locates it in a subservient and complementary role to 
revelation to educe the best in humans and humanity.  
Colin Turner clarifies that Nursi’s use and discussion of philosophy does not always 
mean the same thing and, in general, comparative discourse on philosophy denotes 
certain philosophical approaches leading to materialistic interpretations of science 
and reasoning at the service of human ego.82 A thorough examination of the 30th 
Word reveals Nursi’s explanation of the role of self-awareness (anā) within the 
natural human disposition (fitra) and human ego (nafs). He identifies anā as the 
essential key to understanding God and how the human ego manifests differently 
throughout human history.83 His main argument is that revelation (and authentic 
religion) supported by reason guides the majority of humanity towards goodness, 
virtue and happiness in this world and the next, whereas reason (materialistic 
philosophy) alone is susceptible to the influence of ego and only achieves happiness 
for a small portion of humanity in a finite worldly life.84 Clearly, in reaching ultimate 
truth and attaining human perfection and happiness, Nursi does not rely on human 
reason alone.  
Yet, Nursi’s works are replete with applications of critical reasoning and logical 
argumentation to the point that, as Egyptian scholar of Islamic philosophy ‘Adil 
                                                 
81 Ibid, 30th Word, 1st Aim, 729. 
82 Turner, The Qur’an Revealed, 186. 
83 Nursi, Sözler, 30th Word, 1st Aim, 724-741. This idea will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
84 See also 12th Word where Nursi compares and contrasts the wisdom of the Qur’an and wisdom of 
philosophy. 
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Mahmud Badr identifies, Nursi’s thought and discourse is highly philosophical.85 Is 
this a methodological inconsistency for Nursi? Most significantly, in Nursi’s 
epistemology, reason is not the counterpart of revelation, but more pertinently the 
counterpart of revelation is the universe (kā’ināt). Put differently, the universe, and 
therefore the natural world, is commensurate with revelation (the Qur’an), not 
necessarily reason. The universe has the capacity to confirm the truths of revelation, 
just as revelation has the capacity to confirm the truths reflected in the universe. This 
insight is the most significant aspect in Nursi’s epistemology and cosmology and 
warrants a deeper treatment.  
3.5 The Role of Universe in Nursi’s Epistemology 
Nursi places the universe as a concomitant epistemological source together with the 
Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad for two main reasons. First, for Nursi, this approach 
is the Qur’anic method.86 The concern here is not just to legitimise the universe as a 
source by linking it to the Qur’an; rather, the emphasis is on the audience. Just as 
modern Muslims are confronted by people who question the authority of the 
revelation, Prophet Muhammad faced a similar audience in his time. Unbelievers in 
his time did not readily accept him as a true messenger of God or the Qur’an as an 
authoritative source from the divine. The only objective source of knowledge 
accessible to both believers and disbelievers was the natural world and the universe. 
The universe is the only objective source of knowledge accessible to every person to 
test propositions of faith encapsulated within the revelation. Consequently, the 
                                                 
85 ‘Adil Mahmud Badr, “Said Nursi View of the Age of Progress and the Science of Kalam” (paper 
presented at the 6th International Nursi Symposium on Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, Istanbul, September 
22-24, 2002). 
86 Nursi, Sözler, 25th Word, 488. 
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Qur’an requests its readers to look for verses or signs (āyāt) in the natural world, 
urging them to reflect using their critical reasoning.87  
In the Qur’anic vision and Nursi’s method, the universe should be read like a grand 
book;88 thus, the universe will reveal and confirm all truths of belief proposed by the 
Qur’an. Just as the Qur’an is a commentator of the “verses of creation” (āyāt al-
takwiniyya) embedded in the universe,89 the universe is an exegete of the “verses of 
revelation” (āyāt al-qur’āniyya) encapsulated in the Qur’an.90 Previous to Nursi, al-
Ghazālī articulated a similar metaphor when he depicted the universe as al-kitāb al-
manshūr (the outspread book), the theological and physical mirror to the Qur’an, 
which is al-kitāb al-mastūr (the written book).91 Nursi resurrected this key Qur’anic 
idea centuries after and developed it further as a key theological approach. As Turner 
highlights, this is one of the most distinctive features of Nursi’s theology in that, for 
Nursi, “every creative act of God is an act of revelation, and that the created realm as 
a whole is from all aspects revelatory in nature.”92 Ali Mermer agrees, contending 
that Nursi goes further than any other theologian by inseparably linking the Qur’an 
and the universe in a mutual relationship.93 The key remark where Nursi makes this 
linkage is in the 7th Ray: 
Just as the attribute of Speech (kalām) makes the Most-Sacred-Divine-Essence 
(Dhāt al-Aqdas) known through revelation and inspiration, so too the attribute 
of Power (qudra) makes the Most Sacred Divine Essence known through 
masterly works – each of which act as an embodied word – describing and 
                                                 
87 See for example, Qur’an 3:190-191. Ali Ünal, The Qurʼan with Annotated Interpretation in Modern 
English. (Clifton, N.J.: Tughra Books, 2012). 
88 Nursi, Sözler, 13th Word, 2nd Station, 6th Matter, 224. 
89 Ibid, 25th Word, Introduction, 490. 
90 Ibid, 19th Word, 1st Droplet, 319.  
91 Ramadan, Radical reform, 88. 
92 Turner, The Qur’an Revealed, 191. 
93 Ali Mermer, “Divine Speech in the Risale-i Nur” (paper presented at the 5th International Nursi 
Symposium on Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, Istanbul, September 24-26, 2000). 
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ascribing a Powerful-Possessor-of-Glory (Qadir Dhu’l-Jalal) by presenting the 
entire universe as a materialised form of the Qur’an.94 
This insight from Nursi is original and most significant. As a summary of his 
theological approach, the statement firmly intertwines revelation, universe and their 
key function of making God known and understood to the human audience. 
The second reason why Nursi sets the universe as a source of knowledge for 
propositions of belief is that this approach gives his rational arguments an empirical 
foundation and almost scientific certainty. Especially when philosophical 
developments since the European Enlightenment and scientific discoveries about the 
natural world and the universe challenged the truth claims of all religions,95 the 
empirical method becomes a necessity if religion (Islam) is to have any relevance in 
the modern world. Furthermore, science offers a detailed and thorough knowledge of 
the world and universe, and this knowledge is increasing exponentially. Instead of 
posing science as an adversary of God and religion, incorporating its content as an 
epistemological source in support of belief in God wins a powerful ally. As Şükran 
Vahide suggests, this allows Nursi to end the seeming conflicts between science and 
Qur’anic propositions and provide proofs based on reason and reflective thought on 
the universe.96 
Nursi’s friendly treatment of science is not just a tactical accommodation. He takes 
scientific knowledge right to the core of theology. Citing part of verse 17:44, “...and 
there is not a thing but extols His glory and praise...” and contending that many 
window-like facets open to God through everything, Nursi remarks: 
                                                 
94 Nursi, Şualar, 7th Ray, 1st Chapter, 18th Level, 200. 
95 W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 
1985), 158. 
96 Şükran Vahide, “The Book of the Universe: Its Place in Bediuzzaman’s Thought” (paper presented 
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The essence of the creation and the reality of the universe is founded upon the 
Divine Names. The reality of everything depends upon one or many names. 
Even the qualities and art displayed over the creation rely upon a Name. In fact, 
the true science of philosophy is based on the name Hakīm (All-Wise); true 
science of medicine depends on the Name Shāfi (Healer), and the science of 
geometry relies on the name Muqaddir (Determiner), and so on. Just as each 
branch of science is based on a Name and eventually ends in a Name, the 
realities of all scientific disciplines, human perfections and all levels of human 
virtues are also founded on the Divine Names… In fact, manifestations and the 
impresses of as many as twenty Divine Names may be plainly observed on a 
single living creature.97 
With this important proclamation, Nursi places science, as the revealer of knowledge 
of the world and the universe, at the epistemological epicentre for knowing God. 
This depiction is not new as Ibn ‘Arabī also gives the similitude of the universe as a 
kind of a book of divine names in his seminal work futūhāt al-makkiyya (The 
Meccan Revelations).98 Notwithstanding his critique of Ibn ‘Arabī,99 Nursi seems to 
have embraced this theology. Nevertheless, the crucial difference is that Nursi links 
science, hence empirical knowledge of the world, within the theological equation. As 
Mermer suggests, this link is such that the distinction between theology based on the 
Qur’an and science based on undisputed knowledge of the universe is rendered 
meaningless.100 
The 10th Word101 can be given as an illustration of how Nursi applies his empirical 
methodology (see Figure 1). The starting point is the Qur’anic verse 30:50, “Look, 
then, at the imprints of God’s Mercy (raḥma), how He revives the dead earth after its 
death. Certainly then it is He Who will revive the dead. He has full power over 
everything.” Nursi uses observations from the natural world to demonstrate God’s 
mercy and compassion (raḥma). All living species are clothed and fed according to 
                                                 
97 Nursi, Sözler, 32nd Word, 3rd Stopping Place, 1st Topic, 853. For direct quotations from Nursi, I 
have used Şükran Vahide’s translation as a base and modified it by crosschecking the translation with 
the original text. 
98 Mermer, “Divine Speech in the Risale-i Nur.” 
99 This critique is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
100 Mermer, “Divine Speech in the Risale-i Nur.” 
101 Nursi, Sözler, 10th Word, 82-176. 
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their needs where the most powerless are provided the best of sustenance.102 Animal, 
human, even plant mothers are compelled to serve their young with an irresistible 
impulse of compassion.103 These facts can only be manifestations of a single source 
of love and compassion that can only be derived from the infinite mercy and 
compassion of God, as there are no other identifiable sources for infinite compassion. 
Human life is short and transient. If there was to be only non-existence after a brief 
joyous earthly life, this would constitute a great act of cruelty.104 Since this is 
inconsistent with infinite compassion, humans will be resurrected for an everlasting 
life out of God’s infinite compassion.105 Throughout the 10th Word, Nursi follows the 
same theo-empirical method and reasoning to provide more than ten separate 
arguments for the existence of God and resurrection after death.  
 
Figure 1: Nursi’s empirical methodology 
This example also illustrates the role of reason within Nursi’s epistemology and 
methodology. The claims of revelation are confirmed by empirical observations of 
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the natural world through the use of reasoning. It is safe to conclude that, in Nursi’s 
epistemology, the universe (book of creation) and the Qur’an (book of revelation) 
have equal divine origin and hence importance. Any claim for religious truth must be 
confirmed by both the Qur’an and the universe. Human reason is an essential 
instrument to find this correlation. If there is a direct correlation between the Qur’an 
and the universe mutually entailed by the use of reason, then that truth claim can be 
deemed as absolute truth. Throughout his writings, Nursi follows this methodology 
and brings forward original arguments for God’s existence, divine names and 
attributes, the reality of life after death and other Qur’anic propositions of faith. 
3.6 Significance of Intellectual Perspective in Nursi’s Epistemology 
Crucially, materialistic philosophy – a source of disbelief for Nursi – also uses 
empirical data from the natural world and the universe to support its claims for truth. 
Nursi and theologians following the same methodology, and atheist philosophers and 
scientists argue the complete opposite with a similar claim for certainty. 
Interestingly, the Qur’an seems to recognise people can arrive at opposing 
conclusions using the same body of evidence from the natural world.106 How is this 
possible and who is right? 
According to Nursi, the answer lies in the inherent deceptive nature of human 
perception. Deceptiveness of the perspective is not exactly same as al-Ghazālī’s 
deceptiveness of sensory perception; rather, it is deception effectuated through a 
differing focus in one’s outlook in interpreting empirical data obtained from the 
natural world. Depending on one’s perspective, it is possible to perceive the natural 
world differently and process what is observed with distinct cognition, leading to 
                                                 
106 See for examples verses 2:26; 10:101. 
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opposing conclusions. Nursi calls these two perspectives ma’nā al-ism (indicative of 
the name) and ma’nā al-ḥarf (indicative of the letter).107 He makes this distinction 
when he explains the difference between how the Qur’an and positivistic science and 
philosophy talk about the natural world and the universe: 
The Wise Qur’an (Qur’an al-Hakīm) is the most elevated commentator and the 
most eloquent translator of the Grand Qur’an (book) of universe. It is the 
furqan108 that instructs humanity … in the verses of creation inscribed by the 
pen of Power on the pages of the universe and the tablets of time. It looks at 
creatures--each acting like a meaningful letter--from the perspective of ma’nā 
al-ḥarf109 (meaning indicative of the letter). That is, it looks at them in the name 
of their Artistic Maker (Sānī’). It says, ‘how marvellously they have been made; 
how beautifully they point to the beauty of their Artistic Maker! (Sānī’)’ and 
through this, it exposes the true beauty of the universe. Whereas, the 
philosophy, called natural philosophy or science … instead of looking at the 
epistles in the grand book of creation from the perspective of ma’nā al-ḥarf, 
(meaning indicative of the letter), that is in the name of God, it looks at the 
creation ma’nā al-ism (meaning indicative of the name), that is in the name of 
creation itself. Instead of saying, ‘how beautifully they have been made,’ it says 
‘how beautiful they are.’110 
This distinction between perspectives is one of the hardest notions to comprehend for 
the ordinary readers of the Risale-i Nur. In a letter, Nursi further clarifies the 
difference in two perspectives to one of his confused students.111 He gives the 
analogy of an image in a mirror and the difference in what is seen depending on if 
one is focusing on the mirror or the image in the mirror. If one’s attention is focused 
on the mirror, all one sees is the glass. The image in the mirror blurs and remains in 
the background as fuzzy detail. In this perspective, the mirror acts in the role of 
ma’nā al-ism and has as much value as the material worth of the glass. Conversely, if 
one focuses attention on the reflected image in the mirror, one will see the image 
                                                 
107 Nursi, Sözler, 12th Word, 1st Fundamental, 193. 
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clearly and the glass becomes secondary. In this perspective, the mirror acts in the 
role of ma’nā al-ḥarf. The physical significance of the glass remains in the 
background and the mirror gains greater value and significance. Since the true 
function of a mirror is to reflect images, ma’nā al-ḥarf is the right perspective to 
have. Similarly, the universe should be viewed as a mirror to see images of meanings 
conveyed through constituting parts.112 
For Nursi, the ma’nā al-ism perspective stops at the physicality of things and renders 
the entire universe meaningless, which invariably leads to disbelief and rejection of 
God.113 The ma’nā al-ism perspective would be akin to looking at the Statue of 
Liberty114 without considering its artist, historical context and priceless symbolic 
value for the American people. Consequently, the worth and significance of the 
statue would reduce to its material properties and value. Conversely, in the ma’nā al-
ḥarf perspective, every entity is perceived as part of a greater meaning, just like a 
letter has no independent meaning, but, as part of a word, points to a greater 
meaning. The letter ‘r,’ for example,115 has no meaning by itself. When used to 
construct meaningful words, ‘r’ gains meaning, and hence value, beyond itself. In the 
ma’nā al-ḥarf perspective, creation is viewed as part of a greater meaning where 
every entity is arranged like letters in a word to convey meaning beyond themselves. 
If viewed this way, creation will evidently be seen as the purposeful work of God 
and hence gain profound meaning and value. One will be able to see the testimony of 
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creation to the Creator and the names of God glittering on the mirror of the 
universe.116 
Nursi contends that, when viewed through the lens of positivistic philosophy 
(through ma’nā al-ism), science simply describes the sun in and of itself.117 Although 
the scientific perspective gives knowledge about the sun’s physical properties, it 
gives no meaningful spiritual knowledge and wisdom. The Qur’an, on the other 
hand, looks at the sun as indicative of a greater meaning (ma’nā al-ḥarf). It focuses 
on the sun’s role in the cosmic order when it says, “the sun revolves”118 and brings to 
mind the orderly behaviour of the solar system resulting in the night–day and 
summer–winter cycles as indicative of God’s cosmic order, for it is beyond the 
capacity of the sun to create this system. The Qur’an also says, “He has set up the 
sun as a lamp,”119 highlighting one of the key purposes of the sun – to illuminate the 
earth and make it hospitable. It is clearly beyond the sun to think compassionately 
about creatures and assist in their survival.120 Hence, Nursi argues the fact that 
everything in the universe and natural world serves a purpose greater than itself is 
one of the clearest teleological evidences for the existence of God.121 
One could critique Nursi’s argument and suggest that science identifies the night–day 
or summer–winter cycles as well as how the sun is critical for the survival of life on 
earth. Importantly, Nursi is not entirely inferring that positivistic science discounts 
the sun’s significance in the cosmic order; rather, his central argument is that 
positivistic science’s main focus is not the sun’s role, but the sun itself. The sun’s 
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role is worth mentioning only in passing. Positivistic science examines and produces 
theories on how seasons change, but seldom mentions the significance this has on 
cosmic order and life on earth. Even if it does, positivistic science attributes them to 
random chance and causes. In defence of science, it could be argued that giving 
meaning to the natural world and universe is beyond science’s scope. This is 
precisely Nursi’s main point: positivistic science is empirical and narrow in scope; 
hence, it will not be able to discover the reality of existence. In his view, the 
Qur’anic approach is empirical but holistic; hence, rightly focused on leading to the 
truth. Therefore, in Nursi’s cosmology, the universe should be canvassed as a mirror 
reflecting greater meaning and read like a book conveying a grand mystical story 
beyond its mere physical composition.122 It is only possible to read the universe 
correctly when it is viewed from the perspective of ma’nā al-ḥarf. This perspective 
inevitably leads to discovery of God. In the alternative perspective, ma’nā al-ism, the 
meaning conveyed in the book of the universe is masked. The universe appears 
chaotic, haphazard and unintelligible. 
How can one be so sure that the meaning Nursi insistently suggests is really there; 
could it be that Nursi is forcing meaning on the universe to simply provide an 
empirical basis for his theology? Nursi does not pose such a question, but he 
provides an answer.123 If someone says they cannot decipher any meaning conveyed 
through the universe, it does not mean the meaning is not there. But if multiple 
people can decipher the same meaning from the same set of empirical data, the 
meaning must be there. If a beautifully written Qur’anic text is shown to a person 
who cannot read or understand Arabic, the text will be seen intelligible and 
meaningless. The best they can do is describe the properties of the book and explain 
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how beautifully it is put together. But, if the same Qur’anic text is shown to Arabic 
speaking Qur’an experts, they will immediately recognise it as the Qur’an and be 
able to read the text and explain its meanings in more or less the same manner. This 
demonstrates the text conveys a meaning beyond its letters. Similarly, since people 
with discerning eyes and reflecting minds can translate more or less the same 
meaning conveyed through the book of the universe, this proves the meaning is there 
in reality.124 
In an early book, Katre (Drop), Nursi says his entire education and learning can be 
coalesced in just four terms – ma’nā al-ḥarf, ma’nā al-ism, niyyah (intention) and 
naẓar (perspective).125 The critical focus of these four concepts is the universe and 
the suggestion of the universe analogous to a book (kitāb). As Vahide notes, Nursi 
makes this point to argue the ‘book of the universe’ must then have an author (God) 
and inform the human reader about God’s attributes.126 The book metaphor also 
infers reading must take place with an intention to understand it. Furthermore, as a 
creation of God, the book of the universe becomes a type of revelation in a 
complementary way to the Qur’an as a book (kitāb) of revelation. Just as the Qur’an 
is a divine source of knowledge, knowledge obtained from the universe through 
ma’nā al-ḥarf is also a divine source of knowledge. Nevertheless, as Turner suggests, 
Nursi says the testimony of the universe would be insufficient and self-disclosure of 
God is required as revealed text from the Qur’an. Yet, linking with his earlier 
definitions of the Qur’an, the call for reading and understanding the universe gives it 
an epistemological role in theology. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
The classical Islamic discourse on theology and its epistemology originated within 
the Qur’an and Sunnah as primary sources of knowledge. For classical theologians, 
knowledge offered by the Qur’an is definitive as the authentic word of God. Since 
God would not deceive people and reveal wrong information, the entire content of 
the Qur’an is accepted as true knowledge. Since Prophet Muhammad was guided by 
God, what he said and did are also infallible and revealed certain knowledge. This 
epistemological foundation was a major leap forward for the early Muslim 
community as they were migrating from a Bedouin and tribal society – collectively 
identified as the era of jahiliyyah (ignorance) – with no previous sources of 
knowledge other than tribal stories and practical wisdom. 
As the Muslim community studied the Qur’an and Sunnah, and advanced in 
civilisation, they were exposed to new issues, ideas and theologies as well as sources 
of knowledge. It became necessary to consider additional sources, chief among them 
being the isrāīliyyāt (Jewish and Christian sources), science and human reason (‘aql). 
With isrāīliyyāt receiving heavy criticism and science being rudimentary, reason was 
the main contender as an independent source of knowledge alongside revelation.  
Two centuries of tension between revelation and reason culminated in the Ash’arī 
and Māturīdī Sunni theological schools where a relative balance was achieved or, 
more correctly, reason was incorporated as an epistemological source only with the 
condition of subservience to revelation. While the majority of the Muslim world 
followed these two theological schools, traditionalists, who gave no place to reason, 
and Mu’tazalites, who gave primacy to reason, precipitated at either end of the 
theological spectrum. Al-Ghazālī’s spiritual insight (kashf) became the fourth source 
 175 
of knowledge and was even considered superior to reason within Sufism as it became 
a mass movement from the twelfth century onwards. So, classical Islamic 
epistemology for theology consisted of the Qur’an and Sunnah as revelation (naql), 
human reason (‘aql) and spiritual insight (kashf). 
The modern era brought major changes and developments in epistemology. A 
dramatic increase in human knowledge of the world and the universe, and major 
developments in science and technology, propelled empiricism and science to the 
epistemological centre stage.127 Epistemological tension shifted to interplay between 
science and religion. In the Western world, authenticity of scriptures was challenged 
and their epistemological value was negated outside the church and its theological 
discourse.128 In the case of Islamic scholarship, the primacy of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah persisted, but not without encroachment of science and philosophy without 
proper epistemological considerations.  
Nursi attempts to address the modern imperative and influences by incorporating the 
universe and natural world within the bounds of Islamic epistemology as a primary 
source along with the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad (Sunnah). Nursi argues that 
the universe is a divine book of creation, a rich source of knowledge on the 
existence, unity and names and attributes of God. The universe holds an exegetical 
role to the Qur’an, while at the same time the Qur’an is defined as an interpreter of 
the universe. The Qur’an directs humanity to the right perspective and reveals the 
codes to decipher the language of the universe. In this respect, the Qur’an and the 
universe are an inseparable whole as both are equal revelations from God in different 
forms. Human reason is an important instrument that discovers the correlation 
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between the Qur’an and the universe. If reason can confirm Qur’anic faith 
propositions with empirical evidence from the universe, than that faith proposition is 
certain truth. Prophet Muhammad is the sign of the book of universe, the finest 
culmination of the Qur’anic vision for human beings and the teacher of the true 
purpose of the Qur’an, universe and human beings. Thus, Nursi’s epistemology is a 
holistic system linking the Qur’an, Prophet Muhammad, the universe and human 
reason. 
Nursi’s major contribution to Islamic epistemology is the incorporation of the 
universe and natural world, hence science, as primary sources of theological 
knowledge. Importantly, this is not done at the expense of the Qur’an and Sunnah. In 
his epistemology, the Qur’an and Sunnah not only retain their role as primary 
sources of knowledge, but also their positions are strengthened by their reciprocal 
linking to the universe. At the same time, science is not imported to Islamic 
epistemology wholesale. Nursi makes the significant distinction that its positivistic 
perspective has to change. Effectively, Nursi repositions science and its findings 
within the realm of theology. 
The implications of Nursi’s epistemological contribution are far reaching. First and 
foremost, it offers a firm intellectual and empirical basis for faith propositions of the 
Qur’an. Second, if the universe is God’s revelation and should be read like a book, 
studying the universe, hence science, if done in the name of God, becomes an act of 
worship in reflection (tafakkur). Third, it achieves reconciliation between science 
and religion (Islam), clearing the way for Muslims to more effectively deal with the 
fact that modern science and technology has a Western origin. Lastly, Nursi’s 
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approach opens the door for a far more concrete educational reform than those 
proposed by other prominent twentieth century Muslim reformers.129 
A key distinction of Nursi is that he does not just give a new epistemological theory. 
He puts it to full use in developing his exposition of Islamic theology. This will be 
tackled next in the chapters to follow. 
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4 X 
CHAPTER 4: EXISTENCE OF GOD 
4.1 Introduction 
Whether God exists is the first and central question in theology. The answer makes 
enormous difference not only in the worldview of the individuals, but also the truth 
claims of all faith traditions. Since God is not directly accessible to human 
perception, accepting His existence relies on faith, spiritual experience or persuasion 
of rational argument. Historians trace the oldest rational arguments for the existence 
of God to ancient Greek philosopher Xenophanes (570–475 BCE) who was highly 
critical of Homer’s mythology and anthropomorphism. Xenophanes argued for a 
monotheistic notion of God expressed in a natural theology.1 Contributions of 
Egyptian monotheistic pharaoh Akhenaten (d. 1336 BCE) and Biblical prophets were 
classified as oracular revelation rather than rational theology.2 Later Christian 
theologians, especially the highly influential Augustine of Hippo (354-430), 
articulated a clear set of proofs for God. Basing his argument on the independent 
existence of rules of virtue and the truth of arithmetic, Augustine argued there had to 
be a higher being (God).3  
Muslim scholars of the classical period entwined the Greek and Christian arguments 
for God in unique ways making original contributions. For Muslim theologians, such 
proofs firmly grounded religion in knowledge and reason instead of blind faith or a 
faith despoiled in doubts. Interestingly, al-Ghazālī emphatically contended that 
Abraham and other Qur’anic (also Biblical) prophets were the forbearers of 
reasoning for the existence of God long before the Egyptians and Greeks. Citing 
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examples from the reasoning of prophets, especially Abraham, he claimed the Greeks 
learned rhetorical syllogism from the prophets, not the other way around.4 
There is a line of departure for atheistic and theistic arguments since David Hume’s 
(1711-1776) critique of the classic proofs of God and the role of miracles in 
providing a foundation for the authority of revelation.5 Hume’s critiques, and 
Western philosophers to follow him, instigated a significant puncture in traditional 
arguments for God. Yet, as Richard Swinburne contends, such critiques did not 
produce substantial proofs of God’s non-existence, with the exception of rejecting 
God on the basis of the existence of evil and suffering in the world.6 Karen 
Armstrong adds that Enlightenment philosophy only rejected doctrines and 
interpretations execrable to reason, while “their belief in a Supreme Being remained 
intact.”7 Regardless, Enlightenment philosophy coupled with advancements in 
science compelled modern theologians to develop fresh approaches to questions 
concerning God. Many theologians, including Nursi, responded to this imperative. 
This chapter identifies arguments for the existence of God in classical Islamic 
theology and investigates Nursi’s contributions. The chapter highlights Nursi’s 
position on the proofs of God expounded by classical theologians and how he used 
them, especially the design and teleological proofs. With respect to proofs of God, 
Nursi is original in two ways. First, Nursi reverses the burden of proof and provides a 
new argument for the existence of God that this study calls the default proof. Second, 
Nursi employs literary devices and houses his arguments in language more 
conducive to the understanding of ordinary readers. In doing so, he combines 
                                                 
4 Al-Ghazālī, The Just Balance, 12-31. 
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cosmological, design and teleological arguments under a grander argument for God, 
called the governance argument. 
4.2 Proofs of God in Classical Islamic Theology 
Outstanding theologian and polymath Fahkr al-Din al-Rāzī (1135-1210) classified 
arguments for God into four distinct categories: arguments from features and 
attributes of things; arguments from the way things are created; arguments from the 
contingency of features and attributes of things; and arguments from the contingency 
of creation.8 In the Western tradition, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) made an 
influential categorisation of proofs for God that persists till today. He divided the 
proofs into three main categories – cosmological, physio-theological (design) and 
ontological.9 In the cosmological argument, the starting point is existence in general 
and the need for existence and the universe to have a cause. The design argument 
begins with the constituting parts of the world and relies on empirical considerations. 
The ontological argument starts from a conceptual truth ultimately leading to God 
rather than the universe and constituting parts of the world. As Swinburne points out, 
there are other types of proofs and variants within each of the categories that may 
constitute separate arguments.10 Nevertheless, Kant’s classification gives a good 
framework for the proofs of God in classical and modern Islamic theology. 
The first clear articulation of the cosmological argument was made in the last and 
longest dialogue found in Plato’s (428-348 BCE) Laws.11 The argument starts by 
observing that some things are in motion and there are two kinds of motion: 
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10 Swinburne, The Existence of God, 11. 
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transmitted and self-generated. The ultimate source of all motion must be self-
generated, for if a motion is transmitted it cannot be the cause. Plato continues to 
argue that self-generated motion must be a special alive soul as it cares for the entire 
universe and directs everything to their perfection and this can only be God.12 Plato’s 
argument influenced Christian and Muslim theologians. 
The version of the cosmological argument developed by Muslim theologians – the 
kalām cosmological argument – constitutes one of the most important proofs of God 
in classical Islamic theology. Although Van Ess highlights the Mu’tazalite theologian 
Abu ‘l-Hudhayl (752-850) was the first Muslim theologian to formulate proofs for 
God within Islamic theology,13 the kalām cosmological argument was first argued in 
detail by polymath al-Kindi (801-873), the director of Baghdad’s House of 
Wisdom.14 The cosmological argument is strikingly simple: (1) Anything that has a 
beginning in its existence has a cause; (2) The universe began to exist; therefore, (3) 
The universe’s existence is caused.15 It then follows that, since only God is beyond 
space and time, He must have been the cause of the universe’s existence. Logically, 
this argument is valid – if the two premises are true, the conclusion necessarily 
follows.  
The first premise was accepted as an observable truth. The main challenge was to 
prove the universe had a beginning. The difficulty al-Kindi and other theologians 
faced was the dominant Aristotelian notion of the eternity of the universe, as it was 
considered the universe was unchanging, hence eternal. Without the knowledge and 
                                                 
12 Ibid, 117. 
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15 Nagasawa, The Existence of God, 129. 
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acceptance of the Big Bang Theory,16 it was always going to be logically burdensome 
to argue the opposite. Greatly advancing the ex nihilo creation theory of the universe 
argued by Alexandrian theologian John Philoponus (470-580),17 al-Kindi went to 
great lengths to compose a complex logical argument to prove space and time are 
finite; therefore, the universe must have a beginning.18  
In support of the ex nihilo theory, Muslim theologians adduced the temporality 
(hudūth) argument as a key proof. Al-Ghazālī’s version of the hudūth argument 
proceeds as follows: (1) All phenomena in the world are temporal; (2) These 
temporal phenomena are caused by other temporal phenomena; (3) This cycle can go 
on ad infinitum; (4) But the series of temporality and causation cannot regress 
infinitely; so, (5) There must be a beginning point when causation of existence 
started; therefore, (6) The universe must have had a beginning.19 The key conclusion 
of the cosmological argument was, if the universe was created out of nothing, a cause 
must have preceded the beginning of the universe. This cause must have the 
necessary knowledge, will and power to bring the vast universe into existence. 
Hence, the cause can only be God who is uncaused and is the ultimate cause of all 
causes (musabbab al-asbab). 
The hudūth argument was not the only one put forward to prove the ex nihilo 
creation theory for the universe. Harry Wolfson gives a detailed description and 
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analysis of eight such proofs,20 which had a significant influence on medieval 
Christian and Jewish theology. Wolfson particularly notes their influence on Jewish 
theologian Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), who acknowledged his use of the works 
of Muslim theologians (mutakallimūn) in his seven proofs.21 Wolfson also observes 
that Christian theologians, such as Albertus Magnus (1193-1280), Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274) and St Bonaventura (1221-1274), adopted proofs developed by Muslim 
theologians and philosophers through Latin translations of Ibn Rushd and 
Maimonides.22 Robert Hamond compares these in tables to illustrate Aquinas’ direct 
borrowing of texts from al-Farābi.23 
An important proof for the existence of God, as formulated by Muslim polymath and 
philosopher Ibn Sina, is the contingency (imkān) argument.24 Ibn Sina’s argument 
hinges on the ‘being’ (mahiya) categorised as contingent and necessary, a key 
distinction postulated by al-Farabi. A necessary being is one whose non-existence is 
impossible; a contingent being is one that needs another being to bring it into 
existence and therefore its existence is possible.25 In al-Farābi’s argument, all beings 
start at the lowest and transform to higher orders ultimately terminating in the 
necessary being that nothing more perfect can be conceived.26 According to Majid 
Fakhry, this is the first formulation of the ontological argument for God.27  
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Ibn Sina’s articulation of the contingency argument proceeds as follows: (1) The 
existence of something is either possible or necessary; (2) If its existence is 
necessary, then that is what we are looking for, namely God; (3) If its existence is 
possible, then its existence and non-existence is equally probable, i.e. it requires an 
external cause to necessitate its existence; (4) The cause is necessarily existent – 
God; therefore, (5) In either case God exists.28 A key result of the contingency 
argument is the designation of ‘necessary being’ (wājib al-wujūd) for God. This 
designation appears repeatedly in the writings of Muslim theologians, including 
Nursi. 
There is a debate whether Ibn Sina’s contingency argument can be classified as a 
cosmological or ontological argument. The ontological argument was articulated as 
clearly separate by St Anselm (1033-1098), who argued for God from the idea that 
God can be conceived in the mind.29 The ontological argument was revived and made 
famous in Western philosophy centuries later by Descartes (1596-1650).30 
Notwithstanding Cafer Yaran and Herbert Davidson including Ibn Sina’s 
contingency argument as a variant of the cosmological argument,31 scholars such as 
Fazlur Rahman and Parwiz Morowedge define it as ontological.32 Ayman Shihadeh 
agrees and sets Ibn Sina’s argument as distinct from the design and cosmological 
arguments.33 Even though Ibn Sina’s contingency argument seems to focus on the 
existence of the universe, it acuminates the idea of being (existence) and then moves 
directly to God’s existence without involving the universe or any design aspect of the 
                                                 
28 Yaran, Islamic Thought on the Existence of God, 182. 
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32 Ibid, 191-192. 
33 Shihadeh, “The Existence of God,” 212. 
 185 
Creation. In this respect, it is more appropriate to classify it as ontological. This sets 
Ibn Sina as the independent originator of the ontological argument. 
The imkān argument has been popular with Muslim theologians. Leading theologians 
al-Māturīdī and al-Ash’arī used a version of the argument in their proofs for God.34 
Al-Ghazālī used a variant to prove the truth of the first premise of the cosmological 
argument that every contingent thing that exists has a cause: (1) The existence of 
something is either impossible or possible; (2) Impossible things will never exist;  
(3) If it exists, then its existence was possible; (4) The possibility of existence means 
its existence and non-existence are equally probable; so, (5) For it to come into 
existence, there must be a preponderance to the side of existence to bring that thing 
into existence; therefore, (6) Every contingent thing that exists must have a cause.35  
Attested by the imkān and hudūth arguments, the kalām cosmological argument 
became the standard proof for God in Islamic theology. Although such a complete 
array of proofs provided a logically sound greater argument for God’s existence, 
ordinary believers did not have the philosophical training and logical acumen to fully 
grasp and appreciate the cosmological argument other than the simple reasoning that 
this majestic universe must have a creator. Hence, variants of the teleological 
(design) argument feature far more prominently in classical Islamic theology and 
popular belief.36 
Yaran gives three categories for teleological arguments within classical Islamic 
theology – from wisdom (hikmah), from providence (‘inayah) and from creation 
(ikhtira’). The argument from wisdom hinges on the order and marvel of the natural 
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world: (1) The world shows a marvellous and well-ordered system; (2) This system 
cannot exist without a creator; therefore, (3) There must be a creator of the system 
and the world. Al-Māturīdī is one of the earliest theologians to postulate this 
argument. He highlights a “wondrous wisdom” displayed in every process (orbits of 
cosmic objects, seasons and lifecycles of living beings) that flows in a wise and 
deliberate course throughout the universe.37 Ibn Hazm (994-1064) discusses the 
design and wisdom manifested in two planes – on the scale of cosmic objects and on 
biological life on earth. On the cosmic plane, the way the orbits of cosmic objects fit 
together while remaining unchanged points to the ordering of a “mover.”38 In a 
similar tone, al-Ghazālī quotes Qur’anic verses, such as 2:164, as indicating the 
design and order in the universe and concludes, “This marvellous, well-ordered 
system cannot exist without a maker who conducts it and a creator who plans and 
perfects it.”39 Yaran places arguments from wisdom under the contemporary 
argument of fine-tuning the universe.40 
Arguments from providence and creation are postulated by Ibn Rushd as logically 
more sound and having a firm basis in the Qur’an. The argument from providence is: 
(1) Everything in the natural world and the bodies of human beings are adapted to 
sustain human life; (2) This providence cannot be achieved by chance; therefore,  
(3) The providence is the result of an agent with the will to do so.41 Yaran insists Ibn 
Rushd did not mean the universe was created merely for human beings; rather, there 
is a perfect suitability to meet the needs of human life in the way the universe and 
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earth are designed.42 To support his argument, Ibn Rushd used the Qur’anic passage 
78:6-16,43 which describes how the cosmos and earth are prepared to sustain life.44 
Ibn Rush’s argument from creation is: (1) All life is created from entities devoid of 
life; (2) The cause of this creation cannot be lifeless entities; therefore, (3) Life is 
created by a living agent (God).45 His main textual support is verses 86:4-7 that 
describe the creation of human beings.46 His evidence to support the first premise is 
the fact that higher order features of perception and consciousness cannot come from 
things that do not possess those qualities.47 For Ibn Rushd, all arguments for God are 
either arguments from providence or creation or a combination of both.48 
An important feature of the design argument is that it is open to analogical reasoning. 
For most ordinary believers, this feature made the design argument attractive, as it 
was easily understood through analogies and basic reasoning. Al-Ash’arī gives a few 
examples: It would be irrational to assume a piece of cotton will become a spun 
thread and then a woven garment by itself. A person is required to purposely spin the 
cotton and weave the garment. Further, it would be insane to think earthly clay 
would become mud bricks by itself and then the bricks move into position to build a 
house without a builder. Similarly, every being and the universe needs a maker and 
that maker is God.49 In The Wisdom in God’s Creation,50 al-Ghazālī compares the 
world to a large house and human beings as its owners. He then explains how the 
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house and everything in it cannot have been the product of chance and needs the 
purposeful and wise design of a maker.51 As will be discussed, these analogies are 
put to full use and further expanded by Nursi in his proofs of God. 
A notable argument from design is given by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Shihadeh notes al-
Rāzī considered the design argument far superior to other arguments, as it addressed 
the reason, imagination and other human faculties for maximum effect.52 For 
example: 
Whoever contemplates the various parts of the higher and lower worlds will 
find that this world is constructed in the most advantageous and best manner, 
and the most-superlative and perfect order (tartīb). The mind unambiguously 
testifies that this state of affairs cannot but be by the governance (tadbīr) of a 
wise and knowledgeable [being].53 
In this argument, al-Rāzī distinctly follows a method previous theologians have not. 
First, he builds in his argument attributes of God, not just a conceptualisation of God 
as the necessary being or uncaused cause.54 Without such attribution, God would 
simply be a transcendent deity unreachable to human knowledge and spiritual 
connection.55 Second, al-Rāzī gives an overarching argument of governance 
(rubūbiyyah) that combines the arguments of providence, order and design in one. 
With this argument, al-Rāzī brought into familiarity the first version of the 
governance argument. As will be covered later in this chapter, both aspects feature 
prominently in Nursi’s arguments for God.  
As a significant contrast, not all Muslim theologians thought it was necessary or even 
useful to prove God’s existence. God did not need proof, as belief in God was 
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engrained as part of human natural disposition (fitra). In support, these scholars 
usually cited56 the Qur’anic verse, “So set your whole being upon the Religion as one 
of pure faith. This is the original pattern (fitra) belonging to God on which He has 
originated humankind. No change can there be in God’s creation.”57 As long as 
people did not corrupt their natural disposition, faith in God arose naturally. Even al-
Ghazālī said “whoever supposes that faith is realized through speculative theology, 
abstract proofs, or academic divisions is an innovator” and stressed that faith in God 
is a creation of God in a person’s heart through various means rather than reasoning 
alone.58 Al-Ghazālī insisted, while all humans could know God intuitively through 
their natural disposition, proofs were only necessary for those who were confused 
about God through philosophical ideas.59 Ibn Taymiyya agreed and limited proofs of 
God to contemplation on ‘signs’ displayed in the universe for those whose natural 
disposition was corrupted by “heretical doctrines and methods.”60  
In all, Muslim philosophers and theologians have made significant contributions to 
rational proofs put forward for the existence of God. Using their knowledge of the 
world and carefully adopting philosophical and theological discourse circulating in 
their time, they excogitated elaborate cosmological, teleological and ontological 
arguments. A key emphasis was to prove the ex nihilo creation theory of the world. 
Most of these proofs were beyond the reach of ordinary believers who had no prior 
training in logic and philosophy. Hence, design arguments feature prominently in 
Islamic theology and were more popular with laypeople,61 for they could easily be 
cohered with the Qur’an and related to the natural world. Since the time of al-Rāzī in 
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the twelfth century to the modern era, Muslim theologians essentially repeated the 
same proofs of God articulated by former theologians without making significant 
contributions. In the meantime, Enlightenment philosophers such as David Hume 
and Emmanuel Kant rigorously critiqued and challenged classical proofs of God.62 
Such critiques laid the foundations of materialistic philosophy that strongly 
challenged the core of all faith traditions – the existence of God.  
4.3 Nursi on the Notion of Proof and Classical Proofs of God 
Colin Turner identifies Nursi’s proofs as “not really proofs at all, at least not in the 
philosophically and scientifically accepted senses of the term.”63 Turner contends the 
starting point of Nursi’s arguments is not “creation uninterpreted,” rather it is faith 
(imān) resulting in a faith-based interpretation of Creation designed to “strengthen 
and consolidate belief.”64 While this appears to be the case with respect to the way 
his arguments are articulated, as discussed in Chapter 2, Nursi was aware of the 
classical philosophical methods of proof, but deliberately avoided them.  
This avoidance is clearest in the way Nursi eschews the imkān and hudūth 
arguments. Throughout the Risale-i Nur collection, he mentions the imkān and 
hudūth arguments only twice and briefly, even though he called it one of the two 
major truths the universe witnesses about God.65 Nursi is critical of the complex and 
intertwined logical proofs of theologians (mutakallimūn). He highlights the 
mutakallimūn generally take this approach to demonstrate the impossibility of 
infinite regress in causality first and then to prove the necessary existence (wājib al-
wujūd). In his view, such a pure logical approach is like bringing water from a distant 
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source by arduously laying a pipeline when the Qur’anic approach, as he calls it, digs 
a hole and finds water directly underneath.66 He briefly gives the arguments in 
abstract form and then refers the details to the works of sharh al-mawaqif 
(Commentary on al-Mawaqif) by al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (1339-1413) and 
Sharh al-Maqāsid (Commentary al-Maqasid) by al-Taftazānī.67 
Nursi’s aversion is mainly driven by his concern for his primary audience – the 
disbeliever and ordinary believer with an imitative faith (taqlīd al-imān) and prone to 
doubts in the face of rational arguments introduced by modern science and 
philosophy. Nursi realised the long chain of logical proofs was too abstract and 
missed the interest and intellectual level of most people. Similar to Fakhr al-Dīn 
Razī, he stressed that belief is more than just reasoning; it also engulfs the totality of 
the human being, including spiritual and emotional faculties.68 This does not mean 
Nursi neglected his more intellectually astute readers, rather he positioned his logical 
proofs and arguments in innovative and engaging ways so his words would be 
interesting to read, easy to understand and hence persuasive. 
With respect to proving the existence of God, Nursi attempted to prevail in this task 
in four main passages. The first is the 22nd Word, which is split into two main 
sections.69 The first shorter section addresses ordinary readers with an analogical 
story of two men who are rendered unconscious as they were bathing and taken to a 
bizarre realm, which in some respects is like a world and in other aspects like a 
country, city and palace – similar analogies for the world as seen with al-Ghazālī. 
One of the men sets out to demonstrate in twelve proofs (burhan) to his unbelieving 
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friend that the realm and everything in it shows its owner and artistic maker.70 The 
longer section delves into the theological and rational proofs of God’s existence and 
unity.71 At the beginning of the second section, Nursi makes his intent clear – to 
provide a deeper, more investigative faith (tahqīq al-imān), by distinguishing an 
ordinary appreciation of God’s unity and a far deeper appreciation.72  
The second major passage dealing with the existence of God is the 7th Ray, the 
epistle titled ayah al-kubra (the greatest sign or verse).73 Inspired by verse 17:44,74 
particularly with the part, “There is nothing that does not glorify Him with His 
praise,” Nursi narrates an imaginary journey of a person who travels throughout the 
universe and asks everything about his creator. He makes the entire existence from 
cosmos to particles speak and testify to the existence of God with nineteen steps of 
composite arguments.75 
The third and fourth major passages on God’s existence are the 33rd Word and 23rd 
Flash. The 23rd Flash gives an original argument that can be called the default proof 
for God.76 This proof will be analysed in detail later in this chapter. The 33rd Word 
gives thirty-three separate arguments for God’s existence as “windows that open 
directly to God.”77 Nursi gives a short explanation that, while his primary audience is 
disbelievers, everyone will benefit from the passage: 
Thirty-three Windows will bring to belief those without belief, strengthen the 
belief of those whose belief is weak, make certain (tahqīq) the belief of those 
whose belief is strong but imitative (taqlīd), expand the belief of those whose 
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belief is certain, and progress those with expansive belief to the knowledge of 
God (ma’rifatuallah) - the basis and means of all true human perfections - 
opening up more brilliant vistas for them.78 
The literary devices of dialogue, story-telling and analogies achieve three main 
objectives. First, arguments for God are easier to follow and more interesting for 
ordinary readers. Packaging in stories and using familiar images of a city, building or 
observations from the natural world make Nursi’s arguments more understandable. 
Second, it allows Nursi to combine a number of arguments creating an aggrandised 
effect, increasing their persuasive potential. Third, as Turner also observes, Nursi 
links his style with the Qur’an’s approach.79 The approach of making the entire 
cosmos speak clones his argument within the style and meaning of Qur’anic 
passages. In replicating the Qur’anic method of argumentation, Nursi gives exegesis 
of verses such as, “there is nothing that does not glorify Him with His praise, but you 
cannot comprehend their glorification.”80 Thus, Nursi is more concerned with the 
readability and persuasive effect of his arguments, rather than following 
philosophically acceptable proofs. As will be illustrated in this chapter, Nursi’s 
arguments hold rational and logical ground, notwithstanding the need to peel them 
from his rhetoric and express them in well-crafted forms. 
Before these proofs are analysed in detail, I will discuss Nursi’s views on where the 
burden of proof lies with respect to proving/disproving God’s existence. For Nursi, 
there is an incommensurate distinction between proof of existence and proof of non-
existence, for proof of existence is more powerful and each proof supports one 
another to build a consensus. However, disproof and negation stand in their own 
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right without building a similar consensus.81 Nursi gives examples to illustrate his 
point: If two ordinary men sight a crescent moon, their testimony is far more 
powerful than that of hundreds of scholars saying the crescent is not sighted. So, to 
prove the existence of something, the testimony of two reliable but ordinary 
witnesses is sufficient. If one claims a specific object exists, it would be sufficient to 
prove its existence only by the display of one actual sample. But, if someone else 
claims the same object does not exist, they have to travel and search all corners of the 
world and demonstrate the object does not exist anywhere. Additionally, they will 
have to show the object did not exist in the past and will not exist in the future.82 In 
the case of God, the person attempting to prove non-existence has to even gain 
access beyond the universe to prove there is no God in dimensions beyond the 
visible.83 So, for Nursi, the burden of disproof and negation is far more onerous and 
even impossible. Hence, all a disproving person can do is say, “I don’t see it. In my 
perspective and belief, God does not exist.” They cannot claim nor prove the non-
existence of God in actuality.84 Nursi also makes the point that, even if the non-
existence of something superficially seems like a proof, its nature is always negation 
and rejection, and previous arguments apply to its impossibility.85 
Nursi maintains this position throughout his works to drive home two primary points. 
First, he warns his readers to question and evaluate critically the writings of famous 
scientists and philosophers who may reject God.86 By the argument that disproof is 
difficult, even impossible, he aims to have a psychological advantage and transfer the 
burden of proof to the disproving camp. Second, he increases the persuasiveness of 
                                                 
81 Nursi, Şualar, 7th Ray, Introduction, 141. 
82 Ibid, 142. 
83 Ibid, 144. 
84 Ibid, 142. 
85 Ibid, 143. 
86 Ibid, 142. 
 195 
his arguments in that, while sometimes a single proof may not look conclusive, many 
rational arguments proving the same thing can come together and build a greater 
consensus. For this reason, Nursi often combines numerous arguments for God in 
one passage.  
4.4 Default Proof – Impossibility of God’s Non-existence God 
The default argument put forward by Nursi is original, although he does not use this 
term. Yaran gives a brief outline of Nursi’s default argument, as detailed in the 23rd 
Flash, in a sub-section covering counterarguments to evolution theory.87 Yaran also 
does not label it the ‘default argument’ nor does he classify it as a separate argument 
for God.88 Interestingly, Nursi does not mention evolution theory in the 23rd Flash or 
anywhere else in his writings. It nevertheless gives the impression he is providing a 
counterargument to all other postulations to explain not only Creation, but the very 
existence of everything, including the universe. Turner recognises the distinction of 
the argument and says “Nursi’s exposition of ‘necessary existence’ (wujūb al-wujūd) 
and his attempt to furnish evidence for the existence of one who is, by default, 
‘necessary existence’ (wujūb al-wujūd),” and adds this is an exception where Nursi 
displays logical rigour.89 Nursi’s approach with the default argument is not just to 
support the necessary existence of God, but to argue His non-existence is impossible 
and creation by God is the best and only possible explanation for existence.  
Simply put, Nursi’s default argument first demands an explanation for the universe 
and proceeds to prove the impossibility of each explanation that does not involve 
God. The remaining option that God is the originator of everything becomes true by 
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default. Nursi lays out the argument at the beginning of the 23rd Flash: (1) The 
Creation exists and its existence cannot be denied; (2) Each being comes into 
existence in a purposeful and artistic fashion; (3) Each being has a beginning and 
they are replicated;90 therefore, (3) The entire Creation requires an explanation;  
(4) Only four explanations have been produced by reason – all beings come into 
existence through the assembly of causes, they form by themselves, they naturally 
come into existence by the effect of nature or they are created through the power of 
God; (5) The first three explanations are impossible; therefore, (6) God is the creator 
of all things by necessity and default.91  
The argument is logically valid. The crux of the argument is the fifth premise and 
requires the proof of the impossibility of all three alternative explanations. If this 
premise can be shown to be true, than the whole argument becomes sound. Nursi 
embarks on the difficult task of proving the fifth premise by providing three 
arguments for the impossibility of each explanation put forward for Creation. 
In proving the impossibility of causes creating beings, Nursi begins by posing the 
analogy of a pharmacy with shelves full of carefully prepared medicines. In addition 
to their medicinal traits, each medication also has a special quality of life. Close 
examination shows these living medicines are made from specific ingredients in 
precise amounts according to an exact formula. If they were made haphazardly, they 
would be poisonous rather than medicinal. It is impossible for coincidental acts or 
natural forces to gather together these precise amounts according to a definite 
formula without an experienced pharmacist. Similarly, it would be “hundred times 
more unreasonable and impossible” for living beings to be created as an outcome of 
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haphazard mixing of particles randomly directed by causes when each living being is 
made up of “multiple parts and many differing materials put together in precise 
measure of elements.” So, living beings in this “enormous pharmacy of earth” can 
only be the product of a “limitless wisdom, boundless knowledge and all-pervasive 
will.”92 
Nursi makes a second point that, if the creation of living organisms is attributed to 
physical causes (asbāb), then those causes must be in close contact with the effect 
(musabbib) or be present within the effect. He proceeds to give the example of a fly. 
If it is said that causes produce a fly, then it must be accepted that numerous 
powerful forces and opposing causes must combine in perfect agreement and care to 
produce the fly. They all must be near or within the fly to exert their effect for the fly 
is linked to most of the elements and causes of the universe. This is impossible.93 
As a third point, Nursi puts forward the argument that the most physical causes can 
do to exert their effect is be in contact with the outer body of a living organism. Yet, 
the inside of the organism is “ten times more orderly, subtle and artistically perfect.” 
Furthermore, “the hands of causes and their instruments” could not even touch the 
outer body of miniscule animals and microscopic organisms, which are equally as 
complex and artistic as larger organisms. So, it is impossible to attribute such 
outcomes of life to “lifeless, unknowledgeable, vulgar, distant, opposing causes.”94 
Nursi does not clearly define what causes he is referring to. While this aspect will be 
investigated further in the next chapter, it is reasonable to assume at this point that he 
refers to forces of nature, physical elements and matter as causes external to living 
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beings. Certain criticisms could be made to Nursi’s first impossibility. Hume’s 
perennial objection that making an analogy of natural beings to human artefacts is 
fundamentally fallacious is one such criticism.95 However, as Turner observes, the 
key point Nursi makes is not that medicinal concoctions and living beings are similar 
in every way, but the relevant analogous feature is that they are both products of 
design.96 The second impossibility focuses not only on the necessity of causes to be 
in contact with each being but also infinite succession of causes must be present 
within each cell of a fly a clear impossibility.97 Obviously, science can describe how 
a fly comes to existence from an egg, grows and sustains its life through internal 
chemical processes and reproduces offspring in a cycle of life. Although the 
examples Nursi gives can be explained in other ways, his point that numerous 
elements coming together in precise compositions are at impossible odds remains a 
cogent argument. Scientists such as Paul Davies and Michael Behe discuss the 
impossible odds of life being produced from basic elements on earth to argue the 
divine origination of life.98  
In dealing with the notion that things may come into being by themselves, Nursi 
takes the human body as a case in point. He argues the human body is not only 
complex and living, but “particles are at constant work” to renew every element of 
the “wonderful palace” of the human body.99 Making the matter more complex, the 
human body is in constant relationship and equilibrium with the universe with 
respect to sustenance and survival of its species. Despite the constant exchange and 
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flux of particles, the particles in the body seem to know the body and its relationships 
to keep in functioning order.100 Nursi puts forward a conditional: if it is not accepted 
that the trillions of particles of the body are acting in accordance with “the laws of 
All-Powerful Eternal God” or “they are the tips of pen of divine power,” then every 
particle has to have the vision to see not only every part of the body, but also the 
entire universe it is connected with. Additionally, each particle has to have 
intelligence so it can know and recognise the body, the sources of sustenance as well 
as past, present and future states of the body.101 
In an approach akin to al-Ash’arī, Nursi gives another nuance to the example of the 
human body. He says the human body is structured like a fantastic palace where 
stones on the domes are standing in suspended animation. The stones and bricks on 
the walls are being replaced at all times. Particles seem to know exactly where to go. 
A particle required for a position in the eye ends up in that location after journeying 
through the whole body.102 If these particles are not attributed to one source and said 
to move on their own accord, then for the body to be built, every particle must be all-
knowing, all-powerful and all-seeing – attributes normally associated with God. This 
then entails that every particle must be “absolutely-dominating” (hākim al-mutlaq) 
over all particles and “absolutely-dominated” (mahkūm al-mutlaq) by all other 
particles at the same time – a clear impossibility.103 
In a third example to prove the impossibility of the created by itself theory, Nursi 
gives the example of a book: it is written by an author or the product of a printing 
                                                 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid, 297. 
102 Ibid, 2nd Impossibility, 297. 
103 Ibid. 
 200 
machine. For printing to occur, a typesetting of separate metal letters104 must be 
assembled as printing templates, hence impossible to occur by itself.105 Similarly, if it 
is claimed the human body is assembled by itself, then there must be templates to 
produce every cell in the body. Since such replicating templates do not exist, the 
body must be the product of one creative source.106  
As Turner identifies, what Nursi means by things creating themselves is the 
purposeful assembly of particles and their constituting parts by chance rather than the 
idea that something forms itself to existence from non-existence.107 One could argue 
that forming of living bodies by themselves occur through the replicating templates 
of the DNA. Does this established knowledge negate Nursi’s argument? While it 
does seem to negate it at the outset, the substance of his argument remains. Since 
DNA is composed of billions of codes of information describing in detail how cells 
are built and function, can it be coded by itself? Nursi would argue that this is where 
the impossibility lies. The mystery of how basic atoms come together to produce 
complex life remains unanswered through science. 
Nursi devoted considerable time to deal with the ‘created by nature’ argument, 
perhaps because it is a more commonly held notion with laypeople. It also combines 
all other alternative theories in one including the idea that laws of nature direct all 
events in the universe, living beings can be explained with the theory of evolution108 
without the need for a creator and eventually science will discover and explain all 
mysteries of life and the universe. 
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Nursi begins observing that there is wisdom and artistic creation in everything, 
especially living beings. If one does not attribute creatures to an Eternal God, then it 
must be accepted that, in every being, there must be infinite power, will and 
knowledge.109 This is analogous to an image of the sun appearing in every 
transparent object. If these reflections are not sourced to a single sun, then a sun 
small in size but with the same essence and attributes must be present in every 
object.110 Similarly, if one insists ‘nature is the creator,’ then nature must be in 
everything with immense power, knowledge and will. In a way, there must be a god 
in every living object, a notion not detected and clearly impossible.111  
As the second impossibility of nature, Nursi highlights that, whenever various seeds 
are planted together, different plants sprout. If the production of these plants is not 
attributed to one God, then one must accept the presence of a separate machine in the 
pot to produce each plant.112 Anticipating the objection that seeds are responsible for 
the uniqueness of plants, Nursi argues the material composition of every cell is the 
same, a collection of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon and nitrogen atoms. Water, light and 
air are also no more than passive ingredients. So, for Nursi, the existence of countless 
plant life cannot be explained by matter and processes found in nature alone, for it is 
impossible for atoms to assemble from dead earth to produce life.113 
To illustrate the impossibility and, as he puts it, absurdity of the created by nature 
idea, Nursi presents two hypothetical scenarios. In the first scenario, a primitive man 
enters a majestic palace in the middle of an empty desert. The palace is built with 
state-of-the-art technology and decorated with embellished furniture and works of 
                                                 
109 Nursi, Lem’alar, 23rd Flash, 3rd Matter, 1st Impossibility, 299. 
110 Nursi uses this sun analogy and its variants to solve many abstract theological problems. 
111 Nursi, Lem’alar, 23rd Flash, 3rd Matter, 1st Impossibility, 299. 
112 Ibid, 2nd Impossibility, 299. 
113 Ibid. 
 202 
art. As he wanders around, he thinks about how the palace might have come into 
existence in such a desert. Since he rules out an outside builder, he looks at 
everything in the palace as the source. Even his simple mind can see that none of 
those things could have made the palace. Then he comes across a large book that 
comprises construction blueprints, materials lists and rules of administration. Since 
he can find no other agent, by virtue of the fact the book is related to the whole 
palace, he concludes it is the originator and builder of the palace and everything in 
it.114 In this scenario, the book is analogous to natural laws.  
In the second scenario, another primitive man enters a grand army barracks. He is 
amazed at the simultaneous movements of soldiers in training on hearing the sound 
of a trumpet or command of an officer. Because he does not understand the laws and 
rules of an army or the power of a commander, he imagines soldiers move in unison 
because of unseen ropes tied to their feet. He later goes to a mosque and witnesses 
the worship of thousands of Muslims in Friday prayer. He observes in amazement 
the simultaneous bowing and prostration of the whole congregation on the sound of 
the imam. Since he does not know Islam and the rituals of prayer, he again assumes 
people are moving in unison because of ropes tied to their feet.115 In this scenario, the 
ropes represent causal relationships imagined but not necessarily proven to exist.  
For Nursi, the situation of a materialist believing that nature, together with its laws, is 
the creator of every living being is similar to the man who: 
In the realm of existence, he sees a collection of the laws of Divine practice and 
an index of the creative art of Divine Lordship (rabbaniyyah), which is like a 
page for writing and erasing of Divine Will, and like a constantly changing 
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notebook for the effective laws of Divine Power, and is mistakenly and 
erroneously called ‘nature’.116  
This passage is significant as it highlights how Nursi sees nature and its laws – nature 
is nothing more than a book containing the laws, or patterns of action, of God’s 
operation in the universe.117 The laws of nature have no material existence; they only 
exist as information,118 hence cannot be attributed to cosmic phenomena.119 Natural 
laws originate from God’s attributes of Knowledge and Speech. They become the 
principles and laws on which God’s power manifests to constantly shape the world 
and universe.120 They are “a collective body of the laws of creation, they cannot be 
the Lawgiver.”121 At the very most, nature can be “a work of art, it cannot be the 
Artist … It is a passive receiver, it cannot be the Active Originator.”122 
Nursi makes the final conclusion that, since he has shown all alternative theories 
explaining the origin and present state of the universe fall short in giving satisfactory 
explanation and are impossible, God’s existence is a palpable reality and proven by 
default.123  
Nursi’s approach with the default argument is original in two ways. First, assuming 
that one of the main reasons for people to reject God is that they find it impossible 
for an all-powerful being to exist beyond space and time, he argues there are greater 
impossibilities associated with explanations discounting God. It, then, becomes far 
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more probable and therefore reasonable to accept God.124 Second, Nursi continually 
puts forward the argument, if one does not accept one true God, consciously or 
unconsciously, one ends up accepting innumerable gods. For Nursi, attributes such as 
omniscience, omnipotence and all-pervasiveness are required for the universe to 
function in an orderly manner and living organisms to come to existence perfectly as 
they do. If these are not attributed to one God, then every particle in the universe 
must have divine attributes. Therefore, for Nursi, disbelief in God is not necessarily a 
doctrine of believing in no god, but it inevitably leads to the doctrine of belief in 
innumerable gods. Nursi effectively reverses arguments put forward to reject God 
and transfers the problem of impossibility to the camp of disbelief. Nursi’s approach 
is also unique in his conclusion that the existence of God is a not only a necessity 
(wājib al-wujūd) to explain the Creation, but God’s non-existence is impossible.  
4.5 Argument from Universal Governance – Rubūbiyyah  
Nursi’s universal governance (rubūbiyyah) argument is a combination of 
cosmological, design and teleological arguments. The key concept of rubūbiyyah 
could be defined as God’s system of governance of the universe and natural world. In 
this system, through every observable action, God prepares the universe as a place 
where creatures are equipped with everything they need to sustain their lives and 
protect themselves so they are guided to their potential and purpose of creation.125 In 
his illustration of rubūbiyyah, Nursi uses analogies for the universe as a country, city 
or palace, places that conjure images that need to be ordered and governed, similar to 
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al-Ghazālī’s analogy of the world like a house and humans being dwellers in the 
house.126  
Unlike the default argument, Nursi does not express the argument in clear terms. 
Despite it not being easily discernible at first glance, there is a consistent pattern 
when Nursi invokes rubūbiyyah in his argument for God. He first illustrates there is a 
purposeful rubūbiyyah observable in the universe and natural world. He then argues 
that undertaking these functions and actions requires infinite attributes. Since there is 
no entity known to possess attributes of knowledge, will and power to govern the 
entire universe, the source must be a God who holds those personal attributes. Hence, 
it is possible to deduce the argument in a logical form as: (1) There is a purposeful 
rubūbiyyah observable in the universe; (2) This rubūbiyyah requires certain attributes 
(such as knowledge, will and power); (3) None of the known entities in the universe 
has the required attributes to govern the universe; therefore, (4) There must be a God 
who has the necessary attributes to effectively govern the universe. The argument 
expressed in this form is valid and its soundness depends on the truth of the three 
premises. In supporting these premises, Nursi deploys similar evidence put forward 
by classical theologians when they back arguments from wisdom (hikmah), 
providence (‘inayah) and creation (ikhtira’). This is best illustrated in the 7th Ray, the 
epistle titled ayah al-kubra (the greatest sign or verse). This title is telling in that 
Nursi considers the governance argument as the greatest argument for God since it 
invokes the entire universe and earth together with the entire set of functions and 
beings in it. 
In the 7th Ray, Nursi uses the story of a traveller journeying through the cosmos and 
natural world to examine in detail how all things collaborate with one another in a 
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purposeful way to sustain and order life. The traveller stops across multiple levels: 
rivers, oceans, plains, mountains, trees, plants, birds, animals, the earth, atmosphere, 
cosmic space and the entire universe.127 Importantly, in going to such great lengths, 
Nursi underscores the point that the one who controls the rain, for example, must be 
the one who governs the entire universe.128 More importantly, at the end of each 
demonstration of an aspect of rubūbiyyah, he gives a summary of his argument in 
Arabic,129 but all these summaries start with: lā ilāha illa-llahu ‘l-wājibu ‘l-wujūdi ‘l-
wāhidu ‘l-ahadu alladhī dalla alā wujūbi wujūdihi fī waḥdati (There is no deity but 
God, the One and Unique Necessary Existent, to whose Necessary Existence in 
Unity illustrates…). This key expression not only articulates Nursi’s intention to 
prove the existence of God, but also forms a key link of God’s existence to the unity 
of God.  
To appreciate Nursi’s argument, I present three of his demonstrations of rubūbiyyah 
in some detail. When the traveller in the 7th Ray descends to the immediate sky, he 
notices the atmosphere is used and administered to sustain life on earth. While air 
enables countless living beings to breathe, the wind assists in the germination of 
plants.130 Air transmits numerous soundwaves simultaneously traversing the same 
narrow medium without any mixture of sounds.131 The clouds water numerous 
gardens with enough intensity for life to be sustained as though a merciful hand 
directs the clouds where they are needed.132 Water, made by the combination of two 
simple elements of hydrogen and oxygen, is sent down in the right droplet size and at 
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a speed to shower plants instead of destroying them. Water is employed in numerous 
varying functions that appear wise and driven by a conscious purpose.133 Surely, air, 
wind, clouds and water are not capable of knowing the needs of the creatures and 
lack the compassion necessary to meet them. Therefore, their numerous well-
observed functions and subtle activities can only be part of the governance and 
lordship of a merciful and compassionate God.134  
When the traveller descends to the earth, a whole new realm opens before him. The 
earth glides through space like a divine ship (sefine-i rabbaniye) carrying hundreds 
of thousands of species together with their sustenance and essential needs for 
survival.135 As the traveller does not have time to read the numerous “chapters” from 
the book of the earth, he looks at the “single page of origination and administration 
of living being in spring.”136 From the basic ingredients of soil, seeds, roots and 
water, all plant life is created in the right amounts, at the right time and with the right 
variety “loaded and sent like a train” to meet the needs of all living creatures.137 In 
particular, all newborns are compassionately looked after with the inclusion of 
“canned milk in those food packages, and pumps of sugared milk” delivered through 
their mothers.138 All of these actions of governing life on earth are beyond these 
species or the earth, and hence show the existence, wisdom and mercy of the 
Merciful and Compassionate God.139 
Nursi’s observations reflect the scientific knowledge of the early twentieth century. 
They appear slight and not rigorous enough to support his points when viewed by 
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scientific knowledge of the current era. Thomas Michel acknowledges this and 
asserts that dramatic increases in human knowledge of cosmology, natural processes 
on earth and physiology of biological life only strengthen Nursi’s arguments.140 It is 
possible to bring in updated scientific knowledge to support the same premises. 
On the eightieth level in the reflective journey, Nursi makes the traveller consider the 
entire universe. This section is interesting in that it combines the cosmological and 
teleological arguments for God in one section. Nursi begins in his usual style to draw 
similarities between the universe and other familiar objects and places that also 
require governing: 
This universe is so meaningful and well-ordered that it appears in the form of an 
embodied book of the Glorious One (kitab-ı Sübhāni), as a physical form of 
dominical Qur’an (Kur’an-ı Rabbāni), an adorned palace of the Eternally 
Besought One (saray-ı Samedāni), an orderly city of the Most Merciful (şehr-i 
Rahmāni).141 
He continues to argue the entire book of universe relays “two major truths” 
demonstrating the existence and unity of God. In the first “major truth,” Nursi puts 
forward the imkān and hudūth arguments, which are central arguments within the 
kalām cosmological argument. 
Nursi gives a brief outline of these arguments in a single paragraph. He then says the 
reality of contingency and temporality is diffused across the universe and “the 
majority is visible to the eye and some are seen through the reason.”142 This 
statement is a transition from the brief abstract logical form of the arguments to one 
that fits within Nursi’s epistemology. Over three pages, he explains examples of 
change, transformation and contingency from the natural world visible to all 
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observers.143 There is constant activity of change taking place on earth through a 
complex web of seasons and cycle of life and death, yet the constancy of life through 
seeds, eggs and young points to the necessary existence and eternity of the Artistic 
Maker (Sāni) and the Glorious Being (Dhāt Dhu’l-Jalal).144 Considering 
contingency, Nursi argues that every living being is created with “specific attributes, 
purposeful qualities and beneficial tools” among countless possibilities, illustrating 
the exercise of deliberate choice and selection. When the entire existence is 
considered, infinite numbers of choices are made at every instant while maintaining a 
cosmic order showing the universal governance and “existence of a Necessarily 
Existent God who is infinitely Wise and boundlessly Powerful.”145 Interestingly, with 
this approach, Nursi combines the design and teleological arguments within the 
parameters of the cosmological argument. 
What Nursi calls the “second major truth” is similar to Ibn Rushd’s argument for 
providence (‘inayah) with one significant difference – Nursi uses the word ta’awun 
(mutual assistance) instead. He contends that all beings receive assistance beyond 
their means and power in sustaining their existence, purpose they serve and their 
lives in the case of living beings. While it appears every being is struggling with 
others to survive, in reality they are all directed to assist one another by the 
governance of God “who is Merciful and Wise.”146 For instance, clouds, rain and 
vegetation are made to sustain animal life and, when they die, they assist plant life to 
survive. Animal mothers are made to assist young with mercy and the production of 
milk beyond their design and control. Particles of food “run to the assistance of cells 
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in the body.”147 Nursi uses the ta’awun argument in multiple places in his works, 
including the confutation of the dominant notion of the survival of the fittest 
perspective on earth’s biological life.148 
While discussing six names of God in the 30th Flash, Nursi gives deeper and more 
erudite support for the governance argument in the way he identifies actions visible 
across the universe, indicating a purposeful governance beyond the power and design 
of anything else in the universe. Two examples illustrate Nursi’s argument. The first 
is the manifestation of the name al-Quddūs (The Holy) that drives the earth and 
universe to remain pure and clean. Nursi gives the analogy of a factory where there is 
constant processing and materials, production of goods and, as a result, waste. The 
factory would quickly become derelict unless it is constantly and deliberately 
cleaned.149 Similarly, the earth and universe operate like a factory with constant 
activity and the cycle of life and death producing waste. Creative activity in a space 
leads to unwanted debris, which is swept away over time to render the space clean. If 
the waste produced by countless living beings and inevitably dead animals and plants 
are not cleaned from its face, the earth would rapidly turn into a wasteland. Yet, the 
earth and oceans always appear clean and unblemished. The atmosphere is cleaned 
from harmful substances. Plants and animals are given tools and mechanisms to 
clean themselves. In the body, red blood cells clean the body of carbon dioxide and 
there are processes and systems in place to clean the body of waste and impurities. 
                                                 
147 Ibid. 
148 Nursi, Sözler, 30th Word, 1st Purpose, 734. For more discussion by Nursi on the ta’awun principle 
see also Nursi, Sözler, 381, 404, 547-548, 901, 949; Nursi, Mektubat, 453, 671. 
149 Nursi, Lem’alar, 30th Flash, 1st Point, 556. 
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Nowhere on earth and space can be observed any large accumulation of untreated 
debris and dirt.150 So, an act of cleansing takes place on a universal scale.151 
The second example is the manifestation of the name al-Adl (The Just). Nursi notes 
that, similar to a large city, there are transformations, income and expenditure taking 
place on earth and in the universe at immense scale. The relationship of the earth to 
the solar system, its position, speed and gravity require careful balancing. The 
ecological balance is kept with careful measure in the numbers of young born and 
individuals dying within each species to improve chances for survival and prevent a 
few species from dominating the planet. Within the bodies of each individual animal 
and human, processes of osmosis keep everything in balance. These and many other 
similar observations show the balancing act permeates the entire earth and 
universe.152 
Nursi makes the key conclusion that these actions cannot be attributed to matter, 
things or natural laws. The acts of cleansing and balancing are so pervasive and 
complex that they cannot be explained by particular causes and effects; they pertain 
to the universal governance of God. For cleansing and balancing to take place, every 
entity in the universe either has to have infinite knowledge to consider their active 
part or there needs to be a galactic council made up of representatives from every 
species and types of things where they discuss these complex functions and delegate 
tasks appropriately. Since both options are impossible, these acts are only possible if 
they are ascribed to a Creator.153 From this angle, Nursi’s argument is compelling. 
                                                 
150 There is the exception of waste caused by human activity. Even this type of waste accumulation 
would be cleaned by natural processes given enough time and if the waste production was less than 
what the earth can handle. 
151 Nursi, Lem’alar, 30th Flash, 1st Point, 556-557. 
152 Ibid, 2nd Point, 561-563. 
153 Ibid, 1st Point, 559. 
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Rather than focusing on design or teleology, he presents identifiable patterns of 
action with the best explanation being a single source with the required knowledge, 
power and will to undertake functions responsible for the governance of the universe. 
Nursi follows similar lines of reasoning to identify more actions that relate to the 
governance of the universe. 
In the concluding paragraph to the 7th Ray, Nursi braces his extensive demonstration 
of a universal rubūbiyyah to necessary attributes and existence of God: 
So, the truth of governance (rubūbiyyah) manifesting within the reality of 
activity reveals and makes itself known in qualities (shu’ūnāt) and acts 
(tasarrufāt) such as creating, originating, aesthetically fashioning and bringing 
into being with knowledge and wisdom; determining, forming, administering 
and converting with order and balance; transforming, changing, reducing and 
elevating with purpose and will; and feeding, nurturing, and granting and gifting 
with compassion and mercy. The truth of a clear divinity (ulūhiyyah) 
manifesting within the reality of rubūbiyyah is recognized and known through 
the compassionate and generous reflections of the Beautiful Divine Names 
(asmā al-ḥusnā) and through the glorious (jalālī) and beauteous (jamālī) 
manifestations of the seven affirmative attributes of Life, Knowledge, Power, 
Will, Hearing, Sight, and Speech.154 
This paragraph is significant in revealing Nursi’s understanding of rubūbiyyah to 
include all creative, administrative and transformative actions that lead to the 
creation and maintenance of the universe in the way it is – a most suitable place to 
sustain life and allow them to reach their ultimate potential (kamālāt). For Nursi, the 
actions pertaining to the governance of the universe entail not only the existence of 
God, as will be discussed in the remaining chapters, they also demonstrate the unity 
of God and make God known through His names and attributes. The scale of 
operation in the universe is such that it cannot be satisfactorily explained unless God 
is accepted. Most crucially, within all activities in the universe, attributes such as 
wisdom, mercy, compassion and generosity are apparently visible and cannot be 
                                                 
154 Nursi, Şualar, 7th Ray, 1st Chapter, 212. 
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ascribed to unconscious matter or objects. Those attributes can only be associated 
with a personal God. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this link is quite similar to 
al-Razi’s argument for God with certain attributes identified in actions observed in 
the universe. Nursi brings to it creative use of literary devices, uses of analogous 
images and incorporation of twentieth century science to engage the ordinary reader 
and make them comfortable on familiar terrain.  
4.6 Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad as Proofs of God’s Existence  
A key distinction in Nursi’s approach is the way he entreats the Qur’an and Prophet 
Muhammad as evidence whenever he uses the universe as a focal point to discuss the 
existence of God.155 With this emphasis, he ensures the primary position of the 
revealed sources in his epistemology. While he repeatedly invokes observations from 
the universe, he is careful not to tip the balance towards the universe and science. He 
highlights the interdependent relationship between the universe and revelation in 
affirming the reality of God.156 Nursi also genuinely believes the Qur’an and Prophet 
Muhammad are evidence for God in and of themselves. He ventures to achieve this 
task in two ways. 
First, Nursi links verses of the Qur’an to his discourse. This approach is illustrated by 
the samples of rubūbiyyah covered in the previous section. After discussing how 
winds and clouds are employed within the governance of God, he quotes, “… and 
His disposal of the winds, and the clouds subservient between sky and earth, surely 
there are signs for a people who reason and understand.”157 After discussion on the 
vital functions of rain, Nursi underscores the discussion as an exegesis of the verse, 
                                                 
155 See 16th and 17th levels in 7th Ray, last two indications of the 22nd Word, and 32nd and 33rd 
Windows of the 33rd Word as samples of passages where Nursi gives the Qur’an and Prophet 
Muhammad as evidence for the existence of God. 
156 Nursi, Şualar, 7th Ray, 1st Chapter, 18th Level, 200. 
157 Qur’an 2:164. 
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“He it is Who sends down the rain useful in all ways to rescue (them) after they have 
lost all hope, and spreads out His mercy far and wide (to every being). He it is Who 
is the Guardian, and the All-Praiseworthy.”158 Similarly, following the discussion on 
how earth is brought back to life in spring, he quotes, “Look, then, at the imprints of 
God’s Mercy – how He revives the dead earth after its death: certainly then it is He 
Who will revive the dead. He has full power over everything.”159 Nursi then makes 
the significant comment, “Just as the page of spring makes an exegesis of this verse, 
this verse also miraculously expresses the meanings of the page of spring.”160 This 
remark is significant in that it reveals how Nursi sees revelation and the universe as 
interdependent sources explaining one another. 
Citing revealed sources as evidence for their propositions of faith is usually 
considered a circular argument and logical fallacy. Nursi gets around this problem by 
arguing the divine origin of the Qur’an and the truthfulness of Prophet Muhammad. 
This marks his second approach. His argument could be expressed in logical form as: 
(1) If the Qur’an cannot be the product of human handiwork and Prophet Muhammad 
is not lying about his claim of messengership, then the Qur’an is the word of God 
and Prophet Muhammad is a true messenger of God; (2) The Qur’an cannot be the 
product of human handiwork and Prophet Muhammad did not lie; therefore, (3) The 
Qur’an is the word of God and Prophet Muhammad is a true messenger of God;  
(4) Since the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad attest to God’s existence, God exists. It 
is possible to craft this argument in different ways; regardless, the key premise is the 
second one that Nursi exerts considerable effort to prove. 
                                                 
158 Qur’an 42:28. 
159 Qur’an 30:50 
160 Nursi, Şualar, 7th Ray, 1st Chapter, 3rd Level, 154. 
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In the 25th Word, Nursi provides a lengthy content analysis of the Qur’an to prove it 
cannot be the product of human handiwork. For Nursi, the Qur’an’s literary 
composition; its most eloquent selection and composition of words; deliberate 
symmetry of sound and balance involved in the number of letters deployed in a 
verse; and its future predictions and scientific composition impossible for humans to 
know at the time of Prophet Muhammad are all proofs for the Qur’an being beyond 
the best possible human capability and therefore show the Qur’an can only be the 
word of God.161 Nursi gives numerous examples to illustrate each of these 
statements. While many contemporaries of Nursi use theology for the service of a 
new Qur’anic exegesis, Nursi uses Qur’anic exegesis for the service of theology and 
proof of creed. This difference is important and distinquishes Nursi to his 
contemporaries in twentieth century. 
In the 19th Word and 19th Letter, Nursi outlines arguments for the authenticity of 
Prophet Muhammad’s claim to be true messenger of God. In doing so, he focuses on 
the Prophet’s character to argue he was one of the most truthful and trustworthy of 
all people in history;162 if he never lied about insignificant things, why would he lie 
about the significant claim to receive revelation from God;163 while Prophet 
Muhammad’s opponents attempted to discredit him by branding him with many 
derogatory names, they never accused him of being a liar as no one would have 
believed it;164 he was unlettered, yet he transmitted a book (the Qur’an) transforming 
humanity and world history;165 and in the 19th Letter, Nursi narrates close to 300 
miracles attributed to the Prophet in authentic hadith collections as well as numerous 
                                                 
161 Nursi, Sözler, 25th Word, 488-623. Nursi gives many examples to back up these assertions. 
162 Ibid, 19th Word, 321. 
163 Nursi, Mektubat, 19th Letter, 1st Indication, 131. 
164 Ibid, 2nd Indication, 132. 
165 Ibid, 3rd Indication, 134. 
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instances of his future predictions and previous scriptures predicting his impending 
arrival.166 Nursi emphasises these as facts and poses them as evidence to provide a 
strong basis to argue that Prophet Muhammad is a genuine messenger of God and the 
Qur’an is not the product of human authorship but a composition of divine source. 
Therefore, everything the Qur’an claims becomes true, including the existence and 
unity of God. Similarly, since Prophet Muhammad is not a liar and he claimed to 
speak to God, there must be a God.  
It is possible to provide counterarguments to this line of reasoning; however, it 
cannot be completely discounted as a weak argument. In fact, in Muslim thought, the 
argument for God from the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad cleverly achieves proof 
for three fundamental tenets of Islamic faith – existence of God, belief in scriptures 
and the messengers of God – in a single line of reasoning. Hence, considerable 
numbers of Muslims are persuaded with these arguments and popular online Muslim 
preachers often invoke them in their talks.167 
4.7 Other Proofs of God’s Existence 
In a short passage, Nursi asserts that everything witnesses the existence of God in 
two ways. First, they serve purposes beyond themselves and power. Second, 
everything obeys a set of natural laws they are unable to set for themselves.168 Once 
again, Nursi gives evidence from the natural world to support these arguments. In a 
similar tone, Nursi poses life and death as evidence for God after quoting the verse, 
“He it is who has created death and life.”169 For Nursi, there is nothing in the 
                                                 
166 Ibid, 19th Letter, 129-308. 
167 For examples of Muslim emphasis on proofs of Qur’an and the messengership of Prophet 
Muhammad see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-dFpCv5gI8, https://www.youtube.com/ 
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168 Nursi, Lem’alar, 17th Flash, 8th Indication, 219. 
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universe that causes life directly. Further, for life to be sustained, the entire universe 
must be within the governance of the One who gives life.170 Interestingly, Nursi also 
puts forward death as evidence for God. Every living thing that dies is a reminder 
that living things do not have the capability to sustain or determine their life. Such 
sustenance and determination can only come from an eternal God. As a second 
indication, Nursi presents the earth as a single living entity. If spring with its coming 
to life is evidence for God, the death seen in winter is far greater evidence for the 
existence and power of God,171 just as the Qur’an states, “and He revives the earth 
after its death.”172 
Apart from aspects of design, purpose and governance, Nursi highlights finer aspects 
of existence. In this existence, there is beauty and beautiful things spread across the 
cosmos, earth and living beings.173 He quotes the verse, “He Who makes excellent 
everything that He creates;”174 and remarks that everything is created with beautiful 
form, art and aesthetics.175 Just as a work of art points to its artist, the beauty 
displayed in countless beings point to the Artistic Maker (Sāni).176 
A dramatically different proof for God argued by Nursi concerns the human being. 
Nursi introduces the argument with the verses, “On the earth there are (clear) signs 
for those who seek certainty, and also in your own selves. Will you then not see (the 
                                                 
170 Nursi, Sözler, 33rd Word, 23rd Window, 920-921. 
171 Ibid, 24th Window, 922-923. 
172 Qur’an 30:19. 
173 Nursi, Sözler, 33rd Word, 26th Window, 925. 
174 Qur’an 32:7. 
175 Nursi, Sözler, 33rd Word, 15th Window, 905-906. 
176 Ibid, 25th Window, 924. 
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truth)”177 and says “with the inspiration of the Qur’an” human beings become 
evidence for God in three ways.  
First, human nature is a mirror to God’s names. Human conscience looks at God 
using its inherent powerlessness and poverty within its nature. Only an eternal, all-
powerful God would be a point of strength and relief.178 Nursi continues his 
discussion to assert that human nature also comprises attributes such as knowledge, 
power and will that enable it to reason that, just as humans build, own and administer 
a house, they also appreciate God creating, owning and governing the universe.179 
Nursi highlights the way human beings are created with their inner faculties and 
refined complexity of physical bodies indicates a Creator. He relates the human 
being as the greatest manifestation of God’s Greatest Name, “Just as among the 
Names there is a Greatest Name (ism al-‘aẓam), so too among the impresses of those 
Names there is a greatest impress, and that is human being.”180 Turner suggests 
Nursi’s use of the existential poverty and powerlessness of humans and other created 
beings is a consistent theme in arguing for the existence of God.181 Bilal Kuspinal 
highlights Nursi’s assertion that the inconsistency between human needs and their 
ability to satisfy them as a key argument from the conscience. He further notes that 
                                                 
177 Qur’an 51:20-21. Nursi also quotes 41:53 at the beginning of the 33rd Word where most proofs are 
listed: “We will show them Our manifest signs (proofs) in the horizons of the universe and within 
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178 Nursi, Sözler, 33rd Word, 31st Window, 936. 
179 Ibid. This aspect of human nature becoming an instrument to know God will be explored in more 
detail in Chapter 6. 
180 Ibid, 936-937. 
181 Turner, The Qur’an Revealed, 12-13. 
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Nursi charges human conscience with a natural affinity for truth and God.182 These 
themes will be expanded further in Chapter 6.  
As a second way that human beings prove God’s existence, Nursi draws an analogy 
in the way the human spirit (ruh) governs the body and the way God governs the 
universe. The human spirit183 feels all parts of the body with senses. For the spirit, 
distance does not introduce difficulty as it is related to the entire body. It governs 
countless affairs of the body without difficulty. In a similar way, God governs the 
universe with ease, is aware of all things, distance does not limit Him and countless 
affairs do not cause any difficulty or confusion.184 Needless to say, with this analogy, 
Nursi does not equate God as a spirit of the universe, quoting the Qur’an, “to God 
applies the most sublime attribute.”185 
Third, Nursi poses human life as evidence for God’s existence.186 Nursi posits life as 
the most valuable product of the universe such that the entire universe and existence 
is deployed to produce life. The totality of life is there to support human life as the 
only being with a refined spirit endowed with self-consciousness and emotional 
faculties to sense the existence and presence of God.187 The human is not only 
created in the best integrated composition of inner faculties and outer features, but it 
                                                 
182 Bilal Kuspinar, “The Human Conscience as a Proof for the Existence of God: Nursi’s Perspective,” 
in God, Man, and Mortality: The Perspective of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, ed. Hasan Horkuc (New 
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is also created with beauty of form and being. Such design points the existence of a 
Maker.188 Markham calls this the “Beauty Imperative” argument.189 
4.8 Conclusion 
Proving the existence of God has always been the first and foremost endeavour in 
theology. With the intent to base Islam on firm foundations, Muslim philosophers 
and theologians in the classical era made important contributions to proofs for the 
existence of God. Using their knowledge of the world and carefully adopting 
philosophical and theological discourse available in their time, they excogitated 
elaborate cosmological, teleological and ontological arguments. Attested by the 
imkān and hudūth arguments, the kalām cosmological argument became the standard 
proof for God in Islamic theology. Variants of the design and teleological arguments 
– such as the arguments from wisdom (hikmah), providence (‘inayah) and creation 
(ikhtira’) – also featured prominently in theology and popular belief. There was also 
the case for the argument that belief in God comes naturally to innate human 
disposition and there is no proof needed as long as the innate human nature was not 
corrupted. 
Representing the transition of Islamic scholarship from classical to the modern era, 
Nursi was influenced by the classical proofs for God and also understood the need to 
make original contributions, especially to reach the masses who were doubting God 
on an unprecedented scale. Nursi’s arguments for God are similar and different to 
previous scholarship in a number of ways. Although reluctantly, Nursi refers to the 
imkān and hudūth arguments as part of the grander cosmological arguments. Despite 
his familiarity with these arguments and the works of classical theologians, Nursi 
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departs from the cosmological arguments as he finds them too abstract for ordinary 
Muslims to grasp. Most significantly, this concern pushes Nursi to establish a link 
between the cosmological and design arguments reminiscent of al-Rāzī. The main 
links he finds is the actions that can be identified not only at all levels of existence on 
earth, but also throughout the cosmos. These actions collectively characterise God’s 
pervasive rubūbiyyah, and form the basis of the overarching governance argument. 
For Nursi, this argument is the most significant of all proofs as he calls it the ayah al-
kubra, the greatest sign or proof. 
Without naming them as such, Nursi uses the three main teleological arguments 
within classical Islamic theology – the arguments from hikmah, ‘inayah and ikhtira’. 
Such arguments feature prominently in Nursi’s works as they are more relatable for 
ordinary people and allow the use of Qur’anic verses to support arguments. Nursi 
often uses the arguments from wisdom similar to al-Māturīdī and creation similar to 
Ibn Rushd, especially when putting forward life as evidence. Yet, Nursi displays 
some originality. In addition to Ibn Rushd’s argument from ‘inayah, Nursi uses the 
word ta’awun (mutual assistance) and calls this the second major truth after 
cosmological considerations.  
A key feature in Nursi’s rhetoric is that he follows in the footsteps of al-Ash’arī and 
al-Ghazālī in deploying analogies comparing the earth and cosmos to objects familiar 
to humans, such as a palace, city or book. Nursi is more concerned with the 
readability and persuasive effect of his arguments rather than following 
philosophically acceptable proofs. However, Nursi’s arguments hold rational and 
logical ground, notwithstanding the need to peel them from his rhetoric and express 
them in well-crafted forms. 
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Rather than being apologetic, Nursi displays confidence in his approach to the proofs 
of God. At times, he reverses the burden of proof to those that argue the non-
existence of God. This approach produces one of the most original proofs for God’s 
existence, the default proof. Instead of focusing on the proof of God directly, this 
proof focuses on the impossibility of all other explanations for existence and the 
universe. After proving the impossibility of alternative explanations, Nursi makes the 
conclusion that God’s existence is not only a necessity (wājib al-wujūd), but also His 
non-existence is impossible; thus, God creating the universe not only becomes the 
best explanation but the only possible explanation. 
A key distinction in Nursi’s approach in relation to the existence of God is the way 
he entreats the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad as evidence whenever he uses the 
universe as a focal point. With this emphasis, he ensures the primary position of the 
revealed sources in his epistemology. While he repeatedly invokes observations from 
the universe, he is careful not to tip the balance towards the universe and science. He 
highlights the interdependent relationship between the universe and revelation in 
affirming the reality of God. 
With his proofs of God, Nursi aims to take his readers from an imitative faith (taqlīd 
al-imān) to a deeper and more investigative faith (tahqīq al-imān). For Nursi, there is 
an incommensurate distinction between proof of existence and proof of non-
existence. This is because proof of existence is more powerful, and each proof and 
evidence supports one another to build a consensus. This explains the intensity of 
Nursi’s writings and the way he often merges arguments. For Nursi, proofs from the 
universe not only prove the existence of God, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter, they also demonstrate God’s unity (tawḥīd). 
 223 
 
 
 
 224 
5 X 
CHAPTER 5: TAWHID – THE UNITY OF GOD 
5.1 Introduction 
After investigating whether God exists comes a second important theological 
question – is God one? The answer to this question invariably determines Islamic 
cosmology and Islamic understanding of the way God relates to the world.1 Islam’s 
emphatic response to this key question is the doctrine of tawḥīd. Even a cursory 
reading of the Qur’an reveals a cannonade of verses arguing for a single creator who 
is intimately involved with the affairs of the world.2 When questioned by one of his 
followers to sum up Islam in a few easy to remember words, Prophet Muhammad 
replied, “Say, ‘I believe in God’, and then be straight.”3 Tawḥīd with its absolute 
monotheistic doctrine is impressed as the central tenet of Islam.  
There are three immediate quandaries associated with an absolute monotheistic 
theology. First, if tawḥīd includes God as the disposer of affairs of the world, does 
God direct the operation of the universe through universals only or is He also 
involved with the particulars. Second, if God is the absolute creator and disposer of 
the affairs of the universe, do causes have independent creative effects and what 
precise role, if any, do they have within the creative and operational processes of the 
universe. Third, if God is the “Lord of the worlds”4 and sole disposer of affairs, how 
does one God govern the vast cosmos, innumerable events occurring in the universe 
                                                 
1 The way humans relate to God will be covered in the next chapter. 
2 Qur’an 2:22, 2:115, 2:117, 2:148, 2:164, 2:258, 3:5, 3:29, 3:83, 3:190, 6:97, 7:54, 10:5, 13:2, 13:15-
16, 14:32-33, 14:38, 15:26, 16:4, 16:12, 16:49, 16:65, 17:37, 19:67, 20:50, 21:30 22:88, 23:12-14, 
24:41, 25:2, 25:39, 29:44, 29:61, 30:22, 30:26, 30:50, 31:25, 31:28-29, 32:4, 32:7, 33:54, 35:9, 35:11, 
36:33, 36:38-40, 36:77, 37:6, 40:16, 40:57, 41:11-12, 42:29, 45:4, 46:4-5, 50:15, 67:5, 79:27, 87:7. 
3 Muslim, Iman, 62. See also the Qur’anic verse 41:30 for the same expression. In this verse, the word 
‘istiqāmu’ is translated as ‘stand straight and steadfast’ by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. This generally refers 
to being on a middle path of balance and moderation as opposed to deviation and going to extremes. 
4 Qur’an 1:2. 
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and functioning of countless life forms all at the same time?5 Responding to these 
theological imperatives characterises the Islamic cosmological discourse. 
This chapter examines how the unity of God is demonstrated and explained with 
various proofs within the classical Islamic theology, and how Muslim theologians 
address the immediate theological implications arising from absolute monotheism. 
The chapter explores and analyses Nursi’s contributions to the proofs of God’s unity 
and his answers to key theological and philosophical implications of the absolute 
monotheism of God. The chapter shows that Nursi made three main contributions to 
the understanding of tawḥīd in Islamic theology. First, he articulated an advanced 
definition of tawḥīd to include not only a broad understanding of the unity of the 
creator, but to witness a stamp of unity in every created object. Second, he expanded 
on the traditional proofs of tawḥīd. He contributed to the discourse on cause and 
effect, and provided new proofs to argue that causes do not have real effects. Third, 
he thoroughly explained how the creation of universals and particulars would have 
no difference to God’s power and there is no more difficulty for God to govern a 
small object than the entire universe. With these contributions, Nursi strengthens 
tawḥīd, the most significant doctrine of Islam. 
5.2 Definition of Tawḥīd and Nursi’s Contribution 
The word tawḥīd literally means ‘unification’. When used in reference to God, it 
means to declare and assert the oneness of God.6 More precisely, tawḥīd refers to the 
type of monotheism where the absolute unity of God is asserted and God is declared 
as the sole creator of the universe and governor of its affairs. An account of tawḥīd 
would not be complete without mention of its polar opposite, shirk, which literally 
                                                 
5 Two other key implications of tawhīd are: (1) divine measuring and creation of human actions; and 
(2) the problem of suffering and existence of evil in the world.  
6 Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, The Vision of Islam (New York: Paragon House, 1994), 43. 
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means “to share, to be a partner, to give someone a partner.”7 In Islamic theological 
lexicon, shirk refers to any belief or action where partners are associated with God’s 
divinity, attributes and lordship.8 The strong prohibition of shirk in Islam9 not only 
reinforces the importance of tawḥīd, but provides checks and balances to preclude 
any adulteration of pure monotheism. Consequently, for Muslim theologians, 
upholding tawḥīd and avoiding shirk have been the key impulses when confronted 
with new theological interpretations and dealing with crucial theological issues. 
Not surprisingly, tawḥīd features as a primary theme in Nursi’s works. He 
persistently argues that the “tree of universe” from its widest cosmic boundaries to 
the smallest detail is within the power and will of the Single One of Unity (Dhāt al-
Wahid al-Ahad).10 Nursi adds that true appreciation of the Creator, universe and 
human being would only be possible with tawḥīd and oneness; through tawḥīd, the 
beauty and perfection of God manifests.11 The act of feeding young with mother’s 
milk may be dismissed by attributing it to some causes. Yet, when viewed from the 
perspective of tawḥīd, the act of feeding countless young within each of the millions 
of species through the simultaneous inspiration of their mothers appears as a great act 
of compassion (raḥma) and beauty (jamal) by God.12 The perfection of the universe 
can only surface through tawḥīd.13 Attributing a masterpiece of art to its artistic 
maker immensely increases its value, but severing the art from its maker dramatically 
reduces its value to its basic constituting parts. Similarly, the purpose of the universe 
and value of existence are only established when linked to one Creator. Rejection of 
                                                 
7 Ibid, 49. 
8 Ibid, 49-52. 
9 See Qur’anic verses 6:163; also see 4:116 for shirk as the only unforgivable sin. The Qur’an uses the 
word ‘shirk’ in 75 verses. 
10 Nursi, Şualar, 2nd Ray, 1st Station, Introduction, 25. 
11 Ibid, 1st Fruit, 26. 
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God and shirk sever God from Creation and render the universe as a chaotic place 
and reduce its value to its material parts.14 Tawḥīd also becomes instrumental for 
humans to “attain highest perfections, and become the most valuable fruit of the 
universe and the most perfect and refined of creatures.”15 Humans have numerous 
needs and desires, and can feel an innumerable array of pains, yet their ability to 
meet their needs and end pains is exceedingly limited.16 Among countless innate 
emotions, there is an intense desire for eternity in human natural disposition. Only a 
creator who can govern the entire universe “like a palace” can close one door and 
open another to an afterlife.17 
Nursi gives two distinctive appreciations, hence definitions, of tawḥīd. One is the 
apparent tawḥīd that is understood and appreciated by ordinary believers. The 
second is the true tawḥīd of people who have attained higher levels of understanding 
and certainty.18 Nursi gives the analogy of how large amounts of goods arriving in a 
market can be associated with a businessman in two ways. The first is to look at the 
sheer size of operations and conclude that only the biggest businessman with the 
capacity to deal with so many goods would be the one responsible. In this approach, 
there is room for many other businessmen to claim ownership for parts of delivery 
and business operations. The second way is to look for and identify trademarks 
belonging to the businessman on every product. In this respect, every product 
directly testifies its owner and establishes a single source with far more certainty.19 
                                                 
14 Nursi, Sozler, 23rd Word, 1st Chapter, 1st Point, 417-418. 
15 Nursi, Şualar, 2nd Ray, 1st Station, 3rd Fruit, 37. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Nursi, Sozler, 22nd Word, 1st Flash, 390. 
19 Ibid. 
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Similarly, in the appreciation of apparent tawḥīd, an ordinary believer would state 
God is one, has no partner and there is no one like Him. In contemplating the scale of 
the universe, they reason that such a majestic universe can only be created and 
owned by one God.20 True tawḥīd and its appreciation are far more profound:  
The true divine unity (tawḥīd al-haqīqī) is to attain a perpetual awareness of the 
divine presence and to confirm and believe almost with the certainty of seeing 
(‘ayn al-yaqīn) that everything emerges from the hand of God’s Power and that 
in no way does He have any partner or aide in His divinity, ownership and 
governance (rubūbiyya) of the universe. This outcome is achieved by opening a 
window directly onto God’s light in everything visible in the universe and 
clearly observing and reading the stamp of God’s power, the seal of His 
governance (rubūbiyya), and the inscriptions of His divine pen on everything in 
the universe.21 
Reading from the reverse, three points of emphasis can be identified in this 
definition. First, an observance and identification of divine creation and power in 
every object acts like a trademark pointing to one God. This means one can find God 
and a signature of tawḥīd in everything.22 Second, this appreciation of tawḥīd is far 
more meaningful and fosters a deeper conviction with a high level of certainty that 
there is only a one divine being who has complete ownership and control over the 
affairs of the universe. Third, such conviction raises the level of faith from blind faith 
to the certainty of seeing. A person begins to see God’s presence in everything and 
every event, resulting in the spiritual outcome of a perpetual awareness of God – 
ihsan. So, tawḥīd is not only “the most exalted sacred duty and natural obligation,” 
but it is also the “worship of faith” (‘ibada al-īmāniyya).23 With his definition of 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
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22 Nursi, Şualar, 2nd Ray, 2nd Chapter, 4th Truth, 209. 
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tawḥīd, Nursi inseparably links the universe to the highest spiritual goals and in a 
single paragraph unifies all major aspects of Islam.24 
This is more clearly discernible in the 23rd Word, where Nursi discusses the 
outcomes and benefits of belief. Nursi links four key Islamic concepts giving rise to 
the outcome of happiness: “Belief (īmān) necessitates divine unity (tawḥīd), divine 
unity necessitates surrender (taslīm), surrender (to God) entails reliance (tawakkul) 
and the necessary outcome of reliance is happiness in both worlds.”25 With this, 
Nursi stresses the point that, if belief can result in appreciation of true divine unity, 
this results in a genuine devotional surrender to God. If one realises that the entire 
Creation is within the governance of God and there is a constant awareness of this, 
the person has no choice but to submit to such an overwhelming power. Such 
devotional submission will enable a person to understand what they can and cannot 
do, leading to reliance on God. Such reliance removes unnecessary distress and 
pressures of life leading to happiness in this world and, through faith and good deeds, 
they will also gain happiness in the afterlife. 
The concept of tawakkul can easily be misunderstood and lead to fatalism. Cognisant 
of this danger, Nursi explains the condition of a person who does not rely on God 
with the analogy of a man who boards a ship but continues to carry his luggage. 
While he may be able to carry it at the beginning, the weight becomes unbearable 
after a short time. In reality, the ship could easily carry him and his luggage if only 
he realised and submitted to the captain of the ship. People without true appreciation 
of tawḥīd are crushed under the load of life as they are unable to offload their 
‘baggage’ in a conscious reliance on God who is in full command of the ship of the 
                                                 
24 As will be covered in the next chapter, Nursi further qualifies tawhīd with the concepts of 
wahdāniyya (unity) and ahadiyya (uniqueness). 
25 Nursi, Sozler, 23rd Word, 1st Chapter, 3rd Point, 421. 
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earth.26 Reliance is not a senseless rejection of causes, rather it is to expect the final 
results from God while considering causes as a veil of God’s power, and considering 
the fulfilment of causes as a form of active prayer.27 
5.3 Proofs of God’s Unity in Classical Islamic Theology 
In demonstrating the oneness of God, classical Muslim theologians generally rely on 
two main proofs – dalil al-tadbīr, the argument of administration of God in the way 
He directs and sustains the affairs of the universe; and dalil al-tamanu’, the argument 
of mutual hindrance arising from multiple deity considerations. Scholars of the later 
period generally followed these arguments with nuances in these broad categories.  
One of the earliest theologians to articulate the tadbīr argument as a proof for the 
oneness of God is Harith al-Muhasibi (781-857). He argued that every entity in the 
natural world from inanimate entities to plants, animals and human life fit together 
perfectly. This interconnectedness entails there is unity in administration (tadbīr) and 
points to the unity of the cause for the universe.28 Al-Māturīdī gives a number of 
supporting contentions for the tadbīr argument. A purposeful tadbīr can be observed 
when one considers acts of lordship (af’āl al-rubūbiyya) in the world.29 Series of 
events (seasons and seasonal processes) and entities (the sun, earth and moon) in the 
natural world combine to produce the single result of life and continue to sustain life. 
This is only a possibility if all these events and entities join in conscious 
collaboration or they are administered by one God. Since such collaboration is 
impossible, the tadbīr observed in the world can only be the handiwork of one God.30 
                                                 
26 Ibid, 422. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Yaran, Islamic Thought on the Existence of God, 34. 
29 Ulrich Rudolph, Al-Māturīdī and the Development of Sunnī Theology in Samarqand, trans. Rodrigo 
Adem (Boston: Brill, 2015), 270. 
30 Al-Māturīdī, Kitâb al-Tawhid, 32. 
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Al-Māturīdī argues that opposing forces show their effect in a single entity and 
conflicting attributes are present in the nature of things. Yet, they all produce 
harmony and beneficial outcomes, indicating they are the tadbīr of a single source, 
the all-Powerful God who does everything with wisdom (hikma).31 As discussed in 
the previous chapter, Nursi follows similar reasoning to demonstrate various patterns 
of action in the universe pointing to the existence of God. 
The tadbīr argument requires some knowledge of the world to appreciate. For most 
lay-Muslims, whenever evidence for the oneness of God is raised, the tamānu’ 
argument usually comes to mind. A basic understanding of the argument is to reason, 
if there was more than one god, there would be chaos rather than order in the 
universe. Since there is apparent order, there must be only one God. The tamānu’ 
argument relies and expands on the reasoning provided in verse 21:22 and other 
similar verses in the Qur’an:32 
Had there been in the heavens and the earth any deities other than God, both (of 
those realms) would certainly have fallen into ruin. All-Glorified God is, the 
Lord of the Supreme Throne, in that He is absolutely above all that they 
attribute to Him.33 
 
Say: “If there were, as they assert, deities apart from Him, surely they would 
seek a way to the Master of the Supreme Throne (the dominion of the 
creation).”34 
 
There is no deity along with Him; otherwise each deity would surely have 
sought absolute independence with his creatures under his authority, and they 
would surely have tried to overpower one another.35 
The logical basis of the tamānu’ argument as expressed by classical period 
theologians is mutual hindrance and hence incapacitation if there were two or more 
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gods. The argument is advanced as follows: If there is more than one god, they will 
not always agree. It is possible they would wish to exert opposite effects on the same 
thing. One of them may will for a stone to move, for example, while the other may 
will for it to remain motionless. The association (ta’alluq) of both wills with the 
stone are equally possible. Yet, occurrence of both actions at the same time is 
impossible. If the two gods are equal, their power would mutually hinder one another 
and no change would happen even though they willed to cause an effect. However, 
this is not what is observed in the world. Change occurs all the time. If, however, one 
of the deities overcomes the other, one of them is rendered powerless. Powerlessness 
indicates need and, therefore, origination (hudūth) and possible existence (imkān), 
attributes belonging to created beings rather than a god. Hence, the one who is 
rendered powerless cannot be a god. Since plurality of divinity results in either 
mutual hindrance or powerlessness, the existence of more than one god is 
impossible.36  
Interestingly, al-Ash’arī, and just about all Ash’arite theologians, solely poses the 
tamānu’ argument to argue for the oneness of God.37 A leading Ash’arite theologian, 
al-Juwaynī, succinctly articulates the tamānu’ argument and addresses various 
objections to the argument.38 Al-Ghazālī develops the argument further and focuses 
on the impossibility of allocating separate jurisdictions to each god, presumably one 
creates the heavens while the other the earth or one creates animals while the other 
creates plants.39 Al-Ghazālī asks: ‘is the god capable of creating the heavens also 
capable of creating the earth?’ If the answer is yes, then this would mean there would 
be nothing to differentiate between the two gods in terms of power. He demonstrates 
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that multiplicity of similar things is impossible without there being a difference. In 
other words, the two gods would be the same. If the answer to the original question is 
‘no,’ then this restriction would be impossible since a god capable of creating 
heavenly objects would also be capable of creating earthly objects as they are made 
from similar substances.40 In either case, there is impossibility; therefore, it is not 
possible to divide the cosmos and world between multiple gods and allocate them 
various jurisdictions for the orderly running of affairs.  
However, al-Māturīdī uses tadbīr and tamānu’ arguments as well as arguments from 
scriptures41 in his list of nine proofs for the oneness of God.42 In accounting for this 
distinction, Rudolph Ulrich contends that al-Ash’arī deliberately neglects the tadbīr 
argument because in his theology there was no room for the notion of “autonomous 
natures that must be supervised.”43 However, while al-Māturīdī acknowledges the 
world and entities in it depend on God, he acknowledges the natures (tabā’i) of 
things had effects that needed ordering and directing by God.44 This distinction is an 
important testing ground in locating Nursi within the Ash’arī and Māturīdī 
theological spectrum.  
According to Ulrich, another feature that distinguishes al-Māturīdī is his appeal to 
the sense in which God is naturally understood in the human mind as ‘the One’ (al-
wāhid).45 For al-Māturīdī, wāhid is the first of numbers and when humans speak of 
greatness and superiority of leading people in society they say ‘the one and only …’ 
Analogously, God is conceived as the one and only, and the greatest and first of 
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those that exist46 – an interesting articulation reminiscent of the ontological argument 
and backtracking to the argument a century before Ibn Sina. 
Al-Māturīdī presents another unique argument based on the notion the world is finite. 
He argues, if the notion of more than one god is accepted, it would mean the universe 
and entities in it are also infinite. Since there are infinite numbers, it is also feasible 
there would be infinite numbers of gods. There is no reason to stop at two. Since 
each god would want to be associated with a minimum of one thing, it follows there 
would be infinite numbers of things in the universe. Since the universe, world and 
entities in them are finite, it follows there is only one God.47 Even though the finite 
nature of the world is Aristotelian in origin, as Fathalla Kholeif observes, its 
application to the proof of God’s unity is unique to al-Māturīdī.48 In fact, this is a 
characteristic of classical Islamic theology in that Hellenistic philosophical 
conclusions or ideas are occasionally assimilated within an Islamic framework to 
develop creative and unique arguments supporting Qur’anic propositions of faith. 
Thus, Muslim theologians largely produce tadbīrand tamanu’ arguments for the 
oneness of God. While Ash’arite theology mainly focuses on the tamanu’ argument, 
Māturīdite theology is more flexible in considering all logical proofs that lead to the 
oneness of God. In the seminal theological works of the classical era, the unity of 
God is proven with tadbīr and tamānu’ arguments and they immediately segue to 
discussions focusing on the nature and attributes of God.49 
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5.4 Proofs of Tawḥīd in Risale-i Nur 
Nursi expands on the classical tadbīr and tamānu’ arguments and presses three other 
proofs of tawḥīd – order and harmony argument; ease in creation argument; and 
interdependence argument. He also provides arguments for God’s unity from the 
nature and attributes of God and from the nature of particulars in the universe.  
At the end of the major epistle, 7th Ray, Nursi explains why he spends considerable 
effort and detail in articulating proofs of tawḥīd: 
The Risale-i Nur is not only renovating a minor damage or a small house; it is 
reconstructing an immense destruction and repairing an enormous fortress 
harbouring Islam. It is not only striving to reform an individual’s heart and 
conscience, but also with the medicines and miraculousness of the Qur’an and 
faith (īmān), it is striving to remedy the collective heart (kalb-i umūmi) and the 
collective thought (afkār-ı āmme) wounded by instruments compiled over the 
last thousand years; and it is reforming the collective conscience (vicdan-ı 
umūmi) impaired by the breaching of Islamic symbols and principles on which 
masses of ordinary believers rely.50 
As covered in Chapter 2, Nursi’s revivalist motive and purpose is distinctly apparent 
in this excerpt. Nursi continues to highlight that such a massive task requires 
numerous proofs, strong evidence and extensive detail. He claims the Risale-i Nur 
performs this function as well as being the means for the development of faith and its 
progression through numerous degrees of belief.51 He agglomerates to theology more 
function than what was accomplished in the classical era. It seems plausible to 
assume he believed the reconstruction of Islamic thought, society and civilisation 
must begin with the expression of Islamic worldview and its fundamental principles 
in a way attuned to the contemporary mind.  
Interestingly, only in one paragraph in the 32nd Word does Nursi touch on the 
classical tamānu’ argument of mutual hindrance. He argues, since there is an 
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unbroken chain of interdependence from particles to cosmic objects, the power of 
God is infinite and permeates the entire universe. If there is another god, it would 
have to possess a finite power as two infinites cannot exist at the same time. For this 
god to have any claim to governance of any part in the universe, a finite power must 
overcome an infinite power and set a boundary to the plane of influence of the 
infinite power. This would mean what is infinite would become finite. Since this is 
impossible, it is also impossible to have more than one God.52 Nursi does not repeat 
or develop this argument elsewhere in his works. Once again, this is most likely due 
to its abstract nature and Nursi’s aversion of abstracts with the concern his readership 
may not understand or read his works due to its difficulty and appealing only to the 
mind. 
In addition to the tamānu’ argument, using the reasoning encapsulated in the verse 
21:22, Nursi provides the order (niẓām) and harmony (intiẓām) argument for the 
unity of God. From atoms to living things and stars in the earthly and heavenly 
realms, there is a “most perfect order,” “most beautiful harmony” and “just 
balance.”53 If there was more than one God, their involvement would derange the 
order and harmony in the universe and there would be observable effects of such a 
disorder.54 Nursi explains that the order, harmony and balance in the universe is not 
just fixed once, but constantly maintained in a dynamic system. There is a continuous 
flux of “incomings and outgoings” on earth with the harmony between many 
competing elements and forces maintained, yet the whole planet is kept clean, for 
example, at the same time.55 The stars and cosmic objects are also kept in order 
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through the balancing of forces holding them together.56 Another key dimension is 
the ordering seen at every level of existence and between layers of existence towards 
clear benefits and purposes. Such purposeful order requires knowledge, wisdom, will 
and choice in the orderer: “Order is a complete expression of unity; it demands a 
single orderer. It leaves no place for shirk, the source of dispute and disorder,” 
contends Nursi.57 In addition, every object is given beauty in proportion to its natural 
dispositions and the best possible existence is what exists. To drive this point home, 
Nursi makes a rare but significant quotation from al-Ghazālī, laysa fī’l imkān abda’ 
min mā kān (There is no existence more beautiful than this within the sphere of 
contingencies),58 which is known to have caused rigorous debate in the history of 
Islamic theology with respect to discourse on theodicy.59 
An immediate reaction to this statement is the obvious imperfections, ugliness, 
suffering and evil in existence. Nursi anticipates this objection in the form of answers 
to two questions: An instance of ugliness can be considered an indirect form of 
beauty if it generates numerous instances of beauty. If that instance of ugliness is 
removed, it would cause numerous instances of ugliness by virtue of causing the 
disappearance of those numerous instances of beauty. Secondly, just as the existence 
of darkness allows innumerable degrees of light and numerous degrees of heat result 
from coldness, rare cases of ugliness exist as a unit of measurement to display a wide 
array of beauty. If ugliness did not exist there would only be one type of beauty and 
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innumerable forms of beauty would be kept hidden. So, creation of occasional 
ugliness is indirectly beautiful.60  
The second question focuses on the problem of theodicy and demands an answer as 
to why helpless individuals are subjected to ugliness, suffering or evil. His answer is 
original: Suffering and evil are occasional results of universal laws, called ‘adat 
Allah (habits of God). These laws keep the order and harmony in the universe, giving 
rise to many benefits and useful outcomes. To ensure these outcomes, God allows the 
occasional suffering and evil to exist as unavoidable collateral. The cosmic order 
with the universal laws also opens an arena where God’s names are displayed in 
infinite ways. At the same time though, God provides His mercy and help.61 This 
approach is unique. What Nursi is saying is that suffering and evil is produced not 
with that intent, but to maintain the cosmic order and life on earth. He gives the 
example of the rain: Life would could not be possible without rain, but it sometimes 
causes floods and destruction. No one could argue that rain should be totally 
removed to prevent occasional floods.62 
Apart from the conventional order and harmony argument, Nursi also puts forward 
the ease in creation argument in association with the Qur’anic verse 21:22 as one of 
the consistent proofs for the unity of God. It is not about the abstract notion of 
mutual hindrance, rather the focus is the premise that “in unity (tawḥīd) there is a 
necessary ease and facility while in associating partners (shirk) there are impossible 
difficulties.”63 Nursi takes the stakes higher and contends the counter-intuitive 
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mystery, “the greatest universal (kull) is like the smallest particular (juz’ī) and that 
there is no large or small difference between them,” is one of the most important 
principles of Islam and most significant foundations of tawḥīd.64 Proceeding with this 
assumption, if it can be demonstrated that things and events occur with ease in the 
universe, the unity of God is proven. 
Nursi first demonstrates the premise there is ease in unity and difficulty in 
multiplicity. He does so by giving familiar examples. It is far easier to direct a 
soldier, for example, if he is given into the command of one army officer rather than 
if they were given into the command of one hundred officers. Furthermore, the 
provision of the whole army becomes as easy as provision of a single soldier if it is 
carried out through a single administrative centre. If, on the other hand, the provision 
of a single soldier is referred to multiple centres and factories, it becomes as difficult 
as the provision of the whole army. For each item of provision for a single soldier a 
factory would be needed to produce it. So, numerous factories would be required to 
supply a single soldier.65 Similarly, growing thousands of fruits on a tree becomes 
very easy when it is given to one root and trunk system and a single law of growth 
applies throughout the tree. Whereas, if the growth of a fruit is expected to be carried 
out by external sources (other than the tree-trunk system), growth of every fruit 
becomes as complex as the tree, for “the elements and constituents needed to 
produce a single seed is the same as those required to sustain the whole tree.”66 
Nursi adds that ease in creation within the natural world occurs in spite of four 
competing opposites associated with production: (1) if the production is very fast, it 
would be hard to produce in large quantities in an orderly fashion; (2) things that are 
                                                 
64 Ibid, 7th Ray, 2nd Station, 4th Truth, 214. 
65 Nursi, Lem’alar, 23rd Flash, Conclusion, 3rd Question, 313. 
66 Ibid. 
 240 
artistic and possess high quality would usually be more difficult, require high skills 
and more time to produce, hence they would be more expensive and produced in 
limited quantities; (3) things that are produced abundantly would lack quality and 
hence would be cheap; and (4) producing many things at the same time would 
introduce difficulties of separation and differentiation.67 Yet, in the natural world, all 
these opposites are overcome in an astonishingly easy fashion – artistic, valuable and 
complex beings are produced in abundance, very quickly, easily, with little expense 
and with exceedingly high quality and differentiation.68 For Nursi, the combinations 
of so many opposites and the counter-intuitive results in the production of entities in 
the universe is only possible if Creation is the product of unity, a single source 
(God), rather than the multiplicity of causes or divinities.69 
As the third main argument for the unity of God, Nursi illustrates the 
interdependence argument in the 32nd Word. This argument is similar to the one 
articulated by al-Muhasibi, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. The key distinction 
with Nursi is that he focuses on the interdependence of beings across the universe 
rather than the interconnectedness of things to produce one outcome. The crux of the 
argument is that there is tight interdependence in the universe from the smallest of 
particles to the largest cosmic objects. If this is true, the universe must be the product 
of a single creative and administrative source: God. 
As in the case of his expositions on the existence of God, Nursi uses an imaginary 
dialogue with an advocate of shirk who has a putative claim to any part of Creation 
and hence associate partnership with God in His governance of the universe.70 An 
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atom, notes Nursi, can perform numerous functions in the building of numerous 
beings. These functions are beyond the atom to figure out as it lacks the knowledge 
and power to direct itself. To make the task more difficult, countless atoms of the 
same element do similar functions within the entire universe. So, the one who has 
power over a single atom must also have power over all atoms of the same type. 
Further, these atoms become important ingredients, for example in red blood cells, 
thus the one who governs all atoms must also administer the functions of red blood 
cells.71 Nursi maintains his argument to impress that red blood cells are an essential 
component in the functioning of living cells, which are in turn fundamental 
constituents of the entire system of the human body. Further, humans depend on the 
ecosystems of plants and animals, which depend on the earth, sun, galaxies and 
entire universe.72 So, there is inseparable dependence between all things and beings 
in the universe. 
After a detailed and dialogical coverage of the entire Creation, Nursi quotes the verse 
21:22 and concludes, “There is nothing, from a fly’s wing to the lamps in the 
heavens, there is no shirk, even the size of a fly’s wing, in which those things 
ascribed to God as partners could interfere.”73 In his approach, Nursi makes three 
main points, starting with the smallest particles and moving by layers to reach the 
largest galaxies to cover the entire Creation. First, each entity fulfils numerous 
purposeful tasks in many places that require knowledge and power beyond that 
entity. Second, each entity is not on its own, there are also numerous members of the 
same entity fulfilling the same function horizontally across the universe. They work 
together for creative outcomes that seem to be beyond them to achieve. So, the 
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source of governance must include a dominion covering all entities of the same kind. 
Third, each entity is an essential ingredient for higher layers of Creation. The one 
who has power over that entity and its related entities must also be able to establish 
and administer the relationship between two related layers of Creation. In this way, 
Nursi illustrates an inseparable interdependence vertically between all layers of 
existence and similarity of function horizontally. He makes the final conclusion, 
“With respect to rubūbiyya (governance), the universe is a disintegrable and 
indivisible universal (kull) and all-encompassing (kulli) entity”74 and hence can only 
be governed by one God. 
Nursi provides two additional arguments for tawḥīd in the 2nd and 7th Rays – from 
God’s attributes and actions; and from particulars in existence. With respect to the 
attributes and actions of God, Nursi focuses on ḥākimiya (sovereignty), kibriyā 
(grandeur) and ‘aẓama (splendour), kamāla (perfection), ‘iṭlaq (limitlessness) and 
iḥāṭa (comprehensiveness). The sign of ḥākimiya is the rejection of interference and 
sharing of sovereignty.75 Nursi puts forward the analogy that, even within the human 
domain, leaders reject any share of leadership or sovereignty. A country will not 
have more than one leader at a time and, if there is, it will cause disorder, instability 
and even civil war at the extreme.76 If weak and limited humans feel this way, God 
would reject sharing of His sovereignty on a greater scale.77 As Turner identifies, this 
example does not suggest God is hungry for power or a tyrant, rather it suggests 
God’s sovereignty does not accept intervention on account of it being absolute.78 The 
mark of kibriyā and ‘aẓama is that it does not need assistance or aid. The scale of 
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Creation from stars to beings on earth and the complexity of acts of governance of 
the universe and the earth show God has absolute greatness and splendour.79 The sun 
leaves no need for other sources of light by virtue of its intensity and all-
pervasiveness of its light. Similarly, God’s power is so sublime and compelling that 
it does not leave any room for the assistance of lesser powers.80 The sign of kamāla is 
the rejection of powerlessness, for the perfection of the features of living beings 
require an absolute power and this can only belong to a single essence, hence 
requires unity. The qualities of ‘iṭlaq and iḥāṭa go against partnership, for they have 
a tendency to spread without limitation. The fact that all actions of governance are 
spread across the universe and plants, for example, tend to occupy all available space 
show these actions are limitless, and limitlessness can only be the quality of one.81  
Nursi develops similar arguments from ulūhiyya (divinity), rubūbiyyah (governance), 
fattāhiyya (opening), rahmāniyya (mercifulness), rahīmiyya (compassion), idāra 
(administering) and razzāqiyya (bestowment of sustenance).82 What is common in all 
these arguments is that God’s nature and attributes are shown to be absolute, as 
proven, for Nursi, by the scale of their effects vertically and horizontally across the 
universe. Nothing can penetrate the absoluteness of God’s pervasive activity, 
creativity and dominance of Creation. Since absoluteness has no need for an aide or 
partner, God’s nature and attributes require that He is one, unique and without equal. 
From universals of existence, Nursi proceeds to the other extreme of particulars and 
asserts that the particulars of existence demonstrate tawḥīd in two ways. First, the 
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benefits and purposes of Creation focus at the level of particulars of existence.83 The 
richest activity for divine purposes concentrates over physicality. Not only the 
diversity of divine blessings are delivered through physicality of particulars, but the 
seeds of human worship are also expressed through their experience at the level of 
physical particulars.84 Even though particulars are innumerable and diverse, such 
immaterial concentrations demonstrate tawḥīd. Second, even though there is a 
diversity of life and innumerable individuals of living beings, preservation of life in 
“the heart (seed and egg) of the fruits” of living beings as well as all human 
memories indicate a single act of preservation of a Wise Creator.85 
Therefore, with regard to its benefits, a fruit looks to its tree’s owner. With 
regard to its seed, it looks to all the parts, units, and nature of the tree. And with 
regard to the stamp on its face, which is similar on members of its species, it 
gazes on all fruits of the tree.86 
So, even though the multiplicity of particulars may seem to be unrelated at first sight, 
every entity points to the entire existence and God. Hence, there is a “truth of 
rubūbiyya al mutlaq (absolute governance)” encompassing the entire Creation 
rejecting any inclusion of causes.87 Nursi explains that, just as an orchard farmer is 
ultimately concerned with the harvest of fruits to the outermost branches, the Creator 
of the “tree of universe” has concentrated the fruits of the creative outcomes of his 
works in the details of Creation and the outermost layers of physicality, which is the 
realm of elements, plants, animals and humans. Surely, Nursi adds, if God is the 
Creator, He would not leave them to mere chance or causes. Moreover, the human 
recognition of God through belief and building relations with God through worship 
are higher purposes linked to the display of creativity. Surely, God would not ignore 
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the diversion of belief and worship to anyone other than Him, otherwise His entire 
creative activity would be rendered futile.88 This shows there is the “truth of ulūhiyya 
al-mutlaq (absolute divinity)” rejecting any partnership.89 
A distinctive pattern in Nursi’s proofs for the unity of God is that he covers all 
angles. He argues for tawḥīd from the universals to particulars of existence; from 
God’s nature to living beings in the world; and vertically and horizontally covers the 
entire universe. His arguments from ease of creation and interdependence of beings 
from the smallest to the largest planes of existence are original and compelling to 
illustrate that the universe is a whole, and the cause of the universe and its operation 
must be attributed to a single source. Nevertheless, an absolute monotheistic 
approach has its implications. 
5.5 Implications of Tawḥīd on Causality 
The way one God creates and exclusively governs the universe and every process 
therein raises significant theological implications. How does a single God create 
everything in the universe when there seems to be layers to existence and the 
creation of things occurs sequentially and tends to follow a predictable series of 
events in a causal relationship? What roles do causes have in the Islamic cosmology 
informed by tawḥīd? If causality is recognised, it seems to limit God’s power and 
governance. If it is denied, it appears to abnegate the observed order and sequence of 
events predictable by science.  
As early as the eighth century, Muslim theologians recognised these implications and 
formed a theological position that everything in the universe occurs through the 
active and direct power of God, while their Christian counterparts saw no issue in 
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maintaining that God acts through intermediate causes.90 For Muslim theologians, 
their position was consistent with the Qur’an that left no room for speculation and 
insisted that God is involved in everything from cosmic events to the falling of a 
leaf.91 It was Muslim philosophers who gave some room for causality in their pursuit 
to find a reasonable account for the universe and a Creator who acts behind veils. 
What transpired was a spectacular theological debate in medieval Islamic thought 
spanning across two centuries with the main contenders being al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, al-
Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd. 
Griffel contends the primary factor that led to this debate was the Ash’arī cosmology 
of occasionalism and the related concept of atomism.92 While concepts of atomism 
originated in the early Hellenistic philosophy, they were rejected by Aristotle and all 
later philosophers as well as Christian and Jewish theologians preceding Muslim 
scholars.93 Wolfson postulates the adoption of atomism by mutakallimūn 
(theologians) was due to its predilection to reject causality.94 Although al-Māturīdī 
was not very clear on the ontological structure of the world,95 as Cerić notes, he was 
definite in his repudiation of causality and the doctrine that God is continuous in the 
act of creating.96 Al-Ash’arī was more direct in setting the foundations of the 
theological conceptualisation of atomism. Atomism provided a cosmology to explain 
God’s involvement in the world behind the veil of things and apparent causes. For 
Ash’arite theologians, it preserved God’s full and absolute control over His creation 
and set a bulwark before philosophical encroachments to the omnipotence of God. 
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At the heart of the atomism and occasionalism cosmology lies the assumption that 
the smallest indivisible (lā yatajazza’u) particle, the atom,97 has two aspects. One 
aspect is the substance (jawhar) or essence, which is like an empty shell. It acquires 
attributes (singular ‘araḍ) that give it observable qualities (colour, odour, shape and 
others). At the moment of creation, God forms an association (ta’alluq) between the 
atom and its unique attributes. These associations are not permanent; they have to be 
created at every moment in time. If God wills it, He creates the association and its 
qualities differently from one moment to the next. So, the existence as perceived by 
humans is a series of occasions (like the frames of a movie) that are recreated at 
every moment anew. Because this creation occurs so fast, we perceive it as 
continuous succession of cause and effect. Since God is absolutely free and there is 
no necessity for God to create an occasion because of the previous one, one occasion 
does not cause another. It is purely God’s creation at every moment. So, there is no 
necessary reason (sabab) or cause (‘illa) for any effect. What is observed as 
consistent and predictable events is because God has a habitually consistent way of 
creating.98  
Muslim philosophers had a different approach. They aimed to explain marātib al-
mawjūdāt (hierarchy of beings), as al-Fārābī called it,99 and develop a cosmology that 
best explained causality and how God relates to His creation. Influenced by 
Neoplatonism, al-Fārābī was the first to develop an original synthesis of the 
hierarchy of intelligences100 corresponding with each sphere of beings where lower 
beings are caused by higher efficient causes.101 Al-Fārābī’s understanding of ‘cause’ 
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is Aristotelian and means “material, formal, efficient and final cause” resulting in the 
existence of a being. Al-Fārābī calls them primary sources (mabda’) and for him 
there are six – the First Cause, secondary causes, the active intellect, soul, form and 
matter.102 God, as the First Being, proceeds and emanates (fayḍ) by virtue of His 
overflowing goodness giving rise to the hierarchy of observed entities from cosmos 
to things on earth.103 
The main motive in al-Fārābī’s hierarchy of intelligences and emanation is an 
attempt to explain how an imperfect and dependent world originates from a perfect 
and self-sufficient God. It is built on Ptolemy’s (d. 165) geocentric cosmic model 
where the earth is the centre of the universe – sun, moon, five planets known at the 
time, sphere of fixed stars and tenth supreme sphere (falak al-aflāk) as the highest 
sphere of existence.104 Each sphere has a physical existence and a soul dominated by 
an intellect (‘aql). Each intellect causes the existence of its sphere, governs its 
movement and causes the existence of the next lower sphere.105 The key starting 
point is that the cosmos is an emanation from the Necessary Being who overflows 
(yafiḍ) in an act bounty (jūd) “giving rise to the first intellect.”106 With respect to the 
Necessary Being, al-Fārābī’ remarks, “one should believe this is God.”107 Hence, 
God is the First Cause and therefore the ultimate cause of the chain of emanations 
resulting in lower spheres and intellects.108 When the first intellect comprehends the 
Necessary Being, it brings about the second intellect, and when it comprehends itself, 
it generates the soul of the supreme sphere.109 The succession of emanations 
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continues where each intellect entails the next and their corresponding cosmic 
spheres until the lowest, the active intellect, is produced in the sublunary sphere 
where plants, animals and humans live. Everything on earth is produced by a 
combination of elements according to the characteristics defined by “substantive 
forms” emanating from the active intellect.110 About the nature of intellects, al-Fārābī 
remarks, “one should believe they are the angels.”111 
Ibn Sīnā further develops these ideas and places causality at the kernel of existence, 
“for everything occurring in motion, or everything composed of matter and form, 
there are existing causes,” he noted.112 For ibn Sīnā, God is distinguished with other 
efficient causes in that He is the First Cause and the essential cause (‘illa dhātiyya) 
connoting that the effects caused by God arise necessarily from His essence.113 All 
other secondary causes depend on their immediate higher sphere. Yet, there is also a 
necessary link between causes and conditions. If all conditions are assembled, the 
effect must immediately ensue, as is the case that cotton will necessarily burn if fire 
is brought near it.114  
In their cosmology, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā aim to link the origination of everything 
in the universe to God and develop a system for the explanation of the entire cosmos 
and its events.115 A distinctive feature of their thought is that causes had real effects 
even though they ultimately originated and therefore linked to the First Cause (God). 
Although their system of cosmology looks complete, logical and sound with the 
science of their time, it seems highly speculative and lacking clear support from the 
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Qur’an. The idea of a multiple hierarchy of intelligences appears to carry 
connotations of shirk and the notion of necessary emanation seems to abnegate the 
will of God. There is not much room for God’s active involvement in the world other 
than the initial generation of the first intellect. To be fair to ibn Sīnā, he 
acknowledges the absolute governance of God: 
In the world as a whole and in its parts, both upper and earthly, there is nothing 
which forms an exception to the fact that God is the cause (sabab) of its 
existence and origination and that God has knowledge of it, governs it, and wills 
its coming into being; it is all subject to His government (tadbīr), determination 
(taqdīr), knowledge and will.116 
Nevertheless, a theological response was inevitable and it came from al-Ghazālī. Al-
Ghazālī not only attempts to maintain the doctrine of pure tawḥīd, but he also tries to 
find an acceptable theological position to explain the order and predictability of 
events in the universe. Earlier Muslim theologians, including those from the 
Ash’arite school, developed the notion of ‘ādah (habit) – God acts consistently by 
way of habit and “repeated actions of God are performed by Him by causing the 
continuance of the habit (bi-ijrā’ al-’ādah).”117 Al-Ghazālī prefers to use the term 
sunnah (habitual way) synonymously with ‘ādah,118 most likely to embed the notion 
within the Qur’an’s use of the term.119 Al-Ghazālī explains that God has created in 
the human soul the knowledge that He will not make sudden unexpected changes to 
things around us (convert a book on a table to a boy, for example) although He is 
capable of doing so. When we see a pattern of past events repeated habitually (al-
’ādah), we are led to believe the same pattern will continue in the future.120 Yet, such 
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an observation does not exclude the involvement of other unseen causes. What 
guarantee can be given that parents of a child are the only efficient causes when there 
could be many hidden ones?121 He further explains that what is perceived as causes 
are actually conditions (shurūt) for the creation of a thing, “the creation of life is a 
condition for the creation of knowledge, not that knowledge is produced 
(yatawallad) by life.”122 Al-Ghazālī further elaborates that the conditions are in a 
concomitant relationship (iqtirān) with the produced effects.123 Concomitance is 
established by God “due to habitual course of things” and therefore can be broken by 
God. When cotton is brought near a fire it burns because of this concomitance, but it 
can be changed or reversed if God so willed.124  
Although none used the term ‘natural law,’ Muslim theologians’ descriptions of 
habits of God (sunnat Allah) give an explanation for the consistent patterns of 
creating and action by God and can be described as laws. There is one crucial 
difference between the concepts of a natural law as it is understood in science and the 
consistent patterns generated by habits of God. Unlike the concept of inalterable 
natural laws, in the notion of habits, there is no necessity that, for example, lack of 
food and drink should cause hunger. It just does so habitually.125 Muslim theologians 
were careful not to entrap God into a system of necessities,126 hence they firmly insist 
on the caveat that reversal of a causal relationship is possible if God wills it, but, in 
actuality, God does not change His habits with the exception of miracles. Miracles 
are simply God’s temporary suspension of the habitual exercise of His power to 
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support the mission of a prophet.127 The result is, as Goldziher contends, every 
natural phenomena is the creative outcome of a particular act rather than the 
consequence of a constant law.128  
Ibn Rushd made a one last dash in five counter-arguments against al-Ghazālī and 
theologians with similar denial of the efficacy of causes. First, for Ibn Rushd, denial 
of causes equates to denial of scientific knowledge and wisdom for “scientific 
knowledge (al-’ilm) is the knowledge of things by their causes and wisdom is the 
knowledge of invisible causes.”129 Second, since humans naturally desire knowledge, 
denial of causes would lead to the removal of something that is inseparably part of 
human nature.130 Third, Ibn Rushd asserts that denial of causality also negates the 
most critical premise of the cosmological argument for God – everything that begins 
must have a cause. If causality is removed, there is no way of “arriving at a 
knowledge for the existence of God.”131 Fourth, Ibn Rushd builds a complex 
argument on the accepted notion that atoms, therefore things, have essence and 
attributes. The essence of a thing is the cause of why things are different and prone to 
particular actions. He argues that from the essence of a thing, its nature, appropriate 
actions would proceed, and if no action proceeds, there would be no unity to the 
nature of a being. Since “being and unity are one and the same,” the denial of 
causality would lead to denial of the essence, which would result in the denial of 
unity and in the end result in “non-being,” which is absurd.132 In the fifth point, Ibn 
Rushd provides a counter-argument for the notion of the habit (‘adah) of God. He 
contests that, if it is said God acts habitually, it would entail He had also acquired the 
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habit of acting repeatedly “in the same way by His having acted in that same 
way.”133 This would mean habit (al-’adah) is a competence (malakah) developed in 
God after repetitive action. This would infer some change has occurred in God, an 
idea rejected by theologians and the Qur’an.134  
In the end, Watt, as with many historians of Islamic theology, maintains that Ibn 
Rushd had minimal influence in the Muslim world due to his failure to convince 
Muslim scholarship that philosophy had a place alongside normative textual 
theology.135 Griffel contrasts this view and contends that al-Ghazālī found a synthesis 
between Ibn Sina’s philosophy and Ash’arite theology to construct his own version 
of Islamic cosmology.136 This, in the end, resonated with scholarly circles and the 
Muslim masses effectively sidelining Ibn Rushd. 
5.6 Nursi’s Perspective on Causality 
Centuries later, Nursi joined the debate. Analysis of Nursi’s works demonstrates that 
he followed the normative Islamic theological line in giving no room for the 
effectiveness of causes in the world. During his discussion of the default argument 
for God (presented in the previous chapter), Nursi argues that causes cannot be 
responsible for purposeful and creative outcomes for “physical causes only bring 
matter together, they cannot produce something they do not possess.”137 Similar to al-
Ghazālī,138 the belief that causes have real effects, in Nursi’s view, leads to one of the 
most subtle forms of shirk. Hence, he touches on the subject matter of causality in 
numerous passages of his works usually in tandem with discussion on tawḥīd.  
                                                 
133 Ibid, 555. 
134 Ibid, 556.  
135 Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 119. 
136 Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, 11. 
137 Nursi, Lem’alar, 23rd Flash, Conclusion, 314. 
138 Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, 204. 
 254 
Nursi acknowledges that just about all effects in the universe appear to have been 
linked to causes, but this is a deception of human perception due to the apparent 
ordering of things.139 Closer examination, Nursi adds, reveals that causes do not have 
“real creative effects.”140 To explain why humans perceive an effective relationship 
between a cause and an effect, Nursi focuses on the Ghazālian concept of iqtirān 
(concomitance). In Nursi’s usage, iqtirān means the co-existence of two or more 
entities at the same time and place for a creative outcome to be produced.141 Since the 
non-existence of a single thing can sometimes appear to stop an effect or the addition 
of a thing can seem to start a process, people wrongly associate that single thing as 
the operative cause (‘illa). In reality, for something to emerge, numerous ingredients 
(muqaddamāt) and conditions (shurūt) are required to co-exist at the same time.142 
For instance, a man can cause the destruction of a whole garden by not opening the 
irrigation valve. Yet, the harvest can only be produced with the timely assembly of 
numerous other ingredients and conditions in addition to water supplied by 
irrigation.143  
Even if the right conditions are met and all ingredients are assembled, they are not 
sufficient to produce the effect, for the effect is a creative outcome that requires the 
will and power of God.144 After quoting verse 39:62,145 Nursi makes the statement 
“when we look at the cause and effect in everything in the universe, we see that the 
greatest of causes do not have sufficient power to produce the least of effects.”146 
There is an observable inconsistency between causes that are exceedingly ordinary 
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and powerless, and the effects that are remarkably valuable and artful.147 Nursi 
provides evidence to support his observation. Among all causes, the human being is 
the most capable cause with a far-reaching will and widespread capacity to act. Yet, 
even with the most obvious of all human actions of eating, thinking and speech, the 
portion belonging to humans is negligible.148 When the act of eating is considered, 
the only conscious parts are the choice of food and act of chewing. Whereas eating 
involves hundreds of successive actions, from digestion to how the nutrients are 
separated and used in cells, to finally generate the nutritional benefits. In a separate 
passage, Nursi adds the human memory as a “miracle of power” that cannot be 
attributed to the folding of the brain cortex, neurons or atoms in the brain, yet the 
human memory is capable of recording an immense library of data from childhood to 
old age.149 Similarly, the human part in the act of speech is negligibly small. So, in 
the most basic human functions and actions, as a great cause, the human part is a 
negligible ingredient in the final effect, proving that causes do not generate the 
effects.  
Nursi’s main argument hinges on two key premises. First, for a creative outcome to 
emerge, many conditions, elements and other constituting parts must assemble 
together to produce an effect. So, it cannot be attributed to a single cause, but a 
collection of causes. This is a Ghazālian idea and not unique to Nursi. What is unique 
to Nursi is the second premise. The collection of causes produce a synergistic effect 
(Nursi calls it ījādī, creative) where the value and art displayed in the effect is far 
greater than sum of its individual parts. For Nursi, this difference cannot be 
explained by anything material. Hence, the effect cannot be attributed even to a 
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complete collection of causes. Therefore, there must be a purposeful will, knowledge 
and power for all effects to be created and this can only be attributed to God.  
In the 22nd Word, after defining the two types of tawḥīd, Nursi clarifies where 
causality fits in a tawḥīd-centric cosmology. He states, divine “dignity (‘izza) and 
majesty (‘aẓama) demand that causes are a veil to the hand of (divine) power in the 
view of reason, while unity (tawḥīd) and glory (jalāl) demand that causes withdraw 
their hands from the true effect.”150 This explanation is worded in a way to appeal to 
a believer seeking to understand why causes exist at all if God is the real actor 
behind everything. The statement has two parts. In the first part, Nursi assigns a role 
for causes. They are required to veil God’s dignity and majesty as sometimes humans 
can attribute something evil or ugly to God due to their narrow and subjective 
perspective. Diseases and the angel of death are veils to God as the real actor of 
taking lives so people do not blaspheme against God in sorrow.151 Causes are also 
required for humans to understand the laws of nature as a reflection of God’s order of 
the universe, and harness them for their benefit.152 In the second part of the statement, 
Nursi negates causes in having any creative power. Ultimately, all power giving rise 
to creative effects comes from God.153  
In explaining how God’s power shows its effect on the physical universe, Nursi 
poses the analogy of a mirror. Just like a mirror has two sides, one side shiny and 
transparent while the other side is coloured and opaque, the reality of existence has 
two facets: mulk (manifest world) and malakūt (inner unseen world).154 The mulk 
aspect of existence is what is observed and where all things perceived as causes 
                                                 
150 Ibid, 22nd Word, 1st Station, 1st Flash, 392. 
151 Ibid, 393. 
152 Nursi, Lem’alar, 16th Flash, Conclusion, 195. 
153 Nursi, Sozler, 22nd Word, 1st Station, 1st Flash, 390. 
154 Ibid, 391. 
 257 
reside. It is opaque and coloured, and can have different states of appearance.155 It is 
where opposites such as beauty–ugliness, good–evil and large–small merge to 
generate degrees of things to human perception. Since such mergers often confuse 
the human mind to see this face as ordinary and inappropriate, they require causes to 
veil God’s dignity and majesty.156 At the same time, there are four things that do not 
require causes to veil them – existence, light, life and compassion – for they are pure 
and free from wrong perceptions. Nursi gives the example of rain as an expression of 
compassion. Although how rain forms in clouds is postulated by science, it is not 
entirely understood. There is no scientific law that can predict when it will rain for it 
is an expression of God’s compassion to His creatures. Predictions of rain through 
instruments and the science of meteorology is only a forecast after some signs have 
emerged. Otherwise, rain cannot be predicted as precisely as the rising and setting of 
the sun.157 Similarly, coming into existence (wujūd) is purely good hence attributed 
to God, while all evil is caused by non-existence of essential elements for existence 
to occur.158 A building, for example, only exists together with all of its constituting 
parts. If one essential part is missing, it will collapse.159 Since causes are not linked 
with these four entities, existence, light, life and compassion, there are no laws to 
explain their existence and science cannot predict their occurrence.160 His main point 
is that no cause has the properties to produce these four things and therefore cannot 
be attributed to them. Nursi’s assertion that ‘existence, light, life and compassion do 
not have causes’ is interesting and would be good to examine in more detail. 
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The malakūt aspect of existence, although unseen, is where God’s power acts 
directly. Just like the transparent and shiny side of the mirror, in this face, everything 
is pure, beautiful, fair and good.161 There is no need for “gathering of causes” or 
“ordering of causes” to produce an effective outcome. Hence, for Nursi, causes are 
only apparent in the visible universe; they have no part in the reality of malakūt, the 
inner dimensions of existence.162  
Nursi’s distinction is aimed not at proving such a reality, but to reconcile the contrast 
between the human perception of causes before an effect happens and the need to 
explain how God would govern all affairs in the universe without being seen. 
Importantly, as indicated with the mirror analogy, in Nursi’s cosmology, there is only 
a thin veil between what is seen and the unseen dimension of existence where God’s 
power is in a constant act of creativity. Nursi does not see the need to get involved in 
the layers of intelligences of Ibn Sina and the occasionalism of Ash’arī theology to 
deal with a universe that is entirely governed by God without the need for causes. 
Nursi says Creation could only occur in two ways: ‘ibda as instantaneous original 
creation from nothing (Tr. hiçten) or insha as creation by composition from existing 
matter over time.163 Even though something does not exist physically, it does exist 
within the sphere of God’s knowledge. Qadar, the title of divine knowledge, 
determines an immaterial blueprint for everything.164 In this respect, they could not 
be considered absolutely non-existent before coming into existence in the 
phenomenal world. In the case of ‘ibda, the all-pervasive divine power and command 
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kun fa yakūn (be and it is),165 could then instantly originate over those blueprints “as 
easily as lighting a match” or appear as suddenly as “rubbing a chemical would 
expose a text written in invisible ink.”166 In the case of insha, a being could easily 
form by the composition of atoms according to the immaterial blueprint obeying the 
qadarī laws and all-pervasive power of God, similar to a trained army at rest would 
easily gather in formation by the call of a trumpet, signalling the authority and power 
of the commander, and in accordance with military rules.167 If existence is not 
attributed to an omniscient and omnipotent God and instead attributed to multiple 
hands, nature or causes, Nursi asserts, everything becomes exceedingly difficult to 
produce.168 This would mean there cannot be an immaterial blueprint (in knowledge) 
to model the existence of things. When there is no blueprint to work with, the 
apparent (zāhirī) nothingness becomes absolute (mutlaq) nothingness and “absolute 
nothingness can never be the source of any existence.”169 Hence, creation by ‘ibda 
would be impossible for anything other than God. Insha would be exceedingly 
difficult, for without immaterial blueprints, one has to accept the operation of 
thousands of physical templates over the tiny body of an insect, for example.170  
There are two important distinctions to these notions. First, as Turner underscores, 
what Nursi means by ‘ibda, the original creation from nothing (creation ex nihilo), is 
not “transforming nothing into existence,” as Nursi views this as logical 
impossibility.171 Rather, Nursi means that something that has never existed in a 
physical form but existed within the sphere of God’s knowledge, is brought to 
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existence instantly for the first time. It would be fair to assume that, for Nursi, 
although material existence is according to a template, the atoms and features of the 
entity would be formed into existence rather than collected from existing atoms. 
Second, Nursi recognises that the compositional creation, insha, also occurs over the 
immaterial blueprints, but with the difference that the formation of the entities occurs 
through the gathering of atoms over time and according to certain laws. The idea of 
an immaterial blueprint in divine knowledge is interesting. One indication of their 
existence would be the mathematical nature of the natural laws. Nursi makes this 
connection and says that mathematics in the universe is a reflection of God’s name 
Muqaddir (Determiner).172 
Significantly, Nursi does not completely deny the role of causes or state they should 
be ignored. As indicated before, he sees causes and ordering of causes as essential 
for humans to understand the laws of nature, God’s pattern of action and harness 
them for human benefit in technology.173 Further, adhering to causes is actually a 
type of prayer, which Nursi calls active prayer. Gathering of causes by human 
activity does not create the outcome, but acts as taking an active position to beseech 
God for the creation of the effect. Ploughing soil knocks on the door of the treasures 
of mercy, for this type of active prayer ensures no essential ingredient for the 
creation of effect is missed, but the final creative result is left to God. Nursi makes 
the point that the One of Absolute Generosity (Jawad al-Mutlaq) generally accepts 
active prayer.174 The notion of active prayer is interesting and can serve as an 
important concept for believers in avoiding the inaction of fatalism and arrogance of 
materialism. 
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5.7 How can One God Create and Govern the Universe? 
An important outcome of tawḥīd, as understood and argued by Nursi, is that 
everything depends on God’s will and power at all times no matter how insignificant 
it may be. Nursi recognises this doctrine has two important theological implications 
soliciting an explanation. First, since there are innumerable things and events in the 
universe, how does one God govern everything at all times?175 While the human 
mind may think such governance is difficult, the observation is that creation occurs 
“effortlessly, quickly, directly and without contact.”176 As Nursi puts it, this is one of 
the most significant tricks of the mind to reject God,177 as the mind sees an apparent 
contradiction.178 Moreover, Nursi quotes the following verses to highlight the 
Qur’anic claim that to God’s power there is no difficulty:179 
The creation of you all and the resurrection of you all is but like (the creation 
and resurrection of) a single soul for, verily, God is all-hearing, all-seeing.180  
 
When He wills a thing to be, He but says to it “Be!” and it is. So, All-Glorified 
is He in Whose Hand is the absolute dominion of all things, and to Him you are 
being brought back.181 
 
The advent of the Last Hour will be like the twinkling of an eye, or closer 
still.182  
Ultimately, Nursi rhetorically asks about the wisdom and mystery of this ease in 
creation.183 
Nursi begins his reconciliation of the ease in creation and seeming difficulty of its 
administration by stating, “The relation of divine power is according to laws, that is, 
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it applies equally to many and few, large and small.”184 He gives seven analogies to 
show one source can easily achieve many things at the same time and how certain 
tasks that look difficult may be carried out easily.  
First, by the mystery of luminosity (Tr. şeffafiyet), the sun can appear in a small 
bubble or an entire ocean effortlessly at the same time.185 If the sun had volition and 
reflected its light wilfully, reflection of its light on a single transparent particle would 
be as easy as reflection on the entire earth.186 Second, by the mystery of 
responsiveness (muqabala), a person with a candle, placed in the centre of a circle 
made up of people holding mirrors, would be able to reflect the light to all people 
and their mirrors by virtue of being in the centre of the circle.187 Third, by the 
mystery of systemic order (intizām), a child cam move a small boat and a large ocean 
liner with the same effort.188 Fourth, by the mystery of obedience (imtithal), a 
commander can march a solider and the entire army with the same command.189  
Fifth, by the mystery of balance (Tr. muvazene), very large but sensitive scales can 
weigh two walnuts or two large objects equally.190 If two particles or two stars equal 
in weight are placed in each of the scales, a small exertion or force on one scale 
would easily move it.191 Sixth, by the mystery of abstraction (Tr. tecerrüt), an 
essence free from individuality can enter into everything large or small without 
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difficulty. A very small fish has the same essence of being a fish as a whale, or a 
microbe has the same animate essence as a rhinoceros.192 
Nursi applies these analogies to God’s power and governance. He contends that 
divine power manifests luminously and hence omnipresent and omnipotent. The 
innermost nature of matter in unseen dimensions (malakūt) is transparent where it 
receives the omnipresent divine power without difficulty. There are also systems 
ingrained in the universe making things easier to accomplish. Matter and things also 
are absolutely obedient to divine commands that manifest to human perception as 
natural laws. Furthermore, like the scales analogy, existence and non-existence of 
things are equally possible and a slight effort could easily tip them over to 
existence.193 
For Nursi, the response of the creation to divine power and commands is not just 
absolute, the essence of everything and the way the universe is engineered also play a 
part. Everything has a tendency to seek its point of perfection.194 This tendency 
multiplies to needs, and those needs magnify to strong passion. Such tendencies, 
needs and passions are like seeds and qualities that enable matter and Creation to 
respond to the divine laws of creation.195 Furthermore, Nursi compares the universe 
to a majestic oak tree in its design and operation where thousands of fruits and 
millions of seeds are exposed to a simultaneous act of artistic creation.196 The core 
laws of the tree’s formation is present in its roots and trunk through the network of 
branches and interdependencies of systems. The operation of all of these is made 
possible by the presence of a manifestation of divine will – which can be called the 
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spark of life – present in every branch, leaf, fruit and seed. Through the systems in 
the tree and presence of the spark of life, countless actions involved in the growth of 
the tree and maintenance of its life are performed simultaneously, without one thing 
obstructing another and nothing being neglected.197 Nursi concludes, in a similar 
way, God has total disposal over the tree of the universe and He governs everything 
simultaneously and effortlessly. Divine laws of creation show their effect everywhere 
at the same time and the creative processes are facilitated through a network of 
interdependencies across the universe.198  
Nursi’s explanations show the most effective use of analogies. Nursi poses his use of 
analogies as one of the most important reasons why his works are influential and 
effective in dealing with difficult theological problems. He maintains that analogies 
act like a “telescope that brings distant truths closer” to understanding.199 He adds the 
beauty and power of his works are “flashes from the analogies of the Qur’an” and his 
only share is that he felt great need for them.200 Nursi also anticipates the objection 
that analogical reasoning does not always lead to certain knowledge. There is a type 
of analogical reasoning, Nursi responds, that is far stronger and indicates more 
certainty than logical syllogism for “it demonstrates the tip of a universal truth by 
means of a partial comparison and constructs its judgement on that truth.”201 It 
demonstrates, Nursi adds, a law encapsulated within that universal truth enabling 
understanding of the complete truth and application of the universal law to 
particulars.202 By the analogy of the sun and how its luminosity propagates, a law of a 
truth is demonstrated that “light and luminosity cannot be restricted as for them 
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distance and proximity are the same, many and few are equal, and space cannot limit 
them.”203 The analogy of the tree – with its numerous leaves and fruits growing by 
virtue of one root and trunk system and the application of a single law – 
demonstrates the tip of a truth that, like the tree, “the majestic universe, too, displays 
and is the field of operation of that law of truth and mystery of Divine Oneness.”204 
Nursi is able to maintain the requirements of tawḥīd where God is absolute and the 
disposer of all affairs and at the same time satisfy the mind of any perceived 
difficulty of one God disposing all affairs. Nursi’s explanations are original 
contributions to Islamic theology and understanding of tawḥīd. No other theologian 
saw these as a problem and then tackled them head on to produce theological and 
rational explanations.  
5.8 Conclusion 
Considering tawḥīd is the central tenet of Islamic faith, Nursi’s extensive 
deliberations are not surprising. In his theological-oriented Islamic revival, a deeper 
and more profound understanding of tawḥīd plays a crucial role. In that respect, 
Nursi underscores his central aim of reconstructing the metaphysical fortress of Islam 
and collective consciousness of Muslims, in his view, heavily battered from a 
thousand years of intellectual and spiritual onslaught. A key evidence of his approach 
is seen in the way Nursi defines tawḥīd as ordinary tawḥīd and true tawḥīd. In his 
definition of true tawḥīd, Nursi combines a direct witnessing of the imprints of God’s 
power and governance on every object, and hence gains a perpetual awareness of 
God. He considers true tawḥīd as a worship of faith (‘ibada al-īmāniyya) and links it 
to happiness in this world and the next. 
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In proving the unity of God, Nursi generally follows the two main arguments of the 
classical Muslim theologians – proof of divine administration, dalil al-tadbīr, and 
proof of mutual hindrance, dalil al-tamanu’. Nursi only briefly touches on the 
tamanu’ argument in his characteristic aversion of purely logical and philosophical 
arguments. Nursi greatly expands on the classic tadbīr argument. A distinctive 
pattern in Nursi’s proofs for the unity of God is that he covers all angles. He argues 
for tawḥīd from the universals to particulars of existence; from God’s nature to living 
beings in the world; and vertically and horizontally covering the entire universe. His 
arguments for ease of creation and interdependence of beings from the smallest to the 
largest planes of existence are original and compelling to illustrate that the universe 
is a whole, and the cause of the universe and its operation must be attributed to a 
single source. Considering the fact that Ash’arite theology mainly focuses on the 
tamanu’ argument, while Maturidite theology focuses on a wide array of arguments 
but mainly the tadbīr argument, Nursi approaches more to the Maturidite theological 
line with respect to the proofs of God’s unity. 
Another indicator of Nursi slanting towards the Maturidite end of the theological 
spectrum is his avoidance of the trademark Ash’arite theology of occasionalism. 
Nursi does not see the need to get involved in the layers of intelligences of Ibn Sina 
or the occasionalism of Ash’arī theology to deal with a universe that is entirely 
governed by God without the need for causes. However, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter, he says God continually manifests His names over the mirror of 
creation. In this sense, he embraces the Qur’anic concept of the ‘kun’ command of 
God being responsible for all creation. For Nursi, reconciling this with the reality of 
the observed world is the most important theological aim in relation to understanding 
tawḥīd. He exerts considerable effort in finding this reconciliation through the 
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creative use of analogies. Nursi makes significant original theological contributions 
in his explanations of how one God can easily create and govern the entire universe.  
Analysis of Nursi’s works demonstrates that he followed the normative Islamic 
theological line on their view of causality, in that causality is a deception of senses. 
Similar to al-Ghazālī, a consistent theme in Nursi’s works is that belief in the 
effectiveness of causality leads to a subtle form of shirk. Hence, he touches on the 
subject matter of causality in numerous passages of his works usually in tandem with 
discussions on tawḥīd. Although he repeats some of al-Ghazālī’s arguments, his 
explanations are unique and easy to grasp. An original contribution of Nursi in 
showing the ineffectiveness of causality is the main argument that an effect has far 
greater value and art than the sum of all causes required to create them. Hence, they 
cannot be just attributed to causes and God’s will and power is at work behind a thin 
veil of existence.  
Importantly, Nursi does not completely deny or ignore the role of causes. For 
believers to appreciate the grand design of the cosmos, Nursi clarifies where 
causality fits in a tawḥīd -centric cosmology. Causality is important to veil God’s 
dignity and majesty; therefore it has a place as long as no creative power is attributed 
to causes as required by God’s unity and glory. Causes are also required for humans 
to understand the laws of nature as a reflection of God’s order of the universe, and 
harness them for their benefit. He qualifies adhering to causes as an active prayer that 
is more likely to be accepted than a traditional verbal prayer. 
Nursi is able to maintain the requirements of tawḥīd where God is absolute and the 
disposer of all affairs and at the same time satisfy a believer’s mind of any perceived 
difficulty of one God disposing all affairs. No other theologian saw these as a 
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problem and then tackled them head on to produce theological and rational 
explanations making original contributions to Islamic theology and understanding of 
tawḥīd. One area that is the testing ground of this approach is the locus where God’s 
relation to Creation and humans relating to God intersect. This will be tackled in the 
next chapter. 
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6 X 
CHAPTER 6: MA’RIFAT ALLAH – KNOWING AND 
RELATING TO GOD 
6.1 Introduction 
The third key theological question about God follows naturally from the previous 
two – if God exists, is one in divinity and governs the universe at every instant, how 
should humans relate to God? The theological response to this question determines 
the way humans develop an understanding of and experience God in their everyday 
spiritual lives. The response is invariably associated with the transcendence–
imminence problem. If God is transcendent, beyond space and time, He is rendered 
unreachable, hence relating to Him becomes exceedingly difficult. In faith traditions 
emphasising the absolute transcendence of God, divine intermediaries inevitably 
appear to cover the gap between God and humans who are bound by space and time, 
yet yearn to feel God’s presence in their lives. Conversely, emphasis on His 
imminence and accessibility leads to tendencies to anthropomorphise God into 
worldly images or make Him part of the universe. Is it possible to avoid both? 
The Islamic theological response to the transcendence–imminence problem has been 
addressed by two main disciplines: kalām (theology) and tasawwuf (Sufism).1 The 
cynosure of the theologians was to determine God’s attributes and establish how they 
were related to His essence. For theologians, the nature of God was at stake, hence 
they focused on the preservation of His unity with multiple attributes to be consistent 
with the Qur’an rather than a detailed exposition of God’s names and attributes or the 
direct experience of God. This approach seemed appropriate for the context in which 
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scholars like Al-Ash’arī and Al-Māturīdī wrote on theology as a response to the 
anthropomorphic representations of Mushabbiha (anthropomorphists) and the 
rationalistic doctrines of Mu’tazilites. They aimed to maintain tawḥīd and avoid 
shirk. The inevitable implication of this emphasis was to limit the experience of God 
to abstraction of thought. 
In contrast, Muslim mystics (Sufis) primarily inculcated the notion that the way to 
attain closeness to God was through a deep knowledge of God achieved through 
religious practices and spiritual experiences, leading to a simple ascetic life rather 
than abstract and highly rational explanations of God’s nature and attributes. 
Although spiritually fulfilling for initiates, this approach drew criticism for being 
highly subjective and open to controversial notions that appear to violate tawḥīd. 
Nursi’s aversion of theological abstractions was established in the previous chapters. 
He is equally distant to approaches and terminology of Sufism, as illustrated in 
Chapter 2. Navigating between the two disciplines, Nursi argues that the Qur’an 
presents God as transcendent and imminent at the same time, giving immediate close 
access without violating God’s unity and transcendence. God is transcendent in His 
essence, but imminent in the way He reflects His asma al-ḥusna (beautiful divine 
names) on the cosmos, the earth and every entity of God’s Creation. Notwithstanding 
the role of devotional practices, the key approach in relating to God at a theological 
level is to realise knowledge of God through contemplation of His names and 
attributes as reflected in the universe. Nursi also maintains that, while almost all faith 
traditions broadly agree on the existence and unity of God (or Godhead), the main 
theological differences stem from each faith’s response to the fundamental question 
of how humans should relate to God. Shirk in belief and controversial doctrines of 
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mysticism emerge from varying ways of relating to God. In short, Nursi contends the 
Qur’anic approach delivers the benefits of theology and Sufism while simultaneously 
avoiding the risks. Although traditionally ma’rifat Allah (knowledge of God) was 
seen to fit within the realm of mysticism, Nursi strips it from being purely spiritual 
concept and makes it part of theology. This is one of the main trusts of Nursi and one 
of his main original contributions to Islamic theology. 
6.2 Knowledge of God in Classical Islamic Theology 
In classical Islamic theology, there are three main themes with respect to the nature 
and knowledge of God – the relationship of God’s attributes (sifāt) to divine essence 
(dhāt); how one understands and interprets Qur’anic expressions that would lead to 
anthropomorphism if taken literally; and the list of accepted attributes of God, 
particularly similarities and differences between the mainstream theological schools 
of al-Ash’arī and al-Māturīdī.  
An examination of classical scholarship reveals intense debate around the definition 
and conceptualisation of dhāt and sifāt.2 Nader El-Bizri underscores this discourse 
for its implications on the dialectical concepts of unity–plurality and sameness–
otherness.3 These discussions also have significant implications for Islam’s strictly 
monotheistic position as well as the transcendent–imminent problem. The main 
debate transpired between the two mainstream Sunni schools and their antagonists, 
the Mu’tazilites. Mu’tazilites insist the attributes of God have “no existence 
distinguishable to His essence, but rather emanated from the essence of God;”4 God 
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speaks, for instance, through His essence (dhāt), and God’s speech only exists at the 
time of speaking.5 God is “knowing without possessing knowledge; powerful with 
possessing power” and so on.6 What drives Mu’tazilites to these conclusions is their 
concern that recognising attributes separate to God’s essence leads to 
anthropomorphism and affirming multiplicity in God’s essence.7 Their position, they 
claimed, has no inference of plurality in the essence of God nor the consequence of 
“existence of numerous eternals and necessarily existent beings.”8 The only 
complication is the Qur’an is replete with expressions describing God with qualities 
that are deemed as attributes. Mu’tazilites explain that attributes do not exist in 
reality, but such Qur’anic expressions are a mechanism to facilitate “human 
comprehension” of God.9 
Sunni theologians were alarmed and insisted this position contradicted clear verses of 
the Qur’an and charged Mu’tazilites with deviation. A correct theology had to be 
consistent with the Qur’an and Sunnah for it to be deemed Islamic and not mere 
speculation. Hence, God’s attributes had to be affirmed. Further, they argued the 
Mu’tazalite explanations were absurd. Taftazānī contended the Mu’tazilite argument 
was like saying “a thing is black but there is no blackness in it.”10 At the same time 
though, Sunni theologians realised, if they were to contemplate divine attributes as 
separate to God, it would lead to separation of God into entities resulting in shirk. 
They explained: when a ‘knowledgeable person’ enters a room, it is not said 
‘knowledge entered the room’ nor it is said ‘knowledge and the person entered the 
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room’.11 Hence, Sunni theologians held a suprarational view – God’s attributes (sifāt) 
are neither His essence (‘ayn dhātihī) nor other than His essence (ghayr dhātihī).12 
Further, Sunni theologians precisely insisted that God’s attributes are eternal at all 
times. God is a creator whether He is creating or not; God has the attribute of speech 
eternally whether He is speaking or not.13 They did not see any element of shirk in 
presenting God’s attributes as eternal. Taftazānī explains:  
There is no absurdity in the eternity of the possible [attributes] if this eternity 
subsists in the essence of the Eternal, is necessarily existent in Him, and is not 
separated (munfasil) from Him. Not every eternal is a god, so the existence of a 
number of gods is not implied from the existence of eternal [attributes]. We 
must rather say that God taken with His attributes is eternal.14  
Interestingly, both the Mu’tazilites and their Sunni counterparts claim to vehemently 
preserve the central tenet of tawḥīd. The significance of the discussion is that it 
highlights the importance of tawḥīd to the Islamic creed and the extent to which early 
scholars went to defend it. 
The second major area of discourse in the classical Islamic theology with respect to 
knowing God has been the discussion on various Qur’anic expressions that would 
lead to anthropomorphism if taken literally. When encountering Qur’anic verses such 
as, “your Lord’s Face forever remains,”15 “I created with My own hands”16 and “The 
Compassionate, Who sat on the Throne,”17 it is difficult to determine how 
successfully anthropomorphism can be avoided. In many verses, the Qur’an also 
refers to God as speaking, hearing and seeing as well as attributing qualities such as 
                                                 
11 Ibn Yusuf, Imam Abu Hanifa’s al-Fiqh al-Akbar Explained, 75. 
12 Yusuf, introduction, 20. 
13 Ibn Yusuf, Imam Abu Hanifa’s al-Fiqh al-Akbar Explained, 72. 
14 Al-Taftazani, A Commentary on the Creed of Islam, 50. 
15 Qur’an 55:27. 
16 Qur’an 38:75. 
17 Qur’an 20:5. 
 274 
wrath, mercy and patience.18 While the anthropomorphist Hashawiyya sect believed 
God literally had limbs and organs, Muta’zilites maintained the polar opposite that 
literal understanding of these expressions equated to idolatry. They insisted such 
expressions must be understood metaphorically, ‘hand’ should be interpreted as 
power, ‘seeing’ as knowledge and ‘face’ as the grace of God.19 
Sunni theologians also thought it was theologically precarious to give literal 
meanings. They explained the Qur’an also had expressions of incomparability 
(tanzīh), such as “and comparable to Him there is none”20 and “there is nothing 
whatever like Him,”21 that prevent a literal understanding of the earlier verses. In 
their view, the Mu’tazilite approach of purely associating metaphorical meanings 
was equally wrong as it limited the meanings of these expressions through 
interpretive fixation. The immediate Sunni approach was that of caution and 
followed a position described as tafwīd (consignment) – accept these expressions as 
they are revealed in the Qur’an bilā kayf (without how); that is, consign their true 
meaning to God without interpretation.22  
There were, however, nuances in the classical Sunni theology. As early as the eighth 
century, Abu Hanifa broke from the absolute tafwīd position and called expressions 
as special “attributes of God” without explaining what those attributes connoted.23 
Al-Ash’arī refused to confirm denotations “of God’s hand or face are either 
corporeal members or mere metaphors.”24 Notwithstanding al-Ash’arī and other 
Sunni theologians supporting tafwīd, they have also written about the need for ta’wīl 
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(interpretation).25 The dictum of tafwīd was not satisfactory for later generations as it 
restricted legitimate interpretation of the Qur’an and understanding of God. Al-
Māturīdī and al-Juwaynī forcibly argued the same words and expressions are used 
elsewhere in the Qur’an and they are freely interpreted. There is nothing that should 
prevent their interpretation when used in association with God.26 Ibn Daqiq al-’Id (d. 
1302) followed a middle ground saying, “ta’wīl of these attributes are acceptable if 
the meaning is close to the popular usage (takhatub).”27 Ibn al-Humām (d. 1457) 
followed a situational approach – if people misunderstand, then ta’wil should be 
done so people are not allowed to deviate, otherwise they should be left alone.28 
The third main subject matters of discussion in classical Islamic theology has been 
the list of God’s attributes and their descriptions. There has been remarkable 
agreement in this respect within the majority and mainstream Sunni theology. 
Attributes of God are usually listed in three groups. The first is the personal attribute 
(sifat al-nafsiyya) and there is only one: the Existence (wujūd).29 Al-Ash’arī said 
wujūd is the same as the dhāt (essence) of God, while Rāzi and other scholars 
maintained wujūd was an added description.30 The second group of attributes are the 
five negating attributes (sifāt al-salbiyya) as they negate attribution of their opposite 
to God – self-subsistence (qiyam bi-nafsihī), oneness (wahdāniyya), beginningless 
(qidam), endlessness (baqa’) and unlike the creation (mukhalafatun li-l hawādith).31 
The third group of attributes are called the affirmative attributes (sifāt al-
                                                 
25 Lo Polito, Tawhid, Transcendence and Immanence, 25. 
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thubūtiyya)32 and there are eight in total. The seven agreed upon between all Sunni 
theologians and schools are – life (hayāt), knowledge (‘ilm), will (irāda), power 
(qudra), hearing (sama’), sight (basar) and speech (kalām).33  
There is a difference of opinion on the attribute of creating (takwīn), which the 
Māturīdī School adds as the eighth affirmative attribute. The Ash’arī school holds 
that takwīn is an association (ta’alluq) of the attribute of power with a particular 
effect (athar). While the attribute of power is eternal, the associations and 
subsequent effects are created, hence takwīn cannot be an attribute as this would lead 
to associating eternity to created beings (mukawwan).34 The Māturīdī school 
responds saying the attribute of takwīn is eternal, but its associations and effects are 
created just like the attribute of knowledge is eternal, while what is known 
(ma’lūmāt) is created.35 Māturīdī scholars add that, if takwīn is originated, then it 
would mean another takwīn originated it. The second takwīn would need a third 
takwīn and so on leading to an infinite regress unless an eternal takwīn is accepted.36 
Scholars generally say the difference is semantics as both schools acknowledge God 
as the sole creator and disposer of the affairs of the universe, and that attributes of 
God are eternal.37 
So, classical Islamic theology mainly focuses on God’s attributes – the affirmation of 
attributes in relation to God’s essence, the list of agreed upon attributes and how to 
correctly understand expressions used for God in the Qur’an without violating His 
transcendence. In fairness to theologians, they stress every believer is charged with 
                                                 
32 These attributes are also called sifāt al-ma’āni (entitative attributes) or sifāt al-wujūdiyya 
(existential attributes). Irrespective of how they are termed, the list does not change. 
33 Farfūr, Definitive Proof in the Study of Theology, 83. 
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35 Ibid, 84. 
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37 Ibid, 76. 
 277 
the duty to acquire knowledge (ma’rifa) of God and faith must be based on certain 
knowledge instead of imitation (taqlīd).38 Nevertheless, they did not emphasise the 
names of God nor is there detailed discussion on the way humans should understand 
and relate to God. It is no surprise that these theological matters escape most 
ordinary Muslims who need to relate to God in their everyday life and why Muslim 
mystics find the kalām discourse on God less than satisfying. 
6.3 Ma’rifa – Knowing God through Spiritual Experience 
In contrast to kalām theology, Islamic mysticism (Sufism) focused on the 
relationship with and experience of God rather than abstractions of theology. Muslim 
mystics not only wanted to practice Islam and form correct beliefs, but they insisted a 
Muslim must also be aware of “God’s presence in all things” to correctly relate to 
God.39 This ideal is encapsulated in the concept of ihsān defined by the Prophet as 
“to worship God as if you see Him. Even if you do not see Him, God sees you.”40 
Muslim mystics insisted the presence of God can be seen with the eye of the heart to 
the extent God reveals Himself.41 A framework for a complete understanding and 
relating to God is usually expressed in Sufi literature with three linked concepts – 
imān-billah (belief in the existence and unity of God), ma’rifat-allah (knowledge of 
God) and muhabbat-allah (love of God). The inference is, as belief in God matures, 
it will give the fruits of knowledge and love of God.  
The most notable of the three is ma’rifat-allah, a notion matured over time. 
Annemarie Schimmel suggests it was Dhū’n-Nūn Misrī (796-859) who first 
formulated a distinctive theory of ma’rifa as the intuitive knowledge of God as 
                                                 
38 Ahmad ibn al-Bashir al-Qalawi al-Shinqiti, Islam in the School of Medina: A Commentary on Ibn 
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39 Murata and Chittick, The Vision of Islam, 246. 
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opposed to a knowledge unveiled through spiritual experience.42 Previously, ma’rifa 
was included under the umbrella of ‘ilm, which comprised rational and revealed 
knowledge.43 A frequently cited hadith qudsī44 in Sufi (tasawwuf) literature – “I was 
a hidden treasure and I loved to be known, so I created the world”45 coupled with the 
verse, “I have not created the jinn and humankind but to (know and) worship Me”46 – 
form the basis of the Sufi teaching that God reveals Himself through the cosmos, and 
the purpose of human beings is to know and worship God.47 
Al-Muhāsibī classified knowledge into three categories – knowledge of lawful and 
unlawful; understanding of matters pertaining to afterlife; and ma’rifa. While the 
first two are attainable through study, intellect and reflection (tafakkur), ma’rifa can 
only be attained through a personal relationship with God.48 By the tenth century, 
Abū Nasr al-Sarrāj (d. 988) and others argued that a complete appreciation of 
religious sciences (ulūm al-dīn) must include ma’rifa and related teachings to it 
developed by Sufis, and going even further al-Sarrāj pressed the real fuqahā’49 are 
the Sufis for their profound understanding of religion and God.50 Returning to basics, 
Abū Talīb al-Makkī (d. 996) and al-Ghazālī after him emphasised the knowledge and 
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practice of the five pillars of Islam as essential stepping stones for a deeper 
appreciation of inner spiritual dimensions of worship.51  
Crucially, mahabba, love of God, is equally a central aspect of Sufi literature 
pertaining to ma’rifa. Al-Makkī reminded it was a requirement of faith emphasised 
by Prophet Muhammad that “God and His Messenger should be more beloved to the 
faithful than anything else.”52 He proceeded to describe nine aspects of divine love.53 
Al-Ghazālī agreed, however, he nuanced “mahabba without ma’rifa is impossible – 
one can only love what one knows,”54 and, “if love increases in proportion to 
knowledge, he who knows God best, loves Him the most.”55 Abu Yazid asserted, 
“His love for me preceded mine for Him,”56 suggesting the reciprocal nature of the 
relationship between humanity and God established on mahabba. Accordingly, Sufi 
literature suggests love is a natural consequence and precursor to a mutual and 
intimate relationship with God.57 Al-Ghazālī continued the theme to contend that the 
highest spiritual station to reach is perfect love, the longing to see God in the 
afterlife.58 Al-Ghazālī’s younger brother Ahmad (d. 1126) also wrote a classic book 
on love of God suggesting that to truly appreciate tawḥīd one must experience an 
inner identification of love only for God.59 Sufis emphasise the purpose for the 
creation of humans is to realise love since only humans are capable of returning 
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God’s love.60 So, although love of God is seen as one the highest aims, it hinges on 
knowledge of God. 
An important outcome for belief, knowledge and love of God is qurbiyya, closeness 
to God.61 This pertains to an inner closeness to the presence of God and certainty in 
one’s consciousness. Closeness is achieved through first fulfilling all Islamic 
obligations and then undertaking extra devotions as guided by one of the most 
important ḥadīth qudsī for Sufism: 
My servant ceases not to draw nigh onto Me by works of devotion, until I love 
him and when I love him I am the eye by which he sees and the ear by which he 
hears. And when he approaches a span, I approach a cubit and when he comes 
walking I come running.62 
Spurred on by this hadith, Sufis state love of God coupled with qurbiyya will 
ultimately lead to annihilation in God’s overpowering unveiling such that, as Junayd 
al-Baghdādī (220-298) proclaimed, “Love is the annihilation of the lover in His 
attributes and the confirmation of the Beloved in His essence.”63 Junayd was not the 
first to say so, but was the first to take annihilation up to divine attributes only and 
limit identification of the divine essence – a reconciliation between the reality of 
experience and theologically safer position.  
This is where the key Sufi notion of knowing oneself leading to knowledge of God 
enters. Al-Muhāsibī stresses that, while knowing God is open to everyone, only those 
who polish the mirror of their heart will be receptive of divine light.64 Abū Sa’īd al-
Kharrāz (d. 890), in his thirteen stations of spiritual experience, mentions knowledge 
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of the self (ma’rifat al-nafs) as an essential intermediary to knowledge of God.65 Al 
Makkī goes further and calls for a deeper and more refined self-knowledge expressed 
as knowledge of the heart (‘ilm al-qulūb).66 This theme continues and al-Ghazālī 
underscores the heart (qalb) as opposed to the intellect (‘aql) as the seat of 
perception (idrāq), knowledge (‘ilm) and ma’rifa as a higher cognitive appreciation 
of God and the “immediate experiential spiritual knowledge of God.”67 Al-Ghazālī 
stresses that human nature possesses a predisposed capacity (isti’dād) for ma’rifa in 
that it shows innate qualities and an ability to relate to God.68  
These ideas are combined and further developed into a systematic mystical 
cosmology by Ibn ‘Arabī. His most recurring theme is the discussion on the names of 
God. The universe and all things within manifest the traces (athar) of God’s names 
as they are the signs (āyāt) placed by God in the world alluded to in many verses of 
the Qur’an.69 “God’s Reality infinitely transcends the world,” said Ibn ‘Arabī, “but it 
also mysteriously penetrates all things.”70 Just as Junayd before him, Ibn ‘Arabī 
defines the goal of a Sufi to “assume the character traits of God as one’s own 
(takhalluq bi akhlaq Allah).”71 In this way, a perfected human being (insān al-kāmil) 
through the guidance of revelation is capable of manifesting the entire array of God’s 
names.72 What he means is that the latent attributes in human nature have to be 
nurtured to become an outward character of the person.73 In a way, human nature is 
conducive to mirroring attributes of God.  
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Ibn ‘Arabī lived in the pivotal thirteenth century where Sufism provided spiritual 
solace to Muslim masses suffering under the devastation of the Mongol invasion 
sweeping much of the eastern half of the Muslim world. Sufi orders diffused across 
the Muslim world with the complete mystical system articulated and popularised by 
Ibn ‘Arabī:74 The key to attain ma’rifa and relate to God is to unveil – remove 
barriers to vision and understanding through God’s light enabling a person to feel the 
presence of God within oneself and in the world.75 The world, universe and 
everything within them are like mirrors that reflect the divine names; therefore, 
humans must endeavour to purify their souls so they can be elevated to experience 
the beauty and goodness of the divine reflected in the universe.76  
Could any person get to the level of knowledge and love of God? Just about all Sufi 
masters concede that only a select few could make it all the way. Attainment of 
divine knowledge and predisposing the soul to receive divine self-disclosure hinges 
on reaching spiritual states (ḥāl) and stations (maqām) through the critical 
combination of knowledge (‘ilm), leading an ascetic life (zuhd) and undertaking a 
strict regimen of invocations and remembrance (dhikr) of God’s names to cultivate 
an inner development of the heart (qalb).77 Still, there were no guarantees. As al-
Hakīm al-Tirmidhī (750-869) explained, one has to be worthy of divine knowledge 
and closeness, “ma’rifa is a bounty which God gives to His servant when He opens 
for him the door of favour and grace, beginning without the servant’s being worthy 
of that.”78 Thus, although knowledge, love and closeness to God is open to everyone, 
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the path to realising their truth and internalising them meant traversing a long and 
arduous path of self-purification and development.  
When theology and Sufism (tasawwuf) are considered together, they appear 
complementary, yet there is always tension between them. The theologians focused 
on transcendence and incomparability of God (tanzīh) to preserve the integrity of the 
oneness of God (tawḥīd), but this also rendered God unreachable to ordinary 
believers. Theologians emphasised the affirmative attributes, such a knowing, life, 
hearing and seeing, to facilitate at least a minimum knowledge of God. However, this 
was hardly sufficient to attain the level of ihsān and ma’rifa indicated by revealed 
sources. Tasawwuf, on the other hand, focused on the nearness and immediate 
experience of God within oneself and in the world.79 In this way, humans could relate 
to, know, love and get spiritually close to God. Sufis have been phenomenally 
successful in much of Islamic history as spiritual elite and ordinary Muslims found a 
far more fulfilling experience in the Sufi path than the abstractions of theology. Yet, 
the sophisticated ideas and discourse of tasawwuf, especially when reduced to the 
level of ordinary Muslims, alarmed theologians and they charged tasawwuf for 
inadvertently leading people to tashbīh, positing similarity to God. Is it possible to 
combine two wings of Islam – īmān, correct beliefs represented and explained by 
theology, and ihsān, right spiritual focus – to achieve the immediate presence of God 
expounded by tasawwuf and make it accessible to ordinary Muslims? This is 
precisely what Nursi attempted to accomplish. 
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6.4 Transcendence-Imminence Paradox and Three Ways of Relating to God 
If God exists, how does one have access and relate to an unseen, transcendent God?80 
Excluding some mentally ill who claim to speak to God,81 there is no direct channel 
of revelation or human agent who communicates with God.82 Human inability to see 
God or enter into a direct line of communication renders God distant. Yet, believers 
have a need to develop a close relationship with God and feel God’s imminent 
presence in their lives. In many faith and spiritual traditions, followers look for ways 
leading to a satisfying relationship with God.  
Nursi recognises this theological problem and builds an argument that God can be 
infinitely transcendent (distant) and absolutely imminent (close) at the same time. He 
begins by quoting a number of Qur’anic verses that give the impression God is 
absolutely close to His creation: “So, All-Glorified is He in Whose Hand is the 
dominion of all things;”83 “No living creature is there but He holds it by its forelock 
and keeps it under His complete control;”84 and “We are nearer to him than his 
jugular vein.”85 He also quotes verses that infer distance: “And to Him you are being 
brought back”86 and “The angels and the Spirit ascend to Him, in a day the measure 
of which is fifty thousand years.”87 The main interpretation Nursi provides is, while 
God is closer to humans than themselves, it is humans who are distant to God. The 
key way to address this asymmetry and enable humans to get close to God is to be 
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aware of God’s closeness through manifestations of His names and attributes in the 
universe and on human nature.88 
To illustrate his argument, Nursi uses the analogy of light and sun, as he often does.89 
There are three ways one can relate to the sun. First, if one wishes to “meet” directly 
with the sun, one must overcome many layers of restrictions and travel a long, 
hazardous distance to reach it, a feat very hard to accomplish.90 Second is the 
assumption that the sun literally comes to the level of creation without the need to 
travel. The sun incarnates in a single object or a spark of the sun is embedded within 
everything. Incarnation of the sun is impossible as no entity has the capacity to 
behold its greatness and this way leads to ignoring the real sun and assuming divinity 
in objects or incarnation.91 Third, the sun is close to humans with its unrestricted light 
and immaterial reflection. Since humans are restricted with physicality (that is, space 
and time) they are immensely distant to the sun. The only reasonable way humans 
can relate to the sun is through its reflections, manifestations and attributes such as 
light, heat and colours embedded in its light.92 
Similarly, there are three ways humans can relate to God. First, assuming God is 
transcendent and inherently distant to humans, people may try to reach God through 
a spiritual journey. Success in this approach depends on one’s ability to ascend 
spiritually and it may take many years with no guarantee of success.93 Second, if God 
was to come down to human level by incarnating in earthly form, then people would 
relate to God through the incarnate person without going through a long and arduous 
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spiritual journey. However, such belief assumes earthly objects have the capacity to 
comprise the transcendent God.94 Third, is to focus on God’s names and attributes as 
reflected in the universe and human heart.95 God is already close to humans through 
His attributes, just like the sun is close with its light, heat and reflection in spite of its 
distance. By focusing on God’s ever-present imminent closeness through His names 
and attributes, one can relate to God far more deeply and safely without having to go 
through a long, arduous spiritual journey or violating God’s unity.96  
With this analogy and its application, Nursi achieves a number of goals. His first 
objective is to resolve the apparent contrast between the verses indicating divine 
closeness and distance. In his resolution, a distinction between the way God relates to 
His creation and how humans relate to God is made. Although God is extremely 
close to humans and the rest of the creation, humans are commonly distant to God as 
they contemplate an unseen God beyond space and time. As a second objective, 
Nursi draws a critique of mystical (Sufi) paths to God as inadequate in advancing the 
majority of believers to the ultimate goal of realising truths of belief and God.97 
Although such mystical paths are legitimate and offer many benefits, they may take a 
lifetime of spiritual struggle with no guarantees, only a few complete this arduous 
spiritual journey and often there are associated spiritual and theological risks.98 
Without naming any, Nursi is also critical of faith traditions that attribute divinity to 
humans, other living or non-living beings or the entire universe. As will be covered 
further on, for Nursi, these faith traditions emerged when their followers chose to 
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relate to God by bringing Him to earthly or human level and this is why there are 
dramatic differences between faith traditions even though they broadly agree on the 
existence and unity of God. 
Nursi’s aim is to distinguish what he calls the “Qur’anic way” of relating to God. 
This is the third way in the analogy where one relates to God through focusing on 
His imminent closeness through the manifest divine names and attributes leading to 
an intimate knowledge of God (ma’rifa). Since God’s names and attributes are key to 
understanding God, Nursi notes, the Qur’an is replete with names of God where they 
are linked to natural phenomena and instances within human life.99 Nursi calls the 
divine immediacy of God aqrabiyya and draws a distinction with the mystical 
concept of qurbiyya, an expression used in Sufism referring to the human spiritual 
closeness to God.100 He asserts that aqrabiyya101 is always there, but people are either 
not aware of it or do not focus on it. All it takes is a leap of awareness (just like being 
aware of the sun by feeling heat and light on one’s skin) usually brought about 
through the agency of prophethood and revelation.102 Nursi underscores the 
Companions of Prophet Muhammad achieved this type of awareness and closeness to 
God without going through many states and stations of spiritual journeying.103 With 
this distinction, Nursi also finds an explanation distinguishing sainthood and 
prophethood. 
Sainthood (walāya) is spiritual journeying through the levels of closeness to 
God (qurbiyya); it requires traversing of many levels and to some extent time. 
While prophethood (risāla), whose light is the greatest, looks to the mystery of 
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exposition of Divine immediacy (aqrabiyya), for which an instant of time is 
sufficient.104 
Thus, Nursi positions the Qur’anic way of relating to God on a deliberate focus and 
reflection on God’s names and attributes as theologically safe, taking far less time, 
being accessible to most people and most significantly resulting in the attainment of 
a constant awareness of being in God’s presence (Turk. huzur-u dāimi).105 As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this is the most important theological and spiritual 
outcome of tawḥīd. 
If names and attributes are central to gaining knowledge about and relating to God, 
how does one detect them correctly and with sufficient level of certainty? Nursi 
develops his Qur’anic way of relating to God further by exploring this question with 
the well-known Qur’anic verse proclaiming, “God is the Light of the heavens and 
earth.”106 One possible meaning of this verse, Nursi explains, is that belief in God 
produces an enlightened worldview where God’s light reflects on the human heart 
and human life such that a believer not only begins to see things as they really are 
and attains a deeper awareness of the reality of human condition, but more 
significantly a believer attains a path to the knowledge of God.107 As a second 
explanation of the light verse when read in conjunction with the verse,108 “Whatever 
is in the heavens and the earth glorifies God, and He is the All-Glorious, the All-
Wise,”109 Nursi asserts the universe is created with multiple realms encircled around 
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one another like the petals of a rose. The names of God become the main source of 
illumination in a unique tapestry of reflection in each realm.110 So, in Nursi’s 
Qur’anic way, God’s light encapsulates knowledge about God in terms of His names 
and attributes providing a way to relate to God with the greatest level of certainty. As 
this light reflects on the mirror of human nature and the universe, it becomes 
detectable and discernible rendering God’s light a tangible reality. 
6.5 Detecting Divine Names and Attributes through Human Nature 
Nursi asserts the “human being becomes a mirror to divine names (asmā al-ilāhī) in 
three aspects.”111 First, just as darkness allows light to be known, human nature 
through its weakness, poverty, needs and limitations shows the numerous degrees of 
God’s attributes (awsāf al-ilāhī), such as power (qudra), generosity (ghinā) and 
compassion (raḥma). Second, through God-given but limited human attributes such 
as seeing, hearing, knowing and owning, humans can comprehend the respective 
infinite divine attributes. Third, the names of God manifest in the way human beings 
are physically and spiritually designed and created.112  
Characteristic of his approach, Nursi begins exploring the key mechanism in human 
nature facilitating the mirror-function by citing a verse from the Qur’an: “We offered 
the trust (amāna) to the heavens, and the earth, and the mountains, but they shrank 
from bearing it, and were afraid of it, but human has undertaken it...”113 The Qur’an 
does not elaborate on the meaning of amāna.114 Nursi explains that one of the 
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multiple meanings of the key expression amāna is that it refers to ‘anā’ (‘I’ in 
Arabic):115 the human faculty of ‘self-awareness’ enabling a person to say ‘I am’ and 
differentiate themselves from other beings.116 Anā as a “key to the hidden treasures of 
the Divine Names” and placed “in the hand of human and is attached to their ego-self 
(nafs),” not only enables humans to get to know God, but it also is a “mysterious key 
that unlocks the secrets of the universe.”117 He defines the nature of anā as: 
The All-Wise Artistic Maker (Sāni al-Hakīm) has trusted the human being the 
anā that comprises of the necessary samples and pointers to show and make 
known the reality of His divine attributes (sifāt), qualities (shu’ūnāt) and 
governance (rubūbiyya), such that anā acts as a unit of measurement to know 
the functions of governance (awsāf al-rubūbiyya) and qualities of divinity 
(shu’ūnāt al-ulūhiyya).118  
The key distinction in this passage is the idea that human attributes become units of 
measurements to know not only God’s attributes and qualities, but also how God 
governs the universe for God’s attributes are absolute and infinite and unlike any of 
His creation. In a way, human nature and its qualities are like a dark line across an 
infinite whiteness. By virtue of this dark line (limited human nature) becoming a 
point of reference, the infinite whiteness (the limitless nature of God’s attributes) 
becomes comprehensible. Anā fulfils this function;119 that is, although it is 
meaningless in itself (similar to a ‘kilogram’ would mean nothing on its own, but 
becomes meaningful if used in ‘a kilogram of oranges’),120 by associating anā with 
the infinite attributes and qualities of God, an imaginary line of similarity (tashbīh) is 
drawn over the incomparability (tanzīh) of God, giving humans a point of reference 
to get to know and relate to God. Humans, for example, can understand the infinite 
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knowledge of God by virtue of their limited knowledge. Human ownership of a 
house can make them understand that the universe also has an owner. Human artistic 
ability enables them to appreciate the artistic creativity of God.121 Thus, for Nursi, 
human nature is given certain abilities and attributes in a finite manner to appreciate 
God’s infinite names, attributes and qualities without getting into anthropomorphism. 
Similar to how a thermometer would measure temperature and its varying degrees, 
anā and human nature is an instrument (mīzān) that “makes known absolute, all-
encompassing and limitless attributes of the Necessarily Being (wājib al-wujūd).”122 
If it was not for the instrument of anā, humans would be unable to “unlock the doors 
of universe;”123 hence, recognising and appreciating God would be inconceivable and 
consequently relating to God would be impossible. In a way, Nursi makes a unique 
contribution and elaboration to the Ghazālian idea that amāna in verse 33:72 refers to 
ma’rifa.124 Importantly, Nursi warns, if the instrument of anā was not to perform this 
function properly, it starts to take ownership of what it detects and the thin imaginary 
line materialises and thickens, enveloping the entire human nature and becoming a 
source of all evil (shar), deviation from truth (dalāla) and associating partners (shirk) 
with God.125 For this reason, Nursi adds,126 the Qur’an carries a warning, “He is 
indeed prosperous who has purified it (nafs), and he is indeed lost who has corrupted 
it.”127 
This idea works for the affirmative attributes of God such as knowledge, will, power 
and life, but what about the negating attributes that humans do not have, such as 
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eternity or self-subsistence? This is where finer human emotions and feelings 
embedded deep within human nature become significant. Among all human faculties, 
“the king of all emotions,” Nursi underscores, is the desire for eternity, which is so 
insatiable it is “only satisfied with eternal life and the One who is Eternal.”128 The 
desire for eternity is engrained in human natural disposition (fitra) as a mirror to 
reflect the Eternal One of Beauty (bāqī dhū al-jamāl) so human beings can love and 
long for God. Humans often erroneously claim ownership for the reflection of God’s 
eternity in human nature (as the desire for eternity) and in the process spawn an 
intense feeling of self-love and self-preservation instead of turning to the Eternal 
God.129 Nursi interprets in this vein130 the hadith, “Verily God has created human in 
the image of Most Compassionate (sūrat al-raḥmān)”131 and concludes: 
Now, the true meaning of your life is this: acting as a mirror to the 
manifestation of Divine Uniqueness (aḥadiyya) and the manifestation of the 
Eternally Besought One (ṣamadiyya). Put differently, it is acting as a mirror to 
the Single and Eternally Besought One (dhāt al-aḥad al-ṣamad) through a 
comprehensiveness displayed by being a focal point for all Divine Names (asmā 
al-ḥusnā) manifested in the universe.132 
Nursi’s use of the expression ‘focal point’ is significant. Although a point is nothing 
in itself, by being a ‘focal’ point it gains immense value within a system of optics. In 
a similar manner, each human being, although small in stature, gains the 
immeasurable worth of being the focal point of divine purposes for the entire cosmic 
system and existence.  
How can one be sure that humans are not projecting themselves to God? Nursi is 
aware of the potential problem and attempts to address it by investigating deeper into 
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the mystery of human nature. He begins by stating, on one hand, the human 
capability to mirror all divine names and attributes enables them to understand and 
get to know God, but on the other they enable humans to excel in perfections 
(kamālat).133 Nursi emphasises that human spiritual development and the unravelling 
of all human potential hinge on the essence of human nature becoming an all-
comprehensive mirror to God’s names and attributes.134 This idea is central to Nursi’s 
theological solution to how humans relate to God – human nature and its twin 
outcomes facilitate humans to relate to God in a deep and meaningful way. Nursi 
continues to wedge important caveats, explaining the diversity of faith traditions and 
why there are differences within a given faith tradition. Having limited power and 
will, varying abilities and a diversity of desires, Nursi underscores, humans end up 
searching for the truth of God through numerous veils and obstacles that intervene in 
the search. While some people cannot overcome such barriers, others only penetrate 
through a few.135 Added to that, the level of human spiritual capacity also influences 
the way names and attributes of God are understood. Colours of the reflections of 
Divine Names vary according to the capacity of the mirror (human nature) over 
which they manifest. People, who receive such reflections, sometimes cannot be the 
means to a complete manifestation of a Divine Name.136 Even further, manifestations 
of the divine names take on different forms with respect to universality and 
particularity, shadow and actual. Some human capacities are not able to go beyond 
the particularity and some get stuck in the shadow. For some, in proportion to their 
spiritual capacity, a divine name dominates their natural disposition and spiritual 
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capacity at the expense of others.137 Consequently, not only there is an inherent 
subjectivity, there is also a natural tendency to gravitate towards a particular 
theological slant in human nature influencing the way they appreciate, understand 
and relate to divine names, attributes and ultimate reality of God. 
To expand further, Nursi develops his light and sun analogy. There are three ways 
the sun’s light could reach human perception. First is the reflections on objects such 
as flowers. When the pure light from the sun reaches a flower, it dissipates; some 
colours are absorbed while others are reflected. The reflected light reaches the human 
eye in a pattern that gives the flower its unique colour design. In the process, pure 
sunlight is altered by the limited reflecting capacity of the flower.138 Reflection 
through the moon and planets is the second indirect way sun’s light could reach 
human perception. The moon receives a tiny fraction of sun’s light radiated omni-
directionally. Although the moon is exposed to pure sunlight, only a shadow of the 
light139 is reflected towards the earth, in proportion to the moon’s capacity. While far 
greater than the flower, the moon’s capacity is also limited.140 Direct projection of the 
sun during the day over all objects is the third way the sun’s light reaches human 
perception. Since there is no intermediary, the light is intense, pure and universally 
sensed as every transparent object – glasses, windows and water bubbles – receives 
the full attributes of the sun encapsulated and transmitted through its light.141 In this 
analogy, the sun’s light represents ubiquitous reflection of God’s names and 
attributes and how God reveals Himself. It represents the three ways of knowing God 
(ma’rifat Allah). Nursi asserts that, even if ultimately people may agree on some core 
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tenets, depending on which way is followed not only leads to a differing 
understanding of truths of God, but also they determine the degree to which human 
perfections (kamālat) are attained.142  
In the first way, the natural human disposition (fitra) is like the flower in the analogy. 
Although, every person is capable of receiving God’s light and an understanding of 
God, the pure light is dissipated through the limited human capacity particular to 
each person.143 Since human nature is an opaque mirror, it invariably dissipates and 
refracts God’s light. Although beautiful nuances of understanding of God is possible, 
it becomes impossible to get the full truth of God in this way just as it is impossible 
to see the full reflection of the sun through a flower.144 Nursi does not mention 
directly, but it is not too difficult to deduce that he is referring to spiritual journeying 
through mysticism. If one was to unfold their innate potential through mystical 
experience, God’s light would beautify them like the sun exposes the inherent beauty 
of a flower. However, one’s understanding of God hinges on their inner capacity and 
level of spiritual development achieved, hence often falls short of being complete 
and pure. Their subjective reality colours the way they comprehend God’s reality. 
Accessing the sun’s light through the moon represents truths of faith as received and 
expressed by the philosopher. Although a philosopher’s access to the truth of God is 
of a higher order than that of human mystical experience, it is nevertheless only a 
shadow.145 Nursi placing the philosophical (and connected rational theology) way of 
attaining truth above mystical experience is interesting as there would be many, 
including al-Ghazālī, who would think otherwise. So, in a way, Nursi gives more 
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prominence to human reason above inner experience. However, Nursi continues, the 
philosopher may only find the truth of God by rational inference behind multiple 
layers of intellectual veils.146 Even if the philosopher is elevated all the way to the 
moon “by the stairs of reason,” he will find the moon to be a dark and desolate place 
without real light of its own.147 A philosopher may be able to prove existence and 
unity of God, but will have to concede their incapacity to prove afterlife. Hence, all 
they can do is to imitate ordinary believers in the tenet of afterlife despite their 
prowess in intellectual enquiry.148 Hence, according to Nursi, although philosophy is 
a way to access truth, the philosopher could only attain an incomplete reality.  
The third way represents the light of God received by revelation conveyed through a 
true prophet of God and is the Qur’anic way, as Nursi often refers to it. Prophethood 
and revelation (of the Qur’an), Nursi insists, open a window in every object directly 
onto God.149 In this way, ordinary believers can attain higher access to the truth of 
God as they do not rely on their limited ability, reason and spiritual experience. 
Because they understand a universal and transcendent God is the source of all truth, 
opaque objects and puzzling mirrors do not baffle them. Every object in the universe 
and the universe as a whole become mirrors to God’s names and attributes.150 It is 
certainly the case that revelation encapsulated by scriptural text is also a source for 
division and misinterpretation. Nursi should be understood within his 
epistemological framework: when a person relies on revelation (the Qur’an) as a 
primary source for knowledge of God and then confirms this knowledge with 
reflections and observations in the universe (as directed by the Qur’an) through the 
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use of reason, they overcome the subjective reality of mystical experience and the 
incomplete reality of pure reason to find the objective reality of God’s light as 
reflected in the universe. Consequently, a complete reality of God can be 
appreciated.  
There are two important implications of this long analogy and its application. First, 
Nursi recognises there could be an element of truth in every faith tradition and one 
cannot say differences between scholars, philosophers and mystics within a given 
tradition like Islam can prove one another wrong. Their differences are caused by 
changes in emphasis, the intellectual and spiritual levels attained and inherent human 
subjectivity leading people to think they solely have access to truth. This is 
significant in that it is an inclusive approach to theology while acknowledging that 
every path is the same. It also explains why there are so many differences between 
faith traditions and within a tradition.  
Second, inherent human subjectivity does not mean it should be dismissed 
completely. As explained in this section, Nursi gives to human nature in the form of 
anā an instrumental function to detect and understand God. To prevent errors, the 
human capacity to appreciate God has to be complemented with more objective 
sources. For Nursi, the main sources are the Qur’an and the Qur’anic way of reading 
the book of universe. As discussed in Chapter 3, the universe gains an 
epistemological place within theology as a third but crucially objective source. Nursi 
makes a vital link between human nature and the universe and how divine names 
manifest in both, “Just as the entire set of divine names manifest on the phenomenal 
world (‘ālam), which could be considered as the greater human (insān al-akbar), so 
too, those names manifest on the human nature, which could be considered the lesser 
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world (‘ālam al-asghar).”151 Thus, in Nursi’s epistemology and resulting theological 
hermeneutics, if a name of God revealed by the Qur’an is confirmed with empirical 
observations of the universe and attested by human nature through inner reflection, 
then it becomes certain knowledge about God.  
6.6 Divine Names, Attributes and Waḥdāniyya–Aḥadiyya Manifestations 
Before exploring how Nursi demonstrates the manifestation of God’s names across 
the universe, important related concepts explicated by Nursi need to be covered. 
Specifically, how Nursi explains names and attributes and how their manifestations 
(tajalla) occur through jalāli (majestic) and jamāli (beautiful) as well as through 
waḥdāniyya (oneness) and aḥadiyya (uniqueness) modes. 
In his works, Nursi gives an order of divine acts (af’āl), names (asmā), attributes 
(sifāt), qualities (shu’ūnāt) and essence (dhāt). This is similar to the order of divine 
unveiling (tajallī) outlined by Jīlī (d. after 1408) based on Ibn ‘Arabī.152 The key 
exception is that Nursi includes shu’ūnāt and excludes discussion about the perfect 
human (insān al-kāmil) as the only one who can appreciate the divine essence. 
Islamic mystical distinction outlined by Nursi maintains that the signs of creation 
(āyāt al-takwiniyya), as evidence for propositions of faith identified in the universe, 
not only demonstrate God in all respects but also their perfection point to the 
perfection of God’s qualities and attributes.153 He gives the example of a palace to 
demonstrate how they can be easily identified (Figure 2). The inscriptions and 
adornments of a palace show the perfection of the master builder’s acts. The 
perfection of the acts illustrate the perfection of the master’s titles and names and 
level of his skills in building. The perfection of the names and titles show the 
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perfection of the attributes qualifying the master builder’s artistic and creative 
competence. The perfection of the art and attributes show the perfection of the 
aptitude and essential capacities, which could be termed essential qualities (dhātī 
shu’ūnāt), of the master builder. Finally, the perfection of those essential qualities 
and capacities show the perfection of the master’s essential nature (dhāt).154 Nursi 
quotes the verse, “do you see any flaw”155 and applies the analogy to understanding 
God through created things: The faultless and well-ordered objects of creation 
observed in the phenomenal world point to the perfect actions (af’āl) of an Effective 
Possessor of Power (muassir dhi al-iqtidār). Those perfect acts point to the 
perfection of names (asmā) of a Glorious Actor (fā’il dhū al-jalāl). Perfection of 
names necessarily testifies to the perfect attributes (sifāt) of the Named One of 
Beauty (musamma dhū al-jamāl). Perfect attributes point to the perfection of 
essential qualities (shu’ūnāt) of the Attributed One of Perfection (mawsuf dhū al-
kamāl), and those perfect qualities demonstrate the perfect Essence (dhāt) of God.156 
 
Figure 2: From acts (af’āl) to the divine essence (dhāt) 
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One could list observations in the natural world that may appear less than perfect and 
the existence of evil and suffering as counter examples to Nursi’s reasoning. Nursi 
would say his discussion on cause and effect, outlined in the previous chapter, would 
apply here also. His main objective with this analogy and its application to the 
understanding of God is the order and relationship between af’āl, asmā, sifāt, 
shu’ūnāt and dhāt, and more importantly how one can start from observable and 
measurable objects in the phenomenal world to argue the existence of God and also 
entailment of names, attributes, divine qualities and essence of God. Nursi makes this 
clear with his premise, “just as a well-crafted work cannot be without actions, actions 
cannot be without an actor.”157 He builds all his major argument on this fundamental 
premise.  
Significantly, Nursi lists the seven affirmative attributes (sifāt al-thubūtī) – life, 
knowledge, power, will, seeing, hearing and speech158 – and excludes the distinctly 
Māturīdī theology by avoiding takwin as a distinctive attribute. Nursi uses the 
expression amr al-takwin (creative command) throughout his works and declares, 
“The letters that originate from creative command (amr al-takwin) show their effect 
on the essence of objects (wujūd al-ashyā) as physical forces.”159 He also refers to the 
Qur’anic command kun fa yakūn (be and it is)160 often and, in reference to how seeds 
are created, he asserts, “the creation of those chests (seeds) is so swift in the kāf-nūn 
factory that the Qur’an declares they are created in a single command.”161 So, with 
respect to attributes of God, Nursi follows the distinctive Ash’arī theological 
position. Interestingly, Nursi repeatedly posits events in the phenomenal world as 
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divine actions to prove God’s attributes and in this respect he is more in line with al-
Māturīdī. He also contends the way Risale-i Nur discusses theological matters 
alluding to the compassion and wisdom of God in cosmos is a reflection of the divine 
names Hakīm (All Wise) and Raḥīm (All Merciful),162 a distinctive Māturīdī 
approach. Al-Māturīdī also explains many theological matters on the premise that all 
of God’s actions are wise and His wisdom is comprehensible to human 
understanding.163 This shows Nursi does not restrict himself to one theological 
school, rather he follows the principles of general Sunni theology. 
Nursi’s emphasis and usage of the expression ‘shu’ūnāt’ in reference to God is 
interesting and unique. Classical Muslim theologians used the terms kayfiyāt 
(qualities) and malakāt (habits).164 Shu’ūnāt is the plural of sha’n, which has a 
number of meanings: ‘action’, ‘work’ and ‘quality’. Nursi uses the word to mean two 
distinctive concepts when referring to God. First, shu’ūnāt refers to divine qualities 
associated with the attributes of God that provoke the manifestations of those 
attributes. As an example, God had the creative quality (khallāqiyya) before He 
created anything. The creative quality in God’s essence is referred to as shu’ūnāt. 
When He creates something His name Khaliq (Creator) manifests on the created 
entity. In referring to this concept, Muslim theologians repeatedly use expressions 
such as “God was the Creator even before he created anything” for each attribute to 
drive home the eternal nature of God’s attributes.165 In illustrating shu’ūnāt, Nursi 
says life is one of the most comprehensive mirrors to divine qualities (shu’ūnāt al-
ilāhi) for living beings in the universe can only be created by God who is also living 
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(Hayy). The name Hayy indicates the attribute of life (ḥayāt), which shows the sacred 
qualities of a living essence (dhāt).166  
The second usage refers to sacred qualities (shu’ūnāt al-muqaddasa), such as love, 
mercy, gratitude, that humans would describe as emotions. Such qualities are 
attributed to God in the Qur’an with expressions such as, “God loves those who are 
devoted to doing good”167 and “God does not love the wrongdoers.”168 Nursi warns 
that whenever such qualities are attributed to God the word ‘sacred’ (muqaddasa) 
should be used to distinguish human emotions to divine qualities as God has no 
opposites nor is God similar to any being.169 In support, Nursi quotes170 “There is 
nothing whatever like Him. He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing.”171 At the same 
time, he also quotes, “Whatever attribute of sublimity there is in the heavens and the 
earth, it is His in the highest degree, and He is the All-Glorious, the All-Wise,”172 to 
argue that names, attributes and qualities could be attributed to God. The two verses 
balance one another – God can have names, attributes and qualities so humans can 
relate to God, but they can only be attributed to God in an analogous way so God is 
not anthropomorphised.173 With this warning in mind and in an appropriate way to 
His sacredness, Nursi maintains, the human being becomes a mirror to God’s divine 
qualities (shu’ūnāt) through refined human emotions and subtle feelings that are 
ingrained in human nature and become evident as a quality of life.174  
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A key distinction in Nursi and how he explains the emergence of opposites in the 
universe and particularly on earth rests in the way God’s names are grouped under 
jalāli (glorious) and jamāli (beautiful) names. Ancient Greek philosophers to Muslim 
philosophers and mystics have held the idea that give-and-take of opposites (light–
darkness, good–evil, heat–cold and so on) is at the heart of change and diversity in 
the world.175 What is unique to Nursi, as Turner identifies,176 is that he explains the 
existence of opposites to divine names – each group of names (jalāli and jamāli) 
requires a separate and distinctive set of manifestations leading to an interplay of 
opposites in the phenomenal world.177 Without those opposites, the universe would 
be static and constant and there would be no diversity in creation. For Nursi, all wise 
purposes, transformations and developments including the opposing faculties within 
human nature earn their origin to the manifestations of jalāli and jamāli names.178 
Within the universe and the earth, majestic large scale cosmic objects, powerful 
forces and even pounding of waves are a reflection of jalāli names, while smaller 
more refined objects, subtleties and blessings of sustenance are reflections of jamāli 
names.179  
Jalāli and jamāli groupings are a familiar distinction in Islamic theology and 
mysticism.180 Although within God’s essence such distinction would not arise, it 
helps humans understand why God would have qualities like wrath and love at the 
same time. If God was to be contemplated only through jalāli names, He would be so 
glorious and majestic that the only appropriate way to relate to Him would be fear. 
However, if God was understood only through jamāli names, He would be restricted 
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to anthropomorphic understandings.181 Nevertheless, as Turner observes, while jalāli 
names and their manifestations illustrate the transcendence and incomparability 
(tanzīh) of God, humans intimately understand and relate to God through jamāli 
names and their manifestations.182 Jamāli names impart a balanced understanding of 
God and generate a sense of awe; however, as will be discussed further in the next 
section, Nursi links jamāl and kamāl of God to not only human ability to love and 
relate to God, but also to the very purpose for the existence of the universe.  
Interestingly, Nursi links jalāl and jamāl to two other important concepts of tawḥīd  
–waḥdāniyya (oneness) and aḥadiyya (divine uniqueness) – “So, just as wahdāniyya 
is apparent in the focal point of jalāl (glory) and ḥashma (majesty), so too bounty 
and munificence proclaim aḥadiyya (uniqueness) in the focal point of jamāl (beauty) 
and raḥma (mercy).”183 The waḥdāniyya and aḥadiyya modes of manifestation of 
divine names are crucial not only to identify those names in the universe, but also, 
for Nursi, they explain why the universe appears the way it does. The wahdāniyya 
mode of manifestation occurs in a horizontal, more general manner across the 
universe resulting in general similarities, whereas the ahadiyya mode of 
manifestation occurs in a vertical, more focused manner resulting in uniqueness. 
When he is explaining the name Fard (Individual), he says this name comprises the 
names Wāḥid (One) and Aḥad (Unique).184 The fact the universe is an inseparable 
whole with all its constituting parts demonstrates a manifestation of wahdāniyya. By 
the same token, the human being is designed of inseparable and harmonious parts is a 
manifestation of ahadiyya.185 On the human species, the distinction is clearly 
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observed: The fact human faces look similar in general, with the same features of 
eyes, nose and mouth, shows the stamp of oneness (sikka al-waḥdāniyya), and the 
fact each human face is identifiably different shows a stamp of uniqueness (sikka al-
ahadiyya).186 
Nursi points out it is not possible for everyone to appreciate wahdāniyya at all times, 
as knowledge and appreciation of manifestations of God’s names and attributes 
across the earth or cosmos is required. Whereas ahadiyya manifestations always 
point to specifics and individuals; hence, they are easier to observe and fathom.187 
The sun shines its light omni-directionally and covers all things on earth. While this 
may facilitate knowing the existence and oneness of the sun, it does not allow 
intimate knowledge. This corresponds to wahdāniyya. At the same time, the sun 
shows a reflection of itself on every transparent object and, in line with the capacity 
of each object, they reflect its light, heat and colours. This corresponds to 
ahadiyya.188 For this reason, Nursi adds, the Qur’an often switches to something 
specific whenever it mentions universals and grand aspects of existence: “And 
among His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the diversity of 
your languages and colours.”189 So, wahdāniyya and ahadiyya manifestations are 
required for humans to fully appreciate God’s divine names and attributes. 
The wahdāniyya and ahadiyya distinctions are useful as they allow Nursi to develop 
a clear framework to illustrate manifestations of Gods names. While wahdāniyya 
considerations and scans of the universe allow to find ground to establish the unity 
and oneness of God, it is the ahadiyya perspective that zooms and identifies names of 
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God on living things that most people are familiar with. Hence, it is ahadiyya that 
allows relating to God more closely. Nursi shows that God’s names can be identified 
at the universal and particular, and demonstrates his main idea that the universe is a 
mirror to God’s names and attributes allowing human reason to test whether the 
names of God mentioned in the Qur’an and identified through human nature can be 
objectively established on empirical observations.  
6.7 Illustrations of God’s Names Manifesting in the Universe 
Nursi touches on God’s names and attributes throughout his works, but the clearest 
discussion occurs in the 30th Flash when he details six names of God – Quddūs 
(Holy), ‘Adl (Just), Hakīm (Wise), Fard (Individual), Hayy (Living) and Qayyūm 
(Subsistent), collectively considered to make up the Greatest Name (ism al-’aẓām) of 
God.190 In elaborating these names, Nursi particularly illustrates their waḥdaniyya 
manifestations. Two names, Quddūs and ‘Adl, are covered in this study. 
The name Quddūs comes from the Arabic root q-d-s meaning ‘pure’, ‘sacred’ and 
‘blessed’. Nursi focuses on the meaning of purity and states the purity and 
cleanliness seen in the universe and phenomenal world is a key reflection of the 
name Quddūs.191 He begins by quoting, “And the earth, We have spread it out, and 
how excellent We are in spreading it out,”192 and guided by the verse gives numerous 
instances of related observable acts. Analogously, he suggests the universe is like a 
constantly working factory and the earth is like a guesthouse with a ceaseless flow of 
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guests and activity. As commonly known, operations of factories and guesthouses 
produce waste and, unless deliberately removed, they will be rendered unusable.193 
Remarkably, the universe and particularly the earth are free of waste, clean and fresh. 
When they appear the opposite as a result of constant activity, any impurity and 
waste is swiftly removed and cleaned. These infer there is a purposeful act of 
cleansing taking place.194 Zooming onto particular instances of cleaning, annually 
millions of plants and animals die on earth, but their corpses are cleaned by purpose-
designed scavengers and insects. Without such deliberate acts of cleansing, the earth 
would quickly fill with corpses.195 In the human body, just as breathing cleans the 
body of poisonous carbon dioxide, the white blood cells remove harmful 
microorganisms.196 Just as eyelids clean and protect the eye and flies clean their 
wings so does rain wash away dirt and waste on the ground and clouds clear to leave 
a bright and clean skyline.197 Nursi concludes: 
Thus, this single act of truth, the act of cleansing, is the greatest reflection of a 
Greatest Name (ism al-’aẓām), the name Quddūs (Most Holy), observable over 
the greatest cosmic sphere to such an extent that it shows as directly as the sun 
Divine Existence (mawjudiyya al-rabbāniyya) and Divine Unity (wahdāniyya 
al-ilāhiyya) together with God’s Most Beautiful Names (asmā al-ḥusnā) to far-
sighted discerning eyes.198 
The visible act of cleansing shows the existence of God – either all the creatures 
involved in the act of cleansing, from particles and flies to the earth and stars, would 
have to know and consider the cleansing needs of the cosmos and natural world, or 
each would have to possess the divine attributes will, knowledge and power to 
enforce the act of cleansing on a global scale, or they would have to be members of a 
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cosmic council where they would discuss, agree and allocate tasks to regulate the 
cleansing function. Since these are absurd, Nursi underscores, the act of cleansing 
necessarily requires the existence of God.199 Nursi also argues for the unity of God: 
since the act of cleansing is observed at a universal scale, it can only be the act of a 
single God. Nursi continues to argue that the act of cleansing and purifying shows 
the one who undertakes the act must be a Purifier and Pure (Quddūs).200 Finally, 
Nursi links201 these observations to revealed teachings and states it is because of the 
requirement of the name Quddūs that Prophet Muhammad said, “Cleanliness is a part 
of belief”202 and the Qur’an declares, “Surely God loves those who turn to Him in 
sincere repentance and He loves those who cleanse themselves.”203 
Nursi follows the same approach to illustrate the wahdāniyya manifestation of the 
name ‘Adl. Among other meanings, the word ‘Adl in Arabic implies ‘justice’, 
‘fairness’ and ‘balancing’. Guided by the verse, “There is not a thing but the stores 
are with Us, and We do not send it down except in due, determined measure,”204 
Nursi identifies numerous acts of balancing in the universe and natural world: the 
gravitational balances within the solar system; keeping earth’s temperature relatively 
constant including balancing heat lost to space and received from the sun; balance of 
water-cycle on earth; life and death balance within ecological systems; matching 
features and instincts of animals with their roles in the natural world; balancing 
between body’s need for oxygen, breathing and the number of red blood cells; the 
balance within a living body and its functions; and ultimately establishing and 
maintaining the balance and equilibrium between all parts and functions in the 
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universe while countless changes and transformations are taking place.205 In a similar 
line of argument to the name Quddūs, Nursi concludes the universal act of balancing 
and maintaining equilibrium proves the existence and unity of God, and illustrates 
the grand manifestation of the name ‘Adl.206 He ends saying the name ‘Adl demands 
believers are similarly just and balanced as underpinned by the mention of the word 
‘balance’ (mīzan) four times207 in the verses, “And the heaven – He has made it high 
(above the earth), and He has set up the balance. So that you may not go beyond the 
balance. And observe the balance with full equity, and do not fall short in it.”208  
Nursi’s approach in the 30th Flash achieves three main objectives. First, he illustrates 
how reflections of a divine name could be identified across the universe illustrating a 
wahdāniyya manifestation. Nursi says, within the numerous worlds in the universe 
and the world of each living species, a divine name manifests in a dominant manner 
while other divine names manifest deferentially.209 Awareness and appreciation of 
God’s names in the universe and each world allow humans to get to know God. 
Second, he links names of God to human conduct and character. Humans should be 
clean because God is Quddūs. They should be fair and just because God is ‘Adl. In 
this way, human beings can attain higher levels of perfections (kamalāt) and, by 
virtue of knowing themselves better, they relate to God in a more profound way. 
Third, and quite noticeably, Nursi applies his epistemological framework, discussed 
in chapter three, to develop a methodology to every matter concerning God (Figure 
3) – start with a related verse from the Qur’an; identify empirical evidence 
establishing a purposeful act, or function, at a universal scale; use this evidence to 
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prove the existence, unity and related name of God; and finally relate this back to the 
teachings of the Qur’an. He overcomes the subjectivity of human nature, using 
evidence from the ‘book of universe,’ to confirm what humans have in their natures 
and what the Qur’an teaches about God – revelation envelops everything to guide 
human thought and bypass human subjectivity. 
 
Figure 3: Nursi’s empirical epistemology applied to God 
In the ahadiyya manifestation of divine names, an entity becomes the locus for a 
number of names. An illustration is the way Nursi explains the how the four names 
listed in the verse, “He is the First (Awwal), the Last (Akhir), the All-Outward 
(Zāhir), and the All-Inward (Bāṭin), He has full knowledge of everything”210 are 
manifested on a single tree.211 The seed from which the tree comes contains the 
program of how the tree will be constructed and function, illustrating the name 
Awwal. The fruits and seed of a tree comprise the index and summary of states, 
attributes and purpose of the tree, depicting the name Akhir. The embellishments and 
features displayed over the outer form of the tree exhibit the name Zāhir. Finally, the 
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machinery and the orderly function of the internal components of the tree point to the 
name Bāṭin.212  
Nursi provides a more graphic and lengthier illustration of ahadiyya manifestation in 
the 32nd Word, where he postulates eighteen names could be identified on a single 
flower.213 He first takes the reader from the empirical observations in the phenomenal 
world towards the Jamāl (Beauty) and Kamāl (perfection) shu’ūnāt of God by 
disclosing the meanings and acts associated with appropriate divine names in nine 
steps (see Table 1). If a statue of a flower is made, the sculptor has to first determine 
the shape of the outer form, whose proportions shows the divine names Muqaddīr 
(Determiner), Munazzim (Proportioner) and Musawwīr (Giver of Form). This is 
followed by setting general limits and dimensions of the physical form, which 
requires knowledge and wisdom illustrating the names Alīm (All-Knowing) and 
Hakīm (All-Wise). Once the general form and its dimensions are set, the flower is 
crafted to reveal its full form and endowed with features displaying the names Sāni 
(Crafter) and Muḥsīn (Bestower of Bounty). The colouring of the outer form and 
features adorns and illuminates the flower, depicting the names Muzayyīn (Adorner) 
and Munawwīr (Illuminator). The subtleties in its aesthetics and benevolence of the 
design of its features benefitting the flower’s life demonstrate the names Laṭīf 
(Subtle) and Karīm (Generous). The bestowal of beauty, aesthetics, benevolence and 
generosity entail the will to be known and loved, indicating the names Wadūd 
(Loving) and Ma’rūf (Known One). Adorning the flower with a fruit and beneficial 
outcomes directs attention from adornment to bestowal of blessing and from favour 
to mercy, exhibiting the names Mun’īm (Bestower) and Raḥīm (Merciful). Such 
actions and attributes point to the divine qualities of compassion and grace, 
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illustrating the names Raḥmān (Gracious) and Hannān (Compassionate). Qualities of 
mercy and grace emanate from the beauty (jamāl) and perfection (kamāl) of the 
Divine, illustrating the name Jamīl (Beautiful).214 
1 Determine the outer form Muqaddīr (Determiner), Munazzim 
(Proportioner), Musawwīr (Giver of Form) 
2 Set general limits and dimensions of form Alīm (All Knowing), Hakīm (All Wise) 
3 Craft outer shape and endowing its 
features 
Sāni (Crafter), Muḥsīn (Bestower of Bounty) 
4 Adorn the features and illuminating with 
life 
Muzayyīn (Adorner), Munawwīr (Illuminator) 
5 Subtleties in aesthetics and beneficial 
features 
Laṭīf (Subtle), Karīm (Generous) 
6 Will to be known and loved Wadūd (Loving), Ma’rūf (Known One) 
7 Adorn with fruits and purposeful outcomes  Mun’īm (Bestower), Raḥīm (Merciful) 
8 Qualities of mercy and grace  Raḥmān (Gracious), Hannān (Compassionate). 
9 Beauty and perfection of Divine Essence Jamīl (Beautiful) 
Table 1: Summary of how divine names can be identified on a single flower 
Nursi also advances the argument from the reverse of this analysis – arrive from 
divine beauty and perfection to the determination of the outer physical form of the 
flower215 to drive home the point that, whichever direction of analysis and reasoning 
one takes, the same divine names could be identified. If this many names could be 
identified on the physical features of a flower, Nursi adds, an interplay of more 
names could be identified when a human being is considered in all physical, spiritual 
and emotional aspects.216  
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What is the purpose of such intricate interplay of divine names and the involvement 
of humans? The answer lies in the notions of jamāl and kamāl. Nursi says the prime 
purpose for the existence of the universe is God’s jamāl and kamāl for they would 
inevitably “want to be seen by the beholder and by other adoring eyes.”217 So, God 
created this majestic palace as an exhibition hall and adorned it with His artistic 
creativity for His own sacred view and through the appreciating eyes and 
consciousness of human beings.218 Although the beauty and perfection displayed in 
the universe is only a shadow of the real jamāl and kamāl of God,219 humans have the 
capacity to get to know and love God through the manifestations of God’s beautiful 
names and attributes.220 Nursi suggests, in return for fulfilling this purpose, humans 
attain happiness and moral perfection, “as for the perfection of your life within 
happiness, it is to perceive and love the lights of the Pre-Eternal Sun depicted on the 
mirror of your life.”221 Those who recognise God through the signs placed in the 
universe, get to know God through display of divine names, and love God in 
appreciation of His beauty and perfection, inevitably relate to God through display of 
worship: 
The greatest purpose for this universe is to realise a universal and 
comprehensive human worship and servanthood (ubūdiyyah al-kulliyyah al-
insāniyyah) in response to manifestations of Divine Lordship (rubūbiyyah). And 
the ultimate purpose for human being is to reach that servanthood (ubūdiyyah) 
through knowledge, sciences (ulūm) and moral perfections (kamalāt).222  
Most significantly, this passage links God’s purpose for the universe and human life 
to not only to worship of God in a ritual sense, but also to the qualitative aspects of 
human worship displayed through human virtues and scientific knowledge of the 
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universe. This is a critical idea for Nursi as he is aware his theological approaches 
could only be fully appreciated and put into practice through a detailed knowledge of 
the phenomenal world and universe through the lens of the Qur’an. Since so much 
hinges on the universe acting as a concave mirror reflecting God’s light carrying 
reflections of divine names on the focal point of human nature, any notion that 
suggests the universe is an illusion is deeply troubling for Nursi.  
6.8 Nursi’s Critique of Waḥdat al-Wujūd – Unity of Existence 
One of the most controversial and contested concepts in mystical theology in relation 
to how humans relate to God is Ibn ‘Arabī’s waḥhdat al-wujūd (unity of existence) 
concept, often misunderstood by his supporters and criticised by his opponents. Even 
though Ibn ‘Arabī articulated the ideas at the foundation of waḥdat al-wujūd, he did 
not exactly use the expression.223 Regardless of how it is worded, understood and 
viewed by theologians, waḥdat al-wujūd has had significant influence not only in the 
way humans relate and understand God, but also how one constructs a cosmology of 
Islam. 
The meaning Ibn ‘Arabī gives to the key word wujūd is important. Wujūd is 
generally translated in Western literature as ‘existence’ and ‘being,’ but it literally 
means ‘finding’.224 Even though wujūd came to denote existence, Ibn ‘Arabī parlayed 
the implications of the literal meaning into Islamic mysticism.225 Ibn ‘Arabī applies 
wujūd to God’s essence (dhāt) as the only real Being. Wujūd for Ibn ‘Arabī means 
God is the only one who truly finds and is found.226 It should be noted that Being 
(wujūd) is not used by Ibn ‘Arabī in a purely ontological sense where something is 
                                                 
223 Turner, The Qur’an Revealed, 72. 
224 Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God, xix. 
225 Chittick, Ibn ʻArabi: Heir to the Prophets, 17. 
226 Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God, xix. 
 315 
there to be found, rather, it is also the reality of finding; that is, whenever God is said 
to be the wujūd, it entails and demands consciousness, knowing and perception.227 
Anything other than God, cosmos and each entity within cosmos, is ‘existent’ 
(mawjūd) as a shadow of true wujūd as they neither find nor are found in any real 
sense of the word except they enter into existence through a wujūd granted to them 
by God.228 In that sense, things only have a ‘borrowed wujūd’ depending on God’s 
real wujūd229 and it is returned to God whenever each entity exits the phenomenal 
world.230 Hence, when used for God, wujūd means Being, but for everything else 
other than God, wujūd means existence (mawjūd).231  
These notions give rise to two major implications. In one sense, there is only God’s 
wujūd and everything else is non-existence in the true sense of the term. God is 
totally other, incomparable and transcendent (tanzīh) to every other thing.232 In 
another sense, whenever humans find God, He is immanently present in the knower’s 
awareness.233 Anything else found, wujūd (being in consciousness and perception) 
appears and, consequently, things are experienced by humans as sufficiently real.234 
So, there is some similarity (tashbīh) between humans who are constantly finding 
God, themselves and others, and God who alone finds in an absolute sense.235 Yet, 
just as there would be no reflection without a source of light, without the real wujūd, 
things have no existence.236 So, none (lā) exists (mawjūd) but He (hū) in either case. 
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It is no surprise that most find these ideas confusing and easily reduced to statements 
such as lā mawjūda illa hū (no existent but He). Sirhindi (d. 1624), although a Sufi, 
was one of the more prominent critics of Ibn ‘Arabī. He differentiated experiences as 
physical (wujūdī) and contemplative (shuhūdī). When a person experiences 
annihilation in God, it is the ego-self (nafs) that is experiencing it rather than the 
body.237 Judging by his own mystical experiences, Sirhindi explains when mystics 
successfully abandon their nafs in an ecstatic state, they experience the unity of God 
as a bright reality. It is as though the phenomenal world is the dark sky and entities 
within it are stars; they all disappear by the appearance of the sun. Similarly, for 
those who are confronted with the radiance of unity, the phenomenal world 
disappears and they interpret God to be everything or the only Being (wujūd). 
Consequently, they declare the phenomenal world as illusion and erroneously 
interpret what they experience as experiences of God,238 falling into a deluded state 
of transcendental escapism.239 For Sirhindi, this was dangerous for the experience is 
just the first station on a long mystical journey, whereas they think it is the final 
station and those who see the world as illusion end up considering Islamic ritual 
practices (Shari’ah) as superfluous. So, it would be more correct to say waḥdat al-
shuhūd (unity of witnessing) rather than waḥdat al-wujūd.240  
Importantly, Sirhindi’s critique illustrates he was responding to the followers of 
waḥdat al-wujūd in his time rather than Ibn ‘Arabī, who respected Shari’ah and 
never said the world was an illusion or the same thing as God.241 Although strongly 
critical at times, Sirhindi conceded Ibn ‘Arabī established the foundations of ma’rifa 
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and explained tawḥīd and the origins of the cosmos and its multiplicity to such an 
extent that “Most of the Sufis who came after him chose to follow him and most used 
his terminology. Even I, miserable as I am, have profited from the blessings of this 
prominent man and learnt much from his views and insights.”242  
With this backdrop in mind, Nursi touches on this concept mainly with a critical eye. 
It is not clear to what extent Nursi has studied Ibn ‘Arabī’s works, nor does he 
venture into a lengthy discussion on how Ibn ‘Arabī described his interpretations. 
This is no surprise as this is how Nursi approaches all notions and arguments. 
Nevertheless, he gives some allusions on his understanding of waḥdat al-wujūd and 
waḥdat al-shuhūd.243 For Nursi, waḥdat al-wujūd is to only focus on the Necessary 
Existence (wājib al- wujūd) of God and see the rest of existence as a shadow so 
much so it would be said it does not deserve to be called ‘existent’ at all. Even going 
further, everything other than God is nothing but an illusion and has no real existence 
to the extent that the manifestations of God’s names are only reflections on 
imaginary mirrors.244 Ibn ‘Arabī did not deny the existence of the universe, but as 
Turner notes, those who followed his path and could not appreciate the subtleties of 
his teachings may have come to that conclusion.245 Nursi acknowledges the waḥdat 
al-wujūd school bears an important truth: If a person spiritually rises with the 
strength of imān (belief) and attains a high level of sainthood (closeness to God) by 
exudation of certainty of feeling (haqq al-yaqīn), the highest form of belief, then 
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existence other than God appears as a shadow and imaginary relative to the powerful 
experience of God’s Existence (wujūd).246  
Yet, Nursi is respectfully critical of Ibn ‘Arabī and his theology of waḥdat al-wujūd. 
Nursi contends that Ibn ‘Arabī is a guide in general, but he could not be a guide in all 
matters. He states Ibn ‘Arabī usually proceeds without restraint in his quest for truth, 
hence Ibn ‘Arabī often falls in opposition to the principles of Sunni theology (qawāid 
ahl al-sunnah) and the majority of theologians. Further, Nursi highlights that some of 
Ibn ‘Arabī’s writings are open to misunderstanding and, if taken literally, they could 
imply theological deviation, but a more fair assessment would be that Ibn ‘Arabī is 
clear of deviation.247 He does not mislead; however, he is sometimes misled as what 
he sees and experiences is real but not the entire truth.248 Hence, very few people 
understand Ibn ‘Arabī and his works, and most scholars strongly discourage the 
uninitiated from reading his works.249 
His critique of Ibn ‘Arabī demonstrates how Nursi positions his theological approach 
and differentiates it from those of theologians (mutakallimūn) and Sufi mystics (ahl 
al-tasawwuf). He asserts that theologians limit the universe to temporality (hudūth) 
and contingency (imkān) considerations before “rising above them in thought” to get 
to existence of God and His unity.250 This approach falls short in delivering a 
complete knowledge of God nor does it lead to attaining an awareness of God’s 
presence.251 He is equally critical of Sufi mystics who follow the way of waḥdat al-
wujūd declaring lā mawjūda illa hū (no existent but He) or those who follow waḥdat 
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al-shuhūd stating lā mashhūda illa hū (none witnessed but He).252 Even though they 
genuinely attempt to acquire knowledge of and attain closeness to God, Nursi adds, 
those who highlight only God’s existence (wujūd) end up impelling the universe to 
nothingness and those who only insist on witnessing God (shuhūd) consign the 
universe to oblivion.253 Although Nursi is critical of waḥdat al-wujūd and waḥdat al-
shuhūd in this instance, he makes it clear that waḥdat al-shuhūd is the safer of the 
two intermediary stations on spiritual journeying.254 Although waḥdat al-shuhūd is 
the moderate way of the Sufis, it is still placed within the greater doctrine of waḥdat 
al-wujūd.255 Ultimately though, Nursi prefers the expressions lā ma’būda illa hū (no 
object of worship but He) and lā maqsūda illa hū (no purpose but He) as these 
express best “the wide highway of the Qur’an.”256 Instead of rendering the universe 
to oblivion or nothingness, the Qur’anic approach recognises the importance of the 
universe and harnesses it as a source to inform about God.257 
Theologically, Nursi levels three major criticisms to waḥdat al-wujūd. First is the 
allusion associated with waḥdat al-wujūd that the universe and existence do not have 
real existence. Nursi states such a notion is at odds with the firm Qur’anic consensus 
established by the Companions and the following generation of scholars (tābi’īn) that 
“the reality of things have fixed, real existence” (haqāiqu ‘l-ashyā’ thābitatun).258 
God is the Creator and with His creation the universe exists in reality.259 Since God 
transcends space and time, His association with the universe is a creator–creation 
relationship. Claiming ‘everything is Him’ is wrong and the more correct statement 
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should be ‘everything is from Him’.260 Equally significantly, as also argued by 
Sirhindi,261 real existence of the universe and multiplicity of contingent beings within 
it are required for all six essentials of Islamic faith, not just belief in God’s existence 
and unity. A firm grounding of essentials other than belief in God, Nursi adds, cannot 
be constructed on imagination alone.262 Consequently, when a person intoxicated in 
the ecstatic state of waḥdat al-wujūd re-enters the world of sobriety, they should 
leave the experience behind and not act in accordance with it for what is experienced 
is not meant to be articulated or absorbed through cognition. Any attempt to the 
contrary is not sustainable with the principles of reasoning and speech, and 
knowledge proceeding from the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet.  
The second of Nursi’s theological criticisms of waḥdat al-wujūd is that the doctrine 
only gives prominence to a few names of God, such as Mawjūd (Existent), Waḥid 
(One) and Aḥad (Unique), the manifestations of all other names becomes unreal or 
dependent (Turk. itibari). In actuality, all names have equally real and direct 
manifestations and they are not shadows, secondary or dependent on another name.263 
Nursi explains this with an analogy: Imagine there are mirrors in each corner of a 
room. Each mirror shows a reflection of the room as well as the other three mirrors. 
It would be false to assume by looking at only one mirror that it is the only one 
comprising everything else. Other mirrors equally display a reflection of not only the 
room but also other mirrors.264 In a similar way, each Divine name requires a mirror 
to reflect on. The name Razzaq (Sustainer) requires beings in need of sustenance; the 
name Raḥmān (Most Compassionate) requires conscious beings in need of 
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compassion; and the name Raḥīm (Most Merciful) requires the existence of a 
tangible paradise. If the names Mawjūd, Waḥid and Aḥad are held to be fundamental 
and others are secondary and dependable to these names, then this would devalue 
many other names of God.265  
This is the most original and important of Nursi’s objections to the doctrine of 
waḥdat al-wujūd. Nursi sees waḥdat al-wujūd as fundamentally deficient in the way 
God’s names fully manifest on the entirety of the universe and hence provide a 
deficient understanding and knowledge of God. For Nursi, there is no reason why 
God’s names and their manifestations should be limited in the way waḥdat al-wujūd 
does.  
Nursi’s emphasis is more apparent in his third more subtle but significant critique of 
waḥdat al-wujūd. This time, Nursi is critical of Ibn ‘Arabī directly by saying he 
confuses the essence of things to their physical outward existence. Nursi explains this 
with a complex analogy: There is a key difference between how the sun manifests in 
a mirror and how it appears as an image on photographic paper produced by light 
reflecting from that mirror. The mirror contains the image of the sun and also 
qualifies by it with its colour and brightness. Since there is a close link between sun 
and image, the two can be confused as the same. It would be fine to say, “There is 
nothing apart from the actual sun in the mirror,” if the intent is that the mirror 
contains the direct reflection of the sun.266 The mirror represents the universe and 
nature of all things as they reflect God’s names. As Nursi contests, Ibn ‘Arabī and his 
followers erred when they rejected the fixed (thābit) reality of things by their 
exclusive focus on things as mirrors enveloping reflections of God’s names and 
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critically supposing reflections to be identical with what is reflected (God) and 
claimed, “there is no existent but God.”267 However, in the case of the photograph, 
the image of the sun would be fixed on the paper. The nature of the image on the 
photograph is completely different to the actual sun and the sun’s manifestation takes 
another form of existence. In this case, it would be wrong to say, “There is nothing in 
it other than the sun.” Although the photograph’s fixed image is produced by a 
reflection of the sun, it has a separate existence.268 The photograph represents the 
contingent beings in the universe. Although they reflect the sacred divine names, 
they have a separate existence (wujūd) to God’s Necessary Existence (wājib al-
wujūd) made constant (thābit) by the power of God.269 
So, why are people attracted to and seem to be stuck on what waḥdat al-wujūd 
offers? Nursi gives two main reasons. First is their inability to comprehend and 
appreciate the maximum degree of the creativity of divine governance (rubūbiyya) 
and that everything comes to existence directly with divine will and power. They are 
obliged to say “everything is either Him, or does not have existence, or is imaginary, 
or is His reflection.”270 Second is the attribute of love that never wants to be 
separated from the beloved and yearns for closeness to the beloved. Those who 
experience closeness to God’s presence in the spiritually intoxicated state, ignoring 
the distance and separation in sober state, declared “no existent but He” to escape the 
dreadfulness of separation.271 Nursi sums up saying the first is caused by intellectual 
underdevelopment with regard to higher appreciations of belief and the second is 
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caused by the exceptional expansion of the heart on the path of love.272 In a way, for 
Nursi, it is an imbalance between an underdeveloped mind and overdeveloped heart 
that underpins people’s attraction to the doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd. This 
conclusion honours the people of waḥdat al-wujūd while being critical; however, 
Nursi also demonstrates his main approach of balance between mind and heart as a 
feature of the Qur’anic approach. 
Apart from a critique at a theological level, Nursi’s criticism of waḥdat al-wujūd 
reflects his concern for the modern believer under the influence of numerous 
conflicting modern philosophical ideas and concoctions of beliefs. He points out that 
emphasis on waḥdat al-wujūd in the modern era has three harmful aftereffects.273 
First, it is possible for a person to attain a level of spiritual perfection through waḥdat 
al-wujūd and waḥdat al-shuhūd, only if they have transcended corporeality and 
causality. In this respect, they can reach the level of “denying the universe in the 
name of God,” a limiting but an acceptable position. However, if they are stuck in 
causality, they could end up “denying God in the name of the universe.”274 Put 
differently, for the spiritual elite, it is a legitimate way to enter a state of absolute 
saturation of God’s existence after they outstrip the sphere of causality and sever 
their attachment to contingent beings by renouncing everything other than God.275 
But, presenting these ideas as intellectual knowledge to those who are submerged in 
causality and materialism leads to unintended excrescences. Since they see nothing 
but the phenomenal world and through their love for it they are tightly attached to it, 
intellectually seeing God and the universe as one transfers God’s eternal attributes to 
the universe as well. This further leads to a reversal in the key idea of waḥdat al-
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wujūd – instead of denying the universe and contingent beings for the sake of divine 
existence, they end up denying God on account of the universe.276 
The second harm is the way waḥdat al-wujūd staunchly rejects duality of everything 
other than God, including the evil-commanding souls (nafs al-ammara). This may 
appear to be fine for those who have purified their carnal selves. But, since 
materialism and individualistic egotism are impressed upon modern humans inflating 
their evil-commanding souls, any emphasis on waḥdat al-wujūd could result in 
further impairment of their egos and direct them to covet themselves as objects of 
worship.277  
Third, waḥdat al-wujūd has the propensity to cause false imaginations about God.278 
Exceptionally, if a person speaks of waḥdat al-wujūd and in thought “leaves behind 
the universe” to turn only to God feeling God’s intense presence in a state of spiritual 
ecstasy, that person with the strength of their faith could truly experience that 
everything comes directly from God.279 However, a person who stands with the 
“universe in front” and submerged in causality and “stuck in the swamp of 
naturalism” would end up mixing ideas of waḥdat al-wujūd with their confused 
understanding of God leading to false projections and imaginings about God.280  
Clearly, Ibn ‘Arabī did not teach glorifying the evil-commanding soul, reject God or 
intend to lead people to misunderstand God. Turner contends that Nursi’s dismissal 
of waḥdat al-wujūd as a dysfunctional doctrine to attainment of true faith originates 
from his concern over the real threat of materialistic naturalism spread across the 
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Muslim world in the early twentieth century. Turner adds that Nursi did not want to 
risk contributing to the spread of atheism by showing inclination towards waḥdat al-
wujūd.281 While I tend to concur with Turner on his analysis, there are two other 
considerations. At the turn of the twentieth century, Sufism was still very dominant 
in the late Ottoman society and by extension in the early decades of the Turkish 
Republic. Sufi ideas and doctrines including waḥdat al-wujūd were widespread with 
the uneducated masses and educated elite. The educated elite was also increasingly 
influenced by materialistic naturalism. It was the merging of Sufi ideas (without 
proper guides) and materialism (without critical Islamic evaluation) that worried 
Nursi and made him emphasise the harms. 
Second, as explored in this section, Nursi was genuine in his criticism of waḥdat al-
wujūd on theological grounds. He certainly does not dismiss it as outright false and 
recognises the doctrine has a certain element of truth, but he does not see it 
representing the ultimate truth. Importantly, Nursi makes exceptions in all cases for 
those who genuinely experience what Ibn ‘Arabī taught and spoke about. He, 
however, sees the key limitation of waḥdat al-wujūd as being a reflection of spiritual 
experience rather than certain knowledge based on evidence grounded in revelation 
and reason.282 He excuses those who see waḥdat al-wujūd as the highest truth, saying 
those who enter the state of waḥdat al-wujūd find it pleasurable and ecstatic so much 
so that they resist coming out of it leading them to think it is the ultimate spiritual 
level.283 Their words appearing as deviant uttered in this state could be excused, but 
not for those who are sober.284 At the same time, he categorically states deep down 
the doctrine is fundamentally flawed. Scholars were tolerant of Ibn ‘Arabī because 
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the fundamental theological and epistemological differences are so subtle and 
elevated that they escaped scholars altogether. If they were to realise them, it would 
have been “an extremely serious fall for him (Ibn ‘Arabī), and grievous error.”285 
6.9 Conclusion 
How one should relate to God is the most significant part of theology as it defines the 
way believers experience God in their everyday lives. In this respect, theology 
(kalām) and Sufism (tasawwuf) have vied for the hearts and minds of Muslims 
throughout the history of Islam. The classical Islamic theology mainly focused on the 
attributes of God. Theologians deduced negating and affirmative attributes of God 
from the Qur’an and Sunnah. They insisted the list of agreed upon affirmative 
attributes, such as hearing, seeing, will and power, should be understood in the light 
of the negating attribute that God and His incomparability (tanzīh) is unlike any of 
His creation. In fairness to theologians, they stressed every believer is charged with 
the duty to acquire knowledge (ma’rifa) of God and their faith must be based on 
certain knowledge instead of imitation (taqlīd). Nevertheless, they did not emphasise 
the names of God nor is there detailed discussion on the way humans should 
understand and relate to God.  
Tasawwuf, on the other hand, focused on the nearness and immediate experience of 
God within oneself and witnessing the manifestations of God in the world. Only in 
this way, can humans relate to God, phantom a claim to know and love God, and get 
spiritually close to God. Sufis have been phenomenally successful in much of the 
Islamic history as spiritual elite and ordinary Muslims found a far more fulfilling 
experience on the Sufi path than the abstractions of theology. However, the 
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sophisticated ideas and discourse of tasawwuf, especially when reduced to the level 
of ordinary Muslims, alarmed theologians and they charged tasawwuf for 
inadvertently leading people to tashbīh, positing similarity to God. So, a long-lasting 
tension between kalām and tasawwuf stood before scholars of the modern era.  
Nursi’s writings on how humans are meant to relate to God reveal some of his most 
interesting and original contributions and a synthesis between agreed principles of 
theologians and spiritual insights of mystics. He does so by creating a space with his 
concomitant avoidance of pure abstractions of theology and esoteric discourses of 
Sufism.  
On the theological side, Nursi stays within the general principles of theology. He is 
similar to Ash’arī theology with his exclusion of takwin as part of the affirmative 
attributes. He is also related to Māturīdī theology with consistent alluding to the 
wisdom of God reflected in the universe. However, he is too original to be boxed into 
the major schools of theology and it is reasonable to conclude he stays within the 
general ambit of Sunni theology. In this approach, Nursi stays within the guidance of 
the Qur’an, but does not balk to interpret it. His interpretation of the trust in verse 
33:72 given to humans is unique and significant. For Nursi, the trust is anā, human 
self-awareness, which acts as an instrument to detect the names and attributes of 
God. By associating anā with the infinite attributes and qualities of God, an 
imaginary line of similarity (tashbīh) is drawn over the incomparability (tanzīh) of 
God, giving humans a point of reference to get to know and relate to God.  
With this interpretation, Nursi enters the realm of mystical insights. He immediately 
restrains himself and instead of the Sufi emphasis of qurbiyya, human spiritual 
closeness to God, he highlights aqrabiyya, divine immediacy of God. While 
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achieving qurbiyya depends on human effort and is not achievable for most, 
aqrabiyya is always there if people could take a leap of awareness usually brought 
about through the agency of prophethood and revelation. While the Qur’an acts as an 
instruction manual teaching the invaluable methodology of reading the book of 
universe, the universe becomes an objective source of knowledge to test the veracity 
of Qur’an’s theological and ethical teachings. Essentially, in Nursi’s theology and 
cosmology, the universe and the phenomenal world are designed to facilitate humans 
to relate to God. Humans and the cosmos become mirrors to reflect God’s beautiful 
names, attributes and qualities, which enable humans to appreciate the person-
essence (dhāt) of God.  
Nursi’s critique of Ibn ‘Arabī and his doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd is a case in point 
that tests the consistency of his method and to what extent he absorbs spiritual 
concepts within the scope of theology. For Nursi, the universe and all things 
reflecting God’s names and attributes are key Qur’anic notions that enable God to be 
known with a level of certainty not possible in either pure theology or mystical 
experience. This becomes the basis for his criticism of waḥdat al-wujūd as he 
contends the doctrine does not represent the full and free manifestations of God’s 
names visible across the universe and on all things. On another level, God’s names 
manifesting on the Creation is a spiritual concept or at least a concept championed by 
mystics. Nursi embraces this idea and presents it as Qur’anic and brings it under the 
scope of theology, but this is as far as he will go. With his critique and explanations 
of waḥdat al-wujūd, ultimately Nursi attempts to position all key aspects of theology 
in their respective place: God is the Creator of the universe with a clear purpose and 
the universe has real existence; the immediacy of God is reflected over the universe, 
which acts as a mirror to God’s names and attributes; primal instincts to search for 
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God and machinery to appreciate God are placed in human nature; humans relate and 
get close to God by believing in God, gaining an intimate knowledge of God, 
triggering love of God and expressing that love in acts of devotional worship; and 
revelation and prophethood guide humans in achieving these goals. 
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x 
CONCLUSION  
This study argued that Said Nursi, in response to the intellectual, spiritual, social and 
political challenges facing the Muslim world, followed a theological revival method 
and produced a fresh expression of Islamic theology based on the Qur’an. In doing 
so, not only has he made original contributions to normative Islamic theology, he has 
also brought essential theological aspects of Islam to the ordinary Muslim reader 
whom otherwise would have no access to such knowledge. For Nursi, the availability 
of such knowledge was vital for the revival of Islam as religious schooling and 
spiritual institutions collapsed in the aftermath of colonisation and Muslim minds had 
been disconcerted by the influences of the rising materialism of modernity. 
This study hinged on the definition of theology as a rational endeavour to understand 
everything about God from within a faith tradition and its scriptures in response to 
intellectual and to some extent spiritual problems posed by the conditions of a 
particular time and place. While the rational aspect of theology makes it 
understandable and acceptable to its followers, its response to the conditions of time 
and place is an attempt to make it relevant and applicable for the age. At the same 
time, its faithfulness to revealed texts keeps the integrity of theology within the faith 
tradition across centuries. These three aspects of theology combine to pose great risk 
and stimulus at the same time creating the theologian’s tension in the mind of a 
Muslim scholar troubled by religious and intellectual challenges of their times. The 
history of Islamic theology has largely been an interplay of how the theologian’s 
tension manifested in each era and how scholars of each era responded to the forces 
and challenges at play.  
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The development of Islamic theology through history follows a trajectory making it 
largely a reactive discipline. As early Muslim theologians encountered theological 
problems originating from encounters of Islam with other religions and philosophies, 
they have refrained from delving deep into them and discouraged their students and 
ordinary believers from engaging in active theological discourse (kalām). Inevitably, 
the spirit of curiosity, competitive human nature, natural resistance to blind faith, 
people’s demand for rationally satisfying answers and most significantly an instinct 
to preserve the integrity of Islam combined to instil an impulse to engage in 
theology. It was the scholars with the courage to overcome the theologian’s tension 
who gave birth to the discipline of Islamic theology. 
The first three centuries of Islamic theological history witnessed an intellectual 
struggle chiefly with Mu’tazilites, philosophers and other sects considered heretical, 
precipitating in the development of Ash’arite and Maturidite Sunni schools of 
theology – largely designated as ahl al sunna wa al-jama’a, the broad mainstream 
community following the Qur’an and Sunnah. Islamic creeds on debatable matters 
were developed and explained in major theological works. Coinciding with the 
emergence and spread of madrasa education from the eleventh century onwards, 
theology became a central part of the Islamic education system. Although this 
inclusion ensured theology’s place as a core Islamic discipline among fiqh, tafsīr and 
hadith, it also stagnated its further development.  
Theology’s place with ordinary Muslims were not as palatable. Theology with its 
rational abstractions did not appeal to Muslim masses who needed guidance in 
everyday life and spiritual solace in the aftermath of the Crusades, the Mongol 
invasion and the devastation of Black Plague. Sufism became a mass movement with 
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its emphasis to cultivate an inner transformation and motivation to relate to God 
through spiritual experiences. In this climate, a different type of theological 
approach, the mujaddidī line, emerged and was represented by popular figures like 
al-Ghazālī and Sirhindi who approached Islamic theology from an interdisciplinary 
perspective coupled with the activism to revive Islam within the Muslim masses. 
Muslim scholars from the thirteenth century onwards continued to respond to 
circumstances of their era to preserve mainstream Islamic theology and to a limited 
degree made original theological contributions. 
The modern era brought with it an unprecedented change in all facets of life and 
human thought. Global events and European colonisation ushered in the collapse of 
Muslim empires and classic Islamic civilisation. Enlightenment philosophy, 
scientific developments and Western modernity spawned new philosophical and 
theological challenges for theologians from all faith traditions, including Islam. Since 
Islamic theological history demonstrates that Muslim scholars invariably responded 
to the circumstances and challenges of their time, the dramatic circumstances 
inevitably solicited an even a stronger theological response. What was surprising was 
the lack of such responses in the modern era.  
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi is a notable exception. Nursi lived during a tumultuous 
period of time spanning the collapse of the Ottoman Empire; emergence of secular 
nation states; two world wars; and the challenges imposed by the European 
modernity on traditional Muslim societies and Islam. Secular modernist governments 
persecuted religious activism invariably posing before Muslim scholars the revivalist 
dilemma – how does one carry out the responsibility of reviving Islam while at the 
same time avoiding confrontation with nervous authorities? Under these conditions 
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and faced with dilemmas, most Muslim scholars attempted to base their revivalism 
on a complete exegesis and reinterpretation of the Qur’an and saw Islam as a holistic 
system to be implemented at all levels of society. Consequently, rather than focusing 
on theology, they concentrated on religiosity, social and political reforms inspired by 
Islam. Secular authoritarian governments responded with persecution resulting in a 
spiral of social and political turmoil (including violence) that characterised Muslim 
societies in the twentieth century. 
The revivalist dilemma was felt far more acutely by Nursi. His diagnosis of the 
ailments facing the Muslim world and hence his prognosis were different. His 
activism followed a different trajectory and applied a distinctive methodology. 
During the late Ottoman era, he identified the main problem facing Muslim societies 
to be the tension between science and religion, and the polarisation between the 
madrasa educated traditional Muslims and the modern school (Turk. mektep) 
educated secular and modernist Muslims. To address the root cause, he proposed and 
worked hard to realise an educational model that would concurrently teach science 
and religion. As the new Republic of Turkey emerged from the ashes of the Ottoman 
Empire after WWI, the challenge before Nursi dramatically amplified. Madrasas and 
Sufi lodges were closed, making it impossible to pursue a traditional Islamic 
educational and organisational model. The switch from the Arabic to Latin alphabet 
prevented the new generation of Turkish Muslims from accessing the rich literature 
of Islam. Additionally, Nursi was exiled and had to spend much of his post-1925 life 
in house arrests, trials and imprisonments with severe restrictions of mobility and 
social contact. Under such circumstances, Nursi followed a non-political and non-
violent theological revival method. With this approach, Nursi was able to achieve his 
revival objectives, survive persecution and maintain a high moral ground by 
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distancing himself and his followers from politics and violence to build a firm 
foundation for Islamic revival.  
Nursi’s choice of the theological revival method was not just a tactical 
accommodation. He diagnosed the root problem facing Muslim societies as the 
atheistic assertions of the materialistic philosophy and the doubts to faith they 
injected in the hearts and minds of Muslim masses. Classic Islamic theology was 
inadequate with its abstractions and emphasis on subject matters that were no longer 
relevant. Sufism was insufficient as it assumed a strong faith and avoided intellectual 
enquiry. Nursi’s Qur’anic way was to merge the intellectual and spiritual goals in 
one body of thought and worldview expressed and compiled in his magnum opus, the 
Risale-i Nur collection. Consequently, his writings were the most important 
instrument in Nursi’s theological revivalism. His activism comprised writing and 
disseminating theological exegesis of the Qur’an, which became popular and one of 
the most significant examples of modern Islamic revivalism. 
Since the conditions under which Nursi operated were unique and extremely 
challenging, and he reserved his writing activities solely on theology leaving behind 
a large body of theological writings, has he made original contributions to theology 
and if so to what extent? It was this question that this study investigated. 
One of Nursi’s most significant contributions is in Islamic epistemology. The 
classical Islamic discourse on theology and its epistemology originated within the 
Qur’an and Sunnah as primary sources of knowledge. For classical theologians, 
knowledge offered by the Qur’an is definitive as the authentic word of God and the 
entire content of the Qur’an is accepted as true knowledge. Since Prophet 
Muhammad was guided by God, what he said and did are also infallible and reveal 
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certain knowledge. This epistemological foundation was a major leap forward for the 
early Muslim community as they migrated from a Bedouin and tribal society – 
collectively identified as the era of jahiliyyah (ignorance) – with no previous sources 
of knowledge other than stories and practical wisdom. As the Muslim community 
studied the Qur’an and Sunnah, and advanced in civilisation, they were exposed to 
new issues, ideas and theologies as well as sources of knowledge. It became 
necessary to consider additional sources, chief among them being the isrāīliyyāt 
(Jewish and Christian sources), science and human reason (‘aql). With isrāīliyyāt 
receiving heavy criticism and science being rudimentary, reason was the main 
contender as an independent source of knowledge alongside revelation.  
Two centuries of tension between revelation and reason culminated in the Ash’arī 
and Māturīdī Sunni theological schools where a relative balance was achieved or, 
more correctly, reason was incorporated as an epistemological source only with the 
condition of subservience to revelation. While the majority of the Muslim world 
followed these two theological schools, traditionalists, who gave no place to reason, 
and Mu’tazalites, who gave primacy to reason, precipitated at either end of the 
theological spectrum. Al-Ghazālī’s spiritual insight (kashf) became the third source 
of knowledge and was even considered superior to reason within Sufism and the 
masses who followed Sufi orders from the twelfth century onwards. So, classical 
Islamic epistemology for theology in the classical era consisted of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah as revelation (naql), human reason (‘aql) and spiritual insight (kashf). 
In the modern era, dramatic increases in human knowledge of the natural world and 
the universe, and major developments in science and technology shifted the 
epistemological equilibrium to an interplay between empiricism of science and the 
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traditionalism of religion. In the Western world, the epistemological value of 
scriptures was reduced and supremacy of science was accepted. In the case of 
Islamic scholarship, the primacy of the Qur’an and Sunnah persisted, but science and 
philosophy encroached within the intellectual and theological Islamic discourse 
without proper epistemological considerations.  
Nursi attempted to address the modern imperative and influences by incorporating 
the universe and natural world within the bounds of Islamic epistemology as a 
primary source along with the Qur’an and Sunnah. Nursi resurrected the idea that the 
universe is a divine book of creation, a rich source of knowledge on existence, unity 
and the names and attributes of God. The universe holds an exegetical role to the 
Qur’an; simultaneously, the Qur’an is defined as an interpreter of the universe. The 
Qur’an directs humanity to the right perspective and reveals the codes to decipher the 
language of the universe. In this respect, the Qur’an and the universe are an 
inseparable whole as both are equal revelations from God in different forms. Human 
reason is an important instrument that discovers the correlation between the Qur’an 
and the universe. If reason can confirm Qur’anic faith propositions with empirical 
evidence from the universe, than they become certain truths. Most significantly, 
Nursi shifts the classic epistemological naql and aql considerations to naql and 
universe with aql as the essential instrument that investigates the correlation between 
the two. Nursi also stressed Prophet Muhammad as the primary human agent who 
forms a bridge between naql and the universe. He is the sign of the book of universe, 
the finest culmination of the Qur’anic vision for human beings and the teacher of the 
true purpose of the Qur’an, universe and human beings. Thus, Nursi’s epistemology 
becomes a holistic system linking the Qur’an, Prophet Muhammad, the universe and 
human reason.  
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Nursi’s major contribution to Islamic epistemology is the incorporation of the 
universe and natural world, hence science, as primary sources of theological 
knowledge. Importantly, this is not done at the expense of the Qur’an and Sunnah. In 
his epistemology, the Qur’an and Sunnah not only retain their role as primary 
sources of knowledge, but also their positions are strengthened by their reciprocal 
linking to the universe. At the same time, science is not imported to Islamic 
epistemology wholesale. Nursi makes the significant distinction that its positivistic 
perspective has to change. Effectively, Nursi repositions science and its findings as 
an empirical course within the realm of theology. 
The implications of Nursi’s epistemological contribution are far reaching. They 
provide a firm intellectual and empirical basis for faith propositions of the Qur’an. If 
the universe is God’s revelation and should be read like a book, studying the 
universe, hence science, becomes an act of worship in reflection, tafakkur done in the 
name of God. Such a position achieves a reconciliation between science and religion 
(Islam), clearing the way for Muslims to more effectively deal with the fact that 
modern science and technology have a Western connection. Further, Nursi’s 
approach opens the door for a far more concrete educational reform than those 
proposed by other prominent twentieth century Muslim reformers. A key distinction 
of Nursi is that he does not just give a new epistemological theory. He puts it to full 
use in developing his exposition of Islamic theology. 
Proving the existence of God has always been the first and foremost endeavour in 
theology. With the intent to base Islam on firm foundations, Muslim philosophers 
and theologians in the classical era made important contributions to proofs for the 
existence of God. Using their knowledge of the world and carefully adopting 
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philosophical and theological discourse available in their time, they excogitated 
elaborate cosmological, teleological and ontological arguments. Attested by the 
imkān and hudūth arguments, the kalām cosmological argument became the standard 
proof for God in Islamic theology. Variants of the design and teleological arguments 
– such as the arguments from wisdom (hikmah), providence (‘inayah) and creation 
(ikhtira’) – also featured prominently in theology and popular belief. There was also 
the case for the argument that belief in God comes naturally to innate human 
disposition and there is no proof needed as long as the innate human nature was not 
corrupted. 
Representing the transition of Islamic scholarship from classical to the modern era, 
Nursi was influenced by the classical proofs for God. Nevertheless, he understood 
the need to make original contributions, especially to reach the masses who were 
doubting God on an unprecedented scale. Nursi’s arguments for God are similar and 
different to previous scholarship in a number of ways. Although reluctantly, Nursi 
refers to the cosmological arguments of imkān and hudūth. Despite his familiarity 
with these arguments and the works of classical theologians, Nursi departs from the 
cosmological argument as he finds them too abstract for ordinary Muslims to grasp. 
This concern pushes Nursi to establish a link between the cosmological and design 
arguments reminiscent of al-Rāzī. The main links he finds are the actions that can be 
identified not only at all levels of existence on earth, but also throughout the cosmos. 
These actions collectively characterise God’s pervasive rubūbiyyah, and form the 
basis of the overarching governance argument. For Nursi, this argument is the most 
significant of all proofs as he calls it the ayah al-kubra, the greatest sign or proof. 
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Without naming them as such, Nursi uses the three main teleological arguments 
within classical Islamic theology – the arguments from hikmah, ‘inayah and ikhtira’. 
Such arguments feature prominently in Nursi’s works as they are more relatable for 
ordinary people and allow the use of Qur’anic verses to support arguments. Nursi 
often uses the arguments from wisdom similar to al-Māturīdī and creation similar to 
Ibn Rushd, especially when putting forward life as evidence. Yet, Nursi displays 
some originality. In addition to Ibn Rushd’s argument from ‘inayah, Nursi uses the 
word ta’awun (mutual assistance) and calls this the second major truth after 
cosmological considerations.  
A key feature in Nursi’s rhetoric is that he follows in the footsteps of al-Ash’arī and 
al-Ghazālī in deploying analogies comparing the earth and cosmos to objects familiar 
to humans, such as a palace, city or book. Nursi is more concerned with the 
readability and persuasive effect of his arguments rather than following strictly 
foolproof logical constructions. Nursi’s arguments, however, hold rational and 
logical ground, notwithstanding the need to peel them from his rhetoric and express 
them in well-crafted forms. 
Rather than being apologetic, Nursi is confident in his approach to the proofs of God. 
At times, he reverses the burden of proof to those who argue the non-existence of 
God. This approach produces one of the most original proofs for God’s existence, the 
default proof. Instead of focusing on the proof of God directly, this proof focuses on 
the impossibility of all other explanations for existence and the universe. After 
proving the impossibility of alternative explanations, Nursi makes the conclusion that 
God’s existence is not only a necessity (wājib al-wujūd), but also His non-existence 
is impossible; thus, God creating the universe becomes the only possible explanation. 
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A key distinction in Nursi’s approach in relation to the existence of God is the way 
he entreats the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad as evidence whenever he uses the 
universe as a focal point. With this emphasis, he ensures the primary position of the 
revealed sources in his epistemology. While he repeatedly invokes observations from 
the universe, he is careful not to tip the balance towards the universe and science. He 
highlights the interdependent relationship between the universe and revelation in 
affirming the reality of God. 
In his intense discourse and merging of arguments, Nursi aims to take his readers 
from an imitative faith (taqlīd al-imān) to a deeper and more investigative faith 
(tahqīq al-imān). This can be particularly observed in Nursi’s extensive deliberations 
on tawḥīd, the central tenet of Islamic faith. In his theological-oriented Islamic 
revival, a deeper and more profound understanding of tawḥīd plays a crucial role. In 
that respect, Nursi underscores his central aim of reconstructing the metaphysical 
fortress of Islam and collective consciousness of Muslims, in his view, heavily 
battered from a thousand years of intellectual and spiritual onslaught. A key evidence 
of his approach is seen in the way Nursi defines tawḥīd as ordinary tawḥīd and true 
tawḥīd. In his definition of true tawḥīd, Nursi combines a direct witnessing of the 
imprints of God’s power and governance on every object, and hence gains a 
perpetual awareness of God. He considers true tawḥīd as a worship of faith (‘ibāda 
al-īmāniyya) and links it to happiness in this world and the next. 
In proving the unity of God, Nursi generally follows the two main arguments of the 
classical Muslim theologians – proof of divine administration, dalil al-tadbīr, and 
proof of mutual hindrance, dalil al-tamanu’. Nursi only briefly touches on the 
tamanu’ argument in his characteristic aversion of purely logical and philosophical 
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arguments. Nursi greatly expands on the tadbīr argument. A distinctive pattern in 
Nursi’s proofs for the unity of God is that he covers all angles: from the universals to 
particulars of existence; from God’s nature to living beings in the world; and 
vertically and horizontally covering the entire universe. His arguments for ease of 
creation and interdependence of beings from the smallest to the largest planes of 
existence are original and compelling to illustrate that the universe is a whole, and 
the cause of the universe and its operation must be attributed to a single source.  
Any examination on tawḥīd inevitably open a discussion on causality and theology. 
Analysis of Nursi’s works demonstrates that he followed the normative Islamic 
theological line on their view of causality, in that causality is a deception of senses. 
Similar to al-Ghazālī, a consistent theme in Nursi’s works is that belief in the 
effectiveness of causality leads to a subtle form of shirk. Although he repeats some 
of al-Ghazālī’s arguments, his explanations are unique and easy to grasp. An original 
contribution of Nursi in showing the ineffectiveness of causality is his main 
argument that an effect has far greater value than the sum of all causes required to 
create it. Hence, resultant creative outcomes cannot be just attributed to causes. The 
value gap between the causes and the effects account for God’s will and power at 
work behind a thin veil of existence. Importantly, Nursi does not completely deny or 
ignore the role of causes. Causality is important to veil God’s dignity and majesty; 
therefore, it has a place as long as no creative power is attributed to causes as 
required by God’s unity and glory. Causes are also required for humans to 
understand the laws of nature as a reflection of God’s order of the universe, and 
harness them for their benefit. He qualifies adhering to causes as an active prayer that 
is more likely to be accepted than a traditional verbal prayer. 
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For Nursi, reconciling God’s universal governance (rubūbiyyah) with the reality of 
the observed world is the most important theological aim in relation to understanding 
tawḥīd. He exerts considerable effort in finding this reconciliation through creative 
use of analogies. Nursi makes significant original theological contributions in his 
explanations of how one God can easily create and govern the entire universe. Nursi 
is able to maintain the requirements of tawḥīd where God is absolute and the 
disposer of all affairs and at the same time satisfy a critical mind of any perceived 
difficulty of one God disposing all affairs. No other Muslim scholar saw this as a 
theological problem and then tackled it to make original contributions to Islamic 
theology and understanding of tawḥīd. 
A key test of Nursi’s unique method and epistemology is the theology of how one 
should relate to God, the most significant part of theology defining the way believers 
experience God in their everyday lives. In this respect, theology (kalām) and Sufism 
(tasawwuf) vied for the hearts and minds of Muslims throughout the history of Islam. 
The classical Islamic theology mainly focused on deducing the affirmative and 
negating attributes of God from the Qur’an and Sunnah. They insisted that the list of 
agreed upon affirmative attributes, such as hearing, seeing, will and power, should be 
understood in the light of negating attribute that God and His incomparability 
(tanzīh). While theologians stressed every believer is charged with the duty to 
acquire knowledge (ma’rifa) of God and their faith must be based on certain 
knowledge instead of mere imitation (taqlīd), they did not emphasise the names of 
God nor is there detailed discussion on the way humans should understand and relate 
to God. Tasawwuf, on the other hand, focused on the nearness and immediate 
experience of God within oneself and witnessing the manifestations of God in the 
world. Only in this way could humans relate to, phantom to know and love, and 
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spiritually get close to God. Sufis have been phenomenally successful in much of the 
Islamic history as both spiritual elite and ordinary Muslims found a far more 
fulfilling experience on the Sufi path than the abstractions of theology. However, the 
sophisticated ideas and discourse of tasawwuf, especially when reduced to the level 
of ordinary Muslims, alarmed theologians and they charged tasawwuf for 
inadvertently leading people to tashbīh, positing similarity to God. So, a long-lasting 
tension between kalām and tasawwuf stood before scholars of the modern era.  
Nursi’s writings on how humans are meant to relate to God reveal some of his most 
interesting and original contributions, and a synthesis between agreed principles of 
theologians and spiritual insights of mystics. He does so by creating a space with his 
concomitant avoidance of pure abstractions of theology and certain esoteric 
discourses of Sufism. On the theological side, Nursi stays within the general 
principles of Sunni theology of acknowledging God’s negating and affirmative 
attributes. His explanations, though, go beyond the rational considerations and once 
again anchor in observations from the natural world and universe. Nursi always stays 
within the Qur’anic boundaries, while at the same time finding original grounds for 
theological exegesis. His interpretation of the ‘trust’ given to humans in verse 33:72 
is unique and significant. For Nursi, the trust is anā, human self-awareness, which 
acts as an instrument to detect names and attributes of God. By associating anā with 
the infinite attributes and qualities of God, an imaginary line of similarity (tashbīh) is 
drawn over the incomparability (tanzīh) of God, thus giving humans a point of 
reference to get to know and relate to God.  
With this interpretation, Nursi enters the realm of mystical insight. He immediately 
restrains himself and instead of the Sufi emphasis of qurbiyya, human spiritual 
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closeness to God, he highlights aqrabiyya, divine immediacy of God. While 
achieving qurbiyya depends on human effort and is not achievable for most, 
aqrabiyya is always there if people take a leap of awareness, usually through the 
agency of prophethood and revelation. The immediacy of God is discernible by 
detecting God’s Light guided by the objective reality of revelation (the Qur’an) and it 
becomes possible to decipher God’s names and attributes by identifying empirical 
patterns of actions in the natural world and across the universe. When one gets to 
know God, they can then cultivate an intimate love and closeness with God. While 
the Qur’an acts as an instruction manual teaching the invaluable methodology of 
reading the book of universe, the universe becomes an objective source of knowledge 
to test the veracity of the Qur’an’s theological and ethical teachings. Essentially, in 
Nursi’s theology and cosmology, the universe and phenomenal world are designed 
and created to facilitate humans to relate to God. Humans and the cosmos become 
mirrors to reflect God’s beautiful names, attributes and qualities, which enable 
humans to appreciate the person-essence (dhāt) of God.  
Thus, Nursi’s exposition of Islamic theology is a synthesis between creedal theology 
and mystical cosmology. He uses key insights and outcomes from kalām theology 
and tasawwuf mysticism, but puts both to the critical test of the Qur’anic approach. 
In doing so, he absorbs key spiritual concepts within the scope of theology. His 
critiques of Ibn ‘Arabī and the notion of waḥdat al-wujūd illustrate Nursi’s unique 
theological blend. For Nursi, the universe and all things reflecting God’s names and 
attributes are key Qur’anic notions that enable God to be known with a level of 
certainty not possible through either pure theology or mystical experience. This 
becomes the basis for his criticism of waḥdat al-wujūd as he contends the doctrine 
does not represent the full and free manifestations of all God’s names visible across 
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the universe and on all things. On another level, God’s names manifesting on the 
Creation is a spiritual concept or at least a concept championed by Muslim mystics. 
Nursi embraces this idea, presents it as Qur’anic and brings it under the scope of 
theology, but this is as far as he will go. He is not prepared for wholesale adoption of 
spiritual concepts and will put them to the test of fundamental Qur’anic principles 
agreed by scholarly consensus. With his critique and explanations of waḥdat al-
wujūd, ultimately Nursi attempts to position all key aspects of theology in their 
respective places: God is the Creator of the universe with a clear purpose and the 
universe has real existence; the immediacy of God is reflected over the universe, 
which acts as a mirror to God’s names and attributes; primal instincts to search for 
God and machinery to appreciate God are placed in human nature; humans relate and 
get close to God by believing in God, gaining an intimate knowledge of God, 
triggering love of God and expressing that love in acts of devotional worship; and 
revelation and prophethood guide humans in achieving these goals. 
It is difficult to place Nursi’s theology within the Ash’arite or Maturidite 
frameworks. With respect to the proofs of God’s unity, Nursi approaches more to the 
Maturidite theological line, considering that Ash’arite theology mainly focuses on 
the tamanu’ argument, while Maturidite theology focuses on a wide array of 
arguments but mainly the tadbīr argument. Another indicator of Nursi slanting 
towards the Maturidite end of the theological spectrum is his avoidance of the 
trademark Ash’arite theology of occasionalism. Nursi does not see the need to get 
involved in the layers of intelligences of Ibn Sina or the occasionalism of Ash’arī 
theology to deal with a universe that is entirely governed by God without the need 
for causes. He is also related to Māturīdī theology with his consistent allusion to the 
wisdom of God as reflected in the universe, so much so that Nursi labels his works 
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characterising a reflection of the divine name Hakīm (Wise). At the same time, he 
displays a distinct Ash’arī character with his lack on inclusion of the attribute of 
takwin as part of the affirmative attributes of God. In fact, he is too original to be 
boxed into one of the two major schools of theology, although he remains strictly 
within the general ambit of Sunni theology. 
All in all, Nursi makes three significant contributions to Islamic theology. First, he 
brought the rich tradition of Islam to contemporary audience whose access to Islamic 
learning had been severed by the effects of colonisation or closure of traditional 
madrasa education under authoritarian governments. In this respect, Nursi did not 
have to be original. Transmitting the scholarly tradition of Islam to current and future 
generations under challenging circumstances was a major contribution in itself. 
Second, Nursi does not simply echo the past tradition. He reframed it by highlighting 
and detailing the parts he considered most needed by contemporary Muslims. His 
main concern was to persuade and remove doubts from the minds of confused 
Muslims exposed to myriad philosophies, thought systems and faith traditions. He 
did so by using the power of persuasion, rhetorical devices and creative analogies to 
bring complex theological concepts nearer to the understanding of most people. In 
this sense, Nursi’s writing gave fresh expressions to classic Islamic ideas. Finally, his 
epistemological considerations and justification of the universe as a source of 
knowledge is not unique, but he is the only contemporary scholar to forcefully stress 
it and build a completely fresh Islamic theology and cosmology on this 
epistemological foundation. This allowed him to find new proofs for the existence 
and unity of God and develop original explanations in the important question of how 
to relate to God in modern times for people with a critical mind.  
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Future development in Nursian studies could focus on these three contributions on 
other aspects of Islamic theology Nursi expands on and makes orginnal 
contributions. These would include, proofs of afterlife, divine determination and free 
will, human spitrituality, Qur’anic exegesis and interpretation of hadith.  
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Istanbul: Sözler Publications, 2000. 
Van Ess, Josef. The Flowering of Muslim Theology. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2006. 
Walbridge, John. God and Logic in Islam: The Caliphate of Reason. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Watt, W. Montgomery, and Richard Bell. Introduction to the Qur’an. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1970. 
Watt, W. Montgomery. Islamic Philosophy and Theology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1985. 
 360 
Watt, W. Montgomery. The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazālī. London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1953. 
Winter, Tim J., ed. The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
Wolfson, Harry Austryn. The Philosophy of the Kalam. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1976. 
Yaran, Cafer S. Islamic Thought on the Existence of God: With Contributions from 
Contemporary Western Philosophy of Religion. Washington: Council for 
Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003. 
Yavuz, Hakan M. Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003. 
Yousef, Mohamed Haj. Ibn ʻArabī: Time and Cosmology. London: Routledge, 2008. 
 
